The future of future-oriented cognition in non-humans: theory and the empirical case of the great apes

Intrinsic anticipatory motives in non-human primate food consumption behavior

Future-oriented behavior is regarded as a cornerstone of human cognition. One key phenomenon through which future orientation can be studied is the delay of gratification, when consumption of an immediate reward is withstood to achieve a larger reward later. The delays used in animal delay of gratification paradigms are rather short to be considered relevant for studying human-like future orientation. Here, for the first time, we show that rhesus macaques exhibit human-relevant future orientation downregulating their operant food consumption in anticipation of a nutritionally equivalent but more palatable food with an unprecedentedly long delay of approximately 2.5 h. Importantly, this behavior is not a result of conditioning but intrinsic to the animals. Our results show that the cognitive time horizon of primates, when tested in ecologically valid foraging-like experiments, extends much further into the future than previously considered, opening up new avenues for translational biomedical research.

Planning abilities of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in tool-using contexts

Planning is a type of problem solving in which a course of future action is devised via mental computation. Potential advantages of planning for tool use include reduced effort to gather tools, closer alignment to an efficient tool design, and increased foraging efficiency. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in the Goualougo Triangle use a variety of different types of tools. We hypothesized that procurement strategy (brought to the termite nest, manufactured or acquired at the termite nest, or borrowed from others) reflects planning for current needs, with tool transport behavior varying by tool type and by age and sex class. It is also possible that chimpanzees anticipate the need for tools at future times, which would be evidenced by transporting multiple tool types for a sequential task. One year of video recordings at termite nests were systematically screened for tool procurement; data comprised 299 tool procurement events across 66 chimpanzees. In addition, we screened video recordings of leaf sponging and honey gathering, which resulted in another 38 procurement events. Fishing probes, which are typically used during a single visit, were typically transported to termite nests, while puncturing tools, which are durable and remain on site, were more often acquired at termite nests. Most tools transported in multiples were fishing probes, perhaps in anticipation that a single probe might not last through an entire foraging bout or might be transferred to another chimpanzee. We further documented that chimpanzees transported tool sets, comprising multiple different tool types used in sequence. Mature chimpanzees transported tools more often than did immatures. These observations suggest that chimpanzees plan tool use flexibly, reflecting the availability of raw materials and the likelihood that specific tool types will be needed for particular tasks. Developmental studies and further integration of behavioral, spatial, and archaeological data will help to illuminate the decision making and time depth of planning associated with tool technologies in living primates and hominin ancestors.

Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Parenting Styles Predict Future-Oriented Cognition in Children: A Cross-Sectional Study

Parenting is a crucial environmental factor in children’s social and cognitive development. This study investigated the association between parenting styles and future-oriented cognition skills in elementary school-aged children. Cross-sectional data were collected from parents of 200 Iranian elementary school aged children (6–13 years), 139 boys and 61 girls. Baumrind’s Parenting Styles Questionnaire and Children’s Future Thinking Questionnaire (CFTQ) were administered to parents. There was a significant positive association between authoritative parenting and children’s abilities in prospective memory, episodic foresight, planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition total score. In contrast, authoritarian parenting was negatively correlated with children’s abilities in planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition. Increases in authoritative parenting scores predicted better future-oriented cognition abilities in children.

Towards an animal model of consciousness based on the platform theory

The evolution of intellectual capacities has brought forth a continuum of consciousness levels subserved by neuronal networks of varying complexity. Brain pathologies, neurodegenerative, and mental diseases affect conscious cognition and behavior. Although impairments in consciousness are among the most devastating consequences of neurological and mental diseases, valid and reliable animal models of consciousness, that could be used for preclinical research are missing. The platform theory holds that the brain enters a conscious operation mode, whenever mental representations of stimuli, associations, concepts, memories, and experiences are effortfully maintained (in working memory) and actively manipulated. We used the platform theory as a framework and evaluation standard to categorize behavioral paradigms with respect to the level of consciousness involved in task performance. According to the platform theory, a behavioral paradigm involves conscious cognitive operations, when the problem posed is unexpected, novel or requires the maintenance and manipulation of a large amount of information to perform cognitive operations on them. Conscious cognitive operations are associated with a relocation of processing resources and the redirection of attentional focus. A consciousness behavioral test battery is proposed that is composed of tests which are assumed to require higher levels of consciousness as compared to other tasks and paradigms. The consciousness test battery for rodents includes the following tests: Working memory in the radial arm maze, episodic-like memory, prospective memory, detour test, and operant conditioning with concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedules. Performance in this test battery can be contrasted with the performance in paradigms and tests that require lower levels of consciousness. Additionally, a second more comprehensive behavioral test battery is proposed to control for behavioral phenotypes not related to consciousness. Our theory could serve as a guidance for the decryption of the neurobiological basis of consciousness.

