1
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Huang C, Li Y, Jiang L. Dual effects of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Phys Rev E 2023; 108:024123. [PMID: 37723777 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.108.024123] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2023] [Accepted: 07/18/2023] [Indexed: 09/20/2023]
Abstract
Human beings are easily impacted by social influences, due to their social nature. As an essential manifestation of social influences, conformity is associated with the frequency witnessed in others' behavior, involving normative conformity and informational conformity according to the reaction of individuals. The former comes from the fear of a normative environment, while the latter means most behaviors are followed due to information asymmetry. Normative conformity significantly enhances network reciprocity, producing optimal cooperation at a moderate proportion, which induces within-cluster behavioral homogeneity and between-cluster behavioral diversity. On the contrary, informational conformity has an inhibitory effect on the evolution of cooperation for a low proportion of the conformity population, which contributes to the formation of defectors' clusters. The symmetry and duality of the two types of conformity on cooperation evolution provide an interesting and unexplored approach for future research, revealing the mechanism of conformity in evolutionary games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Changwei Huang
- School of Computer, Electronics and Information, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China and Guangxi Key Laboratory of Multimedia Communications and Network Technology, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
| | - Yuqin Li
- School of Computer, Electronics and Information, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
| | - Luoluo Jiang
- School of Information Management and Artificial Intelligence, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China
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2
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Yao Y, Zeng Z, Pi B, Feng M. Inhibition and activation of interactions in networked weak prisoner's dilemma. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2023; 33:2894480. [PMID: 37276564 DOI: 10.1063/5.0146999] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/18/2023] [Accepted: 05/18/2023] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
In the framework of the coevolution dynamics of the weak prisoner's dilemma, inspired by prior empirical research, we present a coevolutionary model with local network dynamics in a static network framework. Viewing the edges of the network as social interactions between individuals, when individuals play the weak prisoner's dilemma game, they accumulate both payoffs and social interaction willingness based on a payoff matrix of the social interaction willingness we constructed. The edges are then inhibiting or activating based on the social interaction willingness of the two individuals, and individuals only interact with others through activated edges, resulting in local network dynamics in a static network framework. Individuals who receive more cooperation will be more likely to activate the edges around them, meaning they will participate in more social interactions. Conversely, individuals who receive more defects will do the opposite. Specifically, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation under different levels of sensitivity to social interaction willingness and the temptation to defect. Through the simulation, we find that sparse cooperator clusters can expand greatly when social interaction sensitivity and temptation to defect are low. In contrast, dense cooperator clusters form rapidly in a high social interaction sensitivity, which protects the cooperation from high temptation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yichao Yao
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
| | - Ziyan Zeng
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
| | - Bin Pi
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
| | - Minyu Feng
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
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3
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Liu J, Peng Y, Zhu P, Yu Y. The Polarization of the Coupling Strength of Interdependent Networks Stimulates Cooperation. ENTROPY 2022; 24:e24050694. [PMID: 35626577 PMCID: PMC9141804 DOI: 10.3390/e24050694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Revised: 04/27/2022] [Accepted: 05/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through the evolution of strategy. By means of numerical simulation, a hump-like relationship between the level of cooperation and conservative participant density is revealed. Interestingly, interspecies interactions stimulate polarization of the coupling strength of radical-driven players, promoting cooperation between two types of players. We thus demonstrate that a simple mixed network coupling mechanism substantially expands the scope of cooperation among structured populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jinzhuo Liu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China; (J.L.); (Y.P.)
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, China;
| | - Yunchen Peng
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China; (J.L.); (Y.P.)
| | - Peican Zhu
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, China;
| | - Yong Yu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China; (J.L.); (Y.P.)
