Psychosis, Delusions and the "Jumping to Conclusions" Reasoning Bias: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis

Examining the influence of self-referential thinking on aberrant salience and jumping to conclusions bias in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Cognitive processes such as aberrant salience and the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias are implicated in the development of delusions. Self-referential thinking is implicated in this process; however, it is unknown how it may interact with aberrant salience and JTC bias in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (SSDs). This study examined associations of self-referential thinking with aberrant salience, JTC bias, and delusion severity, and whether self-referential stimuli led to an increase in aberrant salience and JTC bias in SSDs (n = 20) relative to psychiatrically healthy controls (n = 20).

METHODS

To assess aberrant salience and JTC bias, participants were asked to complete both self-referential and neutral versions of the Salience Attribution Test (SAT) and the Beads Task, as well as self-report measures of aberrant salience and JTC bias.

RESULTS

Self-referential task condition interacted with clinical group to predict JTC beads task scores, such that participants with SSDs exhibited greater levels of JTC bias than psychiatrically healthy controls during the neutral task condition, when controlling for levels of motivation, cognitive insight, and functioning. Self-referential thinking was significantly associated with aberrant salience, JTC bias, and delusion severity.

LIMITATIONS

This experiment examined trait-level relationships between variables, so does not provide information about state-level interrelationships and would benefit from replication using more dynamic methods such as ecological momentary assessment.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings highlight the interrelationships between self-referential thinking, JTC bias, aberrant salience, and delusion severity, in individuals with SSDs, and support the interactive role of self-referential thinking in predicting JTC bias.

The contributions of risk-taking and impulsivity to jumping to conclusions in the psychosis spectrum

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias has been linked to the formation and maintenance of delusions across the psychosis spectrum. However, it remains unclear whether this bias reflects a primary cognitive deviation or is secondary to other cognitive processes. To this end, we investigated the relationship between JTC, risk-taking, impulsivity, and sensation seeking in individuals with psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) and controls. A large online community sample (N = 1151) completed the Fish Task as a measure for the JTC bias, as well as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) and the Brief Risk-Taking Propensity Scale (R-1) as measures of the propensity to take risks. Measures assessing impulsivity (Impulsive Behavior Scale-8, I-8), sensation seeking (Brief Sensation Seeking Scale, BSSS-4), and verbal intelligence (12-item Wordsum test) were also administered. We dichotomized the sample into extreme groups based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychotic Experiences (CAPE). The present study confirms the existence of a JTC bias in psychosis-prone individuals. Of note, PLE-high individuals self-reported higher risk-taking propensity in the R-1 while at the same time displaying higher objective risk aversion in the BART relative to controls, speaking for a dissociation of subjective versus objective risk-taking behavior. PLE-high individuals showed deviances in other psychological traits (impulsivity, sensation seeking), but these were not associated with hasty decision-making as measured by JTC or risk-taking propensity. The results speak against impulsivity, sensation seeking, or verbal intelligence as driving mechanisms of JTC and risky decision-making.

Associations of conservatism and jumping to conclusions biases with aberrant salience and default mode network

AIM

While conservatism bias refers to the human need for more evidence for decision-making than rational thinking expects, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias refers to the need for less evidence among individuals with schizophrenia/delusion compared to healthy people. Although the hippocampus-midbrain-striatal aberrant salience system and the salience, default mode (DMN), and frontoparietal networks ("triple networks") are implicated in delusion/schizophrenia pathophysiology, the associations between conservatism/JTC and these systems/networks are unclear.

METHODS

Thirty-seven patients with schizophrenia and 33 healthy controls performed the beads task, with large and small numbers of bead draws to decision (DTD) indicating conservatism and JTC, respectively. We performed independent component analysis (ICA) of resting functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. For systems/networks above, we investigated interactions between diagnosis and DTD, and main effects of DTD. We similarly applied ICA to structural and diffusion MRI to explore the associations between DTD and gray/white matter.

RESULTS

We identified a significant main effect of DTD with functional connectivity between the striatum and DMN, which was negatively correlated with delusion severity in patients, indicating that the greater the anti-correlation between these networks, the stronger the JTC and delusion. We further observed the main effects of DTD on a gray matter network resembling the DMN, and a white matter network connecting the functional and gray matter networks (all P < 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] correction). Function and gray/white matter showed no significant interactions.

CONCLUSION

Our results support the novel association of conservatism and JTC biases with aberrant salience and default brain mode.

A Bayesian model of the jumping-to-conclusions bias and its relationship to psychopathology

The mechanisms by which delusion and anxiety affect the tendency to make hasty decisions (Jumping-to-Conclusions bias) remain unclear. This paper proposes a Bayesian computational model that explores the assignment of evidence weights as a potential explanation of the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias using the Beads Task. We also investigate the Beads Task as a repeated measure by varying the key aspects of the paradigm. The Bayesian model estimations from two online studies showed that higher delusional ideation promoted reduced belief updating but the impact of general and social anxiety on evidence weighting was inconsistent. The altered evidence weighting as a result of a psychopathological trait appeared insufficient in contributing to the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias. Variations in Beads Task aspects significantly affected subjective certainty at the point of decisions but not the number of draws to decisions. Repetitions of the Beads Task are feasible if one assesses the Jumping-to-Conclusions bias using number of draws to decisions.

A systematic review of performance-based assessment studies on cognitive biases in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states: A summary of 40 years of research

Cognitive models of psychosis have stimulated empirical studies on cognitive biases involved in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and their symptoms. This systematic review aimed to summarize the studies on the role of cognitive biases as assessed in different performance-based tasks in schizophrenia spectrum psychoses and clinical high-risk states. We focused on five cognitive biases linked to psychosis, i.e., aberrant salience, attentional biases, source monitoring biases, jumping to conclusions, and bias against disconfirmatory evidence. We identified N = 324 studies published in N = 308 articles fulfilling inclusion criteria. Most studies have been cross-sectional and confirmed that the schizophrenia spectrum psychoses are related to exaggerated cognitive biases compared to healthy controls. On the contrary, less evidence suggests a higher tendency for cognitive biases in the UHR sample. The only exceptions were source monitoring and jumping to conclusions, which were confirmed to be exaggerated in both clinical groups. Hallucinations and delusions were the most frequent symptoms studied in the context of cognitive biases. Based on the findings, we presented a hypothetical model on the role of interactions between cognitive biases or additive effects of biases in shaping the risk of psychosis. Future research is warranted for further development of cognitive models for psychosis.

Psychiatric and non-psychiatric patients during the midst of Covid-19: Pandemic distress, psychosis and the belief in conspiracy theories

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic was associated with increased levels of psychological distress in the general population, at the same time providing a perfect breeding ground for conspiracy beliefs. Psychiatric patients are considered as a population with an increased vulnerability for stressful events, and conspiracy beliefs show overlaps with paranoid ideations. The aim of the present study was to investigate if psychiatric patients experienced higher levels of pandemic distress than non-psychiatric patients, if they were more prone to conspiracy beliefs and if pandemic distress as well as other mental health variables were associated with believing in conspiracy theories.

METHODS

Indicators for mental health (pandemic distress, depressive symptoms, general anxiety symptoms, perceived stress) and indicators for believing in conspiracy theories were assessed within psychiatric (n = 73) and non-psychiatric patients (n = 29) during the midst of the pandemic.

RESULTS

Psychiatric patients reported higher levels of pandemic distress than non-psychiatric patients. Conspiracy measurements correlated positively with pandemic distress, but not with anxiety and depression. No differences were found between psychiatric patients with or without psychotic disorder and non-psychiatric patients in regard to conspiracy measurements.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest a higher susceptibility of psychiatric patients to pandemic distress, but not an increased level of believing in conspiracy theories. The common notion that people suffering from psychosis are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories was not supported. Furthermore, distress caused by a specific event and not anxiety per se seems to be related to the degree of conspiracy beliefs.

