Insight and creative thinking processes: Routineandspecial

A meta-analytical review of the impact of mindfulness on creativity: Framing current lines of research and defining moderator variables

Findings relating to the impact of mindfulness interventions on creative performance remain inconsistent, perhaps because of discrepancies between study designs, including variability in the length of mindfulness interventions, the absence of control groups or the tendencies to explore creativity as one unitary construct. To derive a clearer understanding of the impact that mindfulness interventions may exert on creative performance, two meta-analytical reviews were conducted, drawing respectively on studies using a control group design (n = 20) and studies using a pretest-posttest design (n = 17). A positive effect was identified between mindfulness and creativity, both for control group designs (d = 0.42, 95% CIs [0.29, 0.54]) and pretest-posttest designs (d = 0.59, 95% CIs [0.38, 0.81]). Subgroup analysis revealed that intervention length, creativity task (i.e., divergent vs. convergent thinking tasks) and control group type, were significant moderators for control group studies, whereas only intervention length was a significant moderator for pretest-posttest studies. Overall, the findings support the use of mindfulness as a tool to enhance creative performance, with more advantageous outcomes for convergent as opposed to divergent thinking tasks. We discuss the implications of study design and intervention length as key factors of relevance to future research aimed at advancing theoretical accounts of the relationship between mindfulness and creativity.

Creativity From Constraint Exploration and Exploitation

Using the frameworks of creativity as problem solving and Integrated Constraints in Creativity (IConIC), this article develops the proposal that creativity is best understood in terms of a cycle of constraint exploration and exploitation. This general thesis, which applies to varied domains and levels of creativity, is supported by three specific proposals about the role of constraints in creativity, each of which is developed and illustrated with examples. First, constraints provide the criteria for the evaluation of creative outcomes, which can vary as a function of the emphasis on novel usefulness or useful novelty. Second, constraints are critical in each step of the creative process: problem finding, problem construction, and problem solving. Third, constraints play a key role in both open-ended and closed-ended creative problems. These arguments are supported by specific predictions, concerning: (a) task differences in whether novelty or usefulness are emphasized more; (b) individual differences in the processing of constraints (some may favor flexible constraint exploration, while others may favor persistent constraint exploitation), which I hypothesize also correlate with (c) engagement in different types of creative problem-solving (more open-ended, of the sort encountered in art, vs. more closed-ended, of the sort encountered in science, business, and engineering).

Integrated Constraints in Creativity: Foundations for a Unifying Model

Despite their negative connotation, and the pervasiveness of blue-sky, outside-the-box thinking metaphors, constraints are at the heart of creativity. Using a multidisciplinary approach, as part of the Integrated Constraints in Creativity (IConIC) model, I propose that creative outcomes emerge from the successful leveraging of different types of constraints. I introduce a new, constraint-based definition of creativity, grounded in categorization theory, and parsimonious taxonomies of constraints based on which I outline testable predictions and corroborating evidence. I argue that constraints differ in terms of their flexibility (fixed, faux-fixed, or flexible) and functions (exclusionary or focusing), and in terms of whether they apply to the problem search time or the problem search space. Within the search space, constraints can refer to specific concepts or categories. I also advance a distinction between creativity maximizers and satisficers as a function of creativity goals, semantic networks, expertise, and the new constructs of constraint leveraging power and constraint leveraging mindset, that help to explain differences in successful integration of constraints for creativity and creative achievement.

Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load

The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.

Opposites in Reasoning Processes: Do We Use Them More Than We Think, but Less Than We Could?

Our aim in this paper is to contribute toward acknowledging the general role of opposites as an organizing principle in the human mind. We support this claim in relation to human reasoning by collecting evidence from various studies which shows that "thinking in opposites" is not only involved in formal logical thinking, but can also be applied in both deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as in problem solving. We also describe the results of a series of studies which, although they have been developed within a number of different theoretical frameworks based on various methodologies, all demonstrate that giving hints or training reasoners to think in terms of opposites improves their performance in tasks in which spontaneous thinking may lead to classic biases and impasses. Since we all possess an intuitive idea of what opposites are, prompting people to "think in opposites" is something which is undoubtedly within everyone's reach and in the final section, we discuss the potential of this strategy and suggest possible future research directions of systematic testing the benefits that might arise from the use of this technique in contexts beyond those tested thus far. Ascertaining the conditions in which reasoners might benefit will also help in terms of clarifying the underlying mechanisms from the point of view, for instance, of analytical, conscious processing vs. automatic, unconscious processing.

