Survey of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection control policies at leading US academic hospitals in the context of the initial pandemic surge of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) omicron variant

Association between social activities and risk of COVID-19 in a cohort of healthcare personnel

Objective

Previous studies have linked social behaviors to COVID-19 risk in the general population. The impact of these behaviors among healthcare personnel, who face higher workplace exposure risks and possess greater prevention awareness, remains less explored.

Design

We conducted a Prospective cohort study from December 2021 to May 2022, using monthly surveys. Exposures included (1) a composite of nine common social activities in the past month and (2) similarity of social behavior compared to pre-pandemic. Outcomes included self-reported SARS-CoV-2 infection (primary)and testing for SARS-CoV-2 (secondary). Mixed-effect logistic regression assessed the association between social behavior and outcomes, adjusting for baseline and time-dependent covariates. To account for missed surveys, we employed inverse probability-of-censoring weighting with a propensity score approach.

Setting

An academic healthcare system.

Participants

Healthcare personnel.

Results

Of 1,302 healthcare personnel who completed ≥2 surveys, 244 reported ≥1 positive test during the study, resulting in a cumulative incidence of 19%. More social activities in the past month and social behavior similar to pre-pandemic levels were associated with increased likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 infection (recent social activity composite: OR = 1.11, 95% CI 1.02-1.21; pre-pandemic social similarity: OR = 1.14, 95% CI 1.07-1.21). Neither was significantly associated with testing for SARS-CoV-2.

Conclusions

Healthcare personnel social behavior outside work was associated with a higher risk for COVID-19. To protect the hospital workforce, risk mitigation strategies for healthcare personnel should focus on both the community and workplace.

Cycle threshold dynamics of non-severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) respiratory viruses

OBJECTIVE

Many providers use severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) cycle thresholds (Ct values) as approximate measures of viral burden in association with other clinical data to inform decisions about treatment and isolation. We characterized temporal changes in Ct values for non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses as a first step to determine whether cycle thresholds could play a similar role in the management of non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses.

DESIGN

Retrospective cohort study.

SETTING

Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston.

METHODS

We retrospectively identified all adult patients with positive nasopharyngeal PCRs for influenza, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenza, human metapneumovirus (HMPV), rhinovirus, or adenovirus between January 2022 and March 2023. We plotted Ct distributions relative to days since symptom onset, and we assessed whether distributions varied by immunosuppression and other comorbidities.

RESULTS

We analyzed 1,863 positive samples: 506 influenza, 502 rhinovirus, 430 RSV, 219 HMPV, 180 parainfluenza, 26 adenovirus. Ct values were generally 25-30 on the day of symptom onset, lower over the ensuing 1-3 days, and progressively higher thereafter with Ct values ≥30 after 1 week for most viruses. Ct values were generally higher and more stable over time for rhinovirus. There was no association between immunocompromised status and median intervals from symptom onset until Ct values were ≥30.

CONCLUSIONS

Ct values relative to symptom onset for influenza, RSV, and other non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses generally mirror patterns seen with SARS-CoV-2. Further data on associations between Ct values and viral viability, transmissibility, host characteristics, and response to treatment for non-SARS-CoV-2 respiratory viruses are needed to determine how clinicians and infection preventionists might integrate Ct values into treatment and isolation decisions.

Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in a Rural Community Hospital during Omicron Predominance

Healthcare-associated infections due to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has increased since the discovery of the Omicron variant. We describe a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in the medicine-surgery unit of a rural community hospital at the time of high community transmission of Omicron variant in our county. The outbreak occurred in the medicine-surgery unit of an 89-bed rural community hospital in northern Maine. The characteristics of the patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) affected by the outbreak are described. Patient and HCW data collected as part of the outbreak investigation were used in this report. The outbreak control measures implemented are also described. A total of 24 people tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 including 11 patients and 13 HCWs. A total of 12 of the 24 (50%) persons were symptomatic, and rhinorrhea was the most common symptom noted (8/12, 67%). None of the symptomatic persons had gastrointestinal symptoms or symptoms of a loss of sense of smell or taste. All HCWs were vaccinated and 8 of the 11 patients were vaccinated. Outbreak control measures in the affected unit included implementation of full PPE (N95 respirators, eye protection, gowns and gloves) during all patient care, serial testing of employees and patients in the affected unit, cohorting positive patients, closing visitation and thorough environmental cleaning including use of ultraviolet (UV) light disinfection. This outbreak exemplifies the high transmissibility of the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2. The outbreak occurred despite a well-established infection control program. We noted that serial testing, use of N95 respirators during all patient care and UV disinfection were some of the measures that could be successful in outbreak control.

In Support of Universal Admission Testing for SARS-CoV-2 During Significant Community Transmission

Many hospitals have stopped or are considering stopping universal admission testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We discuss reasons why admission testing should still be part of a layered system to prevent hospital-acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections during times of significant community transmission. These include the morbidity of SARS-CoV-2 in vulnerable patients, the predominant contribution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic people to transmission, the high rate of transmission between patients in shared rooms, and data suggesting surveillance testing is associated with fewer nosocomial infections. Preferences of diverse patient populations, particularly the hardest-hit communities, should be surveyed and used to inform prevention measures. Hospitals' ethical responsibility to protect patients from serious infections should predominate over concerns about costs, labor, and inconvenience. We call for more rigorous data on the incidence and morbidity of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections and more research to help determine when to start, stop, and restart universal admission testing and other prevention measures.

