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Dijkstra N. Uncovering the Role of the Early Visual Cortex in Visual Mental Imagery. Vision (Basel) 2024; 8:29. [PMID: 38804350 PMCID: PMC11130976 DOI: 10.3390/vision8020029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2024] [Revised: 04/25/2024] [Accepted: 04/30/2024] [Indexed: 05/29/2024] Open
Abstract
The question of whether the early visual cortex (EVC) is involved in visual mental imagery remains a topic of debate. In this paper, I propose that the inconsistency in findings can be explained by the unique challenges associated with investigating EVC activity during imagery. During perception, the EVC processes low-level features, which means that activity is highly sensitive to variation in visual details. If the EVC has the same role during visual mental imagery, any change in the visual details of the mental image would lead to corresponding changes in EVC activity. Within this context, the question should not be whether the EVC is 'active' during imagery but how its activity relates to specific imagery properties. Studies using methods that are sensitive to variation in low-level features reveal that imagery can recruit the EVC in similar ways as perception. However, not all mental images contain a high level of visual details. Therefore, I end by considering a more nuanced view, which states that imagery can recruit the EVC, but that does not mean that it always does so.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nadine Dijkstra
- Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK
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2
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Cortese A, Kawato M. The cognitive reality monitoring network and theories of consciousness. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:31-38. [PMID: 38316366 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/26/2023] [Revised: 01/17/2024] [Accepted: 01/17/2024] [Indexed: 02/07/2024]
Abstract
Theories of consciousness abound. However, it is difficult to arbitrate reliably among competing theories because they target different levels of neural and cognitive processing or anatomical loci, and only some were developed with computational models in mind. In particular, theories of consciousness need to fully address the three levels of understanding of the brain proposed by David Marr: computational theory, algorithms and hardware. Most major theories refer to only one or two levels, often indirectly. The cognitive reality monitoring network (CRMN) model is derived from computational theories of mixture-of-experts architecture, hierarchical reinforcement learning and generative/inference computing modules, addressing all three levels of understanding. A central feature of the CRMN is the mapping of a gating network onto the prefrontal cortex, making it a prime coding circuit involved in monitoring the accuracy of one's mental states and distinguishing them from external reality. Because the CRMN builds on the hierarchical and layer structure of the cerebral cortex, it may connect research and findings across species, further enabling concrete computational models of consciousness with new, explicitly testable hypotheses. In sum, we discuss how the CRMN model can help further our understanding of the nature and function of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aurelio Cortese
- Computational Neuroscience Labs, ATR Institute International, Kyoto 619-0228, Japan.
| | - Mitsuo Kawato
- Computational Neuroscience Labs, ATR Institute International, Kyoto 619-0228, Japan; XNef, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan.
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3
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Negro N. (Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae012. [PMID: 38495333 PMCID: PMC10944285 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Revised: 02/02/2024] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/19/2024] Open
Abstract
The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos' philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the 'distinction between prediction and accommodation'; (ii) the model should represent the 'structural relevance' of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the 'boldness' of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Niccolò Negro
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo 69978, Israel
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4
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Wagener L, Nieder A. Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:508-521. [PMID: 38165732 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2024]
Abstract
The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.
