The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms

Conscious and unconscious perception of pitch shifts in auditory feedback during vocalization: Behavioral functions and event-related potential correlates

During vocalization, mismatches between expected and perceived auditory feedback are processed rapidly and automatically, suggesting that feedback control of vocalization operates unconsciously. However, whether consciousness modulates speech feedback control remains little studied. To address this question, we concurrently measured behavioral vocal responses and electroencephalography (EEG) in 30 participants while they vocalized and their auditory feedback was perturbed with individually calibrated perceptual threshold level pitch shifts. Following each vocalization trial, participants rated if they consciously detected a pitch shift in their auditory feedback. We analyzed the data on a trial-by-trial basis to test if vocal responses to pitch perturbations were modulated by conscious perception. Our results revealed that even on trials where the participants reported not noticing the pitch shift at all, a compensatory vocal response to the altered auditory feedback was generated. Conscious detection of a pitch shift was associated with an increased magnitude of vocal responses roughly 500-700 ms after the pitch shift compared to the unconscious trials. Conscious detection of the pitch shift correlated with early (Auditory awareness negativity, AAN) and late (Late positivity, LP) neural responses as indexed by the modulation of event-related potentials (ERPs). Source localization of the ERPs suggested that conscious pitch shift detection was associated with increased neural activity within the temporal, frontal and parietal cortical networks known to be involved in speech motor control. These findings emphasize the importance of investigating the role of consciousness in regulating speech feedback control, and their effect on the underlying neural and behavioral functions.

Large-scale functional networks underlying visual attention

Attention networks are loosely defined as the regions of the brain which interact to control behaviour during attentional tasks, but the specific definition of attention networks varies between research programs based on task demands and modalities. The Attention Network Task was designed to exemplify three aspects of attention, alerting, orienting, and executive control, using a visual cueing paradigm. Its proponents propose a system of networks which underlies these aspects. It is debated whether there exists a unified system of networks which underlies attention independently of other cognitive and sensory processing systems. We review the evidence for an attention system within the domain of visual attention. Neuroimaging research using fMRI, EEG, MEG, and others across a variety of tasks attributed to attention, visual cueing, visual search, and divided attention, is compared. This concludes with a discussion on the limitations of an independent "attention system" for describing how the brain flexibly controls many abilities attributed to visual attention.

Synchrony and subjective experience: the neural correlates of the stream of consciousness

Human subjectivity, our first-person conscious experience of the world, is among the deepest scientific mysteries. This opinion article lays out an approach to examining the neural correlates of subjectivity as it unfolds over time. Subjective experience is inherently idiosyncratic, arising from effortless interpretations that feel like perceived facts (p-interpretations), and integrative, with past and expected future moments influencing the current experience. Differential synchrony effects (i.e., neural synchrony that differs between groups) suggest that parts of gestalt cortex (inferior parietal lobule and posterior temporal cortex) and posterior medial cortex track p-interpretations. Differential synchrony may result from each person's preexisting idiosyncratic non-sensory representations (e.g., expectations, memories, motivations) being integrated with sensory inputs to yield unique meaning-infused immediate experiences across the stream of consciousness.

Perceptual and attentional impairments of conscious access involve distinct neural mechanisms despite equal task performance

This study investigates failures in conscious access resulting from either weak sensory input (perceptual impairments) or unattended input (attentional impairments). Participants viewed a Kanizsa stimulus with or without an illusory triangle within a rapid serial visual presentation of distractor stimuli. We designed a novel Kanizsa stimulus that contained additional ancillary features of different complexity (local contrast and collinearity) that were independently manipulated. Perceptual performance on the Kanizsa stimulus (presence vs. absence of an illusion) was equated between the perceptual (masking) and attentional (attentional blink) manipulation to circumvent common confounds related to conditional differences in task performance. We trained and tested classifiers on electroencephalogram (EEG) data to reflect the processing of specific stimulus features, with increasing levels of complexity. We show that late stages of processing (~200-250 ms), reflecting the integration of complex stimulus features (collinearity, illusory triangle), were impaired by masking but spared by the attentional blink. In contrast, decoding of local contrast (the spatial arrangement of stimulus features) was observed early in time (~80 ms) and was left largely unaffected by either manipulation. These results replicate previous work showing that feedforward processing is largely preserved under both perceptual and attentional impairments. Crucially, however, under matched levels of performance, only attentional impairments left the processing of more complex visual features relatively intact, likely related to spared lateral and local feedback processes during inattention. These findings reveal distinct neural mechanisms associated with perceptual and attentional impairments and thus contribute to a comprehensive understanding of distinct neural stages leading to conscious access.

