1
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Yurchenko SB. Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 165:105845. [PMID: 39106941 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105845] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2024] [Revised: 07/26/2024] [Accepted: 08/02/2024] [Indexed: 08/09/2024]
Abstract
A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad "chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey B Yurchenko
- Brain and Consciousness Independent Research Center, Andijan 710132, Uzbekistan.
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2
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Grinde B. Consciousness makes sense in the light of evolution. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 164:105824. [PMID: 39047928 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105824] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2024] [Revised: 07/18/2024] [Accepted: 07/21/2024] [Indexed: 07/27/2024]
Abstract
I believe consciousness is a property of advanced nervous systems, and as such a product of evolution. Thus, to understand consciousness we need to describe the trajectory leading to its evolution and the selective advantages conferred. A deeper understanding of the neurology would be a significant contribution, but other advanced functions, such as hearing and vision, are explained with a comparable lack of detailed knowledge of the brain processes responsible. In this paper, I try to add details and credence to a previously suggested, evolution-based model of consciousness. According to this model, the feature started to evolve in early amniotes (reptiles, birds, and mammals) some 320 million years ago. The reason was the introduction of feelings as a strategy for making behavioral decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bjørn Grinde
- Professor Emeritus, University of Oslo, Problemveien 11, Oslo 0313, Norway.
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3
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Granato G, Baldassarre G. Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory. Neural Netw 2024; 176:106292. [PMID: 38657422 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106292] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2023] [Revised: 03/27/2024] [Accepted: 04/05/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).
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Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Granato
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
| | - Gianluca Baldassarre
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
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4
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Chis-Ciure R, Melloni L, Northoff G. A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 161:105670. [PMID: 38615851 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2024] [Revised: 03/15/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/16/2024]
Abstract
Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert Chis-Ciure
- New York University (NYU), New York, USA; International Center for Neuroscience and Ethics (CINET), Tatiana Foundation, Madrid, Spain; Wolfram Physics Project, USA.
| | - Lucia Melloni
- Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Georg Northoff
- University of Ottawa, Institute of Mental Health Research at the Royal Ottawa Hospital, Ottawa, Canada
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5
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Kanai R, Fujisawa I. Toward a universal theory of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae022. [PMID: 38826771 PMCID: PMC11141593 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2023] [Revised: 05/08/2024] [Accepted: 05/15/2024] [Indexed: 06/04/2024] Open
Abstract
While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryota Kanai
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
| | - Ippei Fujisawa
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
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6
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Storm JF, Klink PC, Aru J, Senn W, Goebel R, Pigorini A, Avanzini P, Vanduffel W, Roelfsema PR, Massimini M, Larkum ME, Pennartz CMA. An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness. Neuron 2024; 112:1531-1552. [PMID: 38447578 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2023] [Revised: 12/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/05/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johan F Storm
- The Brain Signaling Group, Division of Physiology, IMB, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Domus Medica, Sognsvannsveien 9, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
| | - P Christiaan Klink
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Experimental Psychology, Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, 3584 CS Utrecht, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France
| | - Jaan Aru
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
| | - Walter Senn
- Department of Physiology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Rainer Goebel
- Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Oxfordlaan 55, 6229 EV Maastricht, The Netherlands
| | - Andrea Pigorini
- Department of Biomedical, Surgical and Dental Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20122, Italy
| | - Pietro Avanzini
- Istituto di Neuroscienze, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 43125 Parma, Italy
| | - Wim Vanduffel
- Department of Neurosciences, Laboratory of Neuro and Psychophysiology, KU Leuven Medical School, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA; Department of Radiology, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02144, USA
| | - Pieter R Roelfsema
- Department of Vision and Cognition, Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1105 BA Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Laboratory of Visual Brain Therapy, Sorbonne Université, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de la Vision, Paris 75012, France; Department of Integrative Neurophysiology, VU University, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Neurosurgery, Academisch Medisch Centrum, Postbus 22660, 1100 DD Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Marcello Massimini
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences "L. Sacco", Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan 20157, Italy; Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi, Milan 20122, Italy; Azrieli Program in Brain, Mind and Consciousness, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Matthew E Larkum
- Institute of Biology, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Neurocure Center for Excellence, Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Cyriel M A Pennartz
- Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, Center for Neuroscience, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Sciencepark 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, the Netherlands; Research Priority Program Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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7
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Lacalli T. Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1394669. [PMID: 38741757 PMCID: PMC11089241 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1394669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2024] [Accepted: 04/16/2024] [Indexed: 05/16/2024] Open
Abstract
The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thurston Lacalli
