Dual-process theories and consciousness: the case for 'Type Zero' cognition

Neuromodulatory control of complex adaptive dynamics in the brain

How is the massive dimensionality and complexity of the microscopic constituents of the nervous system brought under sufficiently tight control so as to coordinate adaptive behaviour? A powerful means for striking this balance is to poise neurons close to the critical point of a phase transition, at which a small change in neuronal excitability can manifest a nonlinear augmentation in neuronal activity. How the brain could mediate this critical transition is a key open question in neuroscience. Here, I propose that the different arms of the ascending arousal system provide the brain with a diverse set of heterogeneous control parameters that can be used to modulate the excitability and receptivity of target neurons-in other words, to act as control parameters for mediating critical neuronal order. Through a series of worked examples, I demonstrate how the neuromodulatory arousal system can interact with the inherent topological complexity of neuronal subsystems in the brain to mediate complex adaptive behaviour.

Tell Us What You Really Think: A Think Aloud Protocol Analysis of the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test

The standard interpretation of cognitive reflection tests assumes that correct responses are reflective and lured responses are unreflective. However, prior process-tracing of mathematical reflection tests has cast doubt on this interpretation. In two studies (N = 201), we deployed a validated think-aloud protocol in-person and online to test how this assumption is satisfied by the new, validated, less familiar, and non-mathematical verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (vCRT). Verbalized thoughts in both studies revealed that most (but not all) correct responses involved reflection and that most (but not all) lured responses lacked reflection. The think-aloud protocols seemed to reflect business-as-usual performance: thinking aloud did not disrupt test performance compared to a control group. These data suggest that the vCRT usually satisfies the standard interpretation of the reflection tests (albeit not without exceptions) and that the vCRT can be a good measure of the construct theorized by the two-factor explication of 'reflection' (as deliberate and conscious).

Generalization Bias in Science

Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. We challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized conclusions. We support this account of scientific induction by integrating a range of disparate findings from across the cognitive sciences that have until now not been connected to research on the nature of scientific induction. The view that scientific induction involves by default a generalization bias calls for a revision of the current thinking about scientific induction and highlights an overlooked cause of the replication crisis in the sciences. Commonly proposed interventions to tackle scientific overgeneralizations that may feed into this crisis need to be supplemented with cognitive debiasing strategies against generalization bias to most effectively improve science.

Not self-aware? Psychological antecedents and consequences of alienating from one’s actual motives, emotions, and goals

Philosophers and scientists have been puzzling over the potential antecedents and consequences of self-awareness or its relative absence since time immemorial. One major reason is the difficulty of identifying individuals’ actual needs, emotions, or goals and thus making statements about their level of self-awareness. Drawing on a “duality of mind” approach, we review our research that quantified discrepancies between first-person perspective and third-person perspective assessments of motives (“needs”), emotions, and goals as indicators of relative self-awareness. Also, we expand on their proximal causes related to personality–situation interactions and their emotional and motivational consequences. We discuss similarities among the three branches of research on motives, emotions, and goals and, lastly, provide an outlook for future research.

The search for invertebrate consciousness

There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forward? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy, theory-neutral and theory-light. Theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches face serious problems, motivating a middle path: the theory-light approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal commitment about the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognition that is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the hypothesis that phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus. This "facilitation hypothesis" can productively guide inquiry into invertebrate consciousness. What is needed? At this stage, not more theory, and not more undirected data gathering. What is needed is a systematic search for consciousness-linked cognitive abilities, their relationships to each other, and their sensitivity to masking.

Towards new concepts for a biological neuroscience of consciousness

In the search for a sound model of consciousness, we aim at introducing new concepts: closure, compositionality, biobranes and autobranes. This is important to overcome reductionism and to bring life back into the neuroscience of consciousness. Using these definitions, we conjecture that consciousness co-arises with the non-trivial composition of biological closure in the form of biobranes and autobranes: conscious processes generate closed activity at various levels and are, in turn, themselves, supported by biobranes and autobranes. This approach leads to a non-reductionist biological and simultaneously phenomenological theory of conscious experience, giving new perspectives for a science of consciousness. Future works will implement experimental definitions and computational simulations to characterize these dynamical biobranes interacting.

Deficits in access consciousness, integrative function, and consequent autonoetic thinking in schizophrenia

Alterations within consciousness in schizophrenia can be evidenced by impediments in self-awareness and loss of agency. Ned Block's definition of access consciousness is applied in order to further delineate cognitive deficits involving reflective thought and autonoetic thinking in persons with schizophrenia. Current theories on the nature and functioning of consciousness are discussed, which include Global Workspace Theory and metarepresentational characterizations. These describe a recursive, integrative quality to consciousness, contributed to by the functions of access consciousness, that is relevant in examining cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The integrative deficit that is described as operating in conscious process involves a failure to incorporate prior outputs from a separate cognitive task and integrate these into a novel working schema. The alterations in access consciousness in persons with schizophrenia appear to be a consequence of disrupted integrative cognitive functions. An anteceding problem with cortical circuits involving integrative functions related to access consciousness is therefore hypothesized to manifest as subsequent cognitive dysfunction that leads to symptoms of schizophrenia. Constitutive failures to integrate information in schizophrenia could lead to an inability to create experiential unity and manage content in autonoetic consciousness. Some of the aberrant reasoning manifested by persons with schizophrenia, including problems with hierarchical relational reasoning, model-based-learning, J-con, ipseity, and source monitoring, could also reflect alterations in access consciousness, and their investigation offers additional approaches for scientific inquiry.

