Changing the conversation about brain death

Organ Donation by the Imminently Dead: Addressing the Organ Shortage and the Dead Donor Rule

The dead donor rule (DDR) has facilitated the saving of hundreds of thousands of lives. Recent advances in heart donation, however, have exposed how DDR has limited donation of all organs. We propose advancing the moment in the dying process at which death can be determined to increase substantially the supply of organs for transplantation. We justify this approach by identifying certain flaws in the Uniform Determination of Death Act and proposing a modification of that law that permits earlier procurement of healthier organs in greater numbers.

The conceptual injustice of the brain death standard

Family disputes over the diagnosis of brain death have caused much controversy in the bioethics literature over the conceptual validity of the brain death standard. Given the tenuous status of brain death as death, it is pragmatically fruitful to reframe intractable debates about the metaphysical nature of brain death as metalinguistic disputes about its conceptual deployment. This new framework leaves the metaphysical debate open and brings into focus the social functions that are served by deploying the concept of brain death. In doing so, it highlights the epistemic injustice of medicolegal authorities that force people to uniformly accept brain death as a diagnosis of death based on normative considerations of institutional interests, such as saving hospital resources and organ supplies, rather than empirical evidence of brain death as death, which is insufficient at best and nonexistent at worst. In light of this injustice, I propose the rejection of the uniform standard of brain death in favor of a choice-based system that respects families' individualized views of death.

Organ Donation and the Dead Donor Rule: A Synopsis of Pressing Ethical Controversies and Practical Questions

OBJECTIVES

As a result of recent biomedical advancements, organ donation continues to save and enhance countless lives globally.Yet,the gap between the organ supply and demand persists, leading to approximately 17 people dying each day waiting for an organ transplant and another person being added to the transplant waiting list every 9 minutes. This gap persists, in part, because of ethical and practical concerns arising from ambiguities surrounding death determination before donation and the dead donor rule. In this study, we discuss challenges related to defining death in the context of organ donation, critical and tolerant views on the dead donorrule, and possible avenues by which some of the ambiguities and ethicaltensions related to organ donation may be resolved.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We reviewed literature opinions and data pertaining to cultural and religious influences affecting societal attitudes toward death determination and organ donation and examined the future of deceased organ donation.

RESULTS

Cultural and religious influences affect societal attitudes toward death determination and organ donation. There is a plurality of views on the matter that may be assuaged to an extent by standardized death determination criterion that could be implemented globally or by identifying alternative therapies other than human organ transplant.

CONCLUSIONS

The debate regarding death and the acceptability of dead donor organs fortransplant does not have a straightforward solution, and efforts are needed to overcome social, cultural and religious objections.

Is Death Irreversible?

There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that, despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible.

The Shifting Landscape of Death by Neurologic Criteria in Pediatrics: Current Controversies and Persistent Questions

Since the concept of death by neurologic criteria (DNC) or "brain death" was articulated by the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee in 1968, efforts to establish and uphold DNC as equivalent to biologic death have been supported through federal and state legislation, professional guidelines, and hospital policies. Despite these endeavors, DNC remains controversial among bioethics scholars and clinicians and is not universally accepted by patient families and the public. In this focused review, we outline the current points of contention surrounding the diagnosis of DNC in pediatric patients. These include physiologic, legal, and philosophical inconsistencies in the definition of DNC, controversy regarding the components of the clinical exam, variability in clinical practice, and ethical concerns regarding justice and role of informed consent. By better understanding these controversies, clinicians may serve families grappling with the diagnosis of DNC more effectively, compassionately, and equitably.

Healthcare Professionals’ Understandings of the Definition and Determination of Death: A Scoping Review

Background.

During the 1950s, advances in critical care, and organ transplantation altered the relationship between organ failure and death. There has since been a shift away from traditional cardiocirculatory based to brain-based criteria of death, with resulting academic controversy, despite the practice being largely accepted worldwide. Our objective is to develop a comprehensive description of the current understandings of healthcare professionals regarding the meaning, definition, and determination of death.

Methods.

Online databases were used to identify papers published from 2003 to 2020. Additional sources were searched for conference proceedings and theses. Two reviewers screened papers using predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Complementary searches and review of reference lists complemented the final study selection. A data extraction instrument was developed to iteratively chart the results of the review. A qualitative approach was conducted to thematically analyze the data.

Results.

