A leaky evidence accumulation process for perceptual experience

Subcortical correlates of consciousness with human single neuron recordings

Subcortical brain structures such as the subthalamic nucleus or the thalamus are involved in regulating motor and cognitive behavior. However, their contribution to perceptual consciousness remains unclear, due to the inherent difficulties of recording subcortical neuronal activity in humans. Here, we asked neurological patients undergoing surgery for deep brain stimulation to detect weak vibrotactile stimuli applied on their hand while recording single neuron activity from the tip of a microelectrode. We isolated putative single neurons in the subthalamic nucleus and thalamus. A significant proportion of neurons modulated their activity while participants were expecting a stimulus. We found that the firing rate of 23% of these neurons differed between detected and undetected stimuli. Our results provide direct neurophysiological evidence of the involvement of the subthalamic nucleus and the thalamus for the detection of vibrotactile stimuli, thereby calling for a less cortico-centric view of the neural correlates of consciousness.

Measuring motor awareness and metacognition at the start, middle, and end of a reaching movement

The ability to monitor our arm position during goal-directed behaviour allows us to bring our limb to a target as accurately as possible. Despite our success in executing accurate movements, some work suggests that individuals have limited access to information about their limb position. However, other evidence from metacognition research indicates that people have some access to details about their movements. In these studies, individuals are asked to rate their confidence after making judgements about their movements and tend to give higher confidence ratings when they are correct, showing some capacity for self-monitoring. These conflicting results suggest that we may not be able to monitor an entire movement from start to end. In the current study, participants (n = 50) made reaching movements toward targets on a screen. They were then visually presented with two movement paths: one being their actual trajectory and the other being a visually deviated version. Here, we manipulated the location that the deviation was implemented (i.e., start, middle, or end of the path). Participants were then asked to determine which trajectory was their own, while also rating their confidence in their response. Overall, accuracy was lower than expected. Nevertheless, accuracy was significantly lower when deviations occurred at the start of the reach, indicating that awareness of limb position is further reduced at the start of a movement. Additionally, participants were able to metacognitively monitor their movements because their confidence scaled with their accuracy in the task. Finally, differences in metacognitive processes between locations were found, with higher average confidence in the middle of a movement when accuracy was held constant. We conclude that people have a remarkable blindness to the properties of their own movements. As well, monitoring of a limb is significantly reduced at the start of a movement suggesting reduced attention to limb position at this time, possibly due to movement programming demands.

Temporal error monitoring: Monitoring of internal clock or just motor noise?

Understanding how humans monitor and evaluate temporal errors is crucial for uncovering the mechanisms of metacognitive processes, linking the fields of time perception and metacognition. In a typical paradigm, participants self-generate a time interval and subsequently can accurately evaluate its error. The implicit assumption in the field has been that participants monitor temporal representations. Even though temporal error monitoring has been replicated numerous times, it remains unclear what kind of information participants monitor when assessing the just-generated interval. Here, we assessed two scenarios in which participants could monitor sources of variability in temporal error monitoring: the internal representation of duration (Clock Hypothesis) or just motor signal (Motor Hypothesis). We assessed temporal error monitoring by inducing different levels of motor signal in motor timing, with the expectation that these levels of motor execution would influence temporal error monitoring outcomes. The motor signal was manipulated by instructing participants to either use button presses or joystick movements to produce time intervals, allowing us to evaluate and report how different levels of motor execution signal affect temporal error monitoring. According to the Clock Hypothesis, the additional motor signal should impair the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. Conversely, the Motor Hypothesis posits that additional induced signal should enhance the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. In line with the Clock Hypothesis, error monitoring performance was enhanced in a condition with a lower motor signal. These results show that humans evaluate their errors based on an informationally rich representation of internal duration, supporting metacognitive abilities in temporal error monitoring. Public significance: Temporal error monitoring emerged from the fields of interval timing, decision-making, and metacognition, positing that humans evaluate the sign and magnitude of their temporal errors. Here, we critically test whether participants assess their timing representations as such and whether they are aware of the correctness of these evaluations.

Towards formal models of inhibitory mechanisms involved in motor imagery: a commentary on Bach et al. (2022)

A vast body of research suggests that the primary motor cortex is involved in motor imagery. This raises the issue of inhibition: how is it possible for motor imagery not to lead to motor execution? Bach et al. (Psychol Res Psychol Forschung. 10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w, 2022, this issue) suggest that the motor execution threshold may be "upregulated" during motor imagery to prevent execution. Alternatively, it has been proposed that, in parallel to excitatory mechanisms, inhibitory mechanisms may be actively suppressing motor output during motor imagery. These theories are verbal in nature, with well-known limitations. Here, we describe a toy-model of the inhibitory mechanisms thought to be at play during motor imagery to start disentangling predictions from competing hypotheses.