Creativity Is Optimal Novelty and Maximal Positive Affect: A New Definition Based on the Spreading Activation Model

Creativity is commonly defined as a process that leads to a novel and useful outcome (an idea, product, or expression). However, two dilemmas about this definition remain unresolved: (1) A strict application of usefulness is difficult to apply to artistic works: who decides what artwork is useful, and how it is useful? (2) The implied boundary conditions of novelty are problematic: The default perspective is that novelty has a monotonic increasing relationship with creativity, or it is categorical-i.e., novel or not. To address these dilemmas, this paper proposes a spreading activation model of creativity (SAMOC), a model built on a brain-architecture-inspired vast interconnected network of nodes, each node representing information, and assigned meanings through interaction with the environment. Nodes are linked to each other according to principles of temporal contiguity (linking objects/events in time) and similarity (linking objects/events by shared features). A node activated by attention spreads through the network through previously linked nodes. Nodes that are well connected activate each other easily, while those that are weakly connected do not. Net total activation corresponds to positive affect (e.g., pleasure), and this is proposed as an essential criteria for a creative work of art, instead of usefulness. SAMOC also predicts that creativity will be optimized at an intermediate, not extreme, level of novelty. Too much activation will occur with the activation of preexisting ideas (hence reproduction rather than creativity), and too much novelty will not produce spread of activation. The two functions (spreading activation and the novelty curve) are superposed to demonstrate this optimal novelty hypothesis. Early evidence of the hypothesis comes from the data that some great works of art were critically rejected at premiers (suggesting excessive novelty), but after sufficient repetition (and therefore linking) became suitably associated and commenced generating activation. The hypothesis has important implications for future empirical research programs on creativity, and for the definition of creativity itself.

The role of working memory capacity in analytic and multiply-constrained problem-solving in demanding situations

Working memory processes are important for analytic problem-solving; however, their role in multiply-constrained problem-solving is currently debated. This study explored individual differences in working memory and successful completion of analytic and multiply-constrained problem-solving by having participants solve algebra and compound remote associate (CRAT) problems of varying difficulty under low and high memory demand conditions. Working memory was predictive of both algebra and multiply-constrained problem-solving. Specifically, participants with high working memory solved more problems than those with low working. Memory load did not differentially affect performance for low and high working memory participants. However, for multiply-constrained problem-solving the effect of item difficulty was more detrimental for high-span participants than low-span participants. Together, these findings suggest that working memory processes are important for both types of problem-solving and that participants with low working memory capacity may need to offload internal memory demands onto the environment to efficiently solve problems.

Normative Data for 84 UK English Rebus Puzzles

Recent investigations have established the value of using rebus puzzles in studying the insight and analytic processes that underpin problem solving. The current study sought to validate a pool of 84 rebus puzzles in terms of their solution rates, solution times, error rates, solution confidence, self-reported solution strategies, and solution phrase familiarity. All of the puzzles relate to commonplace English sayings and phrases in the United Kingdom. Eighty-four rebus puzzles were selected from a larger stimulus set of 168 such puzzles and were categorized into six types in relation to the similarity of their structures. The 84 selected problems were thence divided into two sets of 42 items (Set A and Set B), with rebus structure evenly balanced between each set. Participants (N = 170; 85 for Set A and 85 for Set B) were given 30 s to solve each item, subsequently indicating their confidence in their solution and self-reporting the process used to solve the problem (analysis or insight), followed by the provision of ratings of the familiarity of the solution phrases. The resulting normative data yield solution rates, error rates, solution times, confidence ratings, self-reported strategies and familiarity ratings for 84 rebus puzzles, providing valuable information for the selection and matching of problems in future research.

"The Penny Drops": Investigating Insight Through the Medium of Cryptic Crosswords

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution.

Aiding the search: Examining individual differences in multiply-constrained problem solving

Understanding and resolving complex problems is of vital importance in daily life. Problems can be defined by the limitations they place on the problem solver. Multiply-constrained problems are traditionally examined with the compound remote associates task (CRAT). Performance on the CRAT is partially dependent on an individual's working memory capacity (WMC). These findings suggest that executive processes are critical for problem solving and that there are reliable individual differences in multiply-constrained problem solving abilities. The goals of the current study are to replicate and further elucidate the relation between WMC and CRAT performance. To achieve these goals, we manipulated preexposure to CRAT solutions and measured WMC with complex-span tasks. In Experiment 1, we report evidence that preexposure to CRAT solutions improved problem solving accuracy, WMC was correlated with problem solving accuracy, and that WMC did not moderate the effect of preexposure on problem solving accuracy. In Experiment 2, we preexposed participants to correct and incorrect solutions. We replicated Experiment 1 and found that WMC moderates the effect of exposure to CRAT solutions such that high WMC participants benefit more from preexposure to correct solutions than low WMC (although low WMC participants have preexposure benefits as well). Broadly, these results are consistent with theories of working memory and problem solving that suggest a mediating role of attention control processes.

Cognitive mechanisms for inferring the meaning of novel signals during symbolisation

As participants repeatedly interact using graphical signals (as in a game of Pictionary), the signals gradually shift from being iconic (or motivated) to being symbolic (or arbitrary). The aim here is to test experimentally whether this change in the form of the signal implies a concomitant shift in the inferential mechanisms needed to understand it. The results show that, during early, iconic stages, there is more reliance on creative inferential processes associated with insight problem solving, and that the recruitment of these cognitive mechanisms decreases over time. The variation in inferential mechanism is not predicted by the sign’s visual complexity or iconicity, but by its familiarity, and by the complexity of the relevant mental representations. The discussion explores implications for pragmatics, language evolution, and iconicity research.