Experience-Specific Dimensions of Consciousness (Observable in Flexible and Spontaneous Action Planning Among Animals)

The multidimensional framework to the study of consciousness, which comes as an alternative to a single sliding scale model, offers a set of experimental paradigms for investigating dimensions of animal consciousness, acknowledging the compelling urge for a novel approach. One of these dimensions investigates whether non-human animals can flexibly and spontaneously plan for a future event, and for future desires, without relying on reinforcement learning. This is a critical question since different intentional structures for action in non-human animals are described as served by different neural mechanisms underpinning the capacity to represent temporal properties. And a lack of appreciation of this variety of intentional structures and neural correlates has led many experts to doubt that animals have access to temporal reasoning and to not recognize temporality as a mark of consciousness, and as a psychological resource for their life. With respect to this, there is a significant body of ethological evidence for planning abilities in non-human animals, too often overlooked, and that instead should be taken into serious account. This could contribute to assigning consciousness profiles, across and within species, that should be tailored according to an implemented and expansive use of the multidimensional framework. This cannot be fully operational in the absence of an additional tag to its dimensions of variations: the experience-specificity of consciousness.

Ants Can Anticipate the Following Quantity in an Arithmetic Sequence

Workers of the ant Myrmica sabuleti have been previously shown to be able to add and subtract numbers of elements and to expect the time and location of the next food delivery. We wanted to know if they could anticipate the following quantity of elements present near their food when the number of these elements increases or decreases over time according to an arithmetic sequence. Two experiments were therefore carried out, one with an increasing sequence, the other with a decreasing sequence. Each experiment consisted of two steps, one for the ants to learn the numbers of elements successively present near their food, the other to test their choice when they were simultaneously in the presence of the numbers from a previously learned sequence and the following quantity. The ants anticipated the following quantity in each presented numerical sequence. This forethinking of the next quantity applies to numerosity, thus, to concrete items. This anticipatory behavior may be explained by associative learning and by the ants’ ability to memorize events and to estimate the elapsing time.

Chimpanzees Predict the Hedonic Outcome of Novel Taste Combinations: The Evolutionary Origins of Affective Forecasting

Affective forecasting–predicting the emotional outcome of never-before experienced situations–is pervasive in our lives. When facing novel situations, we can quickly integrate bits and pieces of prior experiences to envisage possible scenarios and their outcomes, and what these might feel like. Such affective glimpses of the future often steer the decisions we make. By enabling principled decision-making in novel situations, affective forecasting confers the important adaptive advantage of eluding the potentially costly consequences of tackling such situations by trial-and-error. Affective forecasting has been hypothesized as uniquely human, yet, in a recent study we found suggestive evidence of this ability in an orangutan. To test non-verbal subjects, we capitalized on culinary examples of affective forecasting and devised a behavioral test that required the subjects to make predictions about novel juice mixes produced from familiar ingredients. In the present study, we administered the same task to two chimpanzees and found that their performance was comparable to that of the previously tested orangutan and 10 humans, who served as a comparison group. To improve the comparability of human and animal performance, in the present study we also introduced a new approach to assessing if the subjects’ performance was indicative of affective forecasting, which relies exclusively on behavioral data. The results of the study open for the possibility that affective forecasting has evolved in the common ancestor of the great apes, providing Hominids with the adaptive advantage of e.g., quickly evaluating heterogeneous food patches using hedonic prediction.

Seeing thought: a cultural cognitive tool

The present paper, which is the first of two twin opinion papers, offers a theoretical approach of literacy and critical literacy in relation to language, thought, and reasoning. Literacy acquisition and practice proceed through two stages, which partially overlap in terms of processing abilities: the first is achieved when the learner becomes a skilled reader and writer, characterized by automatic word processing; the second, when reading comprehension and written production become expert instruments in the communication of progressively more abstract and sophisticated, but always linguistically-mediated, knowledge and ideas. The destiny of literacy, depending on educational and social factors, is thus to be to fused with language, thought and reasoning. Oral language becomes literate language; and our cognitive activity becomes—as indicated in the title—“seeing thought”, which paves the way, we will argue, for reasoning skills. Making of literacy an epistemic and social tool of our own collective history requires a critical stance that raises itself and ourselves to a stage called critical literacy. In this paper we focus on some of the favorable and unfavorable factors influencing this achievement. The main challenge is to bring literate cognition up to the capacity of choosing between accept and verify, between belief and disbelief, by weighting evidence and reasoning, by arguing and debunking errors and falsities. Accordingly, our objective is essentially to narrate how literacy gives birth to critical literacy and explain why, at the end of this process, critical literacy becomes hard to distinguish from thinking and reasoning.