Event-related potential correlates of consciousness in simple auditory hallucinations

Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have been proposed for perceptual awareness in various sensory modalities. To date, perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) and late positivity (LP) are considered the main NCC candidates, and the question remains which one is the NCC proper. Investigating states where the content of consciousness is independent of the physical stimulus, may provide additional theoretical and empirical value. We studied the event-related potential (ERP) markers of auditory awareness in simple auditory hallucinations using a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm, where participants listened to the near-threshold tones and stimulus-absent trials, rating subjective clarity with the perceptual awareness scale (PAS). The results showed auditory awareness negativity (AAN) - an early event-related potential difference between aware and unaware stimuli - in the hallucinatory condition, suggesting that AAN is an NCC proper in auditory consciousness. Late positivity was absent in simple auditory hallucinations.

Human high-order thalamic nuclei gate conscious perception through the thalamofrontal loop

Human high-order thalamic nuclei activity is known to closely correlate with conscious states. However, it is not clear how those thalamic nuclei and thalamocortical interactions directly contribute to the transient process of human conscious perception. We simultaneously recorded stereoelectroencephalography data from the thalamic nuclei and prefrontal cortex (PFC), while patients with implanted electrodes performed a visual consciousness task. Compared with the ventral nuclei and PFC, the intralaminar and medial nuclei presented earlier and stronger consciousness-related activity. Transient thalamofrontal neural synchrony and cross-frequency coupling were both driven by the θ phase of the intralaminar and medial nuclei during conscious perception. The intralaminar and medial thalamic nuclei thus play a gate role to drive the activity of the PFC during the emergence of conscious perception.

Quantum-like Qualia hypothesis: from quantum cognition to quantum perception

To arbitrate theories of consciousness, scientists need to understand mathematical structures of quality of consciousness, or qualia. The dominant view regards qualia as points in a dimensional space. This view implicitly assumes that qualia can be measured without any effect on them. This contrasts with intuitions and empirical findings to show that by means of internal attention qualia can change when they are measured. What is a proper mathematical structure for entities that are affected by the act of measurement? Here we propose the mathematical structure used in quantum theory, in which we consider qualia as "observables" (i.e., entities that can, in principle, be observed), sensory inputs and internal attention as "states" that specify the context that a measurement takes place, and "measurement outcomes" with probabilities that qualia observables take particular values. Based on this mathematical structure, the Quantum-like Qualia (QQ) hypothesis proposes that qualia observables interact with the world, as if through an interface of sensory inputs and internal attention. We argue that this qualia-interface-world scheme has the same mathematical structure as observables-states-environment in quantum theory. Moreover, within this structure, the concept of a "measurement instrument" in quantum theory can precisely model how measurements affect qualia observables and states. We argue that QQ naturally explains known properties of qualia and predicts that qualia are sometimes indeterminate. Such predictions can be empirically determined by the presence of order effects or violations of Bell inequalities. Confirmation of such predictions substantiates our overarching claim that the mathematical structure of QQ will offer novel insights into the nature of consciousness.

A dynamic bifurcation mechanism explains cortex-wide neural correlates of conscious access

Conscious access is suggested to involve "ignition," an all-or-none activation across cortical areas. To elucidate this phenomenon, we carry out computer simulations of a detection task using a mesoscale connectome-based model for the multiregional macaque cortex. The model uncovers a dynamic bifurcation mechanism that gives rise to ignition in a network of associative regions. A hierarchical N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)/α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) receptor gradient plays a critical role: fast AMPA receptors drive feedforward signal propagation, while slow NMDA receptors in feedback pathways shape and sustain the ignited network. Intriguingly, the model suggests higher NMDA-to-AMPA receptor ratios in sensory areas compared to association areas, a prediction supported by in vitro autoradiography data. Furthermore, the model accounts for diverse behavioral and physiological phenomena linked to consciousness. This work sheds light on how receptor gradients along the cortical hierarchy enable distributed cognitive functions and provides a biologically constrained computational framework for investigating the neurophysiological basis of conscious access.

Examining the lateralization of electrophysiological correlates of auditory awareness

The neurological basis for perceptual awareness remains unclear, and theories disagree as to whether sensory cortices per se generate awareness. Critically, neural activity in the sensory cortices is only a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) if it closely matches the contents of perceptual awareness. Research in vision and touch suggest that contralateral activity in sensory cortices is an NCC. Similarly, research in hearing with two sound sources (left and right) presented over headphones also suggests that a candidate NCC called the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) matches perceived location of sound. The current study used 13 different sound sources presented over loudspeakers for natural localization cues and measured event-related potentials to a threshold stimulus in a sound localization task. Preregistered Bayesian mixed models provided moderate evidence against an overall AAN and very strong evidence against its lateralization. Because of issues regarding data quantity and quality, exploratory analyses with aggregated data from multiple loudspeakers were conducted. Results provided moderate evidence for an overall AAN and strong evidence against its lateralization. Nonetheless, the interpretations of these results remain inconclusive. Therefore, future research should reduce the number of conditions and/or test over several sessions to procure a sufficient amount of data. Taken at face value, the results may suggest issues with AAN as an NCC of auditory awareness, as it does not laterally map onto experiences in a free-field auditory environment, in contrast to the NCCs of vision and touch.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