- Department of Biology, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada
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8
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Guingrich RE, Graziano MSA. Ascribing consciousness to artificial intelligence: human-AI interaction and its carry-over effects on human-human interaction. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1322781. [PMID: 38605842 PMCID: PMC11008604 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1322781] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2023] [Accepted: 03/13/2024] [Indexed: 04/13/2024] Open
Abstract
The question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be considered conscious and therefore should be evaluated through a moral lens has surfaced in recent years. In this paper, we argue that whether AI is conscious is less of a concern than the fact that AI can be considered conscious by users during human-AI interaction, because this ascription of consciousness can lead to carry-over effects on human-human interaction. When AI is viewed as conscious like a human, then how people treat AI appears to carry over into how they treat other people due to activating schemas that are congruent to those activated during interactions with humans. In light of this potential, we might consider regulating how we treat AI, or how we build AI to evoke certain kinds of treatment from users, but not because AI is inherently sentient. This argument focuses on humanlike, social actor AI such as chatbots, digital voice assistants, and social robots. In the first part of the paper, we provide evidence for carry-over effects between perceptions of AI consciousness and behavior toward humans through literature on human-computer interaction, human-AI interaction, and the psychology of artificial agents. In the second part of the paper, we detail how the mechanism of schema activation can allow us to test consciousness perception as a driver of carry-over effects between human-AI interaction and human-human interaction. In essence, perceiving AI as conscious like a human, thereby activating congruent mind schemas during interaction, is a driver for behaviors and perceptions of AI that can carry over into how we treat humans. Therefore, the fact that people can ascribe humanlike consciousness to AI is worth considering, and moral protection for AI is also worth considering, regardless of AI's inherent conscious or moral status.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rose E. Guingrich
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States
- Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States
| | - Michael S. A. Graziano
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States
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9
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Kirkeby-Hinrup A. Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1341430. [PMID: 38558781 PMCID: PMC10979646 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1341430] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.
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10
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Evers K, Farisco M, Pennartz CMA. Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103668. [PMID: 38417198 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2023] [Revised: 02/07/2024] [Accepted: 02/12/2024] [Indexed: 03/01/2024]
Abstract
How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.
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Affiliation(s)
- K Evers
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
| | - M Farisco
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; Bioethics Unit, Biogem, Molecular Biology and Molecular Genetics Research Institute, Ariano Irpino (AV), Italy
| | - C M A Pennartz
- Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherland; Research Priority Area, Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
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11
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Stein T, van Gaal S, Fahrenfort JJ. How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103669. [PMID: 38395013 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2023] [Revised: 02/16/2024] [Accepted: 02/16/2024] [Indexed: 02/25/2024]
Abstract
One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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12
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Rowe EG, Garrido MI, Tsuchiya N. Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report. Cortex 2024; 172:284-300. [PMID: 38142179 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.11.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2023] [Revised: 10/11/2023] [Accepted: 11/21/2023] [Indexed: 12/25/2023]
Abstract
Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).
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Affiliation(s)
- Elise G Rowe
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia; Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia.
| | - Marta I Garrido
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; ARC Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain Function, Victoria, Australia
| | - Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia; Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia; Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Suita, Osaka, Japan; Department of Qualia Structure, ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, Japan; ARC Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain Function, Victoria, Australia
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13
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Dominik T, Mele A, Schurger A, Maoz U. Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105503. [PMID: 38072144 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Revised: 11/09/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/23/2023]
Abstract
The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Alfred Mele
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, FL, USA
| | | | - Uri Maoz
- Brain Institute, Chapman University, CA, USA
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14
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Schmidt T, Biafora M. A theory of visibility measures in the dissociation paradigm. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:65-88. [PMID: 37528279 PMCID: PMC10977871 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02332-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 08/03/2023]
Abstract
Research on perception without awareness primarily relies on the dissociation paradigm, which compares a measure of awareness of a critical stimulus (direct measure) with a measure indicating that the stimulus has been processed at all (indirect measure). We argue that dissociations between direct and indirect measures can only be demonstrated with respect to the critical stimulus feature that generates the indirect effect, and the observer's awareness of that feature, the critical cue. We expand Kahneman's (Psychological Bulletin, 70, 404-425, 1968) concept of criterion content to comprise the set of all cues that an observer actually uses to perform the direct task. Different direct measures can then be compared by studying the overlap of their criterion contents and their containment of the critical cue. Because objective and subjective measures may integrate different sets of cues, one measure generally cannot replace the other without sacrificing important information. Using a simple mathematical formalization, we redefine and clarify the concepts of validity, exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness in the dissociation paradigm, show how dissociations among different awareness measures falsify both single-valued measures and monocausal theories of "consciousness," and formulate the demand that theories of visual awareness should be sufficiently specific to explain dissociations among different facets of awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Schmidt
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
| | - Melanie Biafora
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany
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15
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Fazekas P, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M. A construct-first approach to consciousness science. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105480. [PMID: 38008237 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2023] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/28/2023]
Abstract
We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Fazekas
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Høegh-Guldbergs Gade 6B, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, Université Libre De Bruxelles, 50 avenue F.D. Roosevelt CP191, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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16
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McFadden J. Carving Nature at Its Joints: A Comparison of CEMI Field Theory with Integrated Information Theory and Global Workspace Theory. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:1635. [PMID: 38136515 PMCID: PMC10743215 DOI: 10.3390/e25121635] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2023] [Revised: 11/29/2023] [Accepted: 12/06/2023] [Indexed: 12/24/2023]
Abstract
The quest to comprehend the nature of consciousness has spurred the development of many theories that seek to explain its underlying mechanisms and account for its neural correlates. In this paper, I compare my own conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory with integrated information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT) for their ability to 'carve nature at its joints' in the sense of predicting the entities, structures, states and dynamics that are conventionally recognized as being conscious or nonconscious. I go on to argue that, though the cemi field theory shares features of both integrated information theory and global workspace theory, it is more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, and is thereby a more successful theory of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johnjoe McFadden
- Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK
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17
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Corcoran AW, Hohwy J, Friston KJ. Accelerating scientific progress through Bayesian adversarial collaboration. Neuron 2023; 111:3505-3516. [PMID: 37738981 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2023.08.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2023] [Revised: 07/26/2023] [Accepted: 08/26/2023] [Indexed: 09/24/2023]
Abstract
Adversarial collaboration has been championed as the gold standard for resolving scientific disputes but has gained relatively limited traction in neuroscience and allied fields. In this perspective, we argue that adversarial collaborative research has been stymied by an overly restrictive concern with the falsification of scientific theories. We advocate instead for a more expansive view that frames adversarial collaboration in terms of Bayesian belief updating, model comparison, and evidence accumulation. This framework broadens the scope of adversarial collaboration to accommodate a wide range of informative (but not necessarily definitive) studies while affording the requisite formal tools to guide experimental design and data analysis in the adversarial setting. We provide worked examples that demonstrate how these tools can be deployed to score theoretical models in terms of a common metric of evidence, thereby furnishing a means of tracking the amount of empirical support garnered by competing theories over time.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew W Corcoran
- Monash Centre for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
| | - Jakob Hohwy
- Monash Centre for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK; VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, USA
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18
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Owen M, Huang Z, Duclos C, Lavazza A, Grasso M, Hudetz AG. Theoretical Neurobiology of Consciousness Applied to Human Cerebral Organoids. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2023:1-21. [PMID: 37850471 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180123000543] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2023]
Abstract
Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew Owen
- Philosophy Department, Yakima Valley College, Yakima, WA, USA
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Zirui Huang
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - Catherine Duclos
- Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Department of Neuroscience, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- Centre for Advanced Research in Sleep Medicine, Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux (CIUSSS) du Nord-de-l'île-de-Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
- CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholars Program, Toronto, ON, Canada
| | - Andrea Lavazza
- Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy
- University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
| | - Matteo Grasso
- Center for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
| | - Anthony G Hudetz
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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19
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Rudrauf D, Sergeant-Perthuis G, Tisserand Y, Poloudenny G, Williford K, Amorim MA. The Projective Consciousness Model: Projective Geometry at the Core of Consciousness and the Integration of Perception, Imagination, Motivation, Emotion, Social Cognition and Action. Brain Sci 2023; 13:1435. [PMID: 37891803 PMCID: PMC10605889 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci13101435] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2023] [Revised: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 09/05/2023] [Indexed: 10/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Consciousness has been described as acting as a global workspace that integrates perception, imagination, emotion and action programming for adaptive decision making. The mechanisms of this workspace and their relationships to the phenomenology of consciousness need to be further specified. Much research in this area has focused on the neural correlates of consciousness, but, arguably, computational modeling can better be used toward this aim. According to the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), consciousness is structured as a viewpoint-organized, internal space, relying on 3D projective geometry and governed by the action of the Projective Group as part of a process of active inference. The geometry induces a group-structured subjective perspective on an encoded world model, enabling adaptive perspective taking in agents. Here, we review and discuss the PCM. We emphasize the role of projective mechanisms in perception and the appraisal of affective and epistemic values as tied to the motivation of action, under an optimization process of Free Energy minimization, or more generally stochastic optimal control. We discuss how these mechanisms enable us to model and simulate group-structured drives in the context of social cognition and to understand the mechanisms underpinning empathy, emotion expression and regulation, and approach-avoidance behaviors. We review previous results, drawing on applications in robotics and virtual humans. We briefly discuss future axes of research relating to applications of the model to simulation- and model-based behavioral science, geometrically structured artificial neural networks, the relevance of the approach for explainable AI and human-machine interactions, and the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Rudrauf