It is about time: Conceptual and experimental evaluation of the temporal cognitive mechanisms in mental time travel

Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time to remember past events (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards in time to imagine future events (i.e., future thinking). Despite empirical evidence showing that animals might possess MTT abilities, some still claim that this ability is uniquely human. Recent debates have suggested that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism (i.e., ability to represent the sense of past and future) that makes MTT uniquely human. Advances in the field have been constrained by a lack of comparative data, methodological shortcomings that prevent meaningful comparisons, and a lack of clear conceptualizations of the temporal cognitive mechanism. Here I will present a comprehensive review into MTT in humans and animals-with a particular focus on great apes. I will examine three of the most prominent and influential theoretical models of human MTT. Drawing on these accounts, I suggest that a basic way of understanding time might be shared across species, however culture and language will play a critical role at shaping the way we elaborate mental representations about past and future events. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

A Critical Review of Behavioral and Emotional Disinhibition

The theory of "disinhibition" has been very influential in psychiatry and neurology for over a century. Disinhibition has been used to explain clinical findings in many neurological and psychiatric disorders including dementia, traumatic brain injury, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, substance abuse, impulsivity in personality disorders, and neurodevelopmental disorders. In addition, disinhibition has been used as a unifying theory to link clinical observations with cognitive findings, and even cellular findings. This review discusses the origins and history of the theory of disinhibition and its strengths and weaknesses in four domains: face validity, consistency with other brain mechanisms, consistency with evolutionary mechanisms, and empiric support. I assert that the vagueness of the theory, inconsistency with other brain mechanisms, and lack of empiric support limit the usefulness of this theory. Alternative approaches, based on findings in other motor, language, and cognitive functions, are discussed.

Comparing chimpanzees' preparatory responses to known and unknown future outcomes

When humans plan for the future, we recognize not only that one particular event may occur, but that the future can have different, mutually exclusive possible outcomes. A recent study by Suddendorf et al (Suddendorf 2017 Biol. Lett. 13, 20170170 (doi:10.1098/rsbl.2017.0170)) suggests that young children (less than 3 years) and apes lack this capacity, as demonstrated by their failure to cover each of two tube openings to ensure catching an object that would drop randomly from one of the tubes. Before drawing conclusions based on these negative results, however, it is important to assess subjects' failures and test the reliability of the task itself. To explore whether the apes' performance resulted from an inability to represent mutually exclusive futures or from extraneous factors related to the task, we replicated the methods of Suddendorf et al (Suddendorf 2017 Biol. Lett. 13, 20170170 (doi:10.1098/rsbl.2017.0170)) with a group of six chimpanzees but included a key control condition in which subjects were expected to cover both tubes on every trial (i.e. the rewards would consistently emerge from both tubes). We show that even in this straightforward condition in which the outcome of the trial was known, only four of the six subjects ever covered both tubes, typically doing so after a minimum of 17 trials, and often reverting back to covering one tube on later trials. We conclude that this task is not valid for testing the ability to represent mutually exclusive futures. We discuss what potential factors may explain the results and outline a new suggested method to continue testing for this capacity in the future.

How comparative psychology can shed light on human evolution: Response to Beran et al.'s discussion of "Cognitive capacities for cooking in chimpanzees"

We recently reported a study (Warneken & Rosati Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282, 20150229, 2015) examining whether chimpanzees possess several cognitive capacities that are critical to engage in cooking. In a subsequent commentary, Beran, Hopper, de Waal, Sayers, and Brosnan Learning & Behavior (2015) asserted that our paper has several flaws. Their commentary (1) critiques some aspects of our methodology and argues that our work does not constitute evidence that chimpanzees can actually cook; (2) claims that these results are old news, as previous work had already demonstrated that chimpanzees possess most or all of these capacities; and, finally, (3) argues that comparative psychological studies of chimpanzees cannot adequately address questions about human evolution, anyway. However, their critique of the premise of our study simply reiterates several points we made in the original paper. To quote ourselves: "As chimpanzees neither control fire nor cook food in their natural behavior, these experiments therefore focus not on whether chimpanzees can actually cook food, but rather whether they can apply their cognitive skills to novel problems that emulate cooking" (Warneken & Rosati Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282, 20150229, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, the methodological issues they raise are standard points about psychological research with animals-many of which were addressed synthetically across our 9 experiments, or else are orthogonal to our claims. Finally, we argue that comparative studies of extant apes (and other nonhuman species) are a powerful and indispensable method for understanding human cognitive evolution.