The hidden structure of consciousness

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

The maps of meaning consciousness theory

In simple terms, consciousness is constituted by multiple goals for action and the continuous adjudication of such goals to implement action, which is referred to as the maps of meaning (MoM) consciousness theory. The MoM theory triangulates through three parallel corollaries: action (behavior), mechanism (morphology/pathophysiology), and goals (teleology). (1) An organism's consciousness contains fluid, nested goals. These goals are not intentionality, but intersectionality, via the Darwinian byproduct of embodiment meeting the world, i.e., Darwinian inclusive fitness or randomization and then survival of the fittest. (2) These goals are formed via a gradual descent under inclusive fitness and are the abstraction of a "match" between the evolutionary environment and the organism. (3) Human consciousness implements the brain efficiency hypothesis, genetics, epigenetics, and experience-crystallized efficiencies, not necessitating best or objective but fitness, i.e., perceived efficiency based on one's adaptive environment. These efficiencies are objectively arbitrary but determine the operation and level of one's consciousness, termed as extreme thrownness. (4) Since inclusive fitness drives efficiencies in the physiologic mechanism, morphology, and behavior (action) and originates one's goals, embodiment is necessarily entangled to human consciousness as it is at the intersection of mechanism or action (both necessitating embodiment) occurring in the world that determines fitness. (5) Perception is the operant process of consciousness and is the de facto goal adjudication process of consciousness. Goal operationalization is fundamentally efficiency-based via one's unique neuronal mapping as a byproduct of genetics, epigenetics, and experience. (6) Perception involves information intake and information discrimination, equally underpinned by efficiencies of inclusive fitness via extreme thrownness. Perception is not a 'frame rate' but Bayesian priors of efficiency based on one's extreme thrownness. (7) Consciousness and human consciousness are modular (i.e., a scalar level of richness, which builds up like building blocks) and dimensionalized (i.e., cognitive abilities become possibilities as the emergent phenomena at various modularities such as the stratified factors in factor analysis). (8) The meta dimensions of human consciousness seemingly include intelligence quotient, personality (five-factor model), richness of perception intake, and richness of perception discrimination, among other potentialities. (9) Future consciousness research should utilize factor analysis to parse modularities and dimensions of human consciousness and animal models.

The self and conscious experience

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Faces capture spatial attention only when we want them to: An inattentional blindness EEG study

Previous research on emotional face processing has shown that emotional faces such as fearful faces may be processed without visual awareness. However, evidence for nonconscious attention capture by fearful faces is limited. In fact, studies using sensory manipulation of awareness (e.g., backward masking paradigms) have shown that fearful faces do not attract attention during subliminal viewings nor when they were task-irrelevant. Here, we used a three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm and electroencephalography to examine whether faces (fearful and neutral) capture attention under different conditions of awareness and task-relevancy. We found that the electrophysiological marker for attention capture, the N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc), was elicited by face stimuli only when participants were aware of the faces and when they were task-relevant (phase 3). When participants were unaware of the presence of faces (phase 1) or when the faces were irrelevant to the task (phase 2), no N2pc was observed. Together with our previous work, we concluded that fearful faces, or faces in general, do not attract attention unless we want them to.

Fronto-parietal networks shape human conscious report through attention gain and reorienting

How do attention and consciousness interact in the human brain? Rival theories of consciousness disagree on the role of fronto-parietal attentional networks in conscious perception. We recorded neural activity from 727 intracerebral contacts in 13 epileptic patients, while they detected near-threshold targets preceded by attentional cues. Clustering revealed three neural patterns: first, attention-enhanced conscious report accompanied sustained right-hemisphere fronto-temporal activity in networks connected by the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) II-III, and late accumulation of activity (>300 ms post-target) in bilateral dorso-prefrontal and right-hemisphere orbitofrontal cortex (SLF I-III). Second, attentional reorienting affected conscious report through early, sustained activity in a right-hemisphere network (SLF III). Third, conscious report accompanied left-hemisphere dorsolateral-prefrontal activity. Task modeling with recurrent neural networks revealed multiple clusters matching the identified brain clusters, elucidating the causal relationship between clusters in conscious perception of near-threshold targets. Thus, distinct, hemisphere-asymmetric fronto-parietal networks support attentional gain and reorienting in shaping human conscious experience.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

The effects of visual perceptual load on detection performance and event-related potentials to auditory stimuli