- Correspondence:
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4
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Shi J, Liu J, Perc M, Deng Z, Wang Z. Neighborhood size effects on the evolution of cooperation under myopic dynamics. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:123113. [PMID: 34972342 DOI: 10.1063/5.0073632] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 11/23/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 social dilemma games in which players are located on a two-dimensional square lattice. During the evolution, each player modifies her strategy by means of myopic update dynamic to maximize her payoff while composing neighborhoods of different sizes, which are characterized by the corresponding radius, r. An investigation of the sublattice-ordered spatial structure for different values of r reveals that some patterns formed by cooperators and defectors can help the former to survive, even under untoward conditions. In contrast to individuals who resist the invasion of defectors by forming clusters due to network reciprocity, innovators spontaneously organize a socially divisive structure that provides strong support for the evolution of cooperation and advances better social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Juan Shi
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
| | - Jinzhuo Liu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan 650504, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Zhenghong Deng
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
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5
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Wang Y, Wang X, Ren D, Ma Y, Wang C. Effect of asymmetry on cooperation in spatial evolution. Phys Rev E 2021; 103:032414. [PMID: 33862692 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.103.032414] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2020] [Accepted: 03/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Asymmetry is omnipresent in human society and nature and the reasons causing asymmetry are multiple. To think about the impact of asymmetries on the cooperation systems, we focus on a typical model of great asymmetric traits-the boxed pigs game-and extended the one-to-one interaction to the interaction in population. We consider the asymmetry of payoff and the spatial structure of the two populations in space. Our results have shown that the almost equal abundance and strength of two populations kills cooperative behavior. The single increase of either strength-asymmetry or abundance-asymmetry promotes cooperation. But high levels of both asymmetries would inhibit cooperative behavior, making the powerful mechanism of cooperation broken.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yicheng Wang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, People's Republic of China
| | | | | | | | - Chao Wang
- School of Ecology and Environment, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, People's Republic of China
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6
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Zhang H. A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks. J Math Biol 2021; 82:30. [PMID: 33683438 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01573-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 01/09/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of imitation on the evolution of cooperation. This imitation describes the case where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who will employ their strategies and social networks. Two classical repeated strategies 'always defect (ALLD)' and 'tit-for-tat (TFT)' are adopted. Mathematical analyses are mainly conducted by the method of coalescence theory. Under the assumption of a large population size and weak selection, the results show that the evolution of cooperation is promoted in this dynamic network. As we observed that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller compared to that in well-mixed populations. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches a specific value which depends on three parameters, the repeated rounds of the game, the effective strategy mutation rate, and the effective link mutation rate. Specifically, for a very high value of the effective link mutation rate, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 1. Remarkably, for a low value of the effective link mutation rate, by letting the effective strategy mutation is nearly equal to zero, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches [Formula: see text] for the resulting highly connected networks, which allows TFT to be evolutionary stable. It illustrates that dominance of TFTs is associated with more connected networks. This research can enrich the theory of the coevolution of game strategy and network structure with dynamic imitation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, Shaanxi, China.
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7
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Duh M, Gosak M, Perc M. Mixing protocols in the public goods game. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:032310. [PMID: 33076040 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.032310] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2020] [Accepted: 09/10/2020] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
If interaction partners in social dilemma games are not selected randomly from the population but are instead determined by a network of contacts, it has far reaching consequences for the evolutionary dynamics. Selecting partners randomly leads to a well-mixed population, where pattern formation is essentially impossible. This rules out important mechanisms that can facilitate cooperation, most notably network reciprocity. In contrast, if interactions are determined by a lattice or a network, then the population is said to be structured, where cooperators can form compact clusters that protect them from invading defectors. Between these two extremes, however, there is ample middle ground that can be brought about by the consideration of temporal networks, mobility, or other coevolutionary processes. The question that we here seek to answer is, when does mixing on a lattice actually lead to well-mixed conditions? To that effect, we use the public goods game on a square lattice, and we consider nearest-neighbor and random mixing with different frequencies, as well as a mix of both mixing protocols. Not surprisingly, we find that nearest-neighbor mixing requires a higher frequency than random mixing to arrive at the well-mixed limit. The differences between the two mixing protocols are most expressed at intermediate mixing frequencies, whilst at very low and very high mixing frequencies the two almost converge. We also find a near universal exponential growth of the average size of cooperator clusters as their fraction increases from zero to one, regardless of whether this increase is due to increasing the multiplication factor of the public goods, decreasing the frequency of mixing, or gradually shifting the mixing from random to nearest neighbors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maja Duh
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Marko Gosak
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.,Faculty of Medicine, University of Maribor, Taborska ulica 8, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.,Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan.,Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
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8
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Souza PVS, Silva R, Bauch C, Girardi D. Cooperation in a generalized age-structured spatial game. J Theor Biol 2020; 484:109995. [PMID: 31491496 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.109995] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/03/2019] [Revised: 08/18/2019] [Accepted: 09/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for evolutionary game theory precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly, in recent years, the search for an understanding of how cooperation can be stimulated, even when it conflicts with individual interest, has intensified. We investigate the emergence of cooperation in an age-structured evolutionary spatial game. In it, players age with time and the payoff that they receive after each round depends on their age. We find that the outcome of the game is strongly influenced by the type of distribution used to modify the payoffs according to the age of each player. The results show that, under certain circumstances, cooperators may not only survive but dominate the population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paulo Victor Santos Souza
