Future planning in preschool children

Tomorrow versus a year from now: Do children represent the near and distant future differently?

Adults represent the near future more concretely and vividly than the distant future, with important implications for future-oriented behavior (e.g., planning, self-control). Although children are adept at describing future events at around 5 years of age, we know little about how temporal distance (i.e., "near" vs "distant") affects their future event representations. In a series of three experiments, we sought to determine the effects of temporal distance, age, and event frequency on children's future event representations. Participants, 5- to 9-year-olds, were asked to describe frequent (e.g., snack) and infrequent (e.g., party) events, with half of children imagining that these events would happen in the near future and the other half imagining that they would happen in the distant future. We investigated the effect of temporal distance on numerous event representation indicators (e.g., clarity, details, pronouns), all theoretically grounded in previous literature. Although children perceived near events as closer in time than distant events (Experiments 2 and 2b) and temporal distance affected the clarity of event representations (Experiment 2), most indicators were not affected by temporal distance. In contrast, event frequency (examined in Experiment 1) played an important role in children's event representations, with infrequent events being described more concretely than frequent events. Results suggest that young children may begin perceiving differences in temporal distance but that this does not translate to their event representations (e.g., clarity, pronouns) until later in development. Implications for children's future thinking and future research are discussed.

Moving beyond "Spoon" tasks: When do children autocue their episodic future thought?

Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

The importance of thinking about the future in culture and cumulative cultural evolution

Thinking about possibilities plays a critical role in the choices humans make throughout their lives. Despite this, the influence of individuals' ability to consider what is possible on culture has been largely overlooked. We propose that the ability to reason about future possibilities or prospective cognition, has consequences for cultural change, possibly facilitating the process of cumulative cultural evolution. In particular, by considering potential future costs and benefits of specific behaviours, prospective cognition may lead to a more flexible use of cultural behaviours. In species with limited planning abilities, this may lead to the development of cultures that promote behaviours with future benefits, circumventing this limitation. Here, we examine these ideas from a comparative perspective, considering the relationship between human and nonhuman assessments of future possibilities and their cultural capacity to invent new solutions and improve them over time. Given the methodological difficulties of assessing prospective cognition across species, we focus on planning, for which we have the most data in other species. Elucidating the role of prospective cognition in culture will help us understand the variability in when and how we see culture expressed, informing ongoing debates, such as that surrounding which social learning mechanisms underlie culture. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Young children's future-oriented reasoning for self and other: Effects of conflict and perspective

Young children reason more adaptively about the future (e.g., predicting preferences and delaying gratification) when they are asked to think about another person's perspective versus their own perspective. An explanation for this "other-over-self" advantage is that in contexts where current (e.g., small reward now) and future (e.g., larger reward later) desires conflict, adopting the perspective of another person provides psychological distance and hence more adaptive decision making by reducing conflict. We tested this hypothesis in 158 preschoolers using a battery of representative future-oriented reasoning tasks (Preferences, Delay of Gratification, Picture Book, and "Spoon") in which we varied the perspective children adopted (self or other) and the level of conflict between current and future desires (high or low). We predicted that perspective and conflict would interact such that children would benefit most from taking the perspective of "other" when conflict was high. Although results did not support this hypothesis, we found significant effects of conflict; children reasoned more optimally on our low-conflict task condition than on our high-conflict task condition, and these differences did not appear to be related to inhibitory control. The effect of conflict was most marked in younger preschoolers, resulting in Age × Conflict interactions on two of our four tasks. An other-over-self advantage (i.e., perspective effect) was detected on the Preferences task only. These results add to the growing body of literature on children's future thinking by showing the important role of conflict (and its interaction with age) in the accuracy with which children reason about the future.

Back to the future: relating the development of episodic future thinking to cognitive and affective individual differences and to motivational relevance in preschoolers

Episodic future thinking (EFT) represents the ability to mentally simulate scenarios that will occur in our personal future. In the current study, we used the item choice paradigm, which puts chidren in a problematic situation and requires them to envision a solution by selecting one of various items. This ability was assessed in a sample of 92 preschoolers (3-6 years old), taking into account individual differences in age, gender, cognitive (verbal abilities, EFT memory) and affective (anxiety) factors, as well as contextual factors (motivational relevance). Findings indicate developmental progress in preschoolers' foresight and in their retrospective memory for the item choice problems. The motivational valence of the EFT task played a significant role, as children performed better in the motivationally positive condition, as compared to the neutral and negative ones. However, older children had better performance than younger ones on the motivationally aversive tasks, becoming comparable to their performance in the motivationally appetitive condition. Finally, higher social anxiety was negatively related to children's EFT performance in the aversive condition, when they anticipated negative social exposure. In conclusion, EFT was explained by age-related improvements, the motivational valence of the situation and by individual differences in social anxiety, which is highly relevant for educational and therapeutic practices.