- CIAMS, Université Paris-Saclay, 91405 Orsay, France;
- CIAMS, Université d’Orléans, 45067 Orléans, France
| | - Grégoire Sergeant-Perthuis
- Laboratoire de Biologie Computationnelle et Quantitative (LCQB), CNRS, IBPS, UMR 7238, Sorbonne Université, 75005 Paris, France;
- IMJ-PRG, Inria Paris-Ouragan Project-Team, Sorbonne University, 75005 Paris, France
| | | | - Germain Poloudenny
- Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Lens (LML), UR 2462, Université d’Artois, 62300 Lens, France;
| | - Kenneth Williford
- Philosophy and Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019, USA;
| | - Michel-Ange Amorim
- CIAMS, Université Paris-Saclay, 91405 Orsay, France;
- CIAMS, Université d’Orléans, 45067 Orléans, France
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20
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Ruan Z. The necessary and sufficient mechanism of consciousness in a layered mind. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1280959. [PMID: 37842721 PMCID: PMC10568493 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1280959] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Accepted: 09/14/2023] [Indexed: 10/17/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Zenan Ruan
- Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- Department of Automation, School of Mechanical Engineering and Automation, Zhejiang SCI-TECH University, Hangzhou, China
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21
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Zacks O, Jablonka E. The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad020. [PMID: 37711313 PMCID: PMC10499063 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2023] [Revised: 08/01/2023] [Accepted: 08/24/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023] Open
Abstract
The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Oryan Zacks
- The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv 6934525, Israel
| | - Eva Jablonka
- The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv 6934525, Israel
- CPNSS, London School of Economics, Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
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22
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Sanz LR, Laureys S, Gosseries O. Towards modern post-coma care based on neuroscientific evidence. Int J Clin Health Psychol 2023; 23:100370. [PMID: 36817874 PMCID: PMC9932483 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijchp.2023.100370] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2022] [Accepted: 01/12/2023] [Indexed: 02/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Background Understanding the mechanisms underlying human consciousness is pivotal to improve the prognostication and treatment of severely brain-injured patients. Consciousness remains an elusive concept and the identification of its neural correlates is an active subject of research, however recent neuroscientific advances have allowed scientists to better characterize disorders of consciousness. These breakthroughs question the historical nomenclature and our current management of post-comatose patients. Method This review examines the contribution of consciousness neurosciences to the current clinical management of severe brain injury. It investigates the major impact of consciousness disorders on healthcare systems, the scientific frameworks employed to identify their neural correlates and how evidence-based data from neuroimaging research have reshaped the landscape of post-coma care in recent years. Results Our increased ability to detect behavioral and neurophysiological signatures of consciousness has led to significant changes in taxonomy and clinical practice. We advocate for a multimodal framework for the management of severely brain-injured patients based on precision medicine and evidence-based decisions, integrating epidemiology, health economics and neuroethics. Conclusions Major progress in brain imaging and clinical assessment have opened the door to a new era of post-coma care based on standardized neuroscientific evidence. We highlight its implications in clinical applications and call for improved collaborations between researchers and clinicians to better translate findings to the bedside.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leandro R.D. Sanz
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
| | - Steven Laureys
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Joint International Research Unit on Consciousness, CERVO Brain Research Centre, CIUSS, Laval University, Québec, Canada
| | - Olivia Gosseries
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
- Centre du Cerveau, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
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23
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Fernandez Pujol C, Blundon EG, Dykstra AR. Laminar specificity of the auditory perceptual awareness negativity: A biophysical modeling study. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011003. [PMID: 37384802 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/06/2023] [Accepted: 06/17/2023] [Indexed: 07/01/2023] Open
Abstract
How perception of sensory stimuli emerges from brain activity is a fundamental question of neuroscience. To date, two disparate lines of research have examined this question. On one hand, human neuroimaging studies have helped us understand the large-scale brain dynamics of perception. On the other hand, work in animal models (mice, typically) has led to fundamental insight into the micro-scale neural circuits underlying perception. However, translating such fundamental insight from animal models to humans has been challenging. Here, using biophysical modeling, we show that the auditory awareness negativity (AAN), an evoked response associated with perception of target sounds in noise, can be accounted for by synaptic input to the supragranular layers of auditory cortex (AC) that is present when target sounds are heard but absent when they are missed. This additional input likely arises from cortico-cortical feedback and/or non-lemniscal thalamic projections and targets the apical dendrites of layer-5 (L5) pyramidal neurons. In turn, this leads to increased local field potential activity, increased spiking activity in L5 pyramidal neurons, and the AAN. The results are consistent with current cellular models of conscious processing and help bridge the gap between the macro and micro levels of perception-related brain activity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carolina Fernandez Pujol
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
| | - Elizabeth G Blundon
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
| | - Andrew R Dykstra
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