Load Theory states that perceptual load prevents, or at least reduces, the processing of task-unrelated stimuli. This study systematically examined the detection and neural processing of auditory stimuli unrelated to a visual foreground task. The visual task was designed to create continuous perceptual load, alternated between low and high load, and contained performance feedback to motivate participants to focus on the visual task instead of the auditory stimuli presented in the background. The auditory stimuli varied in intensity, and participants signaled their subjective perception of these stimuli without receiving feedback. Depending on stimulus intensity, we observed load effects on detection performance and P3 amplitudes of the event-related potential (ERP). N1 amplitudes were unaffected by perceptual load, as tested by Bayesian statistics. Findings suggest that visual perceptual load affects the processing of auditory stimuli in a late time window, which is associated with a lower probability of reported awareness of these stimuli.

Revealing robust neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing: activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses

Our ability to consciously perceive information from the visual scene relies on a myriad of intrinsic neural mechanisms. Functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neural correlates of conscious visual processing and to further dissociate from those pertaining to preconscious and unconscious visual processing. However, delineating what core brain regions are involved in eliciting a conscious percept remains a challenge, particularly regarding the role of prefrontal-parietal regions. We performed a systematic search of the literature that yielded a total of 54 functional neuroimaging studies. We conducted two quantitative meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation to identify reliable patterns of activation engaged by i. conscious (n = 45 studies, comprising 704 participants) and ii. unconscious (n = 16 studies, comprising 262 participants) visual processing during various task performances. Results of the meta-analysis specific to conscious percepts quantitatively revealed reliable activations across a constellation of regions comprising the bilateral inferior frontal junction, intraparietal sulcus, dorsal anterior cingulate, angular gyrus, temporo-occipital cortex and anterior insula. Neurosynth reverse inference revealed conscious visual processing to be intertwined with cognitive terms related to attention, cognitive control and working memory. Results of the meta-analysis on unconscious percepts revealed consistent activations in the lateral occipital complex, intraparietal sulcus and precuneus. These findings highlight the notion that conscious visual processing readily engages higher-level regions including the inferior frontal junction and unconscious processing reliably recruits posterior regions, mainly the lateral occipital complex.

The effects of visual working memory load on detection and neural processing of task-unrelated auditory stimuli

While perceptual load has been proposed to reduce the processing of task-unrelated stimuli, theoretical arguments and empirical findings for other forms of task load are inconclusive. Here, we systematically investigated the detection and neural processing of auditory stimuli varying in stimulus intensity during a stimuli-unrelated visual working memory task alternating between low and high load. We found, depending on stimulus strength, decreased stimulus detection and reduced P3, but unaffected N1 amplitudes of the event-related potential to auditory stimuli under high as compared to low load. In contrast, load independent awareness effects were observed during both early (N1) and late (P3) time windows. Findings suggest a late neural effect of visual working memory load on auditory stimuli leading to lower probability of reported awareness of these stimuli.

Imagination: The dawn of consciousness: Fighting some misconceptions in the discussion about consciousness

Several theories of consciousness (ToC) have been proposed, but it is hard to integrate them into a consensus theory. Each theory has its merits, in dealing with some aspects of the question, but the terminology is inconsistent, each ToC aims at answering a different question, and there is not even a reasonable agreement about what 'consciousness' is in the first place. Some common implicit assumptions, and the way some critical words - such as 'sensation', 'perception', 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC) - are thought to relate to consciousness, have introduced a series of misconceptions that make it difficult to pinpoint what consciousness consists in and how it arises in the brain. The purpose of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to discern the various steps that lead from the detection of a stimulus to a conscious experience, by redefining terms such as sensation and perception with an adequate operative meaning; secondly, to emphasize the inevitable contribution of emotions and the active role of imagination in this process. The diffuse view, for the layperson but among scientists as well, is that the brain produces an internal 'representation' of the external reality and of oneself. This tends to consign one to a Cartesian perspective, i.e., the idea that some entity must be there to witness and interpret such representation. This approach splits the conscious experience into brain activity, which generates a (possible) content of consciousness (still unconscious), and a vaguely defined entity or process that 'generates' consciousness and injects (or sheds the light of) consciousness onto the content of brain activity. This way, however, we learn nothing about how such consciousness would arise. We propose here that consciousness is the function that generates a subjectively relevant and emotionally coloured internal image of the experience one is living. In this process, endogenous, spontaneous activity (imaginative activity, consisting in recalling and reviving memories, prefiguring consequences, analysing conjectures) produces many vague and ambiguous hints, rich of symbolic links, which compete in giving rise to an implicit, emotionally characterized, and semantically pleiotropic, internal experience. Cognitive elaboration may extract from this a defined and univocal, complete and consistent, explicit experience, that can be verbally reported ('what it is like to...').