It is about time: Conceptual and experimental evaluation of the temporal cognitive mechanisms in mental time travel

Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time to remember past events (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards in time to imagine future events (i.e., future thinking). Despite empirical evidence showing that animals might possess MTT abilities, some still claim that this ability is uniquely human. Recent debates have suggested that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism (i.e., ability to represent the sense of past and future) that makes MTT uniquely human. Advances in the field have been constrained by a lack of comparative data, methodological shortcomings that prevent meaningful comparisons, and a lack of clear conceptualizations of the temporal cognitive mechanism. Here I will present a comprehensive review into MTT in humans and animals-with a particular focus on great apes. I will examine three of the most prominent and influential theoretical models of human MTT. Drawing on these accounts, I suggest that a basic way of understanding time might be shared across species, however culture and language will play a critical role at shaping the way we elaborate mental representations about past and future events. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

"What Should You Bring with You to This Place?": Examining Children's Episodic Foresight Using Open-Ended Questions

Children's episodic foresight, the ability to mentally project oneself into the future to pre-experience an event (e.g., Atance & O'Neill, 2005), begins to emerge early in the preschool years. Results from the Picture-book task (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005) have shown that children are generally capable of selecting an item needed in the future (from provided options), but young preschoolers have difficulty justifying their choice with future-oriented explanations. Because episodic foresight has typically been measured using forced-choice questions (such as the Picture-book task) less is known about children's more naturalistic and "open-ended" future thinking (i.e., more spontaneous forms of episodic foresight). Forty-eight 3-to 5-year-olds completed a new, open-ended version of the Picture-book task. Using a descriptive approach, we found that children were able to generate an appropriate item to bring with them to a future location, and that this ability improved with age. Temporal focus as well as internal (episodic) and external (semantic) details were explored in the context of children's explanations. Children's explanations were mostly present-oriented and included episodic and semantic details equally. Our findings extend our knowledge of children's episodic foresight by highlighting children's ability to solve future-oriented problems in an open-ended manner.

What Human Planning Can Tell Us About Animal Planning: An Empirical Case

The ability to think about and plan for the future is a critical cognitive skill for our daily life. There is ongoing debate about whether other animals possess future thinking. Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is that there is not a definite methodology that allow us to conclude that animals (and human children) are truly thinking about a future event. Research with humans-both children and adults- will benefit the field of comparative psychology by providing information about the range of humans' responses when they are faced with problems similar to those presented to other animals. Inspired by a problem that chimpanzees experienced in the wild, children of 4 and 5 years of age and young adults were presented with a situation in which they were expected to select two tools in order to obtain a reward. More older children than 4 years old successfully obtained the reward. Adults also succeeded at solving the problem. However, both children and adults struggled to select the two correct tools before any tool-use action was executed. While children's performance is discussed in the context of temporal components required to envisage future events, adults' performance is interpreted in the context of cognitive effort. These findings link developmental and adult cognition with comparative psychology.

Children's future-oriented cognition

Children's future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition.

Thinking about the future: Comparing children's forced-choice versus "generative" responses in the "spoon test"

One of the most popular methods to assess children's foresight is to present children with a problem (e.g., locked box with no key) in one room and then later, in another room, give them the opportunity to select the item (e.g., key) that will solve it. Whether or not children choose the correct item to bring back to the first room is the dependent measure of interest in this "spoon test." Although children as young as 3 or 4 years typically succeed on this test, whether they would pass a more stringent version in which they must verbally generate (vs. select) the correct item in the absence of any cues is unknown. This is an important point given that humans must often make decisions about the future without being explicitly "prompted" by the future-oriented option. In Experiment 1, using an adapted version of the spoon test, we show that as the "generative" requirements of the task increase, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 99) performance significantly decreases. We replicate this effect in Experiment 2 (N = 48 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and also provide preliminary evidence that the capacity to verbally generate the correct item in a spoon test may draw more heavily on children's category fluency skills than does their capacity to select this item among a set of distracters. Our findings underscore the importance of examining more generative forms of future thought in young children.

What is the role of episodic foresight in planning for future needs? Theory and two experiments

Considerable evidence suggests that episodic memory and foresight rely on the same underlying cognitive processes. Some theorists have suggested that the key role of episodic foresight is to allow an individual to disengage from current states to plan for future needs. However, the contribution of episodic cognition to this type of planning has not been investigated. We present two experiments exploring future-state planning in 3-6-year-old children and healthy young adults, finding that both groups were consistently biased towards current states. We further found that there were few relationships between episodic memory ability and future-state planning. Where there was a relationship, the degree of bias was positively related to episodic memory ability, such that those with better episodic were more biased by their current motivational state. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that episodic cognition is particularly vulnerable to bias from current feelings. We propose an account in which episodic cognition allows for cross-talk between current and future motivational states, and that while this can aid prospective decision-making in some scenarios, it may hinder it in others.

Children's behavior and spontaneous talk in a future thinking task

We explored 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 120) "explicit" and "spontaneous" future-oriented cognition. Specifically, children had to think ahead to meet a future physiological need (desire for food) or psychological need (avoiding boredom). One group of children alternated between a room with candy and a room without candy, spending 3 min per visit. Children were explicitly asked which room they wanted to put extra candy in for a future visit to the lab (correct answer: room without candy). A second group of children underwent the same procedure but with toys as the resource instead of food (a replication of Atance et al. in J Exp Child Psychol 129:98-109, 2015). In the food condition, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds all placed candy in the correct room above chance, but only 4- and 5-year-olds were above chance in the toy condition. Overall, 4- and 5-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds, and children performed better in the food condition than the toy condition. Children's spontaneous (or "involuntary") future thinking was assessed by coding their utterances while in the two rooms. Children who solved the explicit task uttered more task-relevant future and past statements than children who failed. Examining spontaneous talk also allowed us to explore children's spontaneous "solving" of the task before being asked an explicit test question. This research highlights the importance of varying stimuli in future thinking tasks and developing methods to capture spontaneous/involuntary future thinking in young children.