Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms

Uncommon and nonpartisan: Antidemocratic attitudes in the American public

Democratic regimes flourish only when there is broad acceptance of an extensive set of norms and values. In the United States, fundamental democratic norms have recently come under threat from prominent Republican officials. We investigate whether this antidemocratic posture has spread from the elite level to rank-and-file partisans. Exploiting data from a massive repeated cross-sectional and panel survey ([Formula: see text] = 45,095 and 5,231 respectively), we find that overwhelming majorities of the public oppose violations of democratic norms, and virtually nobody supports partisan violence. This bipartisan consensus remains unchanged over time despite high levels of affective polarization and exposure to divisive elite rhetoric during the 2022 political campaign. Additionally, we find no evidence that elected officials' practice of election denialism encourages their constituents to express antidemocratic attitudes. Overall, these results suggest that the clear and present threat to American democracy comes from unilateral actions by political elites that stand in contrast to the views of their constituents. In closing, we consider the implications of the stark disconnect between the behavior of Republican elites and the attitudes of Republican voters.

Meta-perception and misinformation

Research on political misperceptions is flourishing across disciplines. Literature on misinformation susceptibility and political group meta-perceptions have arisen independently, both seeking to understand how inaccurate social beliefs of the first and second order respectively contribute to political polarization. Here we review these literatures and argue for greater integration. We highlight four domains where these two literatures intersect: how inaccurate group meta-perceptions may increase misinformation susceptibility, how misinformation may itself convey inaccurate second-order information, how second-order perceptions of misinformation belief may increase misinformation susceptibility, and how reputational concerns may affect misinformation engagement. Our hope is to illuminate fruitful avenues of future research and inspire scholars of political misperceptions to pursue unified theoretical models of how misperceptions drive negative political outcomes.

Norm-violating rhetoric undermines support for participatory inclusiveness and political equality among Trump supporters

Over the last decade, the United States has seen increasing antidemocratic rhetoric by political leaders. Yet, prior work suggests that such norm-violating rhetoric does not undermine support for democracy as a system of government. We argue that, while that may be true, such rhetoric does vitiate support for specific democratic principles. We test this theory by extending prior work to assess the effects of Trump's norm-violating rhetoric on general support for democracy as well as for the principles of participatory inclusiveness, contestation, the rule of law, and political equality. We find that Trump's rhetoric does not alter attitudes toward democracy as a preferred system but does reduce support for inclusiveness and equality among his supporters. Our findings suggest that elite rhetoric can undermine basic principles of American democracy.

Influencing recommendation algorithms to reduce the spread of unreliable news by encouraging humans to fact-check articles, in a field experiment

Society often relies on social algorithms that adapt to human behavior. Yet scientists struggle to generalize the combined behavior of mutually-adapting humans and algorithms. This scientific challenge is a governance problem when algorithms amplify human responses to falsehoods. Could attempts to influence humans have second-order effects on algorithms? Using a large-scale field experiment, I test if influencing readers to fact-check unreliable sources causes news aggregation algorithms to promote or lessen the visibility of those sources. Interventions encouraged readers to fact-check articles or fact-check and provide votes to the algorithm. Across 1104 discussions, these encouragements increased human fact-checking and reduced vote scores on average. The fact-checking condition also caused the algorithm to reduce the promotion of articles over time by as much as -25 rank positions on average, enough to remove an article from the front page. Overall, this study offers a path for the science of human-algorithm behavior by experimentally demonstrating how influencing collective human behavior can also influence algorithm behavior.

Resistance to COVID-19 vaccination and the social contract: evidence from Italy

Confronted with stalled vaccination efforts against COVID-19, many governments embraced mandates and other measures to incentivize vaccination that excluded the unvaccinated from aspects of social and economic life. Even still, many citizens remained unvaccinated. We advance a social contract framework for understanding who remains unvaccinated and why. We leverage both observational and individual-level survey evidence from Italy to study the relationship between vaccination status and social context, social trust, political partisanship, and adherence to core institutional structures such as the rule of law and collective commitments. We find that attitudes toward the rule of law and collective commitments outside the domain of vaccination are strongly associated with compliance with vaccine mandates and incentives. Partisanship also corresponds with vaccine behaviors, as supporters of parties whose leaders criticized aggressive policies to incentivize or mandate vaccination and emphasized individual liberty are least likely to comply. Our findings suggest appeals emphasizing individual benefits may be more effective than appeals emphasizing collective responsibility.

A belief systems analysis of fraud beliefs following the 2020 US election

Beliefs that the US 2020 Presidential election was fraudulent are prevalent despite substantial contradictory evidence. Why are such beliefs often resistant to counter-evidence? Is this resistance rational, and thus subject to evidence-based arguments, or fundamentally irrational? Here we surveyed 1,642 Americans during the 2020 vote count, testing fraud belief updates given hypothetical election outcomes. Participants' fraud beliefs increased when their preferred candidate lost and decreased when he won, and both effects scaled with partisan preferences, demonstrating partisan asymmetry (desirability effects). A Bayesian model of rational updating of a system of beliefs-beliefs in the true vote winner, fraud prevalence and beneficiary of fraud-accurately accounted for this partisan asymmetry, outperforming alternative models of irrational, motivated updating and models lacking the full belief system. Partisan asymmetries may not reflect motivated reasoning, but rather rational attributions over multiple potential causes of evidence. Changing such beliefs may require targeting multiple key beliefs simultaneously rather than direct debunking attempts.