Transdiagnostic cognitive biases in psychiatric disorders: A systematic review and network meta-analysis

Psychiatric disorders are characterized by cognitive deficits, which have been proposed as a transdiagnostic feature of psychopathology ("C" factor). Similarly, cognitive biases (e.g., in attention, memory, and interpretation) represent common tendencies in information processing that are often associated with psychiatric symptoms. However, the question remains whether cognitive biases are also transdiagnostic or are specific to certain psychiatric disorders/symptoms. The current systematic review sought to address whether the proposed "C" factor of transdiagnostic cognitive dysfunction in psychopathology can be extended to cognitive biases. Overall, 31 studies comprising 4401 participants (2536 patients, 1865 non-clinical controls) met inclusion criteria, assessing 19 cognitive biases across 20 diagnostic categories, with most studies focusing on interpretation (k = 22) and attention (k = 11) biases and only 2 assessing memory biases. Traditional meta-analyses found a moderate effect size (g = 0.32) for more severe cognitive biases in all patients relative to non-clinical controls, as well as small but significant associations between interpretation biases and transdiagnostic symptom categories (general psychopathology: r = 0.20, emotion dysfunction: r = 0.17, psychotic symptoms: r = 0.25). Network meta-analyses revealed significant patient versus non-clinical control differences on attention and interpretation biases across diagnoses, as well as significant differences between diagnoses, with highest severity in panic disorder for attention biases and obsessive-compulsive disorder for interpretation biases. The current findings extend the big "C" interpretation of transdiagnostic cognitive dysfunction in psychiatric disorders to cognitive biases and transdiagnostic symptom dimensions. Results also suggest that while the presence of cognitive biases is transdiagnostic, bias severity differs across diagnoses, as in traditional neurocognitive deficits.

Rethinking paranoid ideation and reasoning: A pilot study based on the argumentative theory of reasoning

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Cognitive theories assume an imbalance of intuitive and analytical reasoning in paranoid ideation. The argumentative theory of reasoning offers an approach on the primary function of reasoning and its flaws. It assumes social exchange as main purpose of reasoning. We applied this theory to delusion research and tested experimentally whether social exchange in the form of production and evaluation of arguments influences subsequent reflective reasoning. Additionally, we examined whether the social network and the frequency/preference for discussions are associated with distorted reflective reasoning and paranoid ideation.

METHODS

327 participants completed the Social Network Index (SNI), the Paranoia Checklist (PCL), and the Cognitive Reflection Test-2 (CRT2). Moreover, preference and frequency of discussions were assessed. In the discussion group (N = 165), participants produced arguments and evaluated counterarguments on two socially relevant topics. The control group (N = 162) watched a nature video instead.

RESULTS

The discussion group showed lower distorted reflective reasoning than the control group. Discussion preference and/or frequency was associated with frequency and disturbance of paranoid thoughts, as well as overall paranoid ideation.

LIMITATIONS

Due to the online format environmental factors could not be held constant and no intrasubject comparison of the CRT2 could be computed in the trial. Furthermore, the sample mainly consisted of psychology students.

CONCLUSION

The results contribute to the understanding of distorted reflective reasoning and provides preliminary evidence that the argumentative theory of reasoning may offer a promising perspective for delusion research.

Predictors of paranoia in the daily lives of people with non-affective psychosis and non-clinical controls: A systematic review of intensive longitudinal studies

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Worrying, self-esteem, sleep problems, anomalous internal experiences, reasoning biases, and interpersonal sensitivity are associated with paranoia. However, no review has examined whether these variables function as predictors of paranoia in everyday life. The present systematic review of intensive longitudinal studies (e.g., experience sampling) examined contemporaneous and time-lagged associations between paranoia and each candidate mechanism in individuals with non-affective psychosis and controls (pre-registration: https://osf.io/uwr9d).

METHODS

We searched electronic databases, PsyArXiv, and reference lists for studies published since 1994.

RESULTS

Of n = 5,918 results, n = 54 fulfilled inclusion criteria (n = 43 datasets). Most studies examined individuals with non-affective psychosis (n = 34). Strong evidence emerged for negative affect (subsumed under 'anomalous internal experiences') and sleep problems. For self-esteem, results suggest contemporaneous and lagged effects on paranoia but associations are likely driven by between-person variance. The low number of studies (n = 2 studies each) allowed no conclusions regarding worrying and reasoning biases. Findings on interpersonal sensitivity, which should be interpreted with caution because of the predictor's conceptual overlap with paranoia, indicate contemporaneous effects whereas time-lagged and within-person associations could not be judged due to insufficient data.

LIMITATIONS

The present review used a narrative data-synthetization and it did not cover outcomes such as hallucinations.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite convincing evidence for affect and sleep problems, it remains unclear whether affective states are precursors or also consequences of paranoia (vicious circle), and which of the actigraphy measures (sleep time, -efficiency, -fragmentation, etc.) best predicts paranoia.

Hasty decision making and belief inflexibility in the more delusion prone? A modified disambiguating-scenarios paradigm assessing cognitive biases implicated in delusions

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary models of psychosis imply that cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC), the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and the liberal acceptance (LA) bias play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. Most of the studies investigating the role of cognitive biases, however, have been conducted with socially neutral or abstract stimuli and have assessed patients with established psychoses. For the present study, we aimed to concurrently investigate multiple biases (i.e., the JTC, BADE, and LA biases) in a community sample with a new paradigm using more socially engaging stimuli.

METHODS

A large sample of participants (N = 874) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk was subdivided into two groups based on the frequency of their psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) according to the positive subscale score of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE) and matched based on major demographics variables, resulting in two equally sized groups called High-PLE (at least 2 SD above the mean) and Low-PLE (maximum 0.5 above the mean; n = 46 for each group). Using a modified version of the written-scenarios BADE task, which emphasized social interactions between agents embedded in the scenario, participants rated the plausibility of response options in the face of new information.

RESULTS

In line with previous findings, the High-PLE group demonstrated the JTC, BADE, and LA biases. That is, the members of this group made more decisions after the initial piece of information, were less likely to revise their beliefs in light of new information, and provided higher plausibility ratings for implausible response options compared to the Low-PLE group.

CONCLUSIONS

Results corroborate prior findings suggesting that the JTC, BADE, and LA biases may be contributing factors in delusional ideation and that metacognitive biases extend to social situations.

Cognitive biases are associated with aberrant salience experience in schizophrenia spectrum disorders

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive models suggest the co-occurrence of cognitive biases and aberrant salience is unique to psychosis, but their interaction is not yet fully understood. Therefore, we aimed to elucidate the relationship between subjective cognitive biases and aberrant salience in individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSDs) in this study.

METHODS

A sample of 92 subjects with SSDs underwent an assessment using Davos Assessment Cognitive Biases (DACOBS) and the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI) in a cross-sectional design. We evaluated psychopathological differences based on ASI scores and conducted a linear regression analysis to examine the variables associated with aberrant salience.

RESULTS

Subjects with an ASI score ≥14 demonstrated significantly higher scores across all subscales and total score of ASI and DACOBS (p<0.001). ASI subscales were significantly positive correlated with all DACOBS subscales, ranging from 0.250 for Increased Significance and Safety Behavior to 0.679 for Heightened Emotionality and Social cognition problems. The linear regression analysis revealed a positive association between aberrant salience and the DACOBS subscales jumping to conclusions (JTC) (β=0.220), social cognition problems (β=0.442), subjective cognitive problems (β=0.405), and a negative association with the subscale belief inflexibility (β=-0.350).

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that JTC, social cognition problems and subjective cognitive problems may play a central role in the experience of aberrant salience in individuals with SSDs. This work informs about the need of developing prevention and intervention strategies that specifically target cognitive biases and aberrant salience in the treatment of psychosis.

Accelerating the development of a psychological intervention to restore treatment decision-making capacity in patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorder: a study protocol for a multi-site, assessor-blinded, pilot Umbrella trial (the DEC:IDES trial)

BACKGROUND

A high proportion of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders will at some point in their lives be assessed as not having the capacity to make their own decisions about pharmacological treatment or inpatient care ('capacity'). Few will be helped to regain it before these interventions proceed. This is partly because effective and safe methods to do so are lacking. Our aim is to accelerate their development by testing, for the first time in mental healthcare, the feasibility, acceptability and safety of running an 'Umbrella' trial. This involves running, concurrently and under one multi-site infrastructure, multiple assessor-blind randomised controlled trials, each of which is designed to examine the effect on capacity of improving a single psychological mechanism ('mechanism'). Our primary objectives are to demonstrate feasibility of (i) recruitment and (ii) data retention on the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (MacCAT-T; planned primary outcome for a future trial) at end-of-treatment. We selected three mechanisms to test: 'self-stigma', low self-esteem and the 'jumping to conclusions' bias. Each is highly prevalent in psychosis, responsive to psychological intervention, and hypothesised to contribute to impaired capacity.