The mechanisms of selective attention in phenomenal consciousness

In three experiments we investigated the effects of selective attention in iconic memory and fragile-visual short-term memory (VSTM), which have been related to phenomenal consciousness. We used a novel retro-cue paradigm with different delays (early vs late) and object priorities (high vs equal vs low), to investigate (a) attentional costs and benefits and the role of (b) bottom-up factors and (c) fragile-VSTM in feature-based attentional selection. Experiment 1 showed that attentional costs modulate visual maintenance at longer delays, while Experiment 2 showed that by reducing the time exposure of the memory array from 250 ms to 100 ms, as a bottom-up factor, participants were not able to select the objects based on their priorities. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that a pattern mask presented before the transfer in visual working memory, attenuates the overall performance while preserving the priority effect. The implications for phenomenal consciousness before conscious access are discussed.

Attentional capture mediates the emergence and suppression of intrusive memories

Intrusive memories hijack consciousness and their control may lead to forgetting. However, the contribution of reflexive attention to qualifying a memory signal as interfering is unknown. We used machine learning to decode the brain's electrical activity and pinpoint the otherwise hidden emergence of intrusive memories reported during a memory suppression task. Importantly, the algorithm was trained on an independent attentional model of visual activity, mimicking either the abrupt and interfering appearance of visual scenes into conscious awareness or their deliberate exploration. Intrusion of memories into conscious awareness were decoded above chance. The decoding accuracy increased when the algorithm was trained using a model of reflexive attention. Conscious detection of intrusive activity decoded from the brain signal was central to the future silencing of suppressed memories and later forgetting. Unwanted memories require the reflexive orienting of attention and access to consciousness to be suppressed effectively by inhibitory control.

Neural correlates of consciousness in an attentional blink paradigm with uncertain target relevance

Several event-related potentials (ERPs) have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), most prominently the early visual awareness negativity (VAN) and the late P3b component. Highly influential support for the P3b comes from studies utilizing the attentional blink (AB), where conscious perception of a first visual target (T1) impairs reporting a second target (T2) presented shortly afterwards. Recent no-report studies using other paradigms suggest that the P3b component may reflect post-perceptual processes associated with decision-making rather than awareness. However, no-report studies are limited in their awareness assessment, and their conclusions have not been tested in an AB paradigm. The present study (N = 38) addressed these issues using a novel AB paradigm, which reduced decision-making processes by omitting a discrimination task on T2 stimuli and rendering their relevance uncertain. Nevertheless, awareness was assessed trial by trial. Comparing ERPs in response to seen versus unseen T2 stimuli revealed a VAN but no enhanced P3b regardless of whether they were marked as distinct from distractor stimuli or not. Our results corroborate the VAN and challenge the P3b as NCC despite rigorous trial-by-trial assessment of conscious perception. Thus, they support the idea that awareness emerges during early sensory processing.

Mind blanking is a distinct mental state linked to a recurrent brain profile of globally positive connectivity during ongoing mentation

Mind blanking (MB) is a waking state during which we do not report any mental content. The phenomenology of MB challenges the view of a constantly thinking mind. Here, we comprehensively characterize the MB's neurobehavioral profile with the aim to delineate its role during ongoing mentation. Using functional MRI experience sampling, we show that the reportability of MB is less frequent, faster, and with lower transitional dynamics than other mental states, pointing to its role as a transient mental relay. Regarding its neural underpinnings, we observed higher global signal amplitude during MB reports, indicating a distinct physiological state. Using the time-varying functional connectome, we show that MB reports can be classified with high accuracy, suggesting that MB has a unique neural composition. Indeed, a pattern of global positive-phase coherence shows the highest similarity to the connectivity patterns associated with MB reports. We interpret this pattern's rigid signal architecture as hindering content reportability due to the brain's inability to differentiate signals in an informative way. Collectively, we show that MB has a unique neurobehavioral profile, indicating that nonreportable mental events can happen during wakefulness. Our results add to the characterization of spontaneous mentation and pave the way for more mechanistic investigations of MB's phenomenology.

Increased insula activity precedes the formation of subjective illusory Gestalt

The constructive nature of human perception sometimes leads us to perceiving rather complex impressions from simple sensory input: for example, recognizing animal contours in cloud formations or seeing living creatures in shadows of objects. A special type of bistable stimuli gives us a rare opportunity to study the neural mechanisms behind this process. Such stimuli can be visually interpreted either as simple or as more complex illusory content on the basis of the same sensory input. Previous studies demonstrated increased activity in the superior parietal cortex during the perception of an illusory Gestalt impression compared to a simpler interpretation. Here, we examined the role of slow fluctuations of resting-state fMRI activity in shaping the subsequent illusory interpretation by investigating activity related to the illusory Gestalt not only during, but also prior to its perception. We presented 31 participants with a bistable motion stimulus, which can be perceived either as four moving dot pairs (local) or two moving illusory squares (global). fMRI was used to measure brain activity in a slow event-related design. We observed stronger IPS and putamen responses to the stimulus when participants perceived the global interpretation compared to the local, confirming the findings of previous studies. Most importantly, we also observed that the global stimulus interpretation was preceded by an increased activity of the bilateral dorsal insula, which is known to process saliency and gate information for conscious access. Our data suggest an important role of the dorsal insula in shaping complex illusory interpretations of the sensory input.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent's own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define "the self" (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent's body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

Animal sentience

'Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.