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24
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Yurchenko SB. A systematic approach to brain dynamics: cognitive evolution theory of consciousness. Cogn Neurodyn 2023; 17:575-603. [PMID: 37265655 PMCID: PMC10229528 DOI: 10.1007/s11571-022-09863-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2022] [Revised: 06/29/2022] [Accepted: 07/21/2022] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The brain integrates volition, cognition, and consciousness seamlessly over three hierarchical (scale-dependent) levels of neural activity for their emergence: a causal or 'hard' level, a computational (unconscious) or 'soft' level, and a phenomenal (conscious) or 'psyche' level respectively. The cognitive evolution theory (CET) is based on three general prerequisites: physicalism, dynamism, and emergentism, which entail five consequences about the nature of consciousness: discreteness, passivity, uniqueness, integrity, and graduation. CET starts from the assumption that brains should have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, not as prediction machines. This emphasizes the dynamical nature of consciousness in terms of critical dynamics to account for metastability, avalanches, and self-organized criticality of brain processes, then coupling it with volition and cognition in a framework unified over the levels. Consciousness emerges near critical points, and unfolds as a discrete stream of momentary states, each volitionally driven from oldest subcortical arousal systems. The stream is the brain's way of making a difference via predictive (Bayesian) processing. Its objective observables could be complexity measures reflecting levels of consciousness and its dynamical coherency to reveal how much knowledge (information gain) the brain acquires over the stream. CET also proposes a quantitative classification of both disorders of consciousness and mental disorders within that unified framework.
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25
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Tsuchiya N, Saigo H, Phillips S. An adjunction hypothesis between qualia and reports. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1053977. [PMID: 37077507 PMCID: PMC10107370 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1053977] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2022] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 01/31/2023] Open
Abstract
What are the nature of the relationship among qualia, contents of consciousness, and behavioral reports? Traditionally, this type of question has been only addressed via a qualitative and philosophical approach. Some theorists emphasize an incomplete and inaccurate nature of reports of one's own qualia to discourage formal research programs on qualia. Other empirical researchers, however, have made substantial progress in understanding the structure of qualia from such limited reports. What is the precise relationship between the two? To answer this question, we introduce the concept of “adjoint” or “adjunction” from the category theory in mathematics. We claim that the adjunction captures some aspects of the nuanced relationships between qualia and reports. The concept of adjunction allows us to clarify the conceptual issues with a precise mathematical formulation. In particular, adjunction establishes coherence between two categories that cannot be considered equivalent, yet has an important relationship. This rises in empirical experimental situations between qualia and reports. More importantly, an idea of adjunction naturally leads to various proposals of new empirical experiments to test the predictions about the nature of their relationship as well as other issues in consciousness research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Naotsugu Tsuchiya
- School of Psychological Sciences and Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Suita, Japan
- Advanced Telecommunications Research Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan
- *Correspondence: Naotsugu Tsuchiya ✉
| | - Hayato Saigo
- Nagahama Institute of Bio-Science and Technology, Nagahama, Japan
| | - Steven Phillips
- National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tsukuba, Japan
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26
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McFadden J. Consciousness: Matter or EMF? Front Hum Neurosci 2023; 16:1024934. [PMID: 36741784 PMCID: PMC9889563 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.1024934] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/22/2022] [Accepted: 12/28/2022] [Indexed: 01/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Conventional theories of consciousness (ToCs) that assume that the substrate of consciousness is the brain's neuronal matter fail to account for fundamental features of consciousness, such as the binding problem. Field ToC's propose that the substrate of consciousness is the brain's best accounted by some kind of field in the brain. Electromagnetic (EM) ToCs propose that the conscious field is the brain's well-known EM field. EM-ToCs were first proposed only around 20 years ago primarily to account for the experimental discovery that synchronous neuronal firing was the strongest neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). Although EM-ToCs are gaining increasing support, they remain controversial and are often ignored by neurobiologists and philosophers and passed over in most published reviews of consciousness. In this review I examine EM-ToCs against established criteria for distinguishing between ToCs and demonstrate that they outperform all conventional ToCs and provide novel insights into the nature of consciousness as well as a feasible route toward building artificial consciousnesses.
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27
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O'Regan JK. How voluntary control over information and body movements determines "what it's like" to have perceptual, bodily, emotional and mental experiences. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1108279. [PMID: 36733866 PMCID: PMC9886661 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1108279] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2022] [Accepted: 12/23/2022] [Indexed: 01/18/2023] Open
Abstract
Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have "something it's like." One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem "external" (perceptual), "internal" (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or "mental." A second fundamental aspect is the imposingness of experiences. They can seem "present" to us in different ways, sometimes seeming displayed before us with "spatio-temporal presence." Both these aspects of "what it's like" can be identified with the degree to which we can voluntarily control what we are doing when we engage in an experience. The external/internal/mental dimension is determined by how our voluntary bodily actions can influence the sensorimotor flow of information. The degree of imposingness of experiences and their "spatio-temporal presence" Is determined by how our voluntary actions are impeded or assisted by innate, attention-grabbing mechanisms. By elucidating these two most fundamental aspects of "what it's like," and taken together with prior work on inter- and intra-modal differences in experiences, this article suggests a path toward a scientific theory of the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness, explaining why experiences feel like something rather than feeling like nothing.
