Social sampling: Children track social choices to reason about status hierarchies

Children's and adults' social partner choices are differently affected by statistical information

The current study investigated how U.S. adults (N = 99) and 5- and 6-year-old children (N = 112) use statistical information in their social partner choices. We found that children integrated base rate information (the distribution of traits within groups) and individual-level statistical information (the frequency of an individual's past behaviors) in their partner choices, but adults only relied on the individual-level statistical information and neglected base rate information. In addition, adults and children were affected by non-statistical information: Adults showed risk-seeking and risk-averse tendencies, and children showed only risk-seeking tendencies in their partner choices. These findings provide evidence that both statistical and non-statistical information affect social decisions, and adults and children are influenced by each type of information in distinct ways. The current study suggests future directions to further investigate the role of statistical learning in our social cognition and to develop a unifying account of how non-statistical information interacts with statistical information in our social decisions.

Who Peeked? Children Infer the Likely Cause of Improbable Success

Some outcomes are brought about by intentional agents with access to information and others are not. Children use a variety of cues to infer the causes of outcomes, such as statistical reasoning (e.g., the probability of the outcome) and theory of mind (e.g., a person's perceptual access, preferences, or knowledge). Here we show that children use these cues to infer cheating, a finding which informs our understanding of the flexibility of children's theory of mind. In four experiments (N = 444), 4- to 7-year-olds saw vignettes about blindfolded agents retrieving 10 gumballs from a distribution of yummy and yucky gumballs. Children were then asked if agents were really blindfolded or had peeked. We manipulated the probability of the outcome (i.e., the correspondence between the distribution sampled from and the outcome produced) and the ordering of the outcome was patterned (e.g., five yummy then five yucky) or haphazard. From age 5, children began to use both cues to infer cheating, and also showed signs of flexibly integrating these cues. Together, these findings show that young children can detect cheaters, and that their theory of mind reasoning is flexible and not based on simple and rigid rules (e.g., equating not-seeing with failure). The findings also suggest that children use probabilistic reasoning to infer knowledge.

Calculated Feelings: How Children Use Probability to Infer Emotions

Developing the ability to accurately infer others' emotions is crucial for children's cognitive development. Here, we offer a new theoretical perspective on how children develop this ability. We first review recent work showing that with age, children increasingly use probability to infer emotions. We discuss how these findings do not fit with prominent accounts of how children understand emotions, namely the script account and the theory of mind account. We then outline a theory of how probability allows children to infer others' emotions. Specifically, we suggest that probability provides children with information about how much weight to put on alternative outcomes, allowing them to infer emotions by comparing outcomes to counterfactual alternatives.

Distrust as a form of inequality

Navigating social hierarchies is a ubiquitous aspect of human life. Social status shapes our thoughts, feelings, and actions toward others in various ways. However, it remains unclear how trust is conferred within hierarchies and how status-related cues are used when resources are on the line. This research fills this knowledge gap by examining how ascribed, consensus-based status appearance, and perceived status appearance impact investment decisions for high- and low-status partners during a Trust Game. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we examined the degree to which participants trusted unfamiliar others with financial investments when the only available information about that person was their socioeconomic status (SES). In Study 1, SES was ascribed. Studies 2 and 3 conveyed SES with visual antecedents (clothing). Across all three experiments, participants trusted high SES partners more than low SES partners. In addition, subjective perceptions of status based on visual cues were a stronger predictor of trust than consensus-based status judgments. This work highlights a high status-trust bias for decisions where an individual's money is on the line. In addition, high-status trust bias may occur simply because of an individual's subjective assumptions about another's rank.

Rational learners and parochial norms

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination—especially the ability to imagine improbable events—may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain‐general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning.

This article is categorized under:

Psychology > Development and Aging

Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief

Children's thinking about group-based social hierarchies

Wealth, power, and status are distributed unevenly across social groups. A surge of recent research reveals that people being recognizing, representing, and reasoning about group-based patterns of inequity during the first years of life. We first synthesize recent research on what children learn about group-based social hierarchies as well as how this learning occurs. We then discuss how children not only learn about societal structures but become active participants in them. Studying the origins and development of children's thoughts and behavior regarding group-based social hierarchies provides valuable insight into how systems of inequity are perpetuated across generations and how intergroup biases related to wealth, power, and status may be mitigated and reshaped early in development.

Small groups lead, big groups control: Perceptions of numerical group size, power, and status across development

Participants (N = 384 three- to ten-year-olds; 51% girls, 49% boys; 73% White, 18% multiracial/other, 5% Asian, and 3% Black; N = 610 adults) saw depictions of 20 individuals split into two social groups (1:19; 2:18; 5:15; or 8:12 per group) and selected which group was "in charge" (Experiment 1), "the leader" (Experiment 2), or likely to "get the stuff" (resources) in a conflict (Experiment 3). Whereas participants across ages predicted the larger group would "get the stuff," a tendency to view smaller groups as "in charge" and "the leader" strengthened with age and when the smaller group was rarer. These findings suggest the perceived relation between numerical group size and hierarchy is flexible and inform theory regarding the developmental trajectories of reasoning about power and status.