Outbreak response strategies with type 2-containing oral poliovirus vaccines

Polio Surge Capacity Support Program Contributions to Building Country Capacities in Support of Polio Outbreak Preparedness and Response: Lessons Learned and Remaining Challenges

Despite coordinated efforts at global level, through the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), poliomyelitis disease (Polio) is still a major public health issue. The wild poliovirus type-1 (WPV1) is still endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and new circulations of the WPV1 were confirmed in southeast Africa in 2021, in Malawi and Mozambique. The circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPV) are also causing outbreaks worldwide. The Task Force for Global Health (TFGH)'s Polio Surge Capacity Support Program, established in 2019, is an effort to reinforce the existing partnership with the GPEI to strengthen countries' capacities for polio outbreak preparedness and response. In four years, its coordinated efforts with GPEI partners have resulted in a remarkable improvement in the early detection of poliovirus circulation and reducing the missed children gaps in many countries. However, these encouraging results cannot hide an increasingly complex programmatic environment with numerous funding and operational challenges.

Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses.

Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences

Due to the very low, but nonzero, paralysis risks associated with the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), eradicating poliomyelitis requires ending all OPV use globally. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated cessation of Sabin type 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) in 2016, except for emergency outbreak response. However, as of early 2023, plans for cessation of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) remain undefined, and OPV2 use for outbreak response continues due to ongoing transmission of type 2 polioviruses and reported type 2 cases. Recent development and use of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) leads to additional potential vaccine options and increasing complexity in strategies for the polio endgame. Prior applications of integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling consistent with GPEI strategic plans that preceded OPV2 cessation explored OPV cessation dynamics and the evaluation of options to support globally coordinated risk management efforts. The 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan highlighted the need for early bOPV cessation planning. We review the published modeling and explore bOPV cessation immunization options as of 2022, assuming that the GPEI partners will not support restart of the use of any OPV type in routine immunization after a globally coordinated cessation of such use. We model the potential consequences of globally coordinating bOPV cessation in 2027, as anticipated in the 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan. We do not find any options for bOPV cessation likely to succeed without a strategy of bOPV intensification to increase population immunity prior to cessation.

Outbreak management strategies for cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types

Prior modeling studies showed that current outbreak management strategies are unlikely to stop outbreaks caused by type 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1) or circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in many areas, and suggested increased risks of outbreaks with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. The surge of type 2 poliovirus transmission that began in 2019 and continues to date, in conjunction with decreases in preventive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) for poliovirus types 1 and 3, has led to the emergence of several countries with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. Response to these emerging cocirculation events is theoretically straightforward, but the different formulations, types, and inventories of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) available for outbreak response present challenging practical questions. In order to demonstrate the implications of using different vaccine options and outbreak campaign strategies, we applied a transmission model to a hypothetical population with conditions similar to populations currently experiencing outbreaks of cVDPVs of both types 1 and 2. Our results suggest prevention of the largest number of paralytic cases occurs when using (1) trivalent OPV (tOPV) (or coadministering OPV formulations for all three types) until one poliovirus outbreak type dies out, followed by (2) using a type-specific OPV until the remaining poliovirus outbreak type also dies out. Using tOPV first offers a lower overall expected cost, but this option may be limited by the willingness to expose populations to type 2 Sabin OPV strains. For strategies that use type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2) concurrently administered with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) emerges as a leading option, but questions remain about feasibility, logistics, type-specific take rates, and coadministration costs.

Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation

Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity.  With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers.  Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods:  We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart.  We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results:  While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation.  The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart.  Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023.  We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.

Oral polio vaccine stockpile modeling: insights from recent experience

BACKGROUND

Achieving polio eradication requires ensuring the delivery of sufficient supplies of the right vaccines to the right places at the right times. Despite large global markets, decades of use, and large quantity purchases of polio vaccines by national immunization programs and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), forecasting demand for the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) stockpile remains challenging.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We review OPV stockpile experience compared to pre-2016 expectations, actual demand, and changes in GPEI policies related to the procurement and use of type 2 OPV vaccines. We use available population and immunization schedule data to explore polio vaccine market segmentation, and its role in polio vaccine demand forecasting.

RESULTS

We find that substantial challenges remain in forecasting polio vaccine needs, mainly due to (1) deviations in implementation of plans that formed the basis for earlier forecasts, (2) lack of alignment of tactics/objectives among GPEI partners and other key stakeholders, (3) financing, and (4) uncertainty about development and licensure timelines for new polio vaccines and their field performance characteristics.

CONCLUSIONS

Mismatches between supply and demand over time have led to negative consequences associated with both oversupply and undersupply, as well as excess costs and potentially preventable cases.

Looking back at prospective modeling of outbreak response strategies for managing global type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) cessation

Introduction

Detection of poliovirus transmission and ongoing oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use continue to delay poliomyelitis eradication. In 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of type 2 OPV (OPV2) for preventive immunization and limited its use to emergency outbreak response. In 2019, GPEI partners requested restart of some Sabin OPV2 production and also accelerated the development of a genetically modified novel OPV2 vaccine (nOPV2) that promised greater genetic stability than monovalent Sabin OPV2 (mOPV2).

Methods

We reviewed integrated risk, economic, and global poliovirus transmission modeling performed before OPV2 cessation, which recommended multiple risk management strategies to increase the chances of successfully ending all transmission of type 2 live polioviruses. Following OPV2 cessation, strategies implemented by countries and the GPEI deviated from model recommended risk management strategies. Complementing other modeling that explores prospective outbreak response options for improving outcomes for the current polio endgame trajectory, in this study we roll back the clock to 2017 and explore counterfactual trajectories that the polio endgame could have followed if GPEI had: (1) managed risks differently after OPV2 cessation and/or (2) developed nOPV2 before and used it exclusively for outbreak response after OPV2 cessation.

Results

The implementation of the 2016 model-based recommended outbreak response strategies could have ended (and could still substantially improve the probability of ending) type 2 poliovirus transmission. Outbreak response performance observed since 2016 would not have been expected to achieve OPV2 cessation with high confidence, even with the availability of nOPV2 prior to the 2016 OPV2 cessation.

Discussion

As implemented, the 2016 OPV2 cessation failed to stop type 2 transmission. While nOPV2 offers benefits of lower risk of seeding additional outbreaks, its reduced secondary spread relative to mOPV2 may imply relatively higher coverage needed for nOPV2 than mOPV2 to stop outbreaks.