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28
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Ruan Z. The fundamental challenge of a future theory of consciousness. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1029105. [PMID: 36710768 PMCID: PMC9878380 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1029105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2022] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Zenan Ruan
- Zhejiang University—University of Luxembourg Joint Laboratory on AIs, Robotics and Reasoning (ZLAIRE), School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
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29
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Srinivasan N, Simione L, Arsiwalla XD, Kleiner J, Raffone A. Editorial: Insights in consciousness research 2021. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1182690. [PMID: 37151321 PMCID: PMC10157188 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1182690] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2023] [Accepted: 04/03/2023] [Indexed: 05/09/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Narayanan Srinivasan
- Department of Cognitive Science, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Kanpur, India
- *Correspondence: Narayanan Srinivasan
| | - Luca Simione
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy
- Faculty of Interpreting and Translation, UNINT, Università degli Studi Internazionali, Rome, Italy
| | - Xerxes D. Arsiwalla
- Department of Information and Communication Technologies, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Johannes Kleiner
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
- Munich Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
- Association for Mathematical Consciousness Science, Munich, Germany
| | - Antonino Raffone
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
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30
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Ruan Z. Integrated information and panpsychism: toward a deep understanding of the nature of consciousness. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2144718] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Zenan Ruan
- Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
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Yurchenko SB. From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates. Front Integr Neurosci 2022; 16:928978. [PMID: 36407293 PMCID: PMC9672924 DOI: 10.3389/fnint.2022.928978] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2022] [Accepted: 10/12/2022] [Indexed: 09/22/2023] Open
Abstract
There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.
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Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability. NEUROSCI 2022. [DOI: 10.3390/neurosci3040039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022] Open
Abstract
Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the “local” states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.
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Sevenius Nilsen A, Juel BE, Thürer B, Aamodt A, Storm JF. Are we really unconscious in "unconscious" states? Common assumptions revisited. Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:987051. [PMID: 36277049 PMCID: PMC9581328 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.987051] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/05/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
In the field of consciousness science, there is a tradition to categorize certain states such as slow-wave non-REM sleep and deep general anesthesia as "unconscious". While this categorization seems reasonable at first glance, careful investigations have revealed that it is not so simple. Given that (1) behavioral signs of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, (2) subjective reports of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, and, (3) states presumed to be unconscious are not always devoid of reported experience, there are reasons to reexamine our traditional assumptions about "states of unconsciousness". While these issues are not novel, and may be partly semantic, they have implications both for scientific progress and clinical practice. We suggest that focusing on approaches that provide a more pragmatic and nuanced characterization of different experimental conditions may promote clarity in the field going forward, and help us build stronger foundations for future studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andre Sevenius Nilsen
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Bjørn E. Juel
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
- School of Medicine and Public Health, Wisconsin Institute for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, United States
| | - Benjamin Thürer
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Arnfinn Aamodt
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
| | - Johan F. Storm
- Department of Physiology, Institute of Basic Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Hales CG, Ericson M. Electromagnetism's Bridge Across the Explanatory Gap: How a Neuroscience/Physics Collaboration Delivers Explanation Into All Theories of Consciousness. Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:836046. [PMID: 35782039 PMCID: PMC9245352 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.836046] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2021] [Accepted: 05/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
A productive, informative three decades of correlates of phenomenal consciousness (P-Consciousness) have delivered valuable knowledge while simultaneously locating us in a unique and unprecedented explanatory cul-de-sac. Observational correlates are demonstrated to be intrinsically very unlikely to explain or lead to a fundamental principle underlying the strongly emergent 1st-person-perspective (1PP) invisibly stowed away inside them. That lack is now solidly evidenced in practice. To escape our explanatory impasse, this article focuses on fundamental physics (the standard model of particle physics), which brings to light a foundational argument for how the brain is an essentially electromagnetic (EM) field object from the atomic level up. That is, our multitude of correlates of P-Consciousness are actually descriptions of specific EM field behaviors that are posed (hypothesized) as "the right" correlate by a particular theory of consciousness. Because of this, our 30 years of empirical progress can be reinterpreted as, in effect, the delivery of a large body of evidence that the standard model's EM quadrant can deliver a 1PP. That is, all theories of consciousness are, in the end, merely recipes that select a particular subset of the totality of EM field expression that is brain tissue. With a universal convergence on EM, the science of P-Consciousness becomes a collaborative effort between neuroscience and physics. The collaboration acts in pursuit of a unified explanation applicable to all theories of consciousness while remaining mindful that the process still contains no real explanation as to why or how EM fields deliver a 1PP. The apparent continued lack of explanation is, however, different: this time, the way forward is opened through its direct connection to fundamental physics. This is the first result (Part I). Part II posits, in general terms, a structural (epistemic) add-on/upgrade to the standard model that has the potential to deliver the missing route to an explanation of how subjectivity is delivered through EM fields. The revised standard model, under the neuroscience/physics collaboration, intimately integrates with the existing "correlates of-" paradigm, which acts as its source of empirical evidence. No existing theory of consciousness is lost or invalidated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Colin G. Hales
- Department of Anatomy and Physiology, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
| | - Marissa Ericson
- Department of Psychology and Clinical Neuroscience, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States
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36
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Abstract
How do we decide to act, and how do those decisions relate to conscious choice? A new study helps dissociate the neuronal mechanisms that choose, prepare, and trigger movement from our explicit reports of conscious intention.
