The choice is yours: Infants' expectations about an agent's future behavior based on taking and receiving actions

How barriers become invisible: Children are less sensitive to constraints that are stable over time

When making inferences about the mental lives of others (e.g., others' preferences), it is critical to consider the extent to which the choices we observe are constrained. Prior research on the development of this tendency indicates a contradictory pattern: Children show remarkable sensitivity to constraints in traditional experimental paradigms, yet often fail to consider real-world constraints and privilege inherent causes instead. We propose that one explanation for this discrepancy may be that real-world constraints are often stable over time and lose their salience. The present research tested whether children (N = 133, 5- to 12-year-old mostly US children; 55% female, 45% male) become less sensitive to an actor's constraints after first observing two constrained actors (Stable condition) versus after first observing two actors in contexts with greater choice (Not Stable condition). We crossed the stability of the constraint with the type of constraint: either the constraint was deterministic such that there was only one option available (No Other Option constraint) or, in line with many real-world constraints, the constraint was probabilistic such that there was another option, but it was difficult to access (Hard to Access constraint). Results indicated that children in the Stable condition became less sensitive to the probabilistic Hard to Access constraint across trials. Notably, we also found that children's sensitivity to constraints was enhanced in the Not Stable condition regardless of whether the constraint was probabilistic or deterministic. We discuss implications for children's sensitivity to real-world constraints. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: This research addresses the apparent contradiction that children are sensitive to constraints in experimental paradigms but are often insensitive to constraints in the real world. One explanation for this discrepancy is that constraints in the real world tend to be stable over time and may lose their salience. When probabilistic constraints (i.e., when a second option is available but hard to access) are stable, children become de-sensitized to constraints across trials. First observing contexts with greater choice increases children's sensitivity to both probabilistic and deterministic constraints.

Emphasizing others' persistence can promote unwarranted social inferences in children and adults

People often hear stories about individuals who persist to overcome their constraints. While these stories can be motivating, emphasizing others' persistence may promote unwarranted judgments about constrained individuals who do not persist. Using a developmental social inference task (Study 1a: n = 124 U.S. children, 5-12 years of age; Study 1b: n = 135 and Study 2: n = 120 U.S. adults), the present research tested whether persistence stories lead people to infer that a constrained individual who does not persist, and instead accepts the lower-quality option that is available to them, prefers it over a higher-quality option that is out of reach. Study 1 found evidence for this effect in children (1a) and adults (1b). Even persistence stories about failed outcomes, which emphasize how difficult it would have been to get the higher-quality option, had this effect. Study 2 found that the effect generalized to adults' judgments about an individual facing a different type of constraint from those mentioned in the initial stories. Taken together, emphasizing others' persistence may encourage unwarranted judgments about individuals who are still constrained to lower-quality options. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Rational learners and parochial norms

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

Preference matters: Knowledge of beneficiary's preference influences children's evaluations of the act of leaving a choice for others

People value indirect prosocial actions that benefit others as byproducts of self-oriented actions. One example of such an action is the act of leaving a choice for others when selecting an item for oneself. In this study, we investigated how knowledge of the beneficiary's preference may influence children's evaluations of such actions. Children (n = 91, 4- to 10-year-olds) and adults (n = 43) were asked to evaluate characters taking a snack for themselves from a set of three items-two identical items and one unique item-in a way that either leaves a choice (two different items) or leaves no choice (two identical items) for the next person (the beneficiary). The beneficiary's preference was systematically manipulated as unknown, preferring the unique item, or preferring the item of which there are two. We found notable developmental changes: Children as young as 4 years of age understand that it is nicer not to take away the only thing others prefer; with age, children increasingly appreciate the value of leaving a diverse choice when the beneficiary's preference is unknown; however, when the beneficiary clearly prefers the item of which there are two, children increasingly think that it is nicer to leave two identical but preferred items than to leave a diverse choice. These findings reveal increasing flexibility and subtlety in children's social evaluation of indirect prosocial actions; their evaluation develops from a mere understanding of the value of preference to a flexible appreciation of both preference and choice.

Understanding preferences in infancy

A preference is defined as a dispositional state that helps explain why a person chooses one option over another. Preference understanding is a significant part of interpreting and predicting others' behavior, which can also help to guide social encounters, for instance, to initiate interactions and even form relationships based on shared preferences. Cognitive developmental research in the past several decades has revealed that infants have relatively sophisticated understandings about others' preferences, as part of investigations into how young children make sense of others' behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, dispositions including preferences, and epistemic states. In recent years, research on early psychological knowledge expands to including infant understanding of social situations. As such, infants are also found to use their preference understandings in their social life. They treat favorably others who share their own preferences, and they prefer prosocial and similar others (e.g., those who speak their language). In reviewing these results, we point out future directions for research and conclude with further suggestions and recommendations. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging.

The Development of Negative Event-Emotion Matching in Infancy: Implications for Theories in Affective Science

Predicting another person's emotional response to a situation is an important component of emotion concept understanding. However, little is known about the developmental origins of this ability. The current studies examine whether 10-month-olds expect facial configurations/vocalizations associated with negative emotions (e.g., anger, disgust) to be displayed after specific eliciting events. In Experiment 1, 10-month-olds (N = 60) were familiarized to an Emoter interacting with objects in a positive event (Toy Given) and a negative event (Toy Taken). Infants expected the Emoter to display a facial configuration associated with anger after the negative event, but did not expect the Emoter to display a facial configuration associated with happiness after the positive event. In Experiment 2, 10- and 14-month-olds (N = 120) expected the Emoter to display a facial configuration associated with anger, rather than one associated with disgust, after an "anger-eliciting" event (Toy Taken). However, only the 14-month-olds provided some evidence of linking a facial configuration associated with disgust, rather than one associated with anger, to a "disgust-eliciting event" (New Food). Experiment 3 found that 10-month-olds (N = 60) did not expect an Emoter to display a facial configuration associated with anger after an "anger-eliciting" event involving an Unmet Goal. Together, these experiments suggest that infants start to refine broad concepts of affect into more precise emotion concepts over the first 2 years of life, before learning emotion language. These findings are a first step toward addressing a long-standing theoretical debate in affective science about the nature of early emotion concepts.