Risso's dolphins plan foraging dives

Humans remember the past and use that information to plan future actions. Lab experiments that test memory for the location of food show that animals have a similar capability to act in anticipation of future needs, but less work has been done on animals foraging in the wild. We hypothesized that planning abilities are critical and common in breath-hold divers who adjust each dive to forage on prey varying in quality, location and predictability within constraints of limited oxygen availability. We equipped Risso's dolphins with sound-and-motion recording tags to reveal where they focus their attention through their externally observable echolocation and how they fine tune search strategies in response to expected and observed prey distribution. The information from the dolphins was integrated with synoptic prey data obtained from echosounders on an underwater vehicle. At the start of the dives, whales adjusted their echolocation inspection ranges in ways that suggest planning to forage at a particular depth. Once entering a productive prey layer, dolphins reduced their search range comparable to the scale of patches within the layer, suggesting that they were using echolocation to select prey within the patch. On ascent, their search range increased, indicating that they decided to stop foraging within that layer and started searching for prey in shallower layers. Information about prey, learned throughout the dive, was used to plan foraging in the next dive. Our results demonstrate that planning for future dives is modulated by spatial memory derived from multi-modal prey sampling (echoic, visual and capture) during earlier dives.

Future Thinking: Children But Not Apes Consider Multiple Possibilities

When anticipating the future, we draw on our past experience but must take uncertainty into account; for example, while preparing for a trip, we might pack a raincoat and sunglasses because of unpredictable weather. New research shows that the ability to plan for multiple future possibilities may be present in human children from as early as 3-4 years of age, but appears to be lacking in non-human apes.

Affective forecasting in an orangutan: predicting the hedonic outcome of novel juice mixes

Affective forecasting is an ability that allows the prediction of the hedonic outcome of never-before experienced situations, by mentally recombining elements of prior experiences into possible scenarios, and pre-experiencing what these might feel like. It has been hypothesised that this ability is uniquely human. For example, given prior experience with the ingredients, but in the absence of direct experience with the mixture, only humans are said to be able to predict that lemonade tastes better with sugar than without it. Non-human animals, on the other hand, are claimed to be confined to predicting-exclusively and inflexibly-the outcome of previously experienced situations. Relying on gustatory stimuli, we devised a non-verbal method for assessing affective forecasting and tested comparatively one Sumatran orangutan and ten human participants. Administered as binary choices, the test required the participants to mentally construct novel juice blends from familiar ingredients and to make hedonic predictions concerning the ensuing mixes. The orangutan's performance was within the range of that shown by the humans. Both species made consistent choices that reflected independently measured taste preferences for the stimuli. Statistical models fitted to the data confirmed the predictive accuracy of such a relationship. The orangutan, just like humans, thus seems to have been able to make hedonic predictions concerning never-before experienced events.

Children's and Apes' Preparatory Responses to Two Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

Animal brains have evolved to predict outcomes of events in the immediate environment [1-5]. Adult humans are particularly adept at dealing with environmental uncertainty, being able to mentally represent multiple, even mutually exclusive versions of the future and prepare accordingly. This capacity is fundamental to many complex future-oriented behaviors [6, 7], yet little is known about when it develops in children [8] and whether it is shared with non-human animals [9]. Here we show that children become able to insightfully prepare for two mutually exclusive versions of an undetermined future event during the middle preschool years, whereas we find no evidence for such a capacity in a sample of chimpanzees and orangutans. We gave 90 preschool children and 8 great apes the opportunity to catch an item dropped into a forked tube with two bottom openings. Children's performance improved linearly across age groups (2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 years), with none of the youngest group but most of the oldest group spontaneously covering both openings the first time they prepared to catch the item. The apes performed like 2-year-olds on the first trial, with none of them covering both openings. Some apes and 2-year-olds eventually passed the task, but only in a manner consistent with trial-and-error learning. Our results reveal the developmental trajectory of a critical cognitive ability that allows humans to prepare for future uncertainty, and they also raise the possibility that this ability is not shared with other hominids.