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Öztel T, Balcı F. Metric error monitoring as a component of metacognitive processing. Eur J Neurosci 2024; 59:807-821. [PMID: 37941152 DOI: 10.1111/ejn.16182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2023] [Revised: 09/12/2023] [Accepted: 10/16/2023] [Indexed: 11/10/2023]
Abstract
Metacognitive processing constitutes one of the contemporary target domains in consciousness research. Error monitoring (the ability to correctly report one's own errors without feedback) is considered one of the functional outcomes of metacognitive processing. Error monitoring is traditionally investigated as part of categorical decisions where choice accuracy is a binary construct (choice is either correct or incorrect). However, recent studies revealed that this ability is characterized by metric features (i.e., direction and magnitude) in temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Here, we discuss methodological approaches to investigating metric error monitoring in both humans and non-human animals and review their findings. The potential neural substrates of metric error monitoring measures are also discussed. This new scope of metacognitive processing can help improve our current understanding of conscious processing from a new perspective. Thus, by summarizing and discussing the perspectives, findings, and common applications in the metric error monitoring literature, this paper aims to provide a guideline for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tutku Öztel
- Psychology Department, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
| | - Fuat Balcı
- Psychology Department, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
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6
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Fazekas P, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M. A construct-first approach to consciousness science. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105480. [PMID: 38008237 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105480] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2023] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/28/2023]
Abstract
We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Fazekas
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Høegh-Guldbergs Gade 6B, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences, Université Libre De Bruxelles, 50 avenue F.D. Roosevelt CP191, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
| | - Morten Overgaard
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Universitetsbyen 3, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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7
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Bayne T, Frohlich J, Cusack R, Moser J, Naci L. Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience. Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:1135-1149. [PMID: 37838614 PMCID: PMC10660191 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2023] [Revised: 08/28/2023] [Accepted: 08/29/2023] [Indexed: 10/16/2023]
Abstract
Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a 'late-onset' view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child's first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an 'early-onset' account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tim Bayne
- Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia; Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, Canada.
| | - Joel Frohlich
- Institute for Neuromodulation and Neurotechnology, University Hospital and University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany; Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Rhodri Cusack
- Thomas Mitchell Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Julia Moser
- Masonic Institute for the Developing Brain, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
| | - Lorina Naci
- Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience and Global Brain Health Institute, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
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8
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Faraji J, Metz GAS. Toward reframing brain-social dynamics: current assumptions and future challenges. Front Psychiatry 2023; 14:1211442. [PMID: 37484686 PMCID: PMC10359502 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1211442] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2023] [Accepted: 06/19/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary analyses suggest that the human social brain and sociality appeared together. The two fundamental tools that accelerated the concurrent emergence of the social brain and sociality include learning and plasticity. The prevailing core idea is that the primate brain and the cortex in particular became reorganised over the course of evolution to facilitate dynamic adaptation to ongoing changes in physical and social environments. Encouraged by computational or survival demands or even by instinctual drives for living in social groups, the brain eventually learned how to learn from social experience via its massive plastic capacity. A fundamental framework for modeling these orchestrated dynamic responses is that social plasticity relies upon neuroplasticity. In the present article, we first provide a glimpse into the concepts of plasticity, experience, with emphasis on social experience. We then acknowledge and integrate the current theoretical concepts to highlight five key intertwined assumptions within social neuroscience that underlie empirical approaches for explaining the brain-social dynamics. We suggest that this epistemological view provides key insights into the ontology of current conceptual frameworks driving future research to successfully deal with new challenges and possible caveats in favour of the formulation of novel assumptions. In the light of contemporary societal challenges, such as global pandemics, natural disasters, violent conflict, and other human tragedies, discovering the mechanisms of social brain plasticity will provide new approaches to support adaptive brain plasticity and social resilience.
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Mazor M, Gong C, Fleming SM. Re-evaluating frontopolar and temporoparietal contributions to detection and discrimination confidence. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:221091. [PMID: 37090969 PMCID: PMC10113806 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.221091] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2022] [Accepted: 02/28/2023] [Indexed: 05/03/2023]
Abstract
