Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report

Limited Evidence for Probabilistic Cueing Effects on Grating-Evoked Event-Related Potentials and Orientation Decoding Performance

We can rapidly learn recurring patterns that occur within our sensory environments. This knowledge allows us to form expectations about future sensory events. Several influential predictive coding models posit that, when a stimulus matches our expectations, the activity of feature-selective neurons in the visual cortex will be suppressed relative to when that stimulus is unexpected. However, after accounting for known critical confounds, there is currently scant evidence for these hypothesized effects from studies recording electrophysiological neural activity. To provide a strong test for expectation effects on stimulus-evoked responses in the visual cortex, we performed a probabilistic cueing experiment while recording electroencephalographic (EEG) data. Participants (n = 48) learned associations between visual cues and subsequently presented gratings. A given cue predicted the appearance of a certain grating orientation with 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 90% validity. We did not observe any stimulus expectancy effects on grating-evoked event-related potentials. Multivariate classifiers trained to discriminate between grating orientations performed better when classifying 10% compared to 90% probability gratings. However, classification performance did not substantively differ across any other stimulus expectancy conditions. Our findings provide very limited evidence for modulations of prediction error signaling by probabilistic expectations as specified in contemporary predictive coding models.

Pre-stimulus activities affect subsequent visual processing: Empirical evidence and potential neural mechanisms

PURPOSE

Humans obtain most of their information from visual stimuli. The perception of these stimuli may be modulated by the ongoing pre-stimulus brain activities. Depending on the task design, the processing of different cognitive functions such as spatial attention, feature-based attention, temporal attention, arousal, and mental imagery may start prior to the stimulus onset.

METHOD

This process is typically accompanied by changes in pre-stimulus oscillatory activities including power, phase, or connectivity in different frequency bands. To explain the effect of these changes, several mechanisms have been proposed. In this article, we review these changes and the potential mechanisms in the context of the pre-stimulus enabled cognitive functions. We provide evidence both in favor of and against the most documented mechanisms and conclude that no single mechanism can solely delineate the effects of pre-stimulus brain activities on later processing. Instead, multiple mechanisms may work in tandem to guide pre-stimulus brain activities.

FINDING

Additionally, our findings indicate that in many studies a combination of these cognitive functions begins prior to stimulus onset.

CONCLUSION

Thus, dissociating these cognitive functions is challenging based on the current literature, and the need for precise task designs in later studies to differentiate between them is crucial.

Multivariate Pattern Analysis of EEG Reveals Neural Mechanism of Naturalistic Target Processing in Attentional Blink

The human brain has inherent limitations in consciously processing visual information. When individuals monitor a rapid sequence of images for detecting two targets, they often miss the second target (T2) if it appears within a short time frame of 200-500 ms after the first target (T1), a phenomenon known as the attentional blink (AB). The neural mechanism behind the AB remains unclear, largely due to the use of simplistic visual items such as letters and digits in conventional AB experiments, which differ significantly from naturalistic vision. This study employs advanced multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of human electroencephalography (EEG) data (including 17 females and 18 males) to explore the neural representations associated with target processing within a naturalistic paradigm under conditions where AB does or does not occur. Our MVPA analysis successfully decoded the identity of target images from EEG data. Moreover, in the AB condition, characterized by a limited time between targets, T1 processing coincided with T2 processing, resulting in the suppression of late representational markers of both T1 and T2. Conversely, in the condition with longer inter-target interval, neural representations endured for a longer duration. These findings suggest that the AB can be attributed to the suppression of neural representations in the later stages of target processing.

Physical effort modulates perceptual awareness judgment independent of level of processing

Recent studies have emphasized the association between action and perceptual awareness, suggesting that action-related information can contribute to perceptual awareness. Given that the Level of Processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that the emergence of awareness depends on the level of stimulus processing, the current study examines whether action impacts perceptual awareness across different processing levels. In Experiment 1, participants identified target stimuli's color (low-level task) or category (high-level task) via mouse clicks, followed by visual awareness ratings. Experiment 2 replicated the tasks using hand-grip dynamometers. Results from Experiment 1 support the LoP theory, showing a more gradual emergence of awareness for low-level features and a more dichotomous emergence for high-level features. In Experiment 2, higher reported visual awareness ratings were observed at greater physical effort, regardless of task type. These results suggest that action-related information influences reported awareness of stimuli in the same way at low- and high-level stimulus processing.

