Three Kinds of Decision-Making Capacity for Refusing Medical Interventions

New Brunswick's mental health action plan: A quantitative exploration of program efficacy in children and youth using the Canadian Community Health Survey

In 2011, the New Brunswick government released the New Brunswick Mental Health Action Plan 2011-2018 (Action Plan). Following the release of the Action Plan in 2011, two progress reports were released in 2013 and 2015, highlighting the implementation status of the Action Plan. While vague in their language, these reports indicated considerable progress in implementing the Action Plan, as various initiatives were undertaken to raise awareness and provide additional resources to facilitate early prevention and intervention in children and youth. However, whether these initiatives have yielded measurable improvements in population-level mental health outcomes in children and youth remains unclear. The current study explored the impact of the Action Plan by visualizing the trend in psychosocial outcomes and service utilization of vulnerable populations in New Brunswick before and after the implementation of the Action Plan using multiple datasets from the Canadian Community Health Survey. Survey-weighted ordinary least square regression analyses were performed to investigate measurable improvements in available mental health outcomes. The result revealed a declining trend in the mental wellness of vulnerable youth despite them consistently reporting higher frequencies of mental health service use. This study highlights the need for a concerted effort in providing effective mental health services to New Brunswick youth and, more broadly, Canadian youth, as well as ensuring rigorous routine outcome monitoring and evaluation plans are consistently implemented for future mental health strategies at the time of their initiation.

Ditching decision-making capacity

Decision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice-determining, on the basis of a patient's decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it is critical that we get things right-that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through the relevant ethical considerations in a way that reliably and transparently delivers correct verdicts about who should and should not have the authority to make their own medical decisions. Unfortunately, however, the standard approach to DMC does not get things right. It is of virtually no help in identifying and clarifying the relevant ethical considerations. And, embedded in the prevailing anti-paternalist paradigm, DMC assessments obfuscate and distort the underlying ethical justification for granting or withholding decisional authority. Here, we describe the core commitments of the standard approach to DMC and then highlight three problems with it. We then argue that these problems are significant enough that they call for more than merely tinkering and fine-tuning; variations of the standard approach cannot adequately address them. Instead, we should ditch DMC.

Decision-Making Capacity to Refuse Treatment at the End of Life: The Need for Recognizing Real-World Practices

End-of-life decision making is a troublesome ethical dilemma. These decisions should be made in trustful patient–doctor relationships. We aimed to propose a balanced approach when discussing this complex issue. We categorized the research into four approaches and suggest that a multidisciplinary approach may be appropriate. We also analyzed the pitfalls of the multidisciplinary approach. Our conclusion is two-fold. First, discussions in this field should be based on real-world practice. If this is not the case, the proposal may be armchair theory, which is not effective in a clinical setting. Second, interdisciplinary researchers should not stick to their position too firmly and should listen to others. Otherwise, proposals made will be paternalistic or philosophically biased. Therefore, when philosophical collaboration is applied to the topic of clinical bioethics, it is necessary to thoroughly examine different positions and carry out careful discussions with consideration for medical care settings. Researchers must also understand what is needed for a trustful patient–doctor relationship. By making such efforts, clinical bioethics will contribute to the wellbeing of patients.