Comparison of virus aerosol concentrations across a face shield worn on a healthcare personnel during a simulated patient cough

BACKGROUND

Patients diagnosed with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) aerosolize severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) via respiratory efforts, expose, and possibly infect healthcare personnel (HCP). To prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 HCP have been required to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) during patient care. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, face shields were used as an approach to control HCP exposure to SARS-CoV-2, including eye protection.

METHODS

An MS2 bacteriophage was used as a surrogate for SARS-CoV-2 and was aerosolized using a coughing machine. A simulated HCP wearing a disposable plastic face shield was placed 0.41 m (16 inches) away from the coughing machine. The aerosolized virus was sampled using SKC biosamplers on the inside (near the mouth of the simulated HCP) and the outside of the face shield. The aerosolized virus collected by the SKC Biosampler was analyzed using a viability assay. Optical particle counters (OPCs) were placed next to the biosamplers to measure the particle concentration.

RESULTS

There was a statistically significant reduction (P < .0006) in viable virus concentration on the inside of the face shield compared to the outside of the face shield. The particle concentration was significantly lower on the inside of the face shield compared to the outside of the face shield for 12 of the 16 particle sizes measured (P < .05).

CONCLUSIONS

Reductions in virus and particle concentrations were observed on the inside of the face shield; however, viable virus was measured on the inside of the face shield, in the breathing zone of the HCP. Therefore, other exposure control methods need to be used to prevent transmission from virus aerosol.

Influence of the coronavirus infectious disease 2019 pandemic on infectious disease practice and infection control in Japan: A web questionnaire survey

INTRODUCTION

Infection and mortality rates caused by the coronavirus infectious disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic were high. However, the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the clinical burden in medical facilities remains to be clarified in Japan.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study used a questionnaire-based web survey to clarify how the COVID-19 pandemic affected infectious disease practice and infection control. The questionnaire was sent to healthcare professionals at nationwide medical facilities between January 13, 2023, and February 15, 2023.

RESULTS

Responses were obtained from 1784 healthcare professionals throughout Japan. Hospital management of COVID-19 patients was the responsibility of 96.5% of respondents. Furthermore, 75.1% had experienced nosocomial spread of COVID-19. Manuals and infection control measures for COVID-19 have been arranged in most facilities. In many facilities, the timing of an infected employee's return to work was determined in accordance with the isolation period for coronavirus-positive patients with symptoms established by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan. Approximately 30% of respondents reported that caring for COVID-19 patients, including the use of personal protective equipment, was their most stressful job. Approximately 50% of the respondents reported an increase in overtime hours. Approximately 90% of facilities are now capable of performing COVID-19 testing onsite.

CONCLUSION

Infection control for COVID-19 has been improved, and testing equipment for SARS-CoV-2 has been prepared. Patient care-related burdens and burdens caused by having to compensate for vacancies due to infected staff members have increased. In the future, a reduction in workload and role sharing should be considered.

Maintaining the Utility of Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic Severity Surveillance: Evaluation of Trends in Attributable Deaths and Development and Validation of a Measurement Tool

BACKGROUND

Death within a specified time window following a positive SARS-CoV-2 test is used by some agencies for attributing death to COVID-19. With Omicron variants, widespread immunity, and asymptomatic screening, there is cause to re-evaluate COVID-19 death attribution methods and develop tools to improve case ascertainment.

METHODS

All patients who died following microbiologically confirmed SARS-CoV-2 in the Veterans Health Administration (VA) and at Tufts Medical Center (TMC) were identified. Records of selected vaccinated VA patients with positive tests in 2022, and of all TMC patients with positive tests in 2021-2022, were manually reviewed to classify deaths as COVID-19-related (either directly caused by or contributed to), focused on deaths within 30 days. Logistic regression was used to develop and validate a surveillance model for identifying deaths in which COVID-19 was causal or contributory.

RESULTS

Among vaccinated VA patients who died ≤30 days after a positive test in January-February 2022, death was COVID-19-related in 103/150 cases (69%) (55% causal, 14% contributory). In June-August 2022, death was COVID-19-related in 70/150 cases (47%) (22% causal, 25% contributory). Similar results were seen among the 71 patients who died at TMC. A model including hypoxemia, remdesivir, and anti-inflammatory drugs had positive and negative predictive values of 0.82-0.95 and 0.64-0.83, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

By mid-2022, "death within 30 days" did not provide an accurate estimate of COVID-19-related death in 2 US healthcare systems with routine admission screening. Hypoxemia and use of antiviral and anti-inflammatory drugs-variables feasible for reporting to public health agencies-would improve classification of death as COVID-19-related.