Seven thousand four hundred twenty-eight references were identified. In total, 75 papers met the inclusion criteria. Fourteen additional papers were added from complementary searches. Most were narratives (35%), quantitative investigations (21%), and reviews (18%). Identified themes included: (1) the historical evolution of brain death (BD), (2) persistent controversies about BD and death determination, (3) wide variability in healthcare professionals’ knowledge and attitudes, (4) critical need for BD determination revision.

Conclusions.

We concluded that although BD is widely accepted, there exists variation in healthcare providers’ understanding of its conceptual basis. Death determination remains a divisive issue among scholars. This review identified a need for increased opportunities for formal training on BD among healthcare providers.

Diagnosing death 50 years after the Harvard brain death report

More than 50 years after the publication of the Harvard Committee Report that sought to define death according to whole-brain function criteria, this document continues to generate a diversity of opinions regarding how death should be defined. The various perspectives show that doubts linger regarding when brain death should be diagnosed, the criteria to pinpoint the occurrence of death, and the alignment of medical practices seeking to establish human death with these criteria. This study reviews and assesses three perspectives that have made significant contributions to the debate. Attention is also given to definitions of death that depart from the recommendations of the Harvard Report. Appraisals of various arguments lead to the conclusion that changes in the definition of death have resulted from advances in knowledge of human biology, medical technology and diagnostic techniques. A commentary is included on expediting the time of death with the view of organ donation.

Organ Donation and Declaration of Death: Combined Neurologic and Cardiopulmonary Standards

Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and the lack of standardized protocols for organ procurement. Combining the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards into a single protocol would mitigate the weaknesses of both and provide greater biologic and moral certainty that a donor of unpaired vital organs is indeed dead.

Summary

Before a person's organs can be used for transplantation, he or she must be declared "brain-dead." However, sometimes when someone is declared brain-dead, that person can be maintained on life-support for days or even weeks. This creates some confusion about whether the person has truly died. For patients who have a severe neurologic injury but are not brain-dead, organ donation can also occur after his or her heart stops beating. However, this protocol is more ambiguous and lacks standardized protocols. We propose that before a person can donate organs, he or she must first be declared brain-dead, and then his or her heart must irreversibly stop beating before organs are taken.

When are you dead enough to be a donor? Can any feasible protocol for the determination of death on circulatory criteria respect the dead donor rule?

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term "death" nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of "irreversibility" need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty.

Realigning the Neural Paradigm for Death

Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death.

Apnea Threshold in Pediatric Brain Death: A Case with Variable Results Across Serial Examinations

Consensus guidelines currently exist for the evaluation of pediatric patients with suspected brain death. The guidelines include the requirement for two consistent examinations separated by an observation period and a threshold of 60 mm Hg for PaCO ₂ during apnea testing. We present a patient who met all prerequisites to perform brain death examination but had variability in examinations during apnea testing. We discuss our strategy in managing these unexpected findings, including the importance of open and ongoing communication with the family, and the implications for current guidelines for the determination of brain death in pediatric patients.

Inconsistencies Between the Criterion and Tests for Brain Death

The whole-brain criterion of death provides that a person who has irreversibly lost all clinical functions of the brain is dead. Bedside brain death (BD) tests permit physicians to determine BD by showing that the whole-brain criterion of death has been fulfilled. In a nonsystematic literature review, we identified and analyzed case reports of a mismatch between the whole-brain criterion of death and bedside BD tests. We found examples of patients diagnosed as BD who showed (1) neurologic signs compatible with retained brain functions, (2) neurologic signs of uncertain origin, and (3) an inconsistency between standard BD tests and ancillary tests for BD. Two actions can resolve the mismatch between the whole-brain criterion of death and BD tests: (1) loosen the whole-brain criterion of death by requiring only the irreversible cessation of relevant brain functions and (2) tighten BD tests by requiring an ancillary test proving the cessation of intracranial blood flow. Because no one knows the precise brain functions whose loss is necessary to fulfill the whole-brain criterion of death, we advocate tightening BD tests by requiring the absence of intracranial blood flow.

