Inattentional blindness is influenced by exposure time not motion speed

The visible gorilla: Unexpected fast-not physically salient-Objects are noticeable

It is widely believed that observers can fail to notice clearly visible unattended objects, even if they are moving. Here, we created parametric tasks to test this belief and report the results of three high-powered experiments (total n = 4,493) indicating that this effect is strongly modulated by the speed of the unattended object. Specifically, fast-but not slow-objects are readily noticeable, whether they are attended or not. These results suggest that fast motion serves as a potent exogenous cue that overrides task-focused attention, showing that fast speeds, not long exposure duration or physical salience, strongly diminish inattentional blindness effects.

Does hunger promote the detection of foods? The effect of value on inattentional blindness

Although human perception has evolved into a potent and efficient system, we still fall prey to astonishing failures of awareness as we miss an unexpected object in our direct view when our attention is engaged elsewhere (inattentional blindness). While specific types of value of the unexpected object have been identified to modulate the likelihood of this failure of awareness, it is not clear whether the effect of value on inattentional blindness can be generalized. We hypothesized that the combination of hunger and food-stimuli might increase a more general type of value so that food stimuli have a higher probability to be noticed by hungry participants than by satiated participants. In total, 240 participants were assigned towards a hungry (16 h of fasting) or satiated (no fasting) manipulation and performed afterward a static inattentional blindness task. However, we did not find any effect of value on inattentional blindness based on hunger and food stimuli. We speculate that different underlying mechanisms are involved for different types of value and that value manipulations need to be strong enough to ensure certain value strengths.

Clarifying the effect of facial emotional expression on inattentional blindness

Conscious perception often fails when an object appears unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). While various factors have been identified as determinants of inattentional blindness, the influence of an unexpected object́s semantic value remains ambiguous. This is also true for the supposedly evolutionary meaning of faces; some studies found higher detection rates for faces while others did not or used control conditions that differed in physical aspects of the stimulus as well. In the proposed studies we aim to replicate and clarify the effect of the semantic value of faces on inattentional blindness in a controlled and systematic manner.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

Now or never: noticing occurs early in sustained inattentional blindness

People can show sustained inattentional blindness for unexpected objects visible for seconds or even minutes. Would such objects eventually be noticed given enough time, with the likelihood of noticing accumulating while the unexpected object is visible? Or, is there a narrow window around onset or offset when an object is most likely to be detected, with the chances of noticing dropping outside of that window? Across three experiments (total n's = 283, 756, 488) exploring the temporal dynamics of noticing in sustained inattentional blindness, subjects who noticed the unexpected object did so soon after it onset. Doubling or even tripling the time when the unexpected object was visible barely affected the likelihood of noticing it and had no impact on how accurately subjects reported its features. When people notice an unexpected object in these sustained inattentional blindness tasks, they do so soon after the unexpected object onsets.

Dollars do not determine detection: Monetary value associated with unexpected objects does not affect the likelihood of inattentional blindness

Conscious perception often fails when an object appears unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). Although various factors have been identified that modulate the likelihood of this failure of awareness, it is not clear whether the monetary reward value associated with an object can affect whether or not this object is detected under conditions of inattention. We hypothesised that unexpectedly appearing objects that contain a feature linked to high value, as established via reward learning in a previous task, would subsequently be detected more frequently than objects containing a feature linked to low value. A total of 537 participants first learned the association between a perceptual feature (colour) and subsequent reward values (high, low, or none reward). Afterwards, participants were randomly assigned to a static (Experiment 1) or dynamic (Experiment 2) inattentional blindness task including an unexpected object associated with high, low, or none reward. However, no significant effect of the previously learned value on the subsequent likelihood of detection was observed. We speculate that artificial monetary value, which is known to affect attentional capture, is not strong enough to determine whether or not an object is consciously perceived.

Inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial: Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

When attention is otherwise engaged, observers may experience inattentional blindness, failing to notice objects or events that are presented in plain sight. In an inattentional blindness experiment, an unexpectedstimulus ispresented alongside primary-task stimuli, and its detection is probed. We evaluate a criterion that is commonly used to exclude observers from the data analysis. On the final experimental trial, observers do not perform the primary task, but instead look for anything new. Observers who fail to report the unexpected stimulus on thisfull-attention trialare excluded. On the basis of 4 hypothetical experiments and a review of 128 actual experiments from the literature, we demonstrate some potentially problematic consequences of implementing the full-attention-trial exclusion criterion. Excluded observers may cluster in experimental conditions and the exclusion criterion may lead researchers to understate the pervasiveness of inattentional blindness. It may even render usblindto inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial.

Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst

Zusammenfassung. Wenn wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit einer Aufgabe zuwenden, nehmen wir Dinge, die währenddessen unerwartet auftauchen, häufig nicht bewusst wahr – obwohl sie unmittelbar in unserem Blickfeld erscheinen. Dieses Phänomen, das als Inattentional Blindness bezeichnet wird, kann fatale Konsequenzen in alltäglichen Situationen und auch einen ernstzunehmenden Einfluss auf sportliche Leistungen haben. In Ergänzung zu vorheriger Forschung zeigen meine eigenen Ergebnisse, dass eine Vielzahl situativer Faktoren die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der Inattentional Blindness auftritt, beeinflussen können. Dazu zählen unter anderem bestimmte Eigenschaften des unerwarteten Objekts sowie Kontextfaktoren. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen interindividuelle Unterschiede über die situativen Einflüsse hinaus kaum (oder zumindest nicht reliabel) vorherzusagen, ob Inattentional Blindness auftritt oder nicht. Während es also eine feste Wahrscheinlichkeit über alle Personen hinweg gibt, dass ein unerwartetes Objekt bemerkt wird (deterministischer Aspekt), kann anhand der Persönlichkeitsstruktur und der kognitiven Fähigkeiten dieser Personen nicht vorhergesagt werden, wer von ihnen das unerwartete Objekt entdecken wird und wer nicht (stochastischer Aspekt).