The political system through a partisan lens: Within-person changes in support for political parties precede political system attitudes

Although political party support and attitudes towards the political system are closely related, the temporal ordering of these associations is unclear. Indeed, prior research identifies both partisan-led change in system attitudes and system attitude-led change in party support. Using a ten-year (2010-2020) national probability sample of New Zealand adults (N = 66,359), we test these associations by modelling the within-person cross-lagged effects between conservative and liberal party support, and political system justification. During conservative-led governments, increases in conservative party support predicted increases in political system justification more strongly than vice versa. The 2017 shift to a liberal-led government was met with an immediate reversal of the effects of party support on system justification, but the effect of system justification on party support took a full year to reverse. These results demonstrate people's perceptions of the fairness of the political system depend on their support for the party in power.

Quantifying the 'end of history' through a Bayesian Markov-chain approach

Political regimes have been changing throughout human history. After the apparent triumph of liberal democracies at the end of the twentieth century, Francis Fukuyama and others have been arguing that humankind is approaching an 'end of history' (EoH) in the form of a universality of liberal democracies. This view has been challenged by recent developments that seem to indicate the rise of defective democracies across the globe. There has been no attempt to quantify the expected EoH with a statistical approach. In this study, we model the transition between political regimes as a Markov process and-using a Bayesian inference approach-we estimate the transition probabilities between political regimes from time-series data describing the evolution of political regimes from 1800 to 2018. We then compute the steady state for this Markov process which represents a mathematical abstraction of the EoH and predicts that approximately 46% of countries will be full democracies. Furthermore, we find that, under our model, the fraction of autocracies in the world is expected to increase for the next half-century before it declines. Using random-walk theory, we then estimate survival curves of different types of regimes and estimate characteristic lifetimes of democracies and autocracies of 244 years and 69 years, respectively. Quantifying the expected EoH allows us to challenge common beliefs about the nature of political equilibria. Specifically, we find no statistical evidence that the EoH constitutes a fixed, complete omnipresence of democratic regimes.

Misperceptions about out-partisans' democratic values may erode democracy

Two studies (one preregistered) of Americans (N = 2200) drawn from a nationally representative panel show that both Democrats and Republicans personally value core democratic characteristics, such as free and fair elections, but severely underestimate opposing party members' support for those same characteristics. Democrats estimate that the average Democrat values democratic characteristics 56% (in Study 1) and 77% (in Study 2) more than the average Republican. In a mirror image, Republicans estimate that the average Republican values democratic characteristics 82% (in Study 1) and 88% (in Study 2) more than the average Democrat. In turn, the tendency to believe that political ingroup members value democratic characteristics more than political outgroup members is associated with support for anti-democratic practices, especially among Republicans. Results suggest biased and inaccurate intergroup perceptions may contribute to democratic erosion in the United States.

Online engagement with 2020 election misinformation and turnout in the 2021 Georgia runoff election

Following the 2020 general election, Republican elected officials, including then-President Donald Trump, promoted conspiracy theories claiming that Joe Biden's close victory in Georgia was fraudulent. Such conspiratorial claims could implicate participation in the Georgia Senate runoff election in different ways-signaling that voting doesn't matter, distracting from ongoing campaigns, stoking political anger at out-partisans, or providing rationalizations for (lack of) enthusiasm for voting during a transfer of power. Here, we evaluate the possibility of any on-average relationship with turnout by combining behavioral measures of engagement with election conspiracies online and administrative data on voter turnout for 40,000 Twitter users registered to vote in Georgia. We find small, limited associations. Liking or sharing messages opposed to conspiracy theories was associated with higher turnout than expected in the runoff election, and those who liked or shared tweets promoting fraud-related conspiracy theories were slightly less likely to vote.

Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support for partisan violence

Prominent events, such as the 2021 US Capitol attack, have brought politically motivated violence to the forefront of Americans’ minds. Yet, the causes of support for partisan violence remain poorly understood. Across four studies, we found evidence that exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans’ support for violence are a major cause of partisans’ own support for partisan violence. Further, correcting these false beliefs reduces partisans’ support for and willingness to engage in violence, especially among those with the largest misperceptions, and this effect endured for 1 mo. These findings suggest that a simple correction of partisans’ misperceptions could be a practical and scalable way to durably reduce Americans’ support for, and intentions to engage in, partisan violence.

Scholars, policy makers, and the general public have expressed growing concern about the possibility of large-scale political violence in the United States. Prior research substantiates these worries, as studies reveal that many American partisans support the use of violence against rival partisans. Here, we propose that support for partisan violence is based in part on greatly exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans’ support for violence. We also predict that correcting these inaccurate “metaperceptions” can reduce partisans’ own support for partisan violence. We test these hypotheses in a series of preregistered, nationally representative, correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies (total n = 4,741) collected both before and after the 2020 US presidential election and the 2021 US Capitol attack. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that both Democrats’ and Republicans’ perceptions of their rival partisans’ support for violence and willingness to engage in violence were very inaccurate, with estimates ranging from 245 to 442% higher than actual levels. Further, we found that a brief, informational correction of these misperceptions reduced support for violence by 34% (Study 3) and willingness to engage in violence by 44% (Study 4). In the latter study, a follow-up survey revealed that the correction continued to significantly reduce support for violence approximately 1 mo later. Together, these results suggest that support for partisan violence in the United States stems in part from systematic overestimations of rival partisans’ support for violence and that correcting these misperceptions can durably reduce support for partisan violence in the mass public.

Current research overstates American support for political violence

SignificanceRecent political events show that members of extreme political groups support partisan violence, and survey evidence supposedly shows widespread public support. We show, however, that, after accounting for survey-based measurement error, support for partisan violence is far more limited. Prior estimates overstate support for political violence because of random responding by disengaged respondents and because of a reliance on hypothetical questions about violence in general instead of questions on specific acts of political violence. These same issues also cause the magnitude of the relationship between previously identified correlates and partisan violence to be overstated. As policy makers consider interventions designed to dampen support for violence, our results provide critical information about the magnitude of the problem.