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Boyle A, Brown SAB. Why might animals remember? A functional framework for episodic memory research in comparative psychology. Learn Behav 2025; 53:14-30. [PMID: 39289293 PMCID: PMC11880042 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-024-00645-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/23/2024] [Indexed: 09/19/2024]
Abstract
One of Clayton's major contributions to our understanding of animal minds has been her work on episodic-like memory. A central reason for the success of this work was its focus on ecological validity: rather than looking for episodic memory for arbitrary stimuli in artificial contexts, focussing on contexts in which episodic memory would serve a biological function such as food caching. This review aims to deepen this insight by surveying the numerous functions that have been proposed for episodic memory, articulating a philosophically grounded framework for understanding what exactly functions are, and drawing on these to make suggestions for future directions in the comparative cognitive psychology of episodic memory. Our review suggests four key insights. First, episodic memory may have more than one function and may have different functions in different species. Second, cross-disciplinary work is key to developing a functional account of episodic memory. Third, there is scope for further theoretical elaboration of proposals relating episodic memory to food caching and, in particular, future-oriented cognition. Finally, learning-related functions suggested by AI (artificial intelligence)-based models are a fruitful avenue for future behavioural research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexandria Boyle
- London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
- CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholars Program, London, UK.
| | - Simon A B Brown
- London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
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2
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Voudouris K, Slater B, Cheke LG, Schellaert W, Hernández-Orallo J, Halina M, Patel M, Alhas I, Mecattaf MG, Burden J, Holmes J, Chaubey N, Donnelly N, Crosby M. The Animal-AI Environment: A virtual laboratory for comparative cognition and artificial intelligence research. Behav Res Methods 2025; 57:107. [PMID: 40021555 PMCID: PMC11870899 DOI: 10.3758/s13428-025-02616-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/19/2025] [Indexed: 03/03/2025]
Abstract
The Animal-AI Environment is a unique game-based research platform designed to facilitate collaboration between the artificial intelligence and comparative cognition research communities. In this paper, we present the latest version of the Animal-AI Environment, outlining several major features that make the game more engaging for humans and more complex for AI systems. These features include interactive buttons, reward dispensers, and player notifications, as well as an overhaul of the environment's graphics and processing for significant improvements in agent training time and quality of the human player experience. We provide detailed guidance on how to build computational and behavioural experiments with the Animal-AI Environment. We present results from a series of agents, including the state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning agent Dreamer-v3, on newly designed tests and the Animal-AI testbed of 900 tasks inspired by research in the field of comparative cognition. The Animal-AI Environment offers a new approach for modelling cognition in humans and non-human animals, and for building biologically inspired artificial intelligence.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ben Slater
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Lucy G Cheke
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Wout Schellaert
- VRAIN / ValGRAI, Universitat Politècnica de València, València, Spain
| | | | - Marta Halina
- Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Matishalin Patel
- Centre for Data Science AI and Modelling, University of Hull, Hull, UK
| | - Ibrahim Alhas
- Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Matteo G Mecattaf
- Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - John Burden
- Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Joel Holmes
- Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Niharika Chaubey
- Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Niall Donnelly
- Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
| | - Matthew Crosby
- Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, UK
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Pang R, Recanatesi S. A non-Hebbian code for episodic memory. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2025; 11:eado4112. [PMID: 39982994 PMCID: PMC11844740 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.ado4112] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2024] [Accepted: 01/22/2025] [Indexed: 02/23/2025]
Abstract
Hebbian plasticity has long dominated neurobiological models of memory formation. Yet, plasticity rules operating on one-shot episodic memory timescales rarely depend on both pre- and postsynaptic spiking, challenging Hebbian theory in this crucial regime. Here, we present an episodic memory model governed by a simpler rule depending only on presynaptic activity. We show that this rule, capitalizing on high-dimensional neural activity with restricted transitions, naturally stores episodes as paths through complex state spaces like those underlying a world model. The resulting memory traces, which we term path vectors, are highly expressive and decodable with an odor-tracking algorithm. We show that path vectors are robust alternatives to Hebbian traces, support one-shot sequential and associative recall, along with policy learning, and shed light on specific hippocampal plasticity rules. Thus, non-Hebbian plasticity is sufficient for flexible memory and learning and well-suited to encode episodes and policies as paths through a world model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rich Pang
- Center for the Physics of Biological Function, Princeton, NJ and New York, NY, USA
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton, NJ, USA
| | - Stefano Recanatesi
- Allen Institute for Neural Dynamics, Seattle, WA, USA
- Technion–Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
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Addis DR, Szpunar KK. Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20230408. [PMID: 39278248 PMCID: PMC11449204 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2023.0408] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2024] [Revised: 05/22/2024] [Accepted: 06/14/2024] [Indexed: 09/18/2024] Open
Abstract
Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Donna Rose Addis
- Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest Academy for Research and Education, Toronto, ONM6A 2E1, Canada
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONM5S 3G3, Canada
- School of Psychology, The University of Auckland, Auckland1010, New Zealand
| | - Karl K. Szpunar
- Department of Psychology, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, ONM5B 2K3, Canada
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Lindsey JW, Litwin-Kumar A. Selective consolidation of learning and memory via recall-gated plasticity. eLife 2024; 12:RP90793. [PMID: 39023518 PMCID: PMC11257680 DOI: 10.7554/elife.90793] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/20/2024] Open
Abstract