P3b Does Not Reflect Perceived Contrasts

It has been shown that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness per se but is instead more closely associated with postperceptual processing (Cohen et al., 2020). Here, we seek to investigate whether human participants’ attentional states are different in the report and the no-report conditions. This difference in attentional states, if exists, may lead to degraded consciousness of the stimuli in the no-report condition, and it therefore remains unknown whether the disappearance of P3b is because of a lack of reportability or degraded consciousness. Results of our experiment 1 showed that participants did experience degraded contents of consciousness in the no-report condition. However, results of experiment 2 showed that the degraded contents of consciousness did not influence the amplitude of P3b. These findings strengthen the claim that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness but is associated with postperceptual processing.

Sliding Scale Theory of Attention and Consciousness/Unconsciousness

Attention defined as focusing on a unit of information plays a prominent role in both consciousness and the cognitive unconscious, due to its essential role in information processing. Existing theories of consciousness invariably address the relationship between attention and conscious awareness, ranging from attention is not required to crucial. However, these theories do not adequately or even remotely consider the contribution of attention to the cognitive unconscious. A valid theory of consciousness must also be a robust theory of the cognitive unconscious, a point rarely if ever considered. Current theories also emphasize human perceptual consciousness, primarily visual, despite evidence that consciousness occurs in diverse animal species varying in cognitive capacity, and across many forms of perceptual and thought consciousness. A comprehensive and parsimonious perspective applicable to the diversity of species demonstrating consciousness and the various forms—sliding scale theory of attention and consciousness/unconsciousness—is proposed with relevant research reviewed. Consistent with the continuous organization of natural events, attention occupies a sliding scale in regards to time and space compression. Unconscious attention in the form of the “cognitive unconscious” is time and spaced diffused, whereas conscious attention is tightly time and space compressed to the present moment. Due to the special clarity derived from brief and concentrated signals, the tight time and space compression yields conscious awareness as an emergent property. The present moment enhances the time and space compression of conscious attention, and contributes to an evolutionary explanation of conscious awareness.

Insular Dichotomy in the Implicit Detection of Emotions in Human Faces

The functional roles of the insula diverge between its posterior portion (PI), mainly connected with somato-sensory and motor areas, and its anterior section (AI) connected with the frontal, limbic, and cingulate regions. We report intracranial recordings of local field evoked potentials from PI, AI, and the visual fusiform gyrus to a full array of emotional faces including pain while the individuals' attention was diverted from emotions. The fusiform gyrus and PI responded equally to all types of faces, including neutrals. Conversely, the AI responded only to emotional faces, maximally to pain and fear, while remaining insensitive to neutrals. The two insular sectors reacted with almost identical latency suggesting their parallel initial activation via distinct functional routes. The consistent responses to all emotions, together with the absence of response to neutral faces, suggest that early responses in the AI reflect the immediate arousal value and behavioral relevance of emotional stimuli, which may be subserved by "fast track" routes conveying coarse-spatial-frequency information via the superior colliculus and dorsal pulvinar. Such responses precede the conscious detection of the stimulus' precise signification and valence, which need network interaction and information exchange with other brain areas, for which the AI is an essentialhub.

Lang J, M. Haun A, Albantakis L, Boly M, Tononi G. Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity

Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.

Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model

The goal of the paper is to review existing work on consciousness within the frameworks of Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and Free Energy Principle. The emphasis is put on the role played by the precision and complexity of the internal generative model. In the light of those proposals, these two properties appear to be the minimal necessary components for the emergence of conscious experience-a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness.

Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Task Relevance in Face Perception Using Simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current theories of visual consciousness disagree about whether it emerges during early stages of processing in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network becomes involved. Moreover, disentangling conscious perception from task-related postperceptual processes (e.g., report) and integrating results across different neuroscientific methods remain ongoing challenges. The present study addressed these problems using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and a specific inattentional blindness paradigm with three physically identical phases in female and male human participants. In phase 1, participants performed a distractor task during which line drawings of faces and control stimuli were presented centrally. While some participants spontaneously noticed the faces in phase 1, others remained inattentionally blind. In phase 2, all participants were made aware of the task-irrelevant faces but continued the distractor task. In phase 3, the faces became task-relevant. Bayesian analysis of brain responses demonstrated that conscious face perception was most strongly associated with activation in fusiform gyrus (fMRI) as well as the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG). Smaller awareness effects were revealed in the occipital and prefrontal cortex (fMRI). Task-relevant face processing, on the other hand, led to strong, extensive activation of occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks (fMRI). In EEG, it enhanced early negativities and elicited a pronounced P3b component. Overall, we provide evidence that conscious visual perception is linked with early processing in stimulus-specific sensory brain areas but may additionally involve prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the strong activation of widespread brain networks and the P3b are more likely associated with task-related processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does our brain generate visual consciousness-the subjective experience of what it is like to see, for example, a face? To date, it is hotly debated whether it emerges early in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network is activated. Here, we use simultaneous fMRI and EEG for high spatial and temporal resolution and demonstrate that conscious face perception is predominantly linked to early and occipitotemporal processes, but also prefrontal activity. Task-related processes (e.g., decision-making), on the other hand, elicit brain-wide activations including late and strong frontoparietal activity. These findings challenge numerous previous studies and highlight the importance of investigating the neural correlates of consciousness in the absence of task relevance.

Gradedness of visual awareness depends on attentional scope: Global perception is more graded than local perception

The gradedness or discreteness of our visual awareness has been debated. Here, we investigate the influence of spatial scope of attention on the gradedness of visual awareness. We manipulated scope of attention using hierarchical letter-based tasks (global: broad scope; local: narrow scope). Participants reported the identity of a masked hierarchical letter either at the global level or at the local level. We measured subjective awareness using the perceptual awareness scale ratings and objective performance. The results indicate more graded visual awareness (lesser slope for the awareness rating curve) at the global level compared to the local level. Graded perception was also observed in visibility ratings usage with global level task showing higher usage of the middle PAS ratings. Our results are in line with the prediction of level of processing hypothesis and show that global/local attentional scope and contextual endogenous factors influence the graded nature of our visual awareness.

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which - hopefully - will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.

The early but not the late neural correlate of auditory awareness reflects lateralized experiences

Theories disagree as to whether it is the early or the late neural correlate of awareness that plays a critical role in phenomenal awareness. According to recurrent processing theory, early activity in primary sensory areas corresponds closely to phenomenal awareness. In support, research with electroencephalography found that in the visual and somatosensory modality, an early neural correlate of awareness is contralateral to the perceived side of stimulation. Thus, early activity is sensitive to the perceived side of visual and somatosensory stimulation. Critically, it is unresolved whether this is true also for hearing. In the present study (N = 26 students), Bayesian analyses showed that the early neural correlate of awareness (auditory awareness negativity, AAN) was stronger for contralateral than ipsilateral electrodes whereas the late correlate of auditory awareness (late positivity, LP) was not lateralized. These findings demonstrate that the early but not the late neural correlate of auditory awareness reflects lateralized experiences. Thus, these findings imply that AAN is a more suitable NCC than LP because it correlates more closely with lateralized experiences.

Zooming-in on higher-level vision: High-resolution fMRI for understanding visual perception and awareness

One of the central questions in visual neuroscience is how the sparse retinal signals leaving our eyes are transformed into a rich subjective visual experience of the world. Invasive physiology studies, which offers the highest spatial resolution, have revealed many facts about the processing of simple visual features like contrast, color, and orientation, focusing on the early visual areas. At the same time, standard human fMRI studies with comparably coarser spatial resolution have revealed more complex, functionally specialized, and category-selective responses in higher visual areas. Although the visual system is the best understood among the sensory modalities, these two areas of research remain largely segregated. High-resolution fMRI opens up a possibility for linking them. On the one hand, it allows studying how the higher-level visual functions affect the fine-scale activity in early visual areas. On the other hand, it allows discovering the fine-scale functional organization of higher visual areas and exploring their functional connectivity with visual areas lower in the hierarchy. In this review, I will discuss examples of successful work undertaken in these directions using high-resolution fMRI and discuss where this method could be applied in the future to advance our understanding of the complexity of higher-level visual processing.

Dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task relevance during auditory processing

In recent years, several ERP components have been identified as potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), including early negativities and late positivities. Based on experiments in the visual modality, it has recently been shown that awareness is often confounded with reporting it, possibly overestimating the NCC. It is unknown whether similar constraints also exist in the auditory modality. In order to address this gap, we presented spoken words in a sustained inattentional deafness paradigm. Electrophysiological responses were obtained in three physically identical experimental conditions that differed only with respect to the participants' instructions. Participants were either left uninformed or informed about the presence of spoken words while confronted with an auditory distractor task (U/I condition), informed about the words while exposed to the same task as before (I condition), or requested to respond to the now task-relevant speech stimuli (TR condition). After completion of the U/I condition, only informed participants reported awareness of the words. In ERPs, awareness of words in the U/I and I condition was accompanied by an anterior auditory awareness negativity (AAN). Only when stimuli were task-relevant, i.e., during the TR condition, late positivities emerged. Taken together, these results indicate that early negativities but not late positivities index awareness across sensory modalities. Thus, they provide evidence for a recurrent processing framework, which highlights the importance of early sensory processing in conscious perception.