Organ Transplantation in Iran; Current State and Challenges with a View on Ethical Consideration

Organ transplantation is a new issue in medical science. It is an important achievement and a sign of the progression and ability of medical centers around the world. Governments, populations, the medical community and people involved in culture, art, and media all have a decisive role in the culture of organ donation, which is the only way to guarantee that the healthy organs of a brain-dead person can continue to work and save the lives of people in need of organ transplantation. The brain death phenomenon and its possible application in organ transplantation, while offering new hope for the salvation of a number of patients, has led to many ethical, cultural, and legal issues. Ethical issues in organ transplantation are very complicated due to many social factors such as religion, culture, and traditions of the affected communities. The ethical and legal points of removing organs from the body of a living or cadaveric source, the definition of brain death, the moral and legal conditions of the donor and the recipient, and the financial relationship between them and many others, are all critical issues in organ transplantation. While there may be no available explicit solution to these issues, they should be rigorously considered by the experts. Efforts to systematically eliminate barriers and solve problems in organ transplantation, can not only reduce the costs of maintaining brain-dead patients and encourage patients that need organ transplantation but can also prevent immoral and illegal activities. In this paper, we have reviewed the most important and current challenges in organ transplantation with a view to the ethical considerations, and we have suggested some strategies to extend it in Iran.

Is there a place for CPR and sustained physiological support in brain-dead non-donors?

This article addresses whether cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and sustained physiological support should ever be permitted in individuals who are diagnosed as brain dead and who had held previously expressed moral or religious objections to the currently accepted criteria for such a determination. It contrasts how requests for care would normally be treated in cases involving a brain-dead individual with previously expressed wishes to donate and a similarly diagnosed individual with previously expressed beliefs that did not conform to a brain-based conception of death. The paper first focuses narrowly on requests for CPR and then expands its scope to address extended physiological support. It describes how refusing the brain-dead non-donor's requests for either CPR or extended support would represent enduring harm to the antemortem or previously autonomous individual by negating their beliefs and self-identity. The paper subsequently discusses potential implications of policy that would allow greater accommodations to those with conscientious objections to currently accepted brain-based death criteria, such as for cost, insurance, higher brain formulations and bedside communication. The conclusion is that granting wider latitude to personal conceptions around the definition of death, rather than forcing a contested definition on those with valid moral and religious objections, would benefit both individuals and society.

Death by neurological criteria: expert definitions and lay misgivings

For decades, there has been persistent controversy concerning brain death, or the determination of death by neurological criteria, among physicians, philosophers, and the lay public. This article examines the various ways that brain death is conceptualized and justified, as well as the persistent questions and controversies related to brain death, particularly within pluralistic, multicultural societies. A culturally sensitive and practical way forward is proposed.

When Brain Death Belies Belief

The case of Jahi McMath has reignited a discussion concerning how society should define death. Despite pronouncing McMath brain dead based on the American Academy of Neurology criteria, the court ordered continued mechanical ventilation to accommodate the family's religious beliefs. Recent case law suggests that the potential for a successful challenge to the neurologic criteria of death provisions of the Uniform Determination of Death Act are greater than ever in the majority of states that have passed religious freedom legislation. As well, because standard ethical claims regarding brain death are either patently untrue or subject to legitimate dispute, those whose beliefs do not comport with the brain death standard should be able to reject it.

The Brain Dead Patient Is Still Sentient: A Further Reply to Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez

Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez have argued that the total brain dead patient is still dead because the integrated entity that remains is not even an animal, not only because he is not sentient but also, and more importantly, because he has lost the radical capacity for sentience. In this essay, written from within and as a contribution to the Catholic philosophical tradition, I respond to Lee and Grisez's argument by proposing that the brain dead patient is still sentient because an animal with an intact but severed spinal cord can still perceive and respond to external stimuli. The brain dead patient is an unconscious sentient organism.

Revisiting the Persisting Tension Between Expert and Lay Views About Brain Death and Death Determination: A Proposal Inspired by Pragmatism

Brain death or determination of death based on the neurological criterion has been an enduring source of controversy in academic and clinical circles. The controversy chiefly concerns how death is defined, and it also bears on the justification of the proposed criteria for death determination and their interpretation. Part of the controversy on brain death and death determination stems from disputed crucial medical facts, but in this paper I formulate another hypothesis about the nature of ongoing controversies. At stake is a misunderstood relationship between, on the one hand, the nature of our lay (or our "manifest image") views about death and, on the other hand, the nature of scientific insights (and related conceptual refinements) into death and its determination (the "scientific image"). The misunderstanding of this relationship has partly anchored the controversy and continues to fuel it. Based on a perspective inspired by pragmatism, which stresses the positive contribution of science to ethical and policy debates but also challenges different forms of scientism in science and philosophy found in foundationalist interpretations, I scrutinize three different stances regarding the relationship between lay and scientific perspectives about the definition of death: (1) foundational lay views, (2) foundational expert views, and (3) co-evolving views. I argue that only the latter is sustainable given recent challenges to foundationalist interpretations.