Improving COVID-19 Disease Severity Surveillance Measures: Statewide Implementation Experience

Measurement of the burden of COVID-19 on U.S. hospitals has been an important element of the public health response to the pandemic. However, because of variation in testing density and policies, the metric is not standardized across facilities. Two types of burdens exist, one related to the infection control measures that patients who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 require and one from the care of severely ill patients receiving treatment of COVID-19. With rising population immunity from vaccination and infection, as well as the availability of therapeutics, severity of illness has declined. Prior research showed that dexamethasone administration was highly correlated with other disease severity metrics and sensitive to the changing epidemiology associated with the emergence of immune-evasive variants.

On 10 January 2022, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health began requiring hospitals to expand surveillance to include reports of both the total number of "COVID-19 hospitalizations" daily and the number of inpatients who received dexamethasone at any point during their hospital stay. All 68 acute care hospitals in Massachusetts submitted COVID-19 hospitalization and dexamethasone data daily to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health over a 1-year period. A total of 44 196 COVID-19 hospitalizations were recorded during 10 January 2022 to 9 January 2023, of which 34% were associated with dexamethasone administration. The proportion of patients hospitalized with COVID-19 who had received dexamethasone was 49.6% during the first month of surveillance and decreased to a monthly average of approximately 33% by April 2022, where it has remained since (range, 28.7% to 33%).

Adding a single data element to mandated reporting to estimate the frequency of severe COVID-19 in hospitalized patients was feasible and provided actionable information for health authorities and policy makers. Updates to surveillance methods are necessary to match data collection with public health response needs.

Observational study of organisational responses of 17 US hospitals over the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic

OBJECTIVES

The COVID-19 pandemic has required significant modifications of hospital care. The objective of this study was to examine the operational approaches taken by US hospitals over time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

DESIGN, SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS

This was a prospective observational study of 17 geographically diverse US hospitals from February 2020 to February 2021.

OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS

We identified 42 potential pandemic-related strategies and obtained week-to-week data about their use. We calculated descriptive statistics for use of each strategy and plotted percent uptake and weeks used. We assessed the relationship between strategy use and hospital type, geographic region and phase of the pandemic using generalised estimating equations (GEEs), adjusting for weekly county case counts.

RESULTS

We found heterogeneity in strategy uptake over time, some of which was associated with geographic region and phase of pandemic. We identified a body of strategies that were both commonly used and sustained over time, for example, limiting staff in COVID-19 rooms and increasing telehealth capacity, as well as those that were rarely used and/or not sustained, for example, increasing hospital bed capacity.

CONCLUSIONS

Hospital strategies during the COVID-19 pandemic varied in resource intensity, uptake and duration of use. Such information may be valuable to health systems during the ongoing pandemic and future ones.

Challenges and future opportunities to unlock the critical supply chain of personal and protective equipment (PPE) encompassing decontamination and reuse under emergency use authorization (EUA) conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic: Through a reflective circularity and sustainability lens

Severe acute respiratory syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), and the resulting coronavirus disease (COVID-19), was declared a public health emergency of global concern by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the early months of 2020. There was a marked lack of knowledge to inform national pandemic response plans encompassing appropriate disease mitigation and preparation strategies to constrain and manage COVID-19. For example, the top 16 "most cited" papers published at the start of the pandemic on core knowledge gaps collectively constitute a staggering 29,393 citations. Albeit complex, appropriate decontamination modalities have been reported and developed for safe reuse of personal and protective equipment (PPE) under emergency use authorization (EUA) where critical supply chain shortages occur for healthcare workers (HCWs) caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Commensurately, these similar methods may provide solutions for the safe decontamination of enormous volumes of PPE waste promoting opportunities in the circular bioeconomy that will also protect our environment, habitats and natural capital. The co-circulation of the highly transmissive mix of COVID-19 variants of concern (VoC) will continue to challenge our embattled healthcare systems globally for many years to come with an emphasis placed on maintaining effective disease mitigation strategies. This viewpoint article addresses the rationale and key developments in this important area since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and provides an insight into a variety of potential opportunities to unlock the long-term sustainability of single-use medical devices, including waste management.

Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic and How Blood Operators Can Prepare for the Next Pandemic

Humans interact with virus-infected animal hosts, travel globally, and maintain social networks that allow for novel viruses to emerge and develop pandemic potential. There are key lessons-learned from the coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic that blood operators can apply to the next pandemic. Warning signals to the COVID-19 pandemic included outbreaks of Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-1 (SARS-CoV-1) and Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the prior two decades. It will be critical to quickly determine whether there is a risk of blood-borne transmission of a new pandemic virus. Prior to the next pandemic blood operators should be prepared for changes in activities, policies, and procedures at all levels of the organization. Blood operators can utilize "Plan-Do-Study-Act" cycles spanning from: vigilance for emerging viruses, surveillance activities and studies, operational continuity, donor engagement and trust, and laboratory testing if required. Occupational health and donor safety issues will be key areas of focus even if the next pandemic virus is not transfusion transmitted. Blood operators may also be requested to engage in new activities such as the development of therapeutics or supporting public health surveillance activities. Activities such as scenario development, tabletop exercises, and drills will allow blood operators to prepare for the unknowns of the next pandemic.