The self-face captures attention without consciousness: Evidence from the N2pc ERP component analysis

It is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind the attentional prioritization of the self-face image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the self-prioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for dissociation between attention and consciousness.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

The SSVEP tracks attention, not consciousness, during perceptual filling-in

Research on the neural basis of conscious perception has almost exclusively shown that becoming aware of a stimulus leads to increased neural responses. By designing a novel form of perceptual filling-in (PFI) overlaid with a dynamic texture display, we frequency-tagged multiple disappearing targets as well as their surroundings. We show that in a PFI paradigm, the disappearance of a stimulus and subjective invisibility is associated with increases in neural activity, as measured with steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs), in electroencephalography (EEG). We also find that this increase correlates with alpha-band activity, a well-established neural measure of attention. These findings cast doubt on the direct relationship previously reported between the strength of neural activity and conscious perception, at least when measured with current tools, such as the SSVEP. Instead, we conclude that SSVEP strength more closely measures changes in attention.

An Interactive Layers Model of Self-Regulated Learning and Cognitive Load

Models of self-regulated learning emphasize the active and intentional role of learners and, thereby, focus mainly on conscious processes in working memory and long-term memory. Cognitive load theory supports this view on learning. As a result, both fields of research ignore the potential role of unconscious processes for learning. In this review paper, we propose an interactive layers model on self-regulated learning and cognitive load that considers sensory memory, working memory, and long-term memory. The model distinguishes between (a) unconscious self-regulated learning initiated by so-called resonant states in sensory memory and (b) conscious self-regulated learning of scheme construction in working memory. In contrast with conscious self-regulation, unconscious self-regulation induces no cognitive load. The model describes conscious and unconscious self-regulation in three different layers: a content layer, a learning strategy layer, and a metacognitive layer. Interactions of the three layers reflect processes of monitoring and control. We first substantiate the model based on a narrative review. Afterwards, we illustrate how the model contributes to re-interpretation of inconsistent empirical findings reported in the existing literature.

Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences

In recent years, researchers from independent subfields have begun to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to on-line perception are recruited during and underlie off-line activities such as information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all of these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provides the contents of experiences. This article is intended to move one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural-activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of the recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet communication between these two clusters has been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such information exchange by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.

Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

We review the central tenets and neuroanatomical basis of the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which attempts to account for the main scientific observations regarding the elementary mechanisms of conscious processing in the human brain. The GNW hypothesis proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors. We examine this hypothesis in light of recent data that contrast brain activity evoked by either conscious or non-conscious contents, as well as during conscious or non-conscious states, particularly general anesthesia. We also discuss the relationship between the intertwined concepts of conscious processing, attention, and working memory.

Differential Effects of Awareness and Task Relevance on Early and Late ERPs in a No-Report Visual Oddball Paradigm

To date it is poorly understood how and when deviance processing interacts with awareness and task relevance. Furthermore, an important issue in the study of consciousness is the prevalent confound of conscious perception with the requirement of reporting it. This study addresses these topics using a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm with a visual oddball sequence of geometrical shapes presented to male and female human participants. Electrophysiological responses were obtained in three physically identical Phases A-C that differed only with respect to the instructions: (A) participants were uninformed about the shapes and attended an unrelated foreground task (inattentional blind), (B) were informed about the shapes but still attended the foreground task, and (C) attended the shapes. Conscious processing of shapes was indexed by the visual awareness negativity but not a P3. Deviance processing was associated with the visual mismatch negativity independently of consciousness and task relevance. The oddball P3, however, only emerged when the stimuli were task relevant, and was absent for consciously perceived but task irrelevant stimuli. The P3 thus does not represent a reliable marker of stimulus awareness. This result pattern supports the view of hierarchical predictive processing, where lower levels display automatic deviance processing, whereas higher levels require attention and task relevance.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT To react to potentially important changes in our environment it is fundamental to detect deviations from regularities of sensory input. It has yet to be understood how awareness and task relevance of this input interact with deviance processing. We investigated the role of awareness in deviance detection while at the same time circumventing the confound of awareness and report by means of a no-report paradigm. Our results suggest that early processes are elicited automatically, whereas, contrary to prominent theories, late processes do not depend on awareness but on task-based attention.