What hinders implementation of the WHO FCTC Article 5.3? - The case of South Korea

The challenges in protecting public health interests in multisectoral governance in the context of small island developing states: the case of tobacco control in Fiji and Vanuatu

BACKGROUND

The commercial determinants of health (CDoH) drive the rise of NCDs globally, and their regulation requires multisectoral governance. Despite existing recommendations to strengthen institutional structures, protecting public health interests can be challenging amidst industry interference and conflicting policy priorities, particularly in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) where the need for rapid economic development is pronounced. Small island developing states (SIDS) face even more challenges in regulating CDoH because their unique socioeconomic, political, and geographic vulnerabilities may weaken institutional conditions that could aid health sector actors in protecting health interests. This study aims to explore the institutional conditions that shape health sector actors' capability to protect public health interests in tobacco governance in Fiji and Vanuatu.

METHODS

We employed a qualitative, exploratory case study design. We applied the administrative process theory to inform data collection and analysis. Seventy interviews were completed in Fiji and Vanuatu from 2018 to 2019.

RESULTS

The findings show that the protection of health interests in tobacco governance were not supported by the institutional conditions in Fiji and Vanuatu. While the policy processes formally ensured a level playing field between actors, policies were often developed through informal mechanisms, and the safeguards to protect public interests from vested private interests were not implemented adequately. SIDS vulnerabilities and weak regulation of political parties contributed to the politicisation of government in both states, resulting in high-level government officials' questionable commitment to protect public health interests. The system of checks and balances usually embedded into democratic governments appeared to be muted, and policymakers had limited bureaucratic autonomy to elevate health interests in multisectoral policymaking amidst high-level government officials' frequent rotation. Finally, capacity constraints aggravated by SIDS vulnerabilities negatively impacted health sector actors' capability to analyse policy alternatives.

CONCLUSIONS

Health sector actors in Fiji and Vanuatu were not supported by institutional conditions that could help them protect public health interests in multisectoral governance to regulate CDoH originating from the tobacco industry. Institutional conditions in these states were shaped by SIDS vulnerabilities but could be improved by targeted capacity building, governance and political system strengthening.

Authority in tobacco control in Pacific Small Island Developing States: a qualitative study of multisectoral tobacco governance in Fiji and Vanuatu

OBJECTIVE

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) struggle with implementing multisectoral tobacco control measures, and health sector actors often lack capacity to forge multisectoral commitment. This study aims to explore the sources and dynamics of authority that can enable multisectoral collaboration despite the divergence of policy agendas in tobacco control.

METHODS

We applied a qualitative, explorative case study design, with data collection and analysis guided by an analytical framework that identifies sources and dynamics of authority. Seventy interviews were conducted in Fiji and Vanuatu between 2018 and 2019.

RESULTS

The key features shaping multisectoral coordination for tobacco control in Fiji and Vanuatu are the expert, institutional, capacity-based and legal authority that state and non-state actors have in tobacco governance. The amount of authority actors can secure from these sources was shown to be influenced by their performance (perceived or real), the discourse around tobacco control, the existing legal tools and their strategic alliances. SIDS vulnerabilities, arising from small size, isolation and developing economies, facilitate an economic growth discourse that reduces health sector actors' authority and empowers protobacco actors to drive tobacco governance.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results highlight the need for terms of engagement with the tobacco industry to enable governments to implement multisectoral tobacco control measures. Expanding assistance on tobacco control among government and civil society actors and increasing messaging about the impact of economic, trade and agricultural practices on health are essential to help SIDS implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

'They have a right to participate as a stakeholder': Article 5.3 implementation and government interactions with the tobacco industry in Ethiopia

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Ethiopia. The analysis highlights how operationalising key requirements of Article 5.3, such as minimising policy engagement with the tobacco industry, has been mediated by path-dependent processes of stakeholder consultation and collaboration that have persisted following privatisation of Ethiopia's state-owned tobacco monopoly.

METHODS

We conducted semistructured interviews with key officials (n=21) working in tobacco control policy, with high levels of access secured across ministries and agencies beyond health.

RESULTS

We found contrasting levels of awareness of Article 5.3 across government sectors, with extremely limited awareness in departments beyond health. The data also highlight competing ideas about conflict of interest, in which recognition of a fundamental conflict of interest with the tobacco industry is largely confined to health actors. Beyond limited cross-sectoral awareness and understanding of Article 5.3, gaps in implementation are exacerbated by assumptions and practices around stakeholder consultation, in which attempts to minimise policy interactions with the tobacco industry are mediated by institutionally embedded processes that presume active engagement. The results also highlight a continuation of the close relationship between the Ethiopian government and tobacco monopoly following its privatisation.

CONCLUSION

The Ethiopian government's recent achievements in tobacco control legislation require that policymakers are actively supported in reconciling perceived tensions and requirements for stakeholder consultation. Effective tobacco control governance would be further enhanced by enabling government agencies to more clearly identify which interactions with the tobacco industry are strictly necessary under Article 5.3 guideline recommendations.

Tobacco Industry Interference Index: Implementation of the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Article 5.3 in India

In India, there has been no attempt to measure the implementation of World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Article 5.3, which provides guidelines to address tobacco industry interference (TII). This study draws on a desk review conducted to assess the frequency and severity of TIIs and the government's response, reported between January and December 2017. This study highlights that the government of India does not allow tobacco industry to participate in policy development. However, the industry interferes by collaborating with the government's allied organizations. The tobacco industry has diversified as food industry in India, and directly or indirectly supports various government programs, by investing through their corporate social responsibility schemes. In addition, there are limited legislative measures to allow transparency in adoption of Article 5.3 guidelines across the country. Hence, the findings of this study underscore an exigent need to adopt and implement Article 5.3 at the national level in India.

European Union implementation of Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

BACKGROUND

Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) requires Parties to the agreement to take proactive measures to protect health policy from the vested interests of the tobacco industry. Parties to the FCTC are required to submit periodic reports to the Convention Secretariat on the efforts undertaken to implement it. Previous analyses of national compliance with the FCTC suggest that Article 5.3 implementation is piecemeal and insufficient in many contexts, with governments relying on general transparency and other existing policies for the purpose of Article 5.3 implementation. No in-depth study of Article 5.3 compliance within the European Union (EU) - a signatory to the Convention - has been undertaken. This study seeks to assess the extent of Article 5.3 compliance in European Union institutions, through an analysis of the mechanisms in place in the European Commission and European Parliament. It analyses EU documents relevant to Article 5.3 compliance, as well as semi-structured interviews with policy actors in the EU institutions and the field of tobacco control.

RESULTS

As with many national governments, Article 5.3 compliance within EU institutions is partial and incomplete. Much of the compliance activity cited in EU reports is derived from general codes of conduct for EU staff and the Juncker Commission's transparency agenda. Interview respondents reveal widespread lack of knowledge about the existence of the FCTC and Article 5.3 amongst key policy actors across the institutions. Within the Commission policies vary greatly between Directorates General, and issues surrounding the conceptualisation of the role of Members of the European Parliament affect implementation in that context. While there is growing awareness of the issue in both the Commission and the Parliament, in large part as a result of the experience of lobbying over the Tobacco Products Directive, there remains considerable resistance in both institutions to further substantive action to implement Article 5.3.

CONCLUSIONS

We recommend that a binding and comprehensive policy and code of conduct, specifically designed for the implementation of Article 5.3 and based on the World Health Organization's guidelines, be created to cover the activities of all employees of all EU institutions. Crucially, such guidelines would need to deal explicitly with third parties acting for the tobacco industry.