Macaques can predict social outcomes from facial expressions

There is widespread acceptance that facial expressions are useful in social interactions, but empirical demonstration of their adaptive function has remained elusive. Here, we investigated whether macaques can use the facial expressions of others to predict the future outcomes of social interaction. Crested macaques (Macacanigra) were shown an approach between two unknown individuals on a touchscreen and were required to choose between one of two potential social outcomes. The facial expressions of the actors were manipulated in the last frame of the video. One subject reached the experimental stage and accurately predicted different social outcomes depending on which facial expressions the actors displayed. The bared-teeth display (homologue of the human smile) was most strongly associated with predicted friendly outcomes. Contrary to our predictions, screams and threat faces were not associated more with conflict outcomes. Overall, therefore, the presence of any facial expression (compared to neutral) caused the subject to choose friendly outcomes more than negative outcomes. Facial expression in general, therefore, indicated a reduced likelihood of social conflict. The findings dispute traditional theories that view expressions only as indicators of present emotion and instead suggest that expressions form part of complex social interactions where individuals think beyond the present.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

Cognitive capacities for cooking in chimpanzees

The transition to a cooked diet represents an important shift in human ecology and evolution. Cooking requires a set of sophisticated cognitive abilities, including causal reasoning, self-control and anticipatory planning. Do humans uniquely possess the cognitive capacities needed to cook food? We address whether one of humans' closest relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), possess the domain-general cognitive skills needed to cook. Across nine studies, we show that chimpanzees: (i) prefer cooked foods; (ii) comprehend the transformation of raw food that occurs when cooking, and generalize this causal understanding to new contexts; (iii) will pay temporal costs to acquire cooked foods; (iv) are willing to actively give up possession of raw foods in order to transform them; and (v) can transport raw food as well as save their raw food in anticipation of future opportunities to cook. Together, our results indicate that several of the fundamental psychological abilities necessary to engage in cooking may have been shared with the last common ancestor of apes and humans, predating the control of fire.

Human thinking, shared intentionality, and egocentric biases

The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello's (2014) A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello's proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.

Cup tool use by squirrel monkeys

Captive-born male and female squirrel monkeys spontaneously 'invented' a cup tool use technique to Contain (i.e., hold and control) food they reduced into fragments for consumption and to Contain water collected from a valve to drink. Food cup use was observed more frequently than water cup use. Observations indicate that 68% (n = 39/57) of monkeys in this population used a cup (a plastic slip cap) to Contain food, and a subset of these monkeys, 10% (n = 4/39), also used a cup to Contain water. Cup use was optional and did not replace, but supplemented, the hand/arm-to-mouth eating and direct valve drinking exhibited by all members of the population. Strategies monkeys used to bring food and cups together for food processing activity at preferred upper-level perching areas, in the arboreal-like environment in which they lived, provides evidence that monkeys may plan food processing activity with the cups. Specifically, prior to cup use monkeys obtained a cup first before food, or obtained food and a cup from the floor simultaneously, before transporting both items to upper-level perching areas. After food processing activity with cups monkeys rarely dropped the cups and more often placed the cups onto perching. Monkeys subsequently returned to use cups that they previously placed on perching after food processing activity. The latter behavior is consistent with the possibility that monkeys may keep cups at preferred perching sites for future food processing activity and merits experimental investigation. Reports of spontaneous tool use by squirrel monkeys are rare and this is the first report of population-level tool use. These findings offer insights into the cognitive abilities of squirrel monkeys and provide a new context for behavior studies with this genus and for comparative studies with other primates.

A taxonomy of prospection: introducing an organizational framework for future-oriented cognition

Prospection--the ability to represent what might happen in the future--is a broad concept that has been used to characterize a wide variety of future-oriented cognitions, including affective forecasting, prospective memory, temporal discounting, episodic simulation, and autobiographical planning. In this article, we propose a taxonomy of prospection to initiate the important and necessary process of teasing apart the various forms of future thinking that constitute the landscape of prospective cognition. The organizational framework that we propose delineates episodic and semantic forms of four modes of future thinking: simulation, prediction, intention, and planning. We show how this framework can be used to draw attention to the ways in which various modes of future thinking interact with one another, generate new questions about prospective cognition, and illuminate our understanding of disorders of future thinking. We conclude by considering basic cognitive processes that give rise to prospective cognitions, cognitive operations and emotional/motivational states relevant to future-oriented cognition, and the possible role of procedural or motor systems in future-oriented behavior.

How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.