The capacity of animals to acquire language: do species differences have anything to say to us?

Do bimanual coordination, tool use, and body posture contribute equally to hand preferences in bonobos?

Approximately 90% of the human population is right-handed. The emergence of this hand preference in humans is thought to be linked to the ability to execute complex tasks and habitual bipedalism. In order to test these hypotheses, the present study explored, for the first time, hand preference in relation to both body posture (seated and bipedal) and task complexity (bimanual coordination and two tool use tasks of different complexity) in bonobos (Pan paniscus). Few studies have explored the effects of both posture and task complexity on handedness, and investigations with bonobos are scarce, particularly studies on tool use. Our study aims to overcome such a gap by addressing two main questions: 1) Does a bipedal posture increase the strength of hand preference and/or create a directional bias to the use of the right hand? 2) Independent of body posture, does task complexity increase the strength of the hand preference and/or create a directional bias to the use of the right hand? Our results show that independent of body posture, the more complex the task, the more lateralization occurred. Moreover, subjects tended to be right-handed for tasks involving tool use. However, posture had no significant effect on hand preference in the tasks tested here. Therefore, for a given task, bonobos were not more lateralized in a bipedal posture than in a seated one. Task complexity might thus have contributed more than bipedal posture to the emergence of human lateralization and the preponderance of right-handedness, although a larger sample size and more data are needed to be conclusive.

Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species

Most early studies of consciousness have focused on human subjects. This is understandable, given that humans are capable of reporting accurately the events they experience through language or by way of other kinds of voluntary response. As researchers turn their attention to other animals, "accurate report" methodologies become increasingly difficult to apply. Alternative strategies for amassing evidence for consciousness in non-human species include searching for evolutionary homologies in anatomical substrates and measurement of physiological correlates of conscious states. In addition, creative means must be developed for eliciting behaviors consistent with consciousness. In this paper, we explore whether necessary conditions for consciousness can be established for species as disparate as birds and cephalopods. We conclude that a strong case can be made for avian species and that the case for cephalopods remains open. Nonetheless, a consistent effort should yield new means for interpreting animal behavior.

Piagetian conservation of discrete quantities in bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)

This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.

On the nature of animal thinking

Recent attempts to teach apes rudimentary grammatical skills have produced negative results. The basic obstacle appears to be at the level of the individual symbol which, for apes, functions only as a demand. Little evidence exists that apes can use symbols as names, that is, as a means of simply transmitting information. Even though non-human animals lack linguistic competence, much evidence has accumulated recently that a variety of animals can form representations of particular features of their environment. What then is the non-verbal nature of animal representations? This question will be discussed with reference to recent investigations of animal memory--in particular, studies concerned with a pigeon's ability to learn "lists" of arbitrary elements. While learning to produce a particular sequence of four elements (colors), pigeons also acquire knowledge about the relation between non-adjacent elements and about the ordinal position of a particular element. Learning to produce a particular sequence also facilitates the discrimination of that sequence from other sequences.