In a variety of species and behavioral contexts, learning and memory formation recruits two neural systems, with initial plasticity in one system being consolidated into the other over time. Moreover, consolidation is known to be selective; that is, some experiences are more likely to be consolidated into long-term memory than others. Here, we propose and analyze a model that captures common computational principles underlying such phenomena. The key component of this model is a mechanism by which a long-term learning and memory system prioritizes the storage of synaptic changes that are consistent with prior updates to the short-term system. This mechanism, which we refer to as recall-gated consolidation, has the effect of shielding long-term memory from spurious synaptic changes, enabling it to focus on reliable signals in the environment. We describe neural circuit implementations of this model for different types of learning problems, including supervised learning, reinforcement learning, and autoassociative memory storage. These implementations involve synaptic plasticity rules modulated by factors such as prediction accuracy, decision confidence, or familiarity. We then develop an analytical theory of the learning and memory performance of the model, in comparison to alternatives relying only on synapse-local consolidation mechanisms. We find that recall-gated consolidation provides significant advantages, substantially amplifying the signal-to-noise ratio with which memories can be stored in noisy environments. We show that recall-gated consolidation gives rise to a number of phenomena that are present in behavioral learning paradigms, including spaced learning effects, task-dependent rates of consolidation, and differing neural representations in short- and long-term pathways.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jack W Lindsey
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia UniversityNew YorkUnited States
| | - Ashok Litwin-Kumar
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia UniversityNew YorkUnited States
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Jon-And A, Jonsson M, Lind J, Ghirlanda S, Enquist M. Sequence representation as an early step in the evolution of language. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011702. [PMID: 38091352 PMCID: PMC10752568 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011702] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2023] [Revised: 12/27/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 12/28/2023] Open
Abstract
Human language is unique in its compositional, open-ended, and sequential form, and its evolution is often solely explained by advantages of communication. However, it has proven challenging to identify an evolutionary trajectory from a world without language to a world with language, especially while at the same time explaining why such an advantageous phenomenon has not evolved in other animals. Decoding sequential information is necessary for language, making domain-general sequence representation a tentative basic requirement for the evolution of language and other uniquely human phenomena. Here, using formal evolutionary analyses of the utility of sequence representation we show that sequence representation is exceedingly costly and that current memory systems found in animals may prevent abilities necessary for language to emerge. For sequence representation to evolve, flexibility allowing for ignoring irrelevant information is necessary. Furthermore, an abundance of useful sequential information and extensive learning opportunities are required, two conditions that were likely fulfilled early in human evolution. Our results provide a novel, logically plausible trajectory for the evolution of uniquely human cognition and language, and support the hypothesis that human culture is rooted in sequential representational and processing abilities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna Jon-And
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Department of Romance Studies and Classics, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Markus Jonsson
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Johan Lind
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- IFM Biology, Linköping University, 581 83 Linköping, Sweden
| | - Stefano Ghirlanda
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College of CUNY, Brooklyn, New York, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, New York, United States of America
| | - Magnus Enquist
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Department of Zoology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
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Lind J, Vinken V, Jonsson M, Ghirlanda S, Enquist M. A test of memory for stimulus sequences in great apes. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0290546. [PMID: 37672549 PMCID: PMC10482264 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0290546] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2023] [Accepted: 08/09/2023] [Indexed: 09/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Identifying cognitive capacities underlying the human evolutionary transition is challenging, and many hypotheses exist for what makes humans capable of, for example, producing and understanding language, preparing meals, and having culture on a grand scale. Instead of describing processes whereby information is processed, recent studies have suggested that there are key differences between humans and other animals in how information is recognized and remembered. Such constraints may act as a bottleneck for subsequent information processing and behavior, proving important for understanding differences between humans and other animals. We briefly discuss different sequential aspects of cognition and behavior and the importance of distinguishing between simultaneous and sequential input, and conclude that explicit tests on non-human great apes have been lacking. Here, we test the memory for stimulus sequences-hypothesis by carrying out three tests on bonobos and one test on humans. Our results show that bonobos' general working memory decays rapidly and that they fail to learn the difference between the order of two stimuli even after more than 2,000 trials, corroborating earlier findings in other animals. However, as expected, humans solve the same sequence discrimination almost immediately. The explicit test on whether bonobos represent stimulus sequences as an unstructured collection of memory traces was not informative as no differences were found between responses to the different probe tests. However, overall, this first empirical study of sequence discrimination on non-human great apes supports the idea that non-human animals, including the closest relatives to humans, lack a memory for stimulus sequences. This may be an ability that sets humans apart from other animals and could be one reason behind the origin of human culture.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johan Lind
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Vera Vinken
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
| | - Markus Jonsson
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Stefano Ghirlanda
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Department of Psychology, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College, New York, NY, United States of America
| | - Magnus Enquist
- Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
- Department of Zoology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
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