The neural basis of consciousness

Consciousness has evolved and is a feature of all animals with sufficiently complex nervous systems. It is, therefore, primarily a problem for biology, rather than physics. In this review, I will consider three aspects of consciousness: level of consciousness, whether we are awake or in a coma; the contents of consciousness, what determines how a small amount of sensory information is associated with subjective experience, while the rest is not; and meta-consciousness, the ability to reflect upon our subjective experiences and, importantly, to share them with others. I will discuss and compare current theories of the neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in producing these three aspects of consciousness and conclude that the research in this area is flourishing and has already succeeded to delineate these mechanisms in surprising detail.

The thalamus integrates the macrosystems of the brain to facilitate complex, adaptive brain network dynamics

The human brain is a complex, adaptive system comprised of billions of cells with trillions of connections. The interactions between the elements of the system oppose this seemingly limitless capacity by constraining the system's dynamic repertoire, enforcing distributed neural states that balance integration and differentiation. How this trade-off is mediated by the brain, and how the emergent, distributed neural patterns give rise to cognition and awareness, remains poorly understood. Here, I argue that the thalamus is well-placed to arbitrate the interactions between distributed neural assemblies in the cerebral cortex. Different classes of thalamocortical connections are hypothesized to promote either feed-forward or feedback processing modes in the cerebral cortex. This activity can be conceptualized as emerging dynamically from an evolving attractor landscape, with the relative engagement of distinct distributed circuits providing differing constraints over the manner in which brain state trajectories change over time. In addition, inputs to the distinct thalamic populations from the cerebellum and basal ganglia, respectively, are proposed to differentially shape the attractor landscape, and hence, the temporal evolution of cortical assemblies. The coordinated engagement of these neural macrosystems is then shown to share key characteristics with prominent models of cognition, attention and conscious awareness. In this way, the crucial role of the thalamus in mediating the distributed, multi-scale network organization of the central nervous system can be related to higher brain function.

Private-public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

A core feature of human cognition is an ability to separate private states of mind - what we think or believe - from public actions - what we say or do. This ability is central to successful social interaction - with different social contexts often requiring different mappings between private states and public actions in order to minimise conflict and facilitate communication. Here we investigated how the human brain supports private-public mappings, using an interactive task which required subjects to adapt how they communicated their confidence about a perceptual decision to the social context. Univariate and multivariate analysis of fMRI data revealed that a private-public distinction is reflected in a medial-lateral division of prefrontal cortex - with lateral frontal pole (FPl) supporting the context-dependent mapping from a private sense of confidence to a public report. The concept of private-public mappings provides a promising framework for understanding flexible social behaviour.

Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition

Metacognition - the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive processes - helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals, we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations. There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning and therefore that cultural selection might shape human metacognition. The cultural origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a substantial new programme of research.

Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals

The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural, physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal models of affective disorders. Here, contemporary evidence indicating potential markers of conscious processing in animals is reviewed, with a view to extending this search to include markers of conscious affective processing. We do this by combining animal-focused approaches with investigations of the components of conscious and non-conscious emotional processing in humans, and neuropsychological research into the structure and functions of conscious emotions.

Overstepping the boundaries of free choice: Folk beliefs on free will and determinism in real world contexts

We know little about the commonality of folk beliefs around applications of psychological research on the unconscious control of behaviours. To address this, in Experiment 1 (N = 399) participants volunteered examples of where research on the unconscious has been applied to influence their behaviours. A subset of these were presented in Experiment 2 (N = 198) and Experiment 3 (N = 100). Participants rated the extent to which the behaviour being influenced in these contexts was: (1) via the unconscious, (2) free, (3) the result of prior conscious intentions, (4) under conscious control. Relative to judgements about the extent to which behaviour was influenced via the unconscious, the remaining judgements regarding conscious control of behaviours were either higher (e.g., political contexts) or lower (e.g., therapy). This study is the first to show, using ecologically valid examples, the folk beliefs people share on psychological constructs concerning free will and determinism.

Can Computers Become Conscious and Overcome Humans?

The idea of machines overcoming humans can be intrinsically related to conscious machines. Surpassing humans would mean replicating, reaching and exceeding key distinctive properties of human beings, for example, high-level cognition associated with conscious perception. However, can computers be compared with humans? Can computers become conscious? Can computers outstrip human capabilities? These are paradoxical and controversial questions, particularly because there are many hidden assumptions and misconceptions about the understanding of the brain. In this sense, it is necessary to first explore these assumptions and then suggest how the specific information processing of brains would be replicated by machines. Therefore, this article will discuss a subset of human capabilities and the connection with conscious behavior, secondly, a prototype theory of consciousness will be explored and machines will be classified according to this framework. Finally, this analysis will show the paradoxical conclusion that trying to achieve conscious machines to beat humans implies that computers will never completely exceed human capabilities, or if the computer were to do it, the machine should not be considered a computer anymore.

Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play

Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.

Learning rapidly about the relevance of visual cues requires conscious awareness

Humans have been shown to be capable of performing many cognitive tasks using information of which they are not consciously aware. This raises questions about what role consciousness actually plays in cognition. Here, we explored whether participants can learn cue-target contingencies in an attentional learning task when the cues were presented below the level of conscious awareness and how this differs from learning about conscious cues. Participants' manual (Experiment 1) and saccadic (Experiment 2) response speeds were influenced by both conscious and unconscious cues. However, participants were only able to adapt to reversals of the cue-target contingencies (Experiment 1) or changes in the reliability of the cues (Experiment 2) when consciously aware of the cues. Therefore, although visual cues can be processed unconsciously, learning about cues over a few trials requires conscious awareness of them. Finally, we discuss implications for cognitive theories of consciousness.

Making better decisions in groups

We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.