METHODS

Sixty participants with schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses, impaired capacity and one or more mechanism(s) will be recruited from outpatient and inpatient mental health services in three UK sites (Lothian, Scotland; Lancashire and Pennine; North West England). Those lacking capacity to consent to research could take part if the key criteria were met, including either proxy consent (Scotland) or favourable Consultee advice (England). They will be allocated to one of three randomised controlled trials, depending on which mechanism(s) they have. They will then be randomised to receive, over an 8-week period and in addition to treatment as usual (TAU), 6 sessions of either a psychological intervention which targets the mechanism, or 6 sessions of assessment of the causes of their incapacity (control condition). Participants are assessed at 0 (baseline), 8 (end-of-treatment) and 24 (follow-up) weeks post-randomisation using measures of capacity (MacCAT-T), mechanism, adverse events, psychotic symptoms, subjective recovery, quality of life, service use, anxiety, core schemata and depression. Two nested qualitative studies will be conducted; one to understand participant and clinician experiences and one to investigate the validity of MacCAT-T appreciation ratings.

DISCUSSION

This will be the first Umbrella trial in mental healthcare. It will produce the first 3 single-blind randomised controlled trials of psychological interventions to support treatment decision-making in schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Demonstrating feasibility will have significant implications not only for those seeking to support capacity in psychosis, but also for those who wish to accelerate the development of psychological interventions for other conditions.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

ClinicalTrials.gov NCT04309435 . Pre-registered on 16 March 2020.

Cognitive biases in first-episode psychosis with and without attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Introduction

Psychotic disorders such schizophrenia and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are neurodevelopmental disorders with social cognitive deficits. Specifically, biased interpretation of social information can result in interpersonal difficulties. Cognitive biases are prevalent in psychosis, but no previous study has investigated whether the type and severity of cognitive biases differ between subjects experiencing first-episode psychosis (FEP) with (FEP-ADHD⁺) and without ADHD (FEP-ADHD^-).

Methods

A total of 121 FEP outpatients at the Early Intervention Service of Reus were screened for childhood ADHD through the Diagnostic Interview for ADHD (DIVA). Cognitive biases were assessed by the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp). CBQp scores of FEPs groups were compared with those of healthy controls (HCs) with an analysis of covariance. Spearman correlation analysis explored associations between CBQp scores and psychopathology.

Results

Thirty-one FEPs met the criteria for childhood ADHD and reported significantly more cognitive bias [median (interquartile range): 47 (38-56)] than FEP-ADHD^- [42 (37-48)] and HCs [38 (35.5-43)]. CBQp scores did not differ between FEP-ADHD-and HCs when adjusted for age and sex. After controlling for clinical differences, Intentionalising (F = 20.97; p < 0.001) and Emotional Reasoning biases (F = 4.17; p = 0.04) were more strongly associated with FEP-ADHD⁺ than FEP-ADHD^-. Cognitive biases were significantly correlated with positive psychotic symptoms in both groups but only with depressive symptoms in FEP-ADHD^- (r = 0.258; p = 0.03) and with poor functioning in FEP-ADHD⁺ (r = -0.504; p = 0.003).

Conclusion

Cognitive bias severity increased from HCs to FEP-ADHD-patients to FEP-ADHD⁺ patients. FEP-ADHD⁺ patients may be a particularly vulnerable group in which metacognitive targeted interventions are needed.

Improving causality perception judgments in schizophrenia spectrum disorder via transcranial direct current stimulation

BACKGROUND

Deficient causality perception and attribution may underlie key symptoms of schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD), such as delusions and ideas of reference. Although transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) can increase the influence of spatial information on perceptual causality judgments among healthy participants, its effect among patients with SSD remains unknown. We sought to determine whether tDCS modulates the contribution of stimulus characteristics to perceptual causality judgments among patients with SSD; we predicted that right parietal tDCS would increase the influence of spatial stimulus characteristics on patients' causality perception.

METHODS

Patients with SSD received frontal, parietal, frontoparietal and sham tDCS in 4 separate sessions. Pre- and post-tDCS, patients viewed video clips of ball A colliding with ball B. Spatial linearity (ball B's angle of egress) and temporal contiguity (delay between collision and ball B's movement) varied parametrically. After each launching event, patients rated perceived causality.

RESULTS

Among 19 patients with SSD, we found a brain region-dependent effect of tDCS regarding sensitivity to violations of spatial linearity. After right parietal anodal tDCS, the influence of angle variations on patients' perceptual causality judgments increased, reflected by a higher probability of perceived causality for stimuli with small angles and a lower probability of perceived causality for stimuli with high angles.

CONCLUSION

Transcranial direct current stimulation increased the influence of spatial stimulus characteristics on causality perception among patients with SSD. Future research should explore potential links between tDCS-induced changes in basic perceptual processes and clinical symptoms, such as delusions and ideas of reference.

Relationships between cognitive biases, decision-making, and delusions

Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy controls, 42 schizophrenia-spectrum) and included measures of cognitive biases and behavior on probabilistic reversal learning and explore/exploit tasks. Of those, only win-switch rate significantly differed between groups. In regression, reversal learning performance, random exploration, and poor evidence integration during BADE showed significant, independent associations with paranoia. Only self-reported JTC was associated with delusional ideation, controlling for paranoia. Computational parameters increased the proportion of variance explained in paranoia. Overall, decision-making influenced by strong volatility and variability is specifically associated with paranoia, whereas self-reported hasty decision-making is specifically associated with other themes of delusional ideation. These aspects of decision-making under uncertainty may therefore represent distinct cognitive processes that, together, have the potential to worsen delusional thinking across the psychosis spectrum.

Aberrant adapting of beliefs under stress: a mechanism relevant to the formation of paranoia?

BACKGROUND

Difficulties in the ability to adapt beliefs in the face of new information are associated with psychosis and its central symptom - paranoia. As cognitive processes and psychotic symptoms are both known to be sensitive to stress, the present study investigated the exact associations between stress, adapting of beliefs [reversal learning (RL), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and jumping to conclusions (JTC)] and paranoia. We hypothesized that paranoia would increase under stress and that difficulties in adapting of beliefs would mediate or moderate the link between stress and paranoia. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the investigated effects would be strongest in the group of individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.

METHODS

We exposed 155 participants (38 diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, 40 individuals with attenuated psychotic symptoms, 39 clinical controls diagnosed with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 38 healthy controls) to a control condition and a stress condition, in which we assessed their levels of paranoia and their ability to adapt beliefs. We applied multilevel models to analyze the data.

RESULTS

Paranoia was higher in the stress condition than in the control condition, b = 1.142, s.e. = 0.338, t(150) = 3.381, p < 0.001. RL, BADE, and JTC did not differ between conditions and did not mediate or moderate the association between stress and paranoia (all p_s > 0.05).

CONCLUSIONS

The results support the assumption that stress triggers paranoia. However, the link between stress and paranoia does not seem to be affected by the ability to adapt beliefs.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population: A longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population.

METHODS

We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias [JTC], liberal acceptance bias [LA], bias against disconfirmatory evidence [BADE], possibility of being mistaken [PM]) and delusional ideation at baseline, and delusional ideation 7 to 8 months later.

RESULTS

A greater JTC bias was associated with a greater increase in delusional ideation over the following months. This association was better described by a positive quadratic relationship. Neither BADE, LA nor PM were associated with subsequent changes in delusional ideation.

CONCLUSIONS

This study suggests that jumping-to-conclusions predicts delusional ideation in the general population but that this association may follow a quadratic trajectory. While no other associations turned significant, future studies with shorter temporal distances may shed further light on the role of reasoning biases as risk factors for delusional ideation in non-clinical samples.

The Effect of Situational Experiment Conditions on Hasty Decision Making in the 'Beads Task'

'Jumping to Conclusions', or hasty decision making, is widely studied within clinical and computational psychology. It is typically investigated using the 'beads task', a sequential information sampling paradigm, and defining one or two draws as jumping to conclusion. Situational experimental conditions, e.g., group vs. individual testing, abstract vs. cover story, show-up fee or course credit, frequently vary between studies. Little effort has been dedicated to investigating the potential effects of demand characteristics on hasty decision making. We explored this in four samples of participants (n = 336), in different situational experiment conditions, with two distinct variations of the beads task. An abstract 'Draws to Decision' (DtD) variant, and a cover story combined DtD and probabilistic inferences variant. Situational conditions did not have a significant effect on overall DtD for either variant. However, when using 'extreme scores' (DtD of 1 or 1 to 2) as a measure of hasty decision making, situational conditions had an effect for the abstract variant, with individual testing having the fewest hasty decision makers (DtD1: Mann-Whitney U = 2137.5, p = 0.02; DtD1-2: Mann-Whitney U = 2017.5, p < 0.01), but not for the cover story variant. Our results suggest that the abstract variant is more susceptible to test conditions, especially if a categorisation is used to classify hasty decisions. This does not imply that the cover story variant is better suited to capturing jumping to conclusions behaviour, but highlights the importance of mirroring the situational conditions between different samples. We recommend that testing conditions should be fully disclosed.

Associations between acceptance of the implausible bias, theory of mind and delusions in first-episode psychosis patients; A longitudinal study

Multiple different cognitive biases, among them the liberal acceptance (LA) bias, have been suggested to contribute to reality distortion in psychotic disorders. Earlier studies have been cross-sectional and considered a limited set of cognitive correlates of psychosis, thus the relationship between LA bias and psychosis remains poorly known. We studied a similar bias (acceptance of the implausible (AOI)) in 62 first-episode psychosis (FEP) patients and 62 control subjects, who watched movie scenes with varying degrees of realism and were asked to evaluate the probability of these events occurring in real life. We assessed theory of mind (ToM) performance using the Hinting task and delusion severity using Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale item 11. We correlated the magnitude of AOI with the severity of delusions and performance in the ToM task. Furthermore, we used 1-year follow-up data from 40 FEP patients and 40 control subjects to disentangle state vs trait-like characteristics of AOI. At baseline FEP patients expressed more AOI than control subjects, and the magnitude of AOI correlated positively with the severity of delusions and negatively with ToM performance. At the one-year follow-up, when most patients were in remission, patients still displayed increased AOI, which no longer correlated with delusions. These findings support the notion that the AOI bias could represent a trait rather than a state feature and support further studies to test the hypothesis that it could be one of the causal factors of psychotic disorders, possibly associated with ToM.

Plausible subjective experience versus fallible corroborative evidence: The formulation of insanity in Nigerian criminal courts

Insanity as a defence against criminal conduct has been known since antiquity. Going through significant reformulations across centuries, different jurisdictions across the globe, including Nigeria, have come to adopt various strains of the insanity defence, with the presence of mental disorder being the causative mechanism of the crime as their central theme. A critical ingredient in the Nigerian insanity plea is the presence of 'mental disease' or 'natural mental infirmity' as the basis for the lack of capacity in certain cognitive and behavioural domains resulting in the offence. Mental disorders, which are the biomedical formulations of this critical legal constituent are primarily subjective experiences with variable objective features. Using illustrative cases based on psycho-legal formulation as well as reform-oriented and fundamental legal research, it is shown that Nigerian courts have held that claims of insanity based on the accused person's evidence alone should be regarded as "suspect" and not to be "taken seriously." Thus, Nigerian judicial opinions rely on non-expert accounts of defendants' apparent behavioural abnormalities and reported familial vulnerability to mental illness, amongst other facts while conventionally discountenancing the defendants' plausible phenomenological experiences validated by expert psychiatric opinion in reaching a conclusion of legal insanity. While legal positivism would be supportive of the prevailing judicial attitude in entrenching the validity of the disposition in its tenuous precedential utility, legal realism invites the proponents of justice and fairness to interrogate the merit of such preferential views which are not supported by scientific evidence or philosophical reasoning. This paper argues that disregarding the subjective experience of the defendant, particularly in the presence of sustainable expert opinion when it stands unrebutted is not in the interest of justice. This judicial posturing towards mentally abnormal offenders should be reformed on the basis of current multidisciplinary knowledge. Learning from the South African legislation, formalising the involvement of mental health professionals in insanity plea cases, ensures that courts are guided by professional opinion and offers a model for reform.

The effects of base rate neglect on sequential belief updating and real-world beliefs

Base-rate neglect is a pervasive bias in judgment that is conceptualized as underweighting of prior information and can have serious consequences in real-world scenarios. This bias is thought to reflect variability in inferential processes but empirical support for a cohesive theory of base-rate neglect with sufficient explanatory power to account for longer-term and real-world beliefs is lacking. A Bayesian formalization of base-rate neglect in the context of sequential belief updating predicts that belief trajectories should exhibit dynamic patterns of dependence on the order in which evidence is presented and its consistency with prior beliefs. To test this, we developed a novel 'urn-and-beads' task that systematically manipulated the order of colored bead sequences and elicited beliefs via an incentive-compatible procedure. Our results in two independent online studies confirmed the predictions of the sequential base-rate neglect model: people exhibited beliefs that are more influenced by recent evidence and by evidence inconsistent with prior beliefs. We further found support for a noisy-sampling inference model whereby base-rate neglect results from rational discounting of noisy internal representations of prior beliefs. Finally, we found that model-derived indices of base-rate neglect-including noisier prior representation-correlated with propensity for unusual beliefs outside the laboratory. Our work supports the relevance of Bayesian accounts of sequential base-rate neglect to real-world beliefs and hints at strategies to minimize deleterious consequences of this pervasive bias.

Bayesian reasoning with emotional material in patients with schizophrenia

Delusions are one of the most classical symptoms described in schizophrenia. However, despite delusions are often emotionally charged, they have been investigated using tasks involving non-affective material, such as the Beads task. In this study we compared 30 patients with schizophrenia experiencing delusions with 32 matched controls in their pattern of responses to two versions of the Beads task within a Bayesian framework. The two versions of the Beads task consisted of one emotional and one neutral, both with ratios of beads of 60:40 and 80:20, considered, respectively, as the “difficult” and “easy” variants of the task. Results indicate that patients showed a greater deviation from the normative model, especially in the 60:40 ratio, suggesting that more inaccurate probability estimations are more likely to occur under uncertainty conditions. Additionally, both patients and controls showed a greater deviation in the emotional version of the task, providing evidence of a reasoning bias modulated by the content of the stimuli. Finally, a positive correlation between patients’ deviation and delusional symptomatology was found. Impairments in the 60:40 ratio with emotional content was related to the amount of disruption in life caused by delusions. These results contribute to the understanding of how cognitive mechanisms interact with characteristics of the task (i.e., ambiguity and content) in the context of delusional thinking. These findings might be used to inform improved intervention programs in the domain of inferential reasoning.

Whodunit - A novel video-based task for the measurement of jumping to conclusions in the schizophrenia spectrum

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is implicated in the formation and maintenance of the positive symptoms of psychosis and over the years has become a prominent treatment target. Yet, measures designed to detect JTC are compromised by a number of limitations. We aimed to address some of these shortcomings with a new video-based "Whodunit task" among participants scoring high and low on the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). We recruited a large sample (N = 979) from the general population who were divided into subgroups high vs. low on psychotic-like experiences (PLE), matched for depression and background characteristics. In the Whodunit task, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that one out of six suspects was the perpetrator of a crime (deliberately ambiguous with no clear clues until the end). The primary measure was the number of sequences-to-decision (STD). In line with the hypothesis, participants scoring high on the CAPE positive subscale displayed significantly lower STD and a higher rate of JTC. Response confidence in the assessments was elevated in the PLE-High group. The number of overall decisions was also significantly elevated for the PLE-High group. No group differences were found when comparing those scoring high versus low on depression. The STD index correlated significantly with a corresponding index from another JTC task. The study presents a new paradigm for the measurement of data gathering in the schizophrenia spectrum. Speaking to its validity, the Whodunit task was correlated with another JTC measure. Future research should test abbreviated versions of the paradigm, preferably using multiple trials with differing topics/emotional themes.

Self-reported cognitive biases in psychosis: Validation of the Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS) in a Spanish sample of psychotic patients and healthy controls

Cognitive biases have been demonstrated to be important in developing and maintaining psychosis. However, self-report measures for everyday clinical practice have been developed only recently. We aimed to study one of these instruments for assessing cognitive biases: the Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS). In a Spanish sample of 84 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and 152 healthy controls, we examined a) the factor structure using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test the original one-, three- and seven-factor solutions, b) the reliability (Cronbach's alpha), c) the discriminative power (Multivariate Analysis of Covariance - MANCOVA) and d) the relationships of cognitive biases with positive psychotic-like experiences (PPLEs) in healthy individuals and with psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia-spectrum patients. The CFA revealed that the seven-factor solution achieved the best fit. The DACOBS overall scale (Cronbach's alpha = .92) and subscales obtained good internal consistencies. MANCOVA, controlling for age and education, demonstrated that all subscales differentiated between healthy controls and psychotic patients (Wilks' Lambda = 0.87; F_{7, 226} = 4.70; p < .000; partial eta squared = 0.13). In addition, the DACOBS showed high correlations with PPLEs (controls) and moderate correlations with positive and general symptoms (patients), demonstrating its predictive validity. Concluding, the DACOBS proved to be a psychometrically suitable instrument for assessing cognitive biases in psychosis and adequately differentiated between patients and healthy individuals within the Spanish population. Norm scores are provided.

Clinical insight in first-episode psychosis: Clinical, neurocognitive and metacognitive predictors

OBJECTIVE

Poor insight is a major problem in psychosis, being detrimental for treatment compliance and recovery. Previous studies have identified various correlates of insight impairment, mostly in chronic samples. The current study aimed to determine clinical, neurocognitive, metacognitive, and socio-cognitive predictors of insight in first-episode psychosis.

METHODS

Regression analyses of different insight dimensions were conducted in 190 patients with first-episode psychosis. Measures of clinical symptoms, neurocognition, metacognition, social cognition, and 'jumping to conclusions' bias were entered as predictors.

RESULTS

Delusions, disorganisation, and certain negative symptoms were associated with unawareness in various domains, while depression was associated with greater awareness of illness. Deficit in theory of mind and self-reflective processes, as well as a 'jumping to conclusions' bias, contributed to poor insight. Several neuropsychological scores also contributed to this but their contribution was no longer observed in regression analyses that included all the previously identified clinical and cognitive predictors. A measure of perseverative errors was still associated with unawareness and misattribution of symptoms.

CONCLUSION

In models that account for 28 % to 50 % of the variance, poor insight in first-episode psychosis is mainly associated with delusions and certain negative symptoms. At the cognitive level it does not appear to result from neuropsychological impairment but rather from altered reasoning bias and dysfunction in metacognitive processes. Therapeutic strategies specifically directed at these mechanisms could help improve the evolution of insight in first episode psychosis.

Automated Detection of Cognitive Distortions in Text Exchanges Between Clinicians and People With Serious Mental Illness

OBJECTIVE

The authors tested whether natural language processing (NLP) methods can detect and classify cognitive distortions in text messages between clinicians and people with serious mental illness as effectively as clinically trained human raters.

METHODS

Text messages (N=7,354) were collected from 39 clients in a randomized controlled trial of a 12-week texting intervention. Clinical annotators labeled messages for common cognitive distortions: mental filtering, jumping to conclusions, catastrophizing, "should" statements, and overgeneralizing. Multiple NLP classification methods were applied to the same messages, and performance was compared.

RESULTS

A tuned model that used bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (F1=0.62) achieved performance comparable to that of clinical raters in classifying texts with any distortion (F1=0.63) and superior to that of other models.

CONCLUSIONS

NLP methods can be used to effectively detect and classify cognitive distortions in text exchanges, and they have the potential to inform scalable automated tools for clinical support during message-based care for people with serious mental illness.

Further validation of the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for psychosis

BACKGROUND

Cognitive biases are recognized as important treatment targets for reducing symptoms associated with severe mental disorders. Although cognitive biases have been linked to symptoms in most studies, few studies have looked at such biases transdiagnostically. The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire for psychosis (CBQp) is a self-reported questionnaire that assesses cognitive biases amongst individuals with a psychotic disorder, as well as individuals with other severe mental disorders. The current study aims to validate a French version of the CBQp and to explore transdiagnostic cognitive biases in individuals with psychotic disorders, individuals with depression, and in healthy controls.

METHODS

The CBQp was translated into French following a protocol based on international standards. Discriminant validity and internal consistency were determined for total score and each subscale score. Confirmatory factor analyses were performed to test construct validity. Finally, cluster analyses were conducted to investigate cognitive biases across diagnostic groups.

RESULTS

Our results were similar to those of the original authors, with the one-factor solution (assessment of a general thinking bias) being the strongest, but the two-factor solution (assessing biases within two themes relating to psychosis) and the five-factor solution (assessment of multiple distinct biases) being clinically more interesting. A six-cluster solution emerged, suggesting that individuals with similar diagnoses score differently on all cognitive biases, and that individuals with different diagnoses might have similar cognitive biases.

CONCLUSIONS

The current findings support the validity of the French translation of the CBQp. Our cluster analyses overall support the transdiagnostic presence of cognitive biases.

Thinking style and psychosis proneness do not predict false insights

The FIAT paradigm (Grimmer et al., 2021) is a novel method of eliciting 'Aha' moments for incorrect solutions to anagrams in the laboratory, i.e. false insights. There exist many documented reports of psychotic symptoms accompanying strong feelings of 'Aha!' (Feyaerts, Henriksen, Vanheule, Myin-Germeys, & Sass, 2021; Mishara, 2010; Tulver, Kaup, Laukkonen, & Aru, 2021), suggesting that the newly developed FIAT could reveal whether people who have more false insights are more prone to psychosis and delusional belief. To test this possibility, we recruited 200 participants to take an adapted version of the FIAT and complete measures of thinking style and psychosis proneness. We found no association between experimentally induced false insights and measures of Schizotypy, Need for Cognition, Jumping to Conclusions, Aberrant Salience, Faith in Intuition, or the Cognitive Reflection Task. We conclude that experiencing false insights might not be constrained to any particular type of person, but rather, may arise for anyone under the right circumstances.

Jumping to Conclusions and Its Associations With Psychotic Experiences in Preadolescent Children at Familial High Risk of Schizophrenia or Bipolar Disorder-The Danish High Risk and Resilience Study, VIA 11

BACKGROUND

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, ie, making decisions based on inadequate evidence, is associated with psychosis in adults and is believed to underlie the formation of delusions. Knowledge on the early manifestations of JTC and its associations with psychotic experiences (PE) in children and adolescents is lacking.

DESIGN

Preadolescent children (mean age 11.9 y, SD 0.2) at familial high risk of schizophrenia (FHR-SZ, n = 169) or bipolar disorder (FHR-BP, n = 101), and controls (n = 173) were assessed with the Beads Task to examine JTC. The number of beads drawn before making a decision, "draws to decision" (DTD) was used as a primary outcome. PE were ascertained in face-to-face interviews. General intelligence was measured with Reynolds Intellectual Screening Test.

RESULTS

Children at FHR-SZ took fewer DTD than controls (4.9 vs 5.9, Cohen's d = 0.31, P = .004). Differences were attenuated when adjusting for IQ (Cohen's d = 0.24, P = .02). Higher IQ was associated with a higher number of DTD (B = 0.073, P < .001). Current subclinical delusions compared with no PE were associated with fewer DTD in children at FHR-SZ (P = .04) and controls (P < .05). Associations between delusions and DTD were nullified when accounting for IQ.

CONCLUSIONS

JTC marks familial risk of psychosis in preadolescence, not reducible to general intelligence. JTC is associated with subclinical delusions, but this may be an expression of intellectual impairment. Future studies should establish temporality between JTC and delusion formation and examine JTC as a target for early intervention.

Circular inference predicts nonuniform overactivation and dysconnectivity in brain-wide connectomes

Schizophrenia is a severe mental disorder whose neural basis remains difficult to ascertain. Among the available pathophysiological theories, recent work has pointed towards subtle perturbations in the excitation-inhibition (E/I) balance within different neural circuits. Computational approaches have suggested interesting mechanisms that can account for both E/I imbalances and psychotic symptoms. Based on hierarchical neural networks propagating information through a message-passing algorithm, it was hypothesized that changes in the E/I ratio could cause a "circular belief propagation" in which bottom-up and top-down information reverberate. This circular inference (CI) was proposed to account for the clinical features of schizophrenia. Under this assumption, this paper examined the impact of CI on network dynamics in light of brain imaging findings related to psychosis. Using brain-inspired graphical models, we show that CI causes overconfidence and overactivation most specifically at the level of connector hubs (e.g., nodes with many connections allowing integration across networks). By also measuring functional connectivity in these graphs, we provide evidence that CI is able to predict specific changes in modularity known to be associated with schizophrenia. Altogether, these findings suggest that the CI framework may facilitate behavioral and neural research on the multifaceted nature of psychosis.

A generative framework for the study of delusions

Despite the ubiquity of delusional information processing in psychopathology and everyday life, formal characterizations of such inferences are lacking. In this article, we propose a generative framework that entails a computational mechanism which, when implemented in a virtual agent and given new information, generates belief updates (i.e., inferences about the hidden causes of the information) that resemble those seen in individuals with delusions. We introduce a particular form of Dirichlet process mixture model with a sampling-based Bayesian inference algorithm. This procedure, depending on the setting of a single parameter, preferentially generates highly precise (i.e. over-fitting) explanations, which are compartmentalized and thus can co-exist despite being inconsistent with each other. Especially in ambiguous situations, this can provide the seed for delusional ideation. Further, we show by simulation how the excessive generation of such over-precise explanations leads to new information being integrated in a way that does not lead to a revision of established beliefs. In all configurations, whether delusional or not, the inference generated by our algorithm corresponds to Bayesian inference. Furthermore, the algorithm is fully compatible with hierarchical predictive coding. By virtue of these properties, the proposed model provides a basis for the empirical study and a step toward the characterization of the aberrant inferential processes underlying delusions.

A replication study of JTC bias, genetic liability for psychosis and delusional ideation

BACKGROUND

This study attempted to replicate whether a bias in probabilistic reasoning, or 'jumping to conclusions'(JTC) bias is associated with being a sibling of a patient with schizophrenia spectrum disorder; and if so, whether this association is contingent on subthreshold delusional ideation.

METHODS

Data were derived from the EUGEI project, a 25-centre, 15-country effort to study psychosis spectrum disorder. The current analyses included 1261 patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder, 1282 siblings of patients and 1525 healthy comparison subjects, recruited in Spain (five centres), Turkey (three centres) and Serbia (one centre). The beads task was used to assess JTC bias. Lifetime experience of delusional ideation and hallucinatory experiences was assessed using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences. General cognitive abilities were taken into account in the analyses.

RESULTS

JTC bias was positively associated not only with patient status but also with sibling status [adjusted relative risk (aRR) ratio : 4.23 CI 95% 3.46-5.17 for siblings and aRR: 5.07 CI 95% 4.13-6.23 for patients]. The association between JTC bias and sibling status was stronger in those with higher levels of delusional ideation (aRR interaction in siblings: 3.77 CI 95% 1.67-8.51, and in patients: 2.15 CI 95% 0.94-4.92). The association between JTC bias and sibling status was not stronger in those with higher levels of hallucinatory experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings replicate earlier findings that JTC bias is associated with familial liability for psychosis and that this is contingent on the degree of delusional ideation but not hallucinations.

A Computational Analysis of Abnormal Belief Updating Processes and Their Association With Psychotic Experiences and Childhood Trauma in a UK Birth Cohort

BACKGROUND

Psychotic experiences emerge from abnormalities in perception and belief formation and occur more commonly in those experiencing childhood trauma. However, which precise aspects of belief formation are atypical in psychosis is not well understood. We used a computational modeling approach to characterize belief updating in young adults in the general population, examine their relationship with psychotic outcomes and trauma, and determine the extent to which they mediate the trauma-psychosis relationship.

METHODS

We used data from 3360 individuals from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children birth cohort who completed assessments for psychotic outcomes, depression, anxiety, and two belief updating tasks at age 24 and had data available on traumatic events assessed from birth to late adolescence. Unadjusted and adjusted regression and counterfactual mediation methods were used for the analyses.

RESULTS

Basic behavioral measures of belief updating (draws-to-decision and disconfirmatory updating) were not associated with psychotic experiences. However, computational modeling revealed an association between increased decision noise with both psychotic experiences and trauma exposure, although <3% of the trauma-psychotic experience association was mediated by decision noise. Belief updating measures were also associated with intelligence and sociodemographic characteristics, confounding most of the associations with psychotic experiences. There was little evidence that belief updating parameters were differentially associated with delusions compared with hallucinations or that they were differentially associated with psychotic outcomes compared with depression or anxiety.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings challenge the hypothesis that atypical belief updating mechanisms (as indexed by the computational models and behavioral measures we used) underlie the development of psychotic phenomena.

Functional brain networks underlying probabilistic reasoning and delusions in schizophrenia

Delusions in schizophrenia are false beliefs that are assigned certainty and not afforded the scrutiny that normally gives rise to doubt, even under conditions of weak evidence. The goal of the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study is to identify the brain network(s) involved in gathering information under conditions of weak evidence, in people with schizophrenia experiencing delusions. fMRI activity during probabilistic reasoning in people with schizophrenia experiencing delusions (n = 29) compared to people with schizophrenia not experiencing delusions (n = 41) and healthy controls (n = 41) was observed when participants made judgments based on evidence that weakly or strongly matched (or mismatched) with the focal hypothesis. A brain network involved in visual attention was strongly elicited for conditions of weak evidence for healthy controls and patients not experiencing delusions, but this increase was absent for patients experiencing delusions. This suggests that the state associated with delusions manifests in fMRI as reduced activity in an early visual attentional process whereby weak evidence is incorrectly stamped as conclusive, manifestating as a feeling of fluency and misplaced certainty, short-circuiting the search for evidence, and providing a candidate neural process for 'seeding' delusions.

Rethinking delusions: A selective review of delusion research through a computational lens

Delusions are rigid beliefs held with high certainty despite contradictory evidence. Notwithstanding decades of research, we still have a limited understanding of the computational and neurobiological alterations giving rise to delusions. In this review, we highlight a selection of recent work in computational psychiatry aimed at developing quantitative models of inference and its alterations, with the goal of providing an explanatory account for the form of delusional beliefs in psychosis. First, we assess and evaluate the experimental paradigms most often used to study inferential alterations in delusions. Based on our review of the literature and theoretical considerations, we contend that classic draws-to-decision paradigms are not well-suited to isolate inferential processes, further arguing that the commonly cited 'jumping-to-conclusion' bias may reflect neither delusion-specific nor inferential alterations. Second, we discuss several enhancements to standard paradigms that show promise in more effectively isolating inferential processes and delusion-related alterations therein. We further draw on our recent work to build an argument for a specific failure mode for delusions consisting of prior overweighting in high-level causal inferences about partially observable hidden states. Finally, we assess plausible neurobiological implementations for this candidate failure mode of delusional beliefs and outline promising future directions in this area.

Views of young people with psychosis on using virtual reality assisted therapy. A qualitative study

AIM

Service disengagement is a challenge in young individuals struggling with psychosis. Combining cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) with virtual reality (VR) has proven acceptable and potentially effective for symptoms and social functioning in adults with psychosis. However, studies focusing on young adolescents are lacking. The aim of the present study was to investigate the acceptability of VR-assisted CBTp among adolescents with psychosis.

METHODS

A qualitative study investigating the acceptability of VR during exposure-based social training among adolescents with early onset psychosis. Thematic analysis was used to identify, analyse, interpret and report patterns from the qualitative interviews.

RESULTS

A total of 27 adolescents with psychosis were invited to participate, 11 declined and 16 were enrolled (59%), and all completed the study. The participants were from 13 until 18 years old, mean age 16 years. None of them had previous experience with use of VR in therapy, but 10 out of 16 participants had prior experience with VR from playing video games. Regarding acceptability, 14 out of 16 had positive expectations towards using VR in CBTp, and they would prefer using VR during exposure-based social training to real-life training only.

CONCLUSIONS

VR-assisted CBTp can be an acceptable intervention for adolescents with psychosis, given their comfort with technology and the opportunity to confront their fears in less threatening virtual social settings with fewer social risks. The present study yields support to continue developing VR-assisted therapy for adolescents, and focusing on VR-interventions for early onset psychosis.

SlowMo therapy, a new digital blended therapy for fear of harm from others: An account of therapy personalisation within a targeted intervention

OBJECTIVES

SlowMo therapy is a pioneering blended digital therapy for paranoia, augmenting face-to-face therapy with an interactive 'webapp' and a mobile app. A recent large-scale trial demonstrated small-moderate effects on paranoia alongside improvements in self-esteem, worry, well-being and quality of life. This paper provides a comprehensive account of therapy personalisation within this targeted approach.

DESIGN

Case examples illustrate therapy delivery and descriptive data are presented on personalised thought content.

METHOD

Thought content was extracted from the webapp (n = 140 participants) and coded using newly devised categories: Worries: (1) Persecutory, (2) Negative social evaluation, (3) Negative self-concept, (4) Loss/life stresses, (5) Sensory-perceptual experiences and (6) Health anxieties. Safer thoughts: (1) Safer alternative (specific alternatives to worries), (2) Second-wave (generalised) coping, (3) Positive self-concept, (4) Positive activities and (5) Third-wave (mindfulness-based) coping. Data on therapy fidelity are also presented.

RESULTS

Worries: 'Persecutory' (92.9% of people) and 'Negative social evaluation' (74.3%) were most common. 'General worries/ life stresses' (31.4%) and 'Negative self-concept' (22.1%) were present in a significant minority; 'Health anxieties' (10%) and 'Sensory-perceptual' (10%) were less common. Safer thoughts: 'Second-wave (general) coping' (85%), 'Safer alternatives' (76.4%), 'Positive self-concept' (65.7%) and 'Positive activities' (64.3%) were common with 'Third-wave' (mindfulness) coping observed for 30%. Fidelity: Only three therapy withdrawals were therapy related. Session adherence was excellent (mean = 15.2/16; SD = 0.9). Behavioural work was conducted with 71% of people (119/168).

CONCLUSION

SlowMo therapy delivers a targeted yet personalised approach. Potential mechanisms of action extend beyond reasoning. Implications for cognitive models of paranoia and causal interventionist approaches are discussed.

Relationship between jumping to conclusions and clinical outcomes in people at clinical high-risk for psychosis

BACKGROUND

Psychosis is associated with a reasoning bias, which manifests as a tendency to 'jump to conclusions'. We examined this bias in people at clinical high-risk for psychosis (CHR) and investigated its relationship with their clinical outcomes.

METHODS

In total, 303 CHR subjects and 57 healthy controls (HC) were included. Both groups were assessed at baseline, and after 1 and 2 years. A 'beads' task was used to assess reasoning bias. Symptoms and level of functioning were assessed using the Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States scale (CAARMS) and the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF), respectively. During follow up, 58 (16.1%) of the CHR group developed psychosis (CHR-T), and 245 did not (CHR-NT). Logistic regressions, multilevel mixed models, and Cox regression were used to analyse the relationship between reasoning bias and transition to psychosis and level of functioning, at each time point.

RESULTS

There was no association between reasoning bias at baseline and the subsequent onset of psychosis. However, when assessed after the transition to psychosis, CHR-T participants showed a greater tendency to jump to conclusions than CHR-NT and HC participants (55, 17, 17%; χ2 = 8.13, p = 0.012). There was a significant association between jumping to conclusions (JTC) at baseline and a reduced level of functioning at 2-year follow-up in the CHR group after adjusting for transition, gender, ethnicity, age, and IQ.

CONCLUSIONS

In CHR participants, JTC at baseline was associated with adverse functioning at the follow-up. Interventions designed to improve JTC could be beneficial in the CHR population.

Subjective experience and meaning of delusions in psychosis: a systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis

BACKGROUND

Delusions are a common transdiagnostic feature of psychotic disorders, and their treatment remains suboptimal. Despite the pressing need to better understand the nature, meaning, and course of these symptoms, research into the lived experience of delusional phenomena in psychosis is scarce. Thus, we aimed to explore the lived experience and subjective apprehension of delusions in help-seeking individuals with psychosis, regardless of diagnosis and thematic content of the delusion.

METHODS

In our systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Web of Science for qualitative studies published in English from database inception, with the last search on Sept 9, 2021. Grey literature search and hand-searching of relevant journals were also done. Studies were eligible if they provided an analysis of lived experience of delusions or predelusional phenomena presented from the perspective of individuals (age 14-65 years) who had developed a clinical high-risk stage of psychosis, or a diagnosable affective or non-affective psychotic disorder (as clinically defined, self-reported, or assessed within the primary study). Studies with only a subset of relevant participants were eligible only if data for the population of interest were reported separately. Studies that did not discriminate between the experience of delusion and other positive symptoms (eg, hallucinations) were included only if data for delusions were reported separately or could be extracted. First-person accounts (and author interpretations) discussing changes in the sense of self, lived world, and meaning in relation to delusions were extracted and synthesised using a novel thematic synthesis approach informed by a critical realist stance and a phenomenological theoretical framework. Analytic themes were developed into a new overarching framework for understanding the emergence of delusional phenomena. The study was registered with PROSPERO, CRD42020222104.

FINDINGS

Of the 3265 records screened, 2115 were identified after duplicate removal. Of these, 1982 were excluded after title and abstract screening and 106 after full-text eligibility assessment. Of the 27 studies entering quality assessment, 24 eligible studies were included in the qualitative evidence synthesis, representing the perspectives of 373 help-seeking individuals with lived experience of delusions in the context of psychosis. Gender was reported as male (n=210), female (n=110), transgender (n=1), or not reported (n=52). Only 13 studies reported ethnicity, with White being predominant. The age of most participants ranged from 15 to 65 years. We found no eligible studies investigating subclinical or predelusional experiences in at-risk mental state populations through qualitative methods. Most studies were undertaken in western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and most included participants had received or self-reported a diagnosis within the schizophrenia spectrum. Studies differed in relation to whether they focused on one kind or theme of delusion or delusional phenomena more generally as a unified category. Three superordinate themes relating to experiential changes and meanings in delusion were identified: (1) a radical rearrangement of the lived world dominated by intense emotions; (2) doubting, losing, and finding oneself again within delusional realities; and (3) searching for meaning, belonging, and coherence beyond mere dysfunction. Based on the review findings and thematic synthesis, we propose the Emergence Model of Delusion to advance understanding of delusional phenomena in psychosis.

INTERPRETATION

Delusions are best understood as strongly individualised and inherently complex phenomena emerging from a dynamic interplay between interdependent subpersonal, personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes. Integrative approaches to research on delusion, which consider their potential adaptiveness and favour explanatory pluralism, might be advantageous. Effective clinical care for individuals with psychosis might need adapting to match more closely, and take account of, the subjective experience and meaning of delusions as they are lived through, which might also help redress power imbalances and enduring epistemic injustices in mental health.

FUNDING

Priestley Scholars, Wellcome Trust.

Symptoms of Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance associated with chemicals (IEI-C) are positively associated with perceptual anomalies

OBJECTIVE

Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance (IEI; i.e. the experience of somatic symptoms attributed to environmental agents) represents a functional somatic syndrome of unclear aetiology. Based on previous findings that suggest an association between IEI and perceptual anomalies, this study aimed to investigate the relationship between symptoms of IEI associated with chemicals (IEI-C) and facets of the schizotypy spectrum.

METHODS

A cross-sectional study design was used with N = 410 (78.3% female) persons responding to an online survey in which chemical odor sensitivity (COS) and modern health worries (MHW) that are associated with IEI-C, as well as schizotypal personality traits (SPQ), hallucination proneness (LSHS) and delusional ideation (PDI) as core components of the schizotypy spectrum were assessed.

RESULTS

Schizotypal traits were found to be significantly positively associated with MHWs (r = 0.20, p = .01), COS (r = 0.23, p = .01), and showed significant positive associations with hallucination proneness. Magical thinking was found to exhibit a significant positive relationship with both MHW (r = 0.17, p = .01) and COS (r = 0.21, p = .01). These small associations between IEI-C and facets of the psychosis spectrum remained significant even after statistically controlling for individual levels of trait anxiety and depression.

CONCLUSION

Schizotypal personality traits, particularly magical thinking, and hallucination proneness, appear positively related to facets of IEI-C. The findings are of relevance for the advancement of theoretical models of IEI.

