Behavioural patterns behind the demise of the commons across different cultures

Inferring the ecology of north-Pacific albacore tuna from catch-and-effort data

Catch-and-effort data are among the primary sources of information for assessing the status of terrestrial wildlife and fish. In fishery science, elaborate stock-assessment models are fitted to such data in order to estimate fish-population sizes and guide management decisions. Given the importance of catch-and-effort data, we scoured a comprehensive dataset pertaining to albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) in the north Pacific Ocean for novel ecological information content about this commercially valuable species. Specifically, we used unsupervised learning based on finite mixture modelling to reveal that the north Pacific albacore-tuna stock can be divided into four pseudo-cohorts. We discovered that smaller body mass pseudo-cohorts inhabit relatively high-subtropical to temperate-latitudes, with hotspots off the coast of Japan. Larger body mass pseudo-cohorts inhabit lower-tropical to subtropical-latitudes, with hotspots in the western and central north Pacific. These results offer evidence that albacore tuna prefer different habitats depending on their body mass, and point to long-term migratory routes for the species that the current tagging technology is unlikely to capture in full. We discuss the implications of the results for data-driven modelling of albacore tuna in the north Pacific, as well as the management of the north Pacific albacore-tuna fishery.

Fisheries management as a Stackelberg Evolutionary Game: Finding an evolutionarily enlightened strategy

Fish populations subject to heavy exploitation are expected to evolve over time smaller average body sizes. We introduce Stackelberg evolutionary game theory to show how fisheries management should be adjusted to mitigate the potential negative effects of such evolutionary changes. We present the game of a fisheries manager versus a fish population, where the former adjusts the harvesting rate and the net size to maximize profit, while the latter responds by evolving the size at maturation to maximize the fitness. We analyze three strategies: i) ecologically enlightened (leading to a Nash equilibrium in game-theoretic terms); ii) evolutionarily enlightened (leading to a Stackelberg equilibrium) and iii) domestication (leading to team optimum) and the corresponding outcomes for both the fisheries manager and the fish. Domestication results in the largest size for the fish and the highest profit for the manager. With the Nash approach the manager tends to adopt a high harvesting rate and a small net size that eventually leads to smaller fish. With the Stackelberg approach the manager selects a bigger net size and scales back the harvesting rate, which lead to a bigger fish size and a higher profit. Overall, our results encourage managers to take the fish evolutionary dynamics into account. Moreover, we advocate for the use of Stackelberg evolutionary game theory as a tool for providing insights into the eco-evolutionary consequences of exploiting evolving resources.