Previously, we identified a subset of regions where the relation between decision confidence and univariate functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity was quadratic, with stronger activation for both high and low compared with intermediate levels of confidence. We further showed that, in a subset of these regions, this quadratic modulation appeared only for confidence in detection decisions about the presence or absence of a stimulus, and not for confidence in discrimination decisions about stimulus identity (Mazor et al. 2021). Here, in a pre-registered follow-up experiment, we sought to replicate our original findings and identify the origins of putative detection-specific confidence signals by introducing a novel asymmetric-discrimination condition. The new condition required discriminating two alternatives but was engineered such that the distribution of perceptual evidence was asymmetric, just as in yes/no detection. We successfully replicated the quadratic modulation of subjective confidence in prefrontal, parietal and temporal cortices. However, in contrast with our original report, this quadratic effect was similar in detection and discrimination responses, but stronger in the novel asymmetric-discrimination condition. We interpret our findings as weighing against the detection-specificity of confidence signatures and speculate about possible alternative origins of a quadratic modulation of decision confidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matan Mazor
- School of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, UK
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK
| | - Chudi Gong
- Division of Psychology and Language Science, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK
- State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China
| | - Stephen M. Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, London WC1B 5EH, UK
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10
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Dijkstra N, Fleming SM. Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination. Nat Commun 2023; 14:1627. [PMID: 36959279 PMCID: PMC10036541 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-37322-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2021] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 03/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagery overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. One possibility is that the intention to imagine is used to identify and discount self-generated signals during imagery. Alternatively, because internally generated signals are generally weaker, sensory strength is used to index reality. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here, we combined one-trial-per-participant psychophysics with computational modelling and neuroimaging to show that imagined and perceived signals are in fact intermixed, with judgments of reality being determined by whether this intermixed signal is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. A consequence of this account is that when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nadine Dijkstra
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Aging Research, University College London, London, UK
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
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11
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Frohlich J, Bayne T, Crone JS, DallaVecchia A, Kirkeby-Hinrup A, Mediano PA, Moser J, Talar K, Gharabaghi A, Preissl H. Not with a “zap” but with a “beep”: measuring the origins of perinatal experience. Neuroimage 2023; 273:120057. [PMID: 37001834 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.120057] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2022] [Revised: 03/24/2023] [Accepted: 03/27/2023] [Indexed: 04/03/2023] Open
Abstract
When does the mind begin? Infant psychology is mysterious in part because we cannot remember our first months of life, nor can we directly communicate with infants. Even more speculative is the possibility of mental life prior to birth. The question of when consciousness, or subjective experience, begins in human development thus remains incompletely answered, though boundaries can be set using current knowledge from developmental neurobiology and recent investigations of the perinatal brain. Here, we offer our perspective on how the development of a sensory perturbational complexity index (sPCI) based on auditory ("beep-and-zip"), visual ("flash-and-zip"), or even olfactory ("sniff-and-zip") cortical perturbations in place of electromagnetic perturbations ("zap-and-zip") might be used to address this question. First, we discuss recent studies of perinatal cognition and consciousness using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and, in particular, magnetoencephalography (MEG). While newborn infants are the archetypal subjects for studying early human development, researchers may also benefit from fetal studies, as the womb is, in many respects, a more controlled environment than the cradle. The earliest possible timepoint when subjective experience might begin is likely the establishment of thalamocortical connectivity at 26 weeks gestation, as the thalamocortical system is necessary for consciousness according to most theoretical frameworks. To infer at what age and in which behavioral states consciousness might emerge following the initiation of thalamocortical pathways, we advocate for the development of the sPCI and similar techniques, based on EEG, MEG, and fMRI, to estimate the perinatal brain's state of consciousness.
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Hobot J, Skóra Z, Wierzchoń M, Sandberg K. Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency. Neuroimage 2023; 272:119991. [PMID: 36858333 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.119991] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2022] [Revised: 02/04/2023] [Accepted: 02/25/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2023] Open
Abstract
The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justyna Hobot
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
| | - Zuzanna Skóra
- Colourlab, Department of Computer Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
| | - Kristian Sandberg
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark; Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark
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Chen H, Miao G, Wang S, Zheng J, Zhang X, Lin J, Hao C, Huang H, Jiang T, Gong Y, Liao W. Disturbed functional connectivity and topological properties of the frontal lobe in minimally conscious state based on resting-state fNIRS. Front Neurosci 2023; 17:1118395. [PMID: 36845431 PMCID: PMC9950516 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1118395] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2022] [Accepted: 01/30/2023] [Indexed: 02/12/2023] Open
Abstract
Background Patients in minimally conscious state (MCS) exist measurable evidence of consciousness. The frontal lobe is a crucial part of the brain that encodes abstract information and is closely related to the conscious state. We hypothesized that the disturbance of the frontal functional network exists in MCS patients. Methods We collected the resting-state functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) data of fifteen MCS patients and sixteen age- and gender-matched healthy controls (HC). The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) scale of MCS patients was also composed. The topology of the frontal functional network was analyzed in two groups. Results Compared with HC, the MCS patients showed widely disrupted functional connectivity in the frontal lobe, especially in the frontopolar area and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Moreover, the MCS patients displayed lower clustering coefficient, global efficiency, local efficiency, and higher characteristic path length. In addition, the nodal clustering coefficient and nodal local efficiency in the left frontopolar area and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were significantly reduced in MCS patients. Furthermore, the nodal clustering coefficient and nodal local efficiency in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were positively correlated to auditory subscale scores. Conclusion This study reveals that MCS patients' frontal functional network is synergistically dysfunctional. And the balance between information separation and integration in the frontal lobe is broken, especially the local information transmission in the prefrontal cortex. These findings help us to understand the pathological mechanism of MCS patients better.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Sirui Wang
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Jun Zheng
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Xin Zhang
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Junbin Lin
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Chizi Hao
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Hailong Huang
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
| | - Ting Jiang
- Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Zhongnan Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
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Chamberlin DE. The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy. Front Hum Neurosci 2023; 16:955558. [PMID: 36684841 PMCID: PMC9845783 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.955558] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2022] [Accepted: 12/12/2022] [Indexed: 01/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Coherence Therapy is an empirically derived experiential psychotherapy based on Psychological Constructivism. Symptoms are viewed as necessary output from an implicit model of the world. The therapist curates experiences and directs attention toward discovering the model. Rendered explicit, the model is juxtaposed with contradictory knowledge driving memory re-consolidation with resolution of the symptom. The Bayesian Brain views perception and action as inferential processes. Prior beliefs are combined in a generative model to explain the hidden causes of sensations through a process of Active Inference. Prior beliefs that are poor fits to the real world are suboptimal. Suboptimal priors with optimal inference produce Bayes Optimal Pathology with behavioral symptoms. The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy posits that Coherence Therapy is a dyadic act of therapist guided Active Inference that renders the (probable) hidden causes of a client's behavior conscious. The therapist's sustained attention on the goal of inference helps to overcome memory control bias against retrieval of the affectively charged suboptimal prior. Serial experiences cue memory retrieval and re-instantiation of the physiological/affective state that necessitates production of the symptom in a particular context. As this process continues there is a break in modularity with assimilation into broader networks of experience. Typically, the symptom produced by optimal inference with the suboptimal prior is experienced as unnecessary/inappropriate when taken out of the particular context. The implicit construct has been re-represented and rendered consciously accessible, by a more complex but more accurate model in which the symptom is necessary in some contexts but not others. There is an experience of agency and control in symptom creation, accompanied by the spontaneous production of context appropriate behavior. The capacity for inference has been restored. The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy provides a framework for Coherence Therapy as a computational process which can serve as the basis for new therapeutic interventions and experimental designs integrating biological, cognitive, behavioral, and environmental factors.
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Metacognitive Domains Are Not Aligned along a Dimension of Internal-External Information Source. Psychon Bull Rev 2022:10.3758/s13423-022-02201-1. [DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02201-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
AbstractIt is still debated whether metacognition, or the ability to monitor our own mental states, relies on processes that are “domain-general” (a single set of processes can account for the monitoring of any mental process) or “domain-specific” (metacognition is accomplished by a collection of multiple monitoring modules, one for each cognitive domain). It has been speculated that two broad categories of metacognitive processes may exist: those that monitor primarily externally generated versus those that monitor primarily internally generated information. To test this proposed division, we measured metacognitive performance (using m-ratio, a signal detection theoretical measure) in four tasks that could be ranked along an internal-external axis of the source of information, namely memory, motor, visuomotor, and visual tasks. We found correlations between m-ratios in visuomotor and motor tasks, but no correlations between m-ratios in visual and visuomotor tasks, or between motor and memory tasks. While we found no correlation in metacognitive ability between visual and memory tasks, and a positive correlation between visuomotor and motor tasks, we found no evidence for a correlation between motor and memory tasks. This pattern of correlations does not support the grouping of domains based on whether the source of information is primarily internal or external. We suggest that other groupings could be more reflective of the nature of metacognition and discuss the need to consider other non-domain task-features when using correlations as a way to test the underlying shared processes between domains.
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16
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Peters MA. Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104903. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104903] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2022] [Revised: 09/27/2022] [Accepted: 10/01/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
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Abstract
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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Bowman H, Jones W, Pincham H, Fleming S, Cleeremans A, Smith M. Modelling the simultaneous encoding/serial experience theory of the perceptual moment: a blink of meta-experience. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac003. [PMID: 35242362 PMCID: PMC8889941 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2021] [Revised: 12/14/2021] [Accepted: 02/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
One way to understand a system is to explore how its behaviour degrades when it is overloaded. This approach can be applied to understanding conscious perception by presenting stimuli in rapid succession in the 'same' perceptual event/moment. In previous work, we have identified a striking dissociation during the perceptual moment, between what is encoded into working memory [Lag-1 sparing in the attentional blink (AB)] and what is consciously perceived (Lag-1 impairing in the experiential blink). This paper links this dissociation to what, taking inspiration from the metacognition literature, could be called meta-experience; i.e. how the ability to track and comment on one's visual experience with subjectivity ratings reflects objective performance. Specifically, we provide evidence that the information (in bits) associated with an encoding into working memory decouples from the experiential reflection upon that perceptual/encoding event and that this decoupling is largest when there is the greatest perceptual overload. This is the meta-experiential blink. Meta-experiential self-observation is common to many computational models, including connectionist interpretations of consciousness, Bayesian observers and the readout-enhanced simultaneous type/serial token (reSTST) model. We assess how our meta-experiential blink data could be modelled using the concept of self-observation, providing model fits to behavioural and electroencephalogram responses in the reSTST model. We discuss the implications of our computational modelling of parallel encoding but serial experience for theories of conscious perception. Specifically, we (i) inform theories of Lag-1 sparing during the AB and (ii) consider the implications for the global workspace theory of conscious perception and higher-order theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Howard Bowman
- School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF, UK
| | - William Jones
- School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF, UK
| | - Hannah Pincham
- School of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW 2052, Australia
| | - Steve Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, and Max Planck University College London Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, 12, Queen Square, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neuroscience, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles, 50 ave. F.-D. Roosevelt CP191, Brussels B-1050, Belgium
| | - Murray Smith
- School of Arts, University of Kent, Jarman Building, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7UG, UK
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19
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Schurger A, Graziano M. Consciousness explained or described? Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac001. [PMID: 35145759 PMCID: PMC8824704 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 12/23/2021] [Accepted: 01/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aaron Schurger
- *Correspondence address. Department of Psychology, Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92867, USA. E-mail:
| | - Michael Graziano
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
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20
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Khalsa SS, Berner LA, Anderson LM. Gastrointestinal Interoception in Eating Disorders: Charting a New Path. Curr Psychiatry Rep 2022; 24:47-60. [PMID: 35061138 PMCID: PMC8898253 DOI: 10.1007/s11920-022-01318-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/12/2021] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW Abnormal interoception has been consistently observed across eating disorders despite limited inclusion in diagnostic conceptualization. Using the alimentary tract as well as recent developments in interoceptive neuroscience and predictive processing as a guide, the current review summarizes evidence of gastrointestinal interoceptive dysfunction in eating disorders. RECENT FINDINGS Eating is a complex process that begins well before and ends well after food consumption. Abnormal prediction and prediction-error signals may occur at any stage, resulting in aberrant gastrointestinal interoception and dysregulated gut sensations in eating disorders. Several interoceptive technologies have recently become available that can be paired with computational modeling and clinical interventions to yield new insights into eating disorder pathophysiology. Illuminating the neurobiology of gastrointestinal interoception in eating disorders requires a new generation of studies combining experimental probes of gut physiology with computational modeling. The application of such techniques within clinical trials frameworks may yield new tools and treatments with transdiagnostic relevance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sahib S. Khalsa
- grid.417423.70000 0004 0512 8863Laureate Institute for Brain Research, 6655 South Yale Ave, Tulsa, OK 74136 USA ,grid.267360.60000 0001 2160 264XOxley College of Health Sciences, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK USA
| | - Laura A. Berner
- grid.59734.3c0000 0001 0670 2351Department of Psychiatry, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY USA
| | - Lisa M. Anderson
- grid.17635.360000000419368657Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Minnesota Medical School, Minneapolis, MN USA
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21
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Rorot W. Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab038. [PMID: 34650816 PMCID: PMC8512254 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2021] [Revised: 09/10/2021] [Accepted: 09/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to review existing work on consciousness within the frameworks of Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and Free Energy Principle. The emphasis is put on the role played by the precision and complexity of the internal generative model. In the light of those proposals, these two properties appear to be the minimal necessary components for the emergence of conscious experience-a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wiktor Rorot
- Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927, Stawki 5/7, Warsaw 00-183, Poland
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22
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Abstract
In several papers published in Biological Cybernetics in the 1980s and 1990s, Kawato and colleagues proposed computational models explaining how internal models are acquired in the cerebellum. These models were later supported by neurophysiological experiments using monkeys and neuroimaging experiments involving humans. These early studies influenced neuroscience from basic, sensory-motor control to higher cognitive functions. One of the most perplexing enigmas related to internal models is to understand the neural mechanisms that enable animals to learn large-dimensional problems with so few trials. Consciousness and metacognition-the ability to monitor one's own thoughts, may be part of the solution to this enigma. Based on literature reviews of the past 20 years, here we propose a computational neuroscience model of metacognition. The model comprises a modular hierarchical reinforcement-learning architecture of parallel and layered, generative-inverse model pairs. In the prefrontal cortex, a distributed executive network called the "cognitive reality monitoring network" (CRMN) orchestrates conscious involvement of generative-inverse model pairs in perception and action. Based on mismatches between computations by generative and inverse models, as well as reward prediction errors, CRMN computes a "responsibility signal" that gates selection and learning of pairs in perception, action, and reinforcement learning. A high responsibility signal is given to the pairs that best capture the external world, that are competent in movements (small mismatch), and that are capable of reinforcement learning (small reward-prediction error). CRMN selects pairs with higher responsibility signals as objects of metacognition, and consciousness is determined by the entropy of responsibility signals across all pairs. This model could lead to new-generation AI, which exhibits metacognition, consciousness, dimension reduction, selection of modules and corresponding representations, and learning from small samples. It may also lead to the development of a new scientific paradigm that enables the causal study of consciousness by combining CRMN and decoded neurofeedback.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mitsuo Kawato
- ATR Brain Information Communication Research Group, Computational Neuroscience Laboratory, Hikaridai, Kyoto, 619-0288, Japan.
| | - Aurelio Cortese
- ATR Brain Information Communication Research Group, Computational Neuroscience Laboratory, Hikaridai, Kyoto, 619-0288, Japan
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23
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Cortese A. Metacognitive resources for adaptive learning⋆. Neurosci Res 2021; 178:10-19. [PMID: 34534617 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2021.09.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2021] [Revised: 09/07/2021] [Accepted: 09/08/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Biological organisms display remarkably flexible behaviours. This is an area of active investigation, in particular in the fields of artificial intelligence, computational and cognitive neuroscience. While inductive biases and broader cognitive functions are undoubtedly important, the ability to monitor and evaluate one's performance or oneself -- metacognition -- strikes as a powerful resource for efficient learning. Often measured as decision confidence in neuroscience and psychology experiments, metacognition appears to reflect a broad range of abstraction levels and downstream behavioural effects. Within this context, the formal investigation of how metacognition interacts with learning processes is a recent endeavour. Of special interest are the neural and computational underpinnings of confidence and reinforcement learning modules. This review discusses a general hierarchy of confidence functions and their neuro-computational relevance for adaptive behaviours. It then introduces novel ways to study the formation and use of meta-representations and nonconscious mental representations related to learning and confidence, and concludes with a discussion on outstanding questions and wider perspectives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aurelio Cortese
- Computational Neuroscience Labs, ATR Institute International, 619-0288 Kyoto, Japan.
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24
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Sandved-Smith L, Hesp C, Mattout J, Friston K, Lutz A, Ramstead MJD. Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab018. [PMID: 34457352 PMCID: PMC8396119 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Revised: 06/23/2021] [Accepted: 07/14/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lars Sandved-Smith
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Casper Hesp
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, Amsterdam 1012 GC, Netherlands
| | - Jérémie Mattout
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Antoine Lutz
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
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25
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Eiserbeck A, Enge A, Rabovsky M, Abdel Rahman R. Electrophysiological Chronometry of Graded Consciousness during the Attentional Blink. Cereb Cortex 2021; 32:1244-1259. [PMID: 34435621 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhab289] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2021] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 07/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
One of the ongoing debates about visual consciousness is whether it can be considered as an all-or-none or a graded phenomenon. While there is increasing evidence for the existence of graded states of conscious awareness based on paradigms such as visual masking, only little and mixed evidence is available for the attentional blink paradigm, specifically in regard to electrophysiological measures. Thereby, the all-or-none pattern reported in some attentional blink studies might have originated from specifics of the experimental design, suggesting the need to examine the generalizability of results. In the present event-related potential (ERP) study (N = 32), visual awareness of T2 face targets was assessed via subjective visibility ratings on a perceptual awareness scale in combination with ERPs time-locked to T2 onset (components P1, N1, N2, and P3). Furthermore, a classification task preceding visibility ratings allowed to track task performance. The behavioral results indicate a graded rather than an all-or-none pattern of visual awareness. Corresponding graded differences in the N1, N2, and P3 components were observed for the comparison of visibility levels. These findings suggest that conscious perception during the attentional blink can occur in a graded fashion.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna Eiserbeck
- Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin 12489, Germany
| | - Alexander Enge
- Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin 12489, Germany.,Research Group Learning in Early Childhood, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive & Brain Sciences, Leipzig 04103, Germany
| | - Milena Rabovsky
- Department of Psychology, University of Potsdam, Potsdam 14476, Germany
| | - Rasha Abdel Rahman
- Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin 12489, Germany
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26
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Key B, Zalucki O, Brown DJ. Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects. Front Behav Neurosci 2021; 15:658037. [PMID: 34025371 PMCID: PMC8131515 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2021.658037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2021] [Accepted: 04/07/2021] [Indexed: 02/04/2023] Open
Abstract
How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain's awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that disruption to either processing streams or awareness states perturb subjective experience. Given that the brain must predict the nature of sensory stimuli, we reason that conscious awareness is itself dependent on predictions generated by hierarchically organized forward models of the organism's internal sensory processing. The operation of these forward models requires a specialized neural architecture and hence any nervous system lacking this architecture is unable to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. This approach removes difficulties associated with extrapolations from behavioral and brain homologies typically employed in addressing whether an animal can feel. Using nociception as a model sensation, we show here that the Drosophila brain lacks the required internal neural connectivity to implement the computations required of hierarchical forward models. Consequently, we conclude that Drosophila, and those insects with similar neuroanatomy, do not subjectively experience noxious stimuli and therefore cannot feel pain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian Key
- School of Biomedical Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Oressia Zalucki
- School of Biomedical Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Deborah J. Brown
- School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
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27
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28
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Fleming SM. Theories of consciousness are solutions in need of problems. Cogn Neurosci 2020; 12:86-88. [PMID: 33176555 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1841744] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Doerig et al. point out a number of shortcomings with existing theories of consciousness and argue they should be systematically constrained by empirical data. In this commentary I suggest a further constraint - the potential functions of (the contents of) consciousness. One such candidate function in humans is the social sharing of reportable mental states. The social function of consciousnessprovides a general framework within which to understand the evolution and neurobiology of conscious awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen M Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging and Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK
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29
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Hobot J, Koculak M, Paulewicz B, Sandberg K, Wierzchoń M. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation-Induced Motor Cortex Activity Influences Visual Awareness Judgments. Front Neurosci 2020; 14:580712. [PMID: 33177983 PMCID: PMC7593579 DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2020.580712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2020] [Accepted: 09/18/2020] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
The influence of non-visual information on visual awareness judgments has recently gained substantial interest. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we investigate the potential contribution of evidence from the motor system to judgment of visual awareness. We hypothesized that TMS-induced activity in the primary motor cortex (M1) would increase reported visual awareness as compared to the control condition. Additionally, we investigated whether TMS-induced motor-evoked potential (MEP) could measure accumulated evidence for stimulus perception. Following stimulus presentation and TMS, participants first rated their visual awareness verbally using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), after which they responded manually to a Gabor orientation identification task. Delivering TMS to M1 resulted in higher average awareness ratings as compared to the control condition, in both correct and incorrect identification task response trials, when the hand with which participants responded was contralateral to the stimulated hemisphere (TMS-response-congruent trials). This effect was accompanied by longer PAS response times (RTs), irrespective of the congruence between TMS and identification response. Moreover, longer identification RTs were observed in TMS-response-congruent trials in the M1 condition as compared to the control condition. Additionally, the amplitudes of MEPs were related to the awareness ratings when response congruence was taken into account. We argue that MEP can serve as an indirect measure of evidence accumulated for stimulus perception and that longer PAS RTs and higher amplitudes of MEPs in the M1 condition reflect integration of additional evidence with visual awareness judgment. In conclusion, we advocate that motor activity influences perceptual awareness judgments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justyna Hobot
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
- Perception and Neuroarchitectural Mapping Group, Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
| | - Marcin Koculak
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
| | - Borysław Paulewicz
- Faculty of Psychology in Katowice, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Katowice, Poland
| | - Kristian Sandberg
- Perception and Neuroarchitectural Mapping Group, Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
| | - Michał Wierzchoń
- Consciousness Lab, Psychology Institute, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
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30
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The predictive global neuronal workspace: A formal active inference model of visual consciousness. Prog Neurobiol 2020; 199:101918. [PMID: 33039416 DOI: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2020.101918] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2020] [Revised: 09/13/2020] [Accepted: 09/26/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
The global neuronal workspace (GNW) model has inspired over two decades of hypothesis-driven research on the neural basis of consciousness. However, recent studies have reported findings that are at odds with empirical predictions of the model. Further, the macro-anatomical focus of current GNW research has limited the specificity of predictions afforded by the model. In this paper we present a neurocomputational model - based on Active Inference - that captures central architectural elements of the GNW and is able to address these limitations. The resulting 'predictive global workspace' casts neuronal dynamics as approximating Bayesian inference, allowing precise, testable predictions at both the behavioural and neural levels of description. We report simulations demonstrating the model's ability to reproduce: 1) the electrophysiological and behavioural results observed in previous studies of inattentional blindness; and 2) the previously introduced four-way taxonomy predicted by the GNW, which describes the relationship between consciousness, attention, and sensory signal strength. We then illustrate how our model can reconcile/explain (apparently) conflicting findings, extend the GNW taxonomy to include the influence of prior expectations, and inspire novel paradigms to test associated behavioural and neural predictions.
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31
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Drane DL, Fani N, Hallett M, Khalsa SS, Perez DL, Roberts NA. A framework for understanding the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder. CNS Spectr 2020; 26:1-7. [PMID: 32883381 PMCID: PMC7930164 DOI: 10.1017/s1092852920001789] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
The symptoms of functional neurological disorder (FND) are a product of its pathophysiology. The pathophysiology of FND is reflective of dysfunction within and across different brain circuits that, in turn, affects specific constructs. In this perspective article, we briefly review five constructs that are affected in FND: emotion processing (including salience), agency, attention, interoception, and predictive processing/inference. Examples of underlying neural circuits include salience, multimodal integration, and attention networks. The symptoms of each patient can be described as a combination of dysfunction in several of these networks and related processes. While we have gained a considerable understanding of FND, there is more work to be done, including determining how pathophysiological abnormalities arise as a consequence of etiologic biopsychosocial factors. To facilitate advances in this underserved and important area, we propose a pathophysiology-focused research agenda to engage government-sponsored funding agencies and foundations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel L. Drane
- Departments of Neurology and Pediatrics, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Negar Fani
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Emory School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark Hallett
- Human Motor Control Section, NINDS, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
| | - Sahib S. Khalsa
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA; Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | - David L. Perez
- Cognitive Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry Units, Departments of Neurology and Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Nicole A. Roberts
- School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA
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