Unconscious Perception of Vernier Offsets

The comparison between conscious and unconscious perception is a cornerstone of consciousness science. However, most studies reporting above-chance discrimination of unseen stimuli do not control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. We tested whether observers can discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli when visibility is probed using a bias-free task. To reduce visibility, stimuli were either backward masked or presented for very brief durations (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern-day Tachistoscope. We found some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness, and yet, no conclusive evidence thereof. To seek more decisive proof, we simulated a series of Bayesian observer models, including some that produce visibility judgements alongside type-1 judgements. Our data are best accounted for by observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. Overall, the stimuli and visibility manipulations employed here induced mild instances of blindsight-like behavior, making them attractive candidates for future investigation of this phenomenon.

Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience

To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts. To investigate this question, we used three carefully matched manipulations that typically result in behavioral shifts in decision criteria: a visual illusion (Müller-Lyer condition), a punishment scheme (payoff condition), and a change in the ratio of relevant stimuli (base rate condition). To gauge shifts in subjective experience, we introduce a task in which participants not only make decisions about what they have just seen but are also asked to reproduce their experience of a target stimulus. Using Bayesian ordinal modeling, we show that each of these three manipulations affects the decision criterion as intended but that the visual illusion uniquely affects sensory experience as measured by reproduction. In a series of follow-up experiments, we use computational modeling to show that although the visual illusion results in a distinct drift-diffusion (DDM) parameter profile relative to nonsensory manipulations, reliance on DDM parameter estimates alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether a given manipulation is perceptual or nonperceptual.

The Dominance of Anticipatory Prefrontal Activity in Uncued Sensory-Motor Tasks

Anticipatory event-related potentials (ERPs) precede upcoming events such as stimuli or actions. These ERPs are usually obtained in cued sensory-motor tasks employing a warning stimulus that precedes a probe stimulus as in the contingent negative variation (CNV) paradigms. The CNV wave has been widely studied, from clinical to brain-computer interface (BCI) applications, and has been shown to emerge in medial frontoparietal areas, localized in the cingulate and supplementary motor areas. Several dated studies also suggest the existence of a prefrontal CNV, although this component was not confirmed by later studies due to the contamination of ocular artifacts. Another lesser-known anticipatory ERP is the prefrontal negativity (pN) that precedes the uncued probe stimuli in discriminative response tasks and has been localized in the inferior frontal gyrus. This study aimed to characterize the pN by comparing it with the CNV in cued and uncued tasks and test if the pN could be associated with event preparation, temporal preparation, or both. To achieve these aims, high-density electroencephalographic recording and advanced ERP analysis controlling for ocular activity were obtained in 25 volunteers who performed 4 different visuomotor tasks. Our results showed that the pN amplitude was largest in the condition requiring both time and event preparation, medium in the condition requiring event preparation only, and smallest in the condition requiring temporal preparation only. We concluded that the prefrontal CNV could be associated with the pN, and this activity emerges in complex tasks requiring the anticipation of both the category and timing of the upcoming stimulus. The proposed method can be useful in BCI studies investigating the endogenous neural signatures triggered by different sensorimotor paradigms.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

No Evidence for Neural Overlap between Unconsciously Processed and Imagined Stimuli

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any representational overlap could be because of overlap in feedback processes. In the current study, we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category representations during imagined stimuli, conscious perception, and unconscious processing using fMRI in humans of either sex. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were observed only between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, connectivity analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and in imagery compared with unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing representational overlap between purely feedforward- and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations influenced by feedback, either stimulus driven (perception) or purely internally driven (imagery), are, however, relatively similar.

Representational dynamics preceding conscious access

Our senses are continuously bombarded with more information than our brain can process up to the level of awareness. The present study aimed to enhance understanding on how attentional selection shapes conscious access under conditions of rapidly changing input. Using an attention task, EEG, and multivariate decoding of individual target- and distractor-defining features, we specifically examined dynamic changes in the representation of targets and distractors as a function of conscious access and the task-relevance (target or distractor) of the preceding item in the RSVP stream. At the behavioral level, replicating previous work and suggestive of a flexible gating mechanism, we found a significant impairment in conscious access to targets (T2) that were preceded by a target (T1) followed by one or two distractors (i.e., the attentional blink), but striking facilitation of conscious access to targets shown directly after another target (i.e., lag-1 sparing and blink reversal). At the neural level, conscious access to T2 was associated with enhanced early- and late-stage T1 representations and enhanced late-stage D1 representations, and interestingly, could be predicted based on the pattern of EEG activation well before T1 was presented. Yet, across task conditions, we did not find convincing evidence for the notion that conscious access is affected by rapid top-down selection-related modulations of the strength of early sensory representations induced by the preceding visual event. These results cannot easily be explained by existing accounts of how attentional selection shapes conscious access under rapidly changing input conditions, and have important implications for theories of the attentional blink and consciousness more generally.

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness.