The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

The science of justice: The neuropsychology of social punishment

The social punishment (SP) of norm violations has received much attention across multiple disciplines. However, current models of SP fail to consider the role of motivational processes, and none can explain the observed behavioral and neuropsychological differences between the two recognized forms of SP: second-party punishment (2PP) and third-party punishment (3PP). After reviewing the literature giving rise to the current models of SP, we propose a unified model of SP which integrates general psychological descriptions of decision-making as a confluence of affect, cognition, and motivation, with evidence that SP is driven by two main factors: the amount of harm (assessed primarily in the salience network) and the norm violator's intention (assessed primarily in the default-mode and central-executive networks). We posit that motivational differences between 2PP and 3PP, articulated in mesocorticolimbic pathways, impact final SP by differentially impacting the assessments of harm and intention done in these domain-general large-scale networks. This new model will lead to a better understanding of SP, which might even improve forensic, procedural, and substantive legal practices.

Unravelling the many facets of human cooperation in an experimental study

Humans readily cooperate, even with strangers and without prospects of reciprocation. Despite thousands of studies, this finding is not well understood. Most studies focussed on a single aspect of cooperation and were conducted under anonymous conditions. However, cooperation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, involving generosity, readiness to share, fairness, trust, trustworthiness, and willingness to take cooperative risks. Here, we report findings of an experiment where subjects had to make decisions in ten situations representing different aspects of cooperation, both under anonymous and 'personalised' conditions. In an anonymous setting, we found considerable individual variation in each decision situation, while individuals were consistent both within and across situations. Prosocial tendencies such as generosity, trust, and trustworthiness were positively correlated, constituting a 'cooperativeness syndrome', but the tendency to punish non-cooperative individuals is not part of this syndrome. In a personalised setting, information on the appearance of the interaction partner systematically affected cooperation-related behaviour. Subjects were more cooperative toward interaction partners whose facial photographs were judged 'generous', 'trustworthy', 'not greedy', 'happy', 'attractive', and 'not angry' by a separate panel. However, individuals eliciting more cooperation were not more cooperative themselves in our experiment. Our study shows that a multi-faceted approach can reveal general behavioural tendencies underlying cooperation, but it also uncovers new puzzling features of human cooperation.

Shibboleth: An agent-based model of signalling mimicry

Mimicry is an essential strategy for exploiting competitors in competitive co-evolutionary relationships. Protection against mimicry may, furthermore, be a driving force in human linguistic diversity: the potential harm caused by failing to detect mimicked group-identity signals may select for high sensitivity to mimicry of honest group members. Here we describe the results of five agent-based models that simulate multi-generational interactions between two groups of individuals: original members of a group with an honest identity signal, and members of an outsider group who mimic that signal, aiming to pass as members of the in-group. The models correspond to the Biblical story of Shibboleth, where a tribe in conflict with another determines tribe affiliation by asking individuals to pronounce the word, 'Shibboleth.' In the story, failure to reproduce the word phonetically resulted in death. Here, we run five different versions of a 'Shibboleth' model: a first, simple version, which evaluates whether a composite variable of mimicry quality and detection quality is a superior predictor to the model's outcome than is cost of detection. The models thereafter evaluate variations on the simple model, incorporating group-level behaviours such as altruistic punishment. Our results suggest that group members' sensitivity to mimicry of the Shibboleth-signal is a better predictor of whether any signal of group identity goes into fixation in the overall population than is the cost of mimicry detection. Thus, the likelihood of being detected as a mimic may be more important than the costs imposed on mimics who are detected. This suggests that theoretical models in biology should place greater emphasis on the likelihood of detection, which does not explicitly entail costs, rather than on the costs to individuals who are detected. From a language learning perspective, the results suggest that admission to group membership through linguistic signals is powered by the ability to imitate and evade detection as an outsider by existing group members.

A marine cleaning mutualism provides new insights in biological market dynamics

Most mutually beneficial social interactions (cooperation within species, mutualism between species) involve some degree of partner choice. In an analogy to economic theory as applied to human trading practices, biological market theory (BMT) focuses on how partner choice affects payoff distributions among non-human traders. BMT has inspired a great diversity of research, including research on the mutualism between cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and other marine fish, their 'clients'. In this mutualism, clients have ectoparasites removed and cleaners obtain food in return. We use the available data on L. dimidiatus cleaner-client interactions to identify avenues for future expansion of BMT. We focus on three main topics, namely how partner quality interacts with supply-to-demand ratios to affect service quality, the role of threats and forms of forceful intervention, and the potential role of cognition. We consider it essential to identify the specifics of each biological market as a basis for the development of more sophisticated BMT models. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

The restart effect in social dilemmas shows humans are self-interested not altruistic

Do economic games show evidence of altruistic or self-interested motivations in humans? A huge body of empirical work has found contrasting results. While many participants routinely make costly decisions that benefit strangers, consistent with the hypothesis that humans exhibit a biologically novel form of altruism (or "prosociality"), many participants also typically learn to pay fewer costs with experience, consistent with self-interested individuals adapting to an unfamiliar environment. Key to resolving this debate is explaining the famous "restart effect," a puzzling enigma whereby failing cooperation in public goods games can be briefly rescued by a surprise restart. Here we replicate this canonical result, often taken as evidence of uniquely human altruism, and show that it 1) disappears when cooperation is invisible, meaning individuals can no longer affect the behavior of their groupmates, consistent with strategically motivated, self-interested, cooperation; and 2) still occurs even when individuals are knowingly grouped with computer players programmed to replicate human decisions, consistent with confusion. These results show that the restart effect can be explained by a mixture of self-interest and irrational beliefs about the game's payoffs, and not altruism. Consequently, our results suggest that public goods games have often been measuring self-interested but confused behaviors and reject the idea that conventional theories of evolution cannot explain the results of economic games.

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based "purity" concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.

Gossip and reputation in everyday life

Gossip-a sender communicating to a receiver about an absent third party-is hypothesized to impact reputation formation, partner selection, and cooperation. Laboratory experiments have found that people gossip about others' cooperativeness and that they use gossip to condition their cooperation. Here, we move beyond the laboratory and test several predictions from theories of indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection about the content of everyday gossip and how people use it to update the reputation of others in their social network. In a Dutch community sample (N = 309), we sampled daily events in which people either sent or received gossip about a target over 10 days (ngossip = 5284). Gossip senders frequently shared information about targets' cooperativeness and did so in ways that minimize potential retaliation from targets. Receivers overwhelmingly believed gossip to be true and updated their evaluation of targets based on gossip. In turn, a positive shift in the evaluation of a target was associated with higher intentions to help them in future interactions, and with lower intentions to avoid them in the future. Thus, gossip is used in daily life to impact and update reputations in a way that enables partner selection and indirect reciprocity. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

Cross-cultural research on moral reasoning has brought to the fore the question of whether moral judgements always turn on inferences about the mental states of others. Formal legal systems for assigning blame and punishment typically make fine-grained distinctions about mental states, as illustrated by the concept of mens rea, and experimental studies in the USA and elsewhere suggest everyday moral judgements also make use of such distinctions. On the other hand, anthropologists have suggested that some societies have a morality that is disregarding of mental states, and have marshalled ethnographic and experimental evidence in support of this claim. Here, we argue against the claim that some societies are simply less ‘mind-minded’ than others about morality. In place of this cultural main effects hypothesis about the role of mindreading in morality, we propose a contextual variability view in which the role of mental states in moral judgement depends on the context and the reasons for judgement. On this view, which mental states are or are not relevant for a judgement is context-specific, and what appear to be cultural main effects are better explained by culture-by-context interactions.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences

Reputations are an essential feature of human sociality and the evolution of cooperation and group living. Much scholarship has focused on reputations, yet typically on a narrow range of domains (e.g. prosociality and aggressiveness), usually in isolation. Humans can develop reputations, however, from any collective information. We conducted exploratory analyses on the content, distribution and structure of reputation domain diversity across cultures, using the Human Relations Area Files ethnographic database. After coding ethnographic texts on reputations from 153 cultures, we used hierarchical modelling, cluster analysis and text analysis to provide an empirical view of reputation domains across societies. Findings suggest: (i) reputational domains vary cross-culturally, yet reputations for cultural conformity, prosociality, social status and neural capital are widespread; (ii) reputation domains are more variable for males than females; and (iii) particular reputation domains are interrelated, demonstrating a structure consistent with dimensions of human uniqueness. We label these features: cultural group unity, dominance, neural capital, sexuality, social and material success and supernatural healing. We highlight the need for future research on the evolution of cooperation and human sociality to consider a wider range of reputation domains, as well as their social, ecological and gender-specific variability. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity (IR) is a key mechanism to understand cooperation among unrelated individuals. It involves reputations and complex information processing, arising from social interactions. By helping someone, individuals may improve their reputation, which may be shared in a population and change the predisposition of others to reciprocate in the future. The reputation of individuals depends, in turn, on social norms that define a good or bad action, offering a computational and mathematical appealing way of studying the evolution of moral systems. Over the years, theoretical and empirical research has unveiled many features of cooperation under IR, exploring norms with varying degrees of complexity and information requirements. Recent results suggest that costly reputation spread, interaction observability and empathy are determinants of cooperation under IR. Importantly, such characteristics probably impact the level of complexity and information requirements for IR to sustain cooperation. In this review, we present and discuss those recent results. We provide a synthesis of theoretical models and discuss previous conclusions through the lens of evolutionary game theory and cognitive complexity. We highlight open questions and suggest future research in this domain. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.