Perception and memory in neuroscience: a conceptual analysis

Flexible Neuromorphic Electronics for Wearable Near-Sensor and In-Sensor Computing Systems

Flexible neuromorphic architectures that emulate biological cognitive systems hold great promise for smart wearable electronics. To realize neuro-inspired sensing and computing electronics, artificial sensory neurons that detect and process external stimuli must be integrated with central nervous systems capable of parallel computation. In near-sensor computing, synaptic devices, and sensors are used to emulate sensory neurons and receptors, respectively. In contrast, in in-sensor computing, a single multifunctional device serves as both the receptor and neuron. Bio-inspired cognitive systems efficiently detect and process stimuli through data structuring techniques, significantly reducing data volume and enabling the extension of neuromorphic applications to smart wearable systems. To construct wearable near- and in-sensor computing, it is crucial to develop artificial sensory neurons and central nervous synapses that replicate the biological functionalities. Additionally, the integrated systems must exhibit high mechanical flexibility and integration density. This review addresses research on flexible bio-inspired cognitive systems, classified into near- and in-sensor computing. It covers fundamental aspects, including biological cognitive processes, the required components, and the structures for each component, as well as applications for wearable smart systems. Finally, it offers perspectives on future research directions for flexible neuromorphic electronics in smart wearable systems connected to the next-generation Internet of Things.

The concept of (depth) cues: An exemplification of homuncular language in vision science

The term “depth cue” is fundamental to and widely used in vision science. However, despite the prevalence and importance of that concept, there is virtually no study on its theoretical foundations and coherence. This article aims at filling that gap by investigating both its historical development and its current use within the predominant computational approach to vision. Against the backdrop of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophy, it is shown that both traditional and current characterizations of depth cues suffer from a serious logical flaw known as “homunculus” or “mereological fallacy.” It is suggested that the problem of homuncular language impedes critical thinking and theorizing in vision science since it obscures the matters at issue by disguising explanatorily empty expressions as explanatory hypotheses. Furthermore, it is argued that homuncular language is not confined to the concept of depth cues but typical of current cognitive science in general since it is linked to its most fundamental assumption of the brain being an information processing system. In conclusion, resulting implications for cognitive science and cognitive scientists are considered.

Acceptably aware during general anaesthesia: 'dysanaesthesia'--the uncoupling of perception from sensory inputs

This review makes the case for 'dysanaesthesia', a term encompassing states of mind that can arise in the course of anaesthesia during surgery, characterised by an uncoupling of sensation and perceptual experience. This is reflected in a macroscopic, functional model of anaesthetically-relevant consciousness. Patients in this state can be aware of events but in a neutral way, not in pain, sometimes personally dissociated from the experiences. This makes events associated with surgery peripheral to their whole experience, such that recall is less likely and if it exists, makes any spontaneous report of awareness unlikely. This state of perception-sensation uncoupling is therefore broadly acceptable (a minimum requirement for acceptable anaesthesia) but since it is likely a dose-related phenomenon, may also represent a precursor for awareness with adverse recall. This hypothesis uniquely explains the often inconsistent responses seen during the experimental paradigm of the 'isolated forearm technique', wherein apparently anaesthetised patients exhibit a positive motor response to verbal command, but no spontaneous movement to surgery. The hypothesis can also explain the relatively high incidence of positive response to relatively direct questions for recall (e.g., using the Brice questionnaire; ∼1:500; the vast majority of these being neutral reports) versus the very low incidence of spontaneous reports of awareness (∼1:15,000; a higher proportion of these being adverse recollections). The hypothesis is consistent with relevant notions from philosophical discussions of consciousness, and neuroscientific evidence. Dysanaesthesia has important implications for research and also for the development of appropriate monitoring.