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Abstract
This article argues that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism. The article has three main parts. The first describes background principles concerning information processing in the brain, from which one can deduce a general, rational framework for explaining consciousness. The second part describes a specific theory that embodies those background principles, the Attention Schema Theory. In the past several years, a growing body of experimental evidence-behavioral evidence, brain imaging evidence, and computational modeling-has addressed aspects of the theory. The final part discusses the evolution of consciousness. By emphasizing the specific role of consciousness in cognition and behavior, the present approach leads to a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans. The goal of this article is to present a comprehensive, overarching framework in which we can understand scientifically what consciousness is and what key adaptive roles it plays in brain function.
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38
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Kirkeby-Hinrup A. Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption. Front Psychol 2022; 13:804896. [PMID: 35369174 PMCID: PMC8966701 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.804896] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/29/2021] [Accepted: 02/23/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
- Theoretical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.,Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
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Niikawa T, Miyahara K, Hamada HT, Nishida S. Functions of consciousness: conceptual clarification. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac006. [PMID: 35356269 PMCID: PMC8963277 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2021] [Revised: 02/07/2022] [Accepted: 02/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
There are many theories of the functions of consciousness. How these theories relate to each other, how we should assess them, and whether any integration of them is possible are all issues that remain unclear. To contribute to a solution, this paper offers a conceptual framework to clarify the theories of the functions of consciousness. This framework consists of three dimensions: (i) target, (ii) explanatory order, and (iii) necessity/sufficiency. The first dimension, target, clarifies each theory in terms of the kind of consciousness it targets. The second dimension, explanatory order, clarifies each theory in terms of how it conceives of the explanatory relation between consciousness and function. The third dimension, necessity/sufficiency, clarifies each theory in terms of the necessity/sufficiency relation posited between consciousness and function. We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some existing scientific and philosophical theories of the functions of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Katsunori Miyahara
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience (CHAIN), Hokkaido University, Kita 12 Nishi 7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido, 060-0812, Japan
| | - Hiro Taiyo Hamada
- Neurotechnology R&D Unit, Araya Inc., 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-6024, Japan
| | - Satoshi Nishida
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), Advanced ICT Research Institute, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), 1-4 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka 565-0871, Japan
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40
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Ellia F, Chis-Ciure R. Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory. Conscious Cogn 2022; 100:103281. [PMID: 35325632 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2021] [Revised: 01/14/2022] [Accepted: 01/15/2022] [Indexed: 02/03/2023]
Abstract
In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Ellia
- School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States.
| | - Robert Chis-Ciure
- School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States; Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania
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41
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Explaining the gradient: Requirements for theories of visual awareness. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e59. [PMID: 35319411 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21001874] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
We propose that any theory of visual awareness must explain the gradient of different awareness measures over experimental conditions, especially when those measures form double dissociations among each other. Theories meeting this requirement must be specific to the measured facets of awareness, such as motion, contrast, or color. Integrated information theory (IIT) lacks such specificity because it is an underconstrained theory with unspecific predictions.