Memorability shapes perceived time (and vice versa)

Visual stimuli are known to vary in their perceived duration. Some visual stimuli are also known to linger for longer in memory. Yet, whether these two features of visual processing are linked is unknown. Despite early assumptions that time is an extracted or higher-order feature of perception, more recent work over the past two decades has demonstrated that timing may be instantiated within sensory modality circuits. A primary location for many of these studies is the visual system, where duration-sensitive responses have been demonstrated. Furthermore, visual stimulus features have been observed to shift perceived duration. These findings suggest that visual circuits mediate or construct perceived time. Here we present evidence across a series of experiments that perceived time is affected by the image properties of scene size, clutter and memorability. More specifically, we observe that scene size and memorability dilate time, whereas clutter contracts it. Furthermore, the durations of more memorable images are also perceived more precisely. Conversely, the longer the perceived duration of an image, the more memorable it is. To explain these findings, we applied a recurrent convolutional neural network model of the ventral visual system, in which images are progressively processed over time. We find that more memorable images are processed faster, and that this increase in processing speed predicts both the lengthening and the increased precision of perceived durations. These findings provide evidence for a link between image features, time perception and memory that can be further explored with models of visual processing.

Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain

The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.

How to get rich from inflation

We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as "subjective inflation" allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What's more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally argue for an interpretation on which subjective experience is genuinely rich, but (in peripheral/unattended areas) unreliable as a guide to the external world. The main challenge for this view is that it appears to imply that experience in the periphery is not just unreliable but unstable. However, I argue that this consequence, while initially appearing unintuitive, is in fact plausible.

Catecholaminergic neuromodulation and selective attention jointly shape perceptual decision-making

Perceptual decisions about sensory input are influenced by fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, most prominently driven by attention and neuromodulator systems. It is currently unknown if neuromodulator activity and attention differentially modulate perceptual decision-making and/or whether neuromodulatory systems in fact control attentional processes. To investigate the effects of two distinct neuromodulatory systems and spatial attention on perceptual decisions, we pharmacologically elevated cholinergic (through donepezil) and catecholaminergic (through atomoxetine) levels in humans performing a visuo-spatial attention task, while we measured electroencephalography (EEG). Both attention and catecholaminergic enhancement improved decision-making at the behavioral and algorithmic level, as reflected in increased perceptual sensitivity and the modulation of the drift rate parameter derived from drift diffusion modeling. Univariate analyses of EEG data time-locked to the attentional cue, the target stimulus, and the motor response further revealed that attention and catecholaminergic enhancement both modulated pre-stimulus cortical excitability, cue- and stimulus-evoked sensory activity, as well as parietal evidence accumulation signals. Interestingly, we observed both similar, unique, and interactive effects of attention and catecholaminergic neuromodulation on these behavioral, algorithmic, and neural markers of the decision-making process. Thereby, this study reveals an intricate relationship between attentional and catecholaminergic systems and advances our understanding about how these systems jointly shape various stages of perceptual decision-making.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Prior information differentially affects discrimination decisions and subjective confidence reports

According to Bayesian models, both decisions and confidence are based on the same precision-weighted integration of prior expectations ("priors") and incoming information ("likelihoods"). This assumes that priors are integrated optimally and equally in decisions and confidence, which has not been tested. In three experiments, we quantify how priors inform decisions and confidence. With a dual-decision task we create pairs of conditions that are matched in posterior information, but differ on whether the prior or likelihood is more informative. We find that priors are underweighted in discrimination decisions, but are less underweighted in confidence about those decisions, and this is not due to differences in processing time. The same patterns remain with exogenous probabilistic cues as priors. With a Bayesian model we quantify the weighting parameters for the prior at both levels, and find converging evidence that priors are more optimally used in explicit confidence, even when underused in decisions.

Challenging the fixed-criterion model of perceptual decision-making

Perceptual decision-making is often conceptualized as the process of comparing an internal decision variable to a categorical boundary or criterion. How the mind sets such a criterion has been studied from at least two perspectives. One idea is that the criterion is a fixed quantity. In work on subjective phenomenology, the notion of a fixed criterion has been proposed to explain a phenomenon called "subjective inflation"-a form of metacognitive mismatch in which observers overestimate the quality of their sensory representation in the periphery or at unattended locations. A contrasting view emerging from studies of perceptual decision-making is that the criterion adjusts to the level sensory uncertainty and is thus sensitive to variations in attention. Here, we mathematically demonstrate that previous empirical findings supporting subjective inflation are consistent with either a fixed or a flexible decision criterion. We further lay out specific task properties that are necessary to make inferences about the flexibility of the criterion: (i) a clear mapping from decision variable space to stimulus feature space and (ii) an incentive for observers to adjust their decision criterion as uncertainty changes. Recent work satisfying these requirements has demonstrated that decision criteria flexibly adjust according to uncertainty. We conclude that the fixed-criterion model of subjective inflation is poorly tenable.