Is human nature hiddine in the genome?

Evolutionary psychology and design reincarnation: A reply to Peters

In this riposte it will be argued that the critique by Peters (2013) of the theoretical foundation of evolutionary psychology misses the mark, and, in the process, unfortunately repeats many common and egregious misunderstandings. This reply will attempt to outline the real position of evolutionary psychologists with respect to modularity and the development, flexibility, and learning capacities of cognitive adaptations. In particular, evolutionary psychologists’ concept of the developmental target of naturally selected design will be made salient. I also aim to provide a more accurate treatment of the neurobiological and genomic issues at stake. In sum, it will be shown that Peters’ rendering of the theoretical foundation of evolutionary psychology is a straw man representation and that the real position of evolutionary psychologists is far more interesting once some of the nuances of their theoretical foundation are brought to light.

Modularity in cognition: framing the debate

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.

The evolutionary roots of our environmental problems: toward a Darwinian ecology

It is widely acknowledged that we need to stabilize population growth and reduce our environmental impact; however, there is little consensus about how we might achieve these changes. Here I show how evolutionary analyses of human behavior provide important, though generally ignored, insights into our environmental problems. First, I review increasing evidence that Homo sapiens has a long history of causing ecological problems. This means that, contrary to popular belief, our species' capacity for ecological destruction is not simply due to "Western" culture. Second, I provide an overview of how evolutionary research can help to understand why humans are ecologically destructive, including the reasons why people often overpopulate, overconsume, exhaust common-pool resources, discount the future, and respond maladaptively to modern environmental hazards. Evolutionary approaches not only explain our darker sides, they also provide insights into why people cherish plants and animals and often support environmental and conservation efforts (e.g., Wilson's "biophilia hypothesis"). Third, I show how evolutionary analyses of human behavior offer practical implications for environmental policy, education, and activism. I suggest that education is necessary but insufficient because people also need incentives. Individual incentives are likely to be the most effective, but these include much more than narrow economic interests (e.g., they include one's reputation in society). Moralizing and other forms of social pressure used by environmentalists to bring about change appear to be effective, but this idea needs more research. Finally, I suggest that integrating evolutionary perspectives into the environmental sciences will help to break down the artificial barriers that continue to divide the biological and social sciences, which unfortunately obstruct our ability to understand ourselves and effectively address our environmental problems.