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42
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The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories. Nat Hum Behav 2022; 6:593-604. [DOI: 10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2021] [Accepted: 12/17/2021] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
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Schurger A, Graziano M. Consciousness explained or described? Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac001. [PMID: 35145759 PMCID: PMC8824704 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 12/23/2021] [Accepted: 01/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aaron Schurger
- *Correspondence address. Department of Psychology, Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92867, USA. E-mail:
| | - Michael Graziano
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
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Rahimian S. The myth of when and where: How false assumptions still haunt theories of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2021; 97:103246. [PMID: 34861555 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2021] [Revised: 11/19/2021] [Accepted: 11/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Recent advances in neural sciences have uncovered countless facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of subjective experience as they are built on false assumptions. These assumptions have led us into a state of cognitive dissonance between maintaining our standard scientific practices on the one hand, and maintaining our folk notions on the other. I end by proposing Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness and that even if ideas like panpsychism turn out to be holding the seemingly missing piece of the puzzle, the path to them must go through Illusionism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sepehrdad Rahimian
- Department of Psychology, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
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45
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Deane G. Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab024. [PMID: 34484808 PMCID: PMC8408766 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2021] [Revised: 07/26/2021] [Accepted: 08/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by 'subjective valuation'-a deep inference about the precision or 'predictability' of the self-evidencing ('fitness-promoting') outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of 'selflessness'; in particular the 'totally selfless' states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Deane
- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK
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Del Pin SH, Skóra Z, Sandberg K, Overgaard M, Wierzchoń M. Comparing theories of consciousness: why it matters and how to do it. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab019. [PMID: 34422317 PMCID: PMC8372971 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2021] [Revised: 06/13/2021] [Accepted: 08/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
The theoretical landscape of scientific studies of consciousness has flourished. Today, even multiple versions of the same theory are sometimes available. To advance the field, these theories should be directly compared to determine which are better at predicting and explaining empirical data. Systematic inquiries of this sort are seen in many subfields in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g. in working memory. Nonetheless, when we surveyed publications on consciousness research, we found that most focused on a single theory. When 'comparisons' happened, they were often verbal and non-systematic. This fact in itself could be a contributing reason for the lack of convergence between theories in consciousness research. In this paper, we focus on how to compare theories of consciousness to ensure that the comparisons are meaningful, e.g. whether their predictions are parallel or contrasting. We evaluate how theories are typically compared in consciousness research and related subdisciplines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and we provide an example of our approach. We then examine the different reasons why direct comparisons between theories are rarely seen. One possible explanation is the unique nature of the consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness, and we set out the features that a theory of consciousness should account for.
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Affiliation(s)
- Simon Hviid Del Pin
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Ingardena 6, Krakow 30-060, Poland
| | - Zuzanna Skóra
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Ingardena 6, Krakow 30-060, Poland
| | - Kristian Sandberg
- Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus Universitet, Universitetsbyen 3, Building 1710, Aarhus C 8000, Denmark
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus Universitet, Universitetsbyen 3, Building 1710, Aarhus C 8000, Denmark
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Ingardena 6, Krakow 30-060, Poland
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Kirkeby-Hinrup A, Fazekas P. Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis. Conscious Cogn 2021; 94:103173. [PMID: 34371465 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103173] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2021] [Revised: 07/18/2021] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which - hopefully - will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
- Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Lund University, Sweden; Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, CFIN, Aarhus University, Denmark.
| | - Peter Fazekas
- Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, CFIN, Aarhus University, Denmark; Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Belgium
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Menétrey MQ, Vogelsang L, Herzog MH. A guideline for linking brain wave findings to the various aspects of discrete perception. Eur J Neurosci 2021; 55:3528-3537. [PMID: 34125452 PMCID: PMC9543405 DOI: 10.1111/ejn.15349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2020] [Revised: 05/16/2021] [Accepted: 06/09/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Brain waves, determined by electrical and magnetic brain recordings (e.g., EEG and MEG), and fluctuating behavioral responses, determined by response time or accuracy measures, are frequently taken to support discrete perception. For example, it has been proposed that humans experience only one conscious percept per brain wave (e.g., during one alpha cycle). However, the proposed link between brain waves and discrete perception is typically rather vague. More importantly, there are many models and aspects of discrete perception and it is often not apparent in what theoretical framework brain wave findings are interpreted and to what specific aspects of discrete perception they relate. Here, we review different approaches to discrete perception and highlight issues with particular interpretations. We then discuss how certain findings on brain waves may relate to certain aspects of discrete perception. The main purpose of this meta‐contribution is to give a short overview of discrete models of perception and to illustrate the need to make explicit what aspects of discrete theories are addressed by what aspects of brain wave findings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maëlan Q Menétrey
- Laboratory of Psychophysics, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Lukas Vogelsang
- Laboratory of Psychophysics, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Michael H Herzog
- Laboratory of Psychophysics, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
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Mallatt J. A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2021; 23:650. [PMID: 34067413 PMCID: PMC8224652 DOI: 10.3390/e23060650] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2021] [Revised: 05/14/2021] [Accepted: 05/18/2021] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA
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Zhang J, Dong D. Book Review: Brain, Mind and Consciousness. Front Psychol 2021. [PMCID: PMC8160097 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.675976] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Jing Zhang
- School of Marxism, Institute of Philosophy, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Da Dong
- Department of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
- *Correspondence: Da Dong
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