Remote group therapies for cognitive health in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders: Feasible, acceptable, engaging

Severe cognitive impairments and cognitive distortions are core to schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (SSDs) and are associated with deteriorated social functioning. Despite well-established efficacy of group psychosocial therapies targeting cognitive health in SSDs, dissemination of these programs remains limited. Remote delivery offers a promising strategy for increasing the programs' accessibility. Yet, little research has evaluated group therapies for cognitive health delivered in this way. Thus, we aimed to assess, from participants' and therapists' perspectives, the feasibility, acceptability, as well as levels and process of engagement in a videoconference delivery of group psychosocial therapies for SSD patients' cognitive health. Participants, outpatients, attended Action Based Cognitive Remediation or Metacognitive Training, both adapted for videoconference. Then, participants and therapists completed post-therapy questionnaires. Of the 28 participants attending at least one session, 75% completed more than half of sessions and seven dropped out. Technology did not appear to significantly hinder participation in the programs. All completing participants reported a positive experience with therapy, 67% were not bothered by the distance from the therapist, and 77% trusted that the information shared was kept confidential. Therapist-rated levels of attention M = 7.5/9 (SD = 1.04), participation M = 6.91/9 (SD = 1.32), and social interactions M = 5.31/9 (SD = 1.96) were satisfactory. Nonetheless, participants indicated that they would have appreciated more social interactions with group members. These positive results validate the earliest stage in the implementation process for remote group therapies targeting cognitive health in SSDs. Remote delivery promises to improve access to therapies targeting cognitive health and, ultimately, facilitate functional recovery for SSD patients.

Increased Belief Instability in Psychotic Disorders Predicts Treatment Response to Metacognitive Training

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

In a complex world, gathering information and adjusting our beliefs about the world is of paramount importance. The literature suggests that patients with psychotic disorders display a tendency to draw early conclusions based on limited evidence, referred to as the jumping-to-conclusions bias, but few studies have examined the computational mechanisms underlying this and related belief-updating biases. Here, we employ a computational approach to understand the relationship between jumping-to-conclusions, psychotic disorders, and delusions.

STUDY DESIGN

We modeled probabilistic reasoning of 261 patients with psychotic disorders and 56 healthy controls during an information sampling task-the fish task-with the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter. Subsequently, we examined the clinical utility of this computational approach by testing whether computational parameters, obtained from fitting the model to each individual's behavior, could predict treatment response to Metacognitive Training using machine learning.

STUDY RESULTS

We observed differences in probabilistic reasoning between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, participants with and without jumping-to-conclusions bias, but not between patients with low and high current delusions. The computational analysis suggested that belief instability was increased in patients with psychotic disorders. Jumping-to-conclusions was associated with both increased belief instability and greater prior uncertainty. Lastly, belief instability predicted treatment response to Metacognitive Training at the individual level.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results point towards increased belief instability as a key computational mechanism underlying probabilistic reasoning in psychotic disorders. We provide a proof-of-concept that this computational approach may be useful to help identify suitable treatments for individual patients with psychotic disorders.

Jumping to conclusions correlates with negative symptoms, poor response inhibition, and impaired functioning in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias is the tendency to make immediate decisions based on little information. There are few studies that have investigated the relationship between JTC and frontal lobe function. We examined the association between JTC and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB), and Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale in individuals with schizophrenia.

METHODS

In total, 50 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and 50 healthy control individuals were administered the beads task. Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia were assessed using the FAB, BPRS, and GAF.

RESULTS

There was a significant negative correlation between JTC and the negative symptoms of the BPRS (rs=-.368, p = .008). There was a significant positive correlation between JTC and the Go/No-Go task of the FAB (rs=.319, p = .026), and the GAF (rs=.433, p = .002).

CONCLUSION

JTC in individuals with schizophrenia may be categorized according to several causes, including negative symptoms and poor response inhibition.

The relationship between jumping to conclusions and social cognition in first-episode psychosis

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) and impaired social cognition (SC) affect the decoding, processing, and use of social information by people with psychosis. However, the relationship between them had not been deeply explored within psychosis in general, and in first-episode psychosis (FEP) in particular. Our aim was to study the relationship between JTC and SC in a sample with FEP. We conducted a cross-sectional study with 121 patients with FEP, with measures to assess JTC (easy, hard, and salient probability tasks) and SC (emotional recognition, attributional style, and theory of mind). We performed Student's t-test and logistic regression in order to analyse these associations.We found a statistically significant and consistent relationship of small-moderate effect size between JTC (all three tasks) and impaired emotional recognition. Also, our results suggest a relationship between JTC and internal attributions for negative events. Relationships between JTC and theory of mind were not found. These results highlight the importance of psychological treatments oriented to work on a hasty reasoning style and on improving processing of social information linked to emotional recognition and single-cause attributions.

Why conspiracy theorists are not always paranoid: Conspiracy theories and paranoia form separate factors with distinct psychological predictors

Paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories both involve suspiciousness about the intentions of others but have rarely been studied together. In three studies, one with a mainly student sample (N = 496) and two with more representative UK population samples (N = 1,519, N = 638) we compared single and two-factor models of paranoia and conspiracy theories as well as associations between both belief systems and other psychological constructs. A model with two correlated factors was the best fit in all studies. Both belief systems were associated with poor locus of control (belief in powerful others and chance) and loneliness. Paranoid beliefs were specifically associated with negative self-esteem and, in two studies, insecure attachment; conspiracy theories were associated with positive self-esteem in the two larger studies and narcissistic personality traits in the final study. Conspiracist thinking but not paranoia was associated with poor performance on the Cognitive Reflection Task (poor analytical thinking). The findings suggest that paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories are distinct but correlated belief systems with both common and specific psychological components.

Verschwörungstheorien und paranoider Wahn: Lassen sich Aspekte kognitionspsychologischer Modelle zu Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von paranoiden Wahnüberzeugungen auf Verschwörungstheorien übertragen?

Der vorliegende narrative Übersichtsartikel stellt zunächst verschiedene Definitionen von Verschwörungstheorien und Verschwörungsmentalität vor und präsentiert Studien zu Zusammenhängen zwischen Persönlichkeitseigenschaften, Symptomen psychischer Störungen und Verschwörungstheorien. Anschließend werden die Kontinuumshypothese des Wahns sowie neuere Konzeptualisierungen von allgemeinem und paranoiden Wahn diskutiert, des Weiteren werden typische kognitionspsychologische Modelle präsentiert, die die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Wahnüberzeugungen durch eine Interaktion von biologischen Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren, psychologischen Faktoren und sozialen Faktoren erklären. In diesen Modellen mediieren sowohl kognitive Verarbeitungsstile („cognitive biases“) als auch emotionale Prozesse die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Wahn, beispielsweise die Tendenz, voreilige Schlussfolgerungen zu treffen („jumping to conclusions bias“), sowie externale Kontrollüberzeugungen und ein externalisierender personalisierender Kausalattributionsstil. Anschließend wird diskutiert, ob Menschen, die Verschwörungstheorien zugeneigt sind, ebenfalls ähnliche kognitive Verarbeitungsstile aufweisen, die auch bei Personen zu finden sind, die paranoiden Wahnüberzeugungen zustimmen und unter psychotischen Störungen leiden. Parallelen bestehen zwischen beiden Personengruppen beispielsweise im Hinblick auf eine Neigung zu externalen Kontrollüberzeugungen und einen external personalisierenden Kausalattributionsstil. Auch bestehen Ähnlichkeiten in der Neigung, voreilige Schlussfolgerungen zu treffen. Fragen nach Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen beiden Phänomenen sollten in weiteren präregistrierten experimentellen Studien quer- sowie längsschnittlich untersucht werden. Möglicherweise könnten moderne niedrigschwellige Interventionsmethoden der kognitiven Verhaltenstherapie von Psychosen (CBTp) in die Beratung oder Prävention von Verschwörungstheorien implementiert werden.

People with schizophrenia use less information to interpret ambiguous social situations

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The tendency of people with schizophrenia to gather insufficient information before making decisions or jumping to conclusions has been repeatedly reported. However, criticism has also been expressed regarding the ecological validity of this finding. Here we present the results obtained by a group of people with schizophrenia and a control group in a non-probabilistic task that requires obtaining items of information before interpreting an ambiguous social situation.

METHODS

Patients with schizophrenia (n = 48) and controls (n = 44) aged 18-50 years participated in the study. All subjects completed the Beads Task and the modified Social Information Preference Task.

RESULTS

Patients with schizophrenia showed a statistically significant tendency to jump to conclusions, including in the proposed novel social task. Unlike other studies, we were unable to find a relationship between this bias and greater severity of psychotic symptoms.

LIMITATIONS

We did not include patients with high levels of psychotic symptoms or a clinical control group.

CONCLUSIONS

The tendency to jump to conclusions in schizophrenia could be present in everyday interpersonal situations.