- Departamento de Ciências Exatas e Licenciaturas, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 27213-145, Volta Redonda, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
| | - Rafael Silva
- Rua Antônio Barreiros, 212 Aterrado 27215350 Volta Redonda Brazil
| | - Chris Bauch
- Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada
| | - Daniel Girardi
- Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada
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9
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Geng Y, Hu K, Shen C, Shi L, Wang Z. Aspiration induced interdependence leads to optimal cooperation level. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2019; 29:083114. [PMID: 31472494 DOI: 10.1063/1.5093014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2019] [Accepted: 07/24/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
How to couple different networks is a key issue in interdependent networks, where information sharing and payoff coupling are two frequently used methods. Unlike previous studies, in this paper, we propose a new coupling mode and test its performance in interdependent networks. Specifically, a player tends to seek additional support on another network only if his environment (defined as the proportion of holding different strategies in the neighborhood) is worse enough and exceeds an aspiration level. Conversely, it turns to the traditional version on single network if his environment is pleasing enough (the value of environment is small). Whether to establish additional support will directly influence the range of selecting fittest learning objects. As we can see from numerical results, moderate aspiration introduces diversity into the system and cooperation evolves with the support of network coupling. Besides, we also demonstrate that players with external links on the boundary of cooperative clusters protect internal cooperators and attract more players to cooperate under preferential selection rule.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yini Geng
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Kaipeng Hu
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Chen Shen
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- School of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China
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10
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Du C, Geng Y, Yin X, Ma Y, Li X, Shi L. The effect of asymmetric reproductive ability on the evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks. Sci Rep 2019; 9:10760. [PMID: 31341178 PMCID: PMC6656746 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-46826-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2018] [Accepted: 07/04/2019] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we consider an asymmetric reproductive ability on interdependent networks and investigate how this setting affects the evolution of cooperation. In detail, players decide to update their strategies at each step on main network (network B), while for sub network (network A), players update their strategies with a fixed probability p. Obviously, the system restores the traditional case when p = 1, where cooperation can survive by interdependent network reciprocity. And our asymmetric set-up comes into play when p < 1. Numerical simulation results show that our asymmetric coupling will hinder the overall cooperation level for small p. In detail, the introduction of asymmetric reproductive ability urges the formation of symmetry breaking and further weakens the positive impact by location synchronous effect. And the root cause is entirely distinct situation of utility differences on two networks. These observations further demonstrate a class of phenomena on interdependent networks that it would have catastrophic consequences on one network even if a unrelated change only occurs seemingly on another network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunpeng Du
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, China
| | - Yini Geng
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, China
| | - Xiaoxiao Yin
- Zhejiang College, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Jinhua, 321013, China
| | - Yongjuan Ma
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, China
| | - Xiaogang Li
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, 650221, China.
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai, 201209, China.
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11
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Verma P, Nandi AK, Sengupta S. Bribery games on interdependent complex networks. J Theor Biol 2018; 450:43-52. [PMID: 29704488 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.028] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2017] [Revised: 04/18/2018] [Accepted: 04/19/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Bribe demands present a social conflict scenario where decisions have wide-ranging economic and ethical consequences. Nevertheless, such incidents occur daily in many countries across the globe. Harassment bribery constitute a significant sub-set of such bribery incidents where a government official demands a bribe for providing a service to a citizen legally entitled to it. We employ an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to analyse the evolution of corrupt and honest strategies in structured populations characterized by an interdependent complex network. The effects of changing network topology, average number of links and asymmetry in size of the citizen and officer population on the proliferation of incidents of bribery are explored. A complex network topology is found to be beneficial for the dominance of corrupt strategies over a larger region of phase space when compared with the outcome for a regular network, for equal citizen and officer population sizes. However, the extent of the advantage depends critically on the network degree and topology. A different trend is observed when there is a difference between the citizen and officer population sizes. Under those circumstances, increasing randomness of the underlying citizen network can be beneficial to the fixation of honest officers up to a certain value of the network degree. Our analysis reveals how the interplay between network topology, connectivity and strategy update rules can affect population level outcomes in such asymmetric games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Prateek Verma
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India
| | - Anjan K Nandi
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India
| | - Supratim Sengupta
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India.
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12
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Shen C, Chu C, Shi L, Perc M, Wang Z. Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2018; 5:180199. [PMID: 29892454 PMCID: PMC5990773 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.180199] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2018] [Accepted: 03/23/2018] [Indexed: 05/24/2023]
Abstract
In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People's Republic of China
| | - Chen Chu
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People's Republic of China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People's Republic of China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroska cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- CAMTP—Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Mladinska 3, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Zhen Wang
- School of Mechanical Engineering and Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, People's Republic of China
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13
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Lee HW, Malik N, Mucha PJ. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks. JOURNAL OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 2018; 6:1-23. [PMID: 29732158 PMCID: PMC5931405 DOI: 10.1093/comnet/cnx018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one strategy at a time (cooperate or defect) across all of its neighbors, changing that strategy and possibly changing partners in response to local changes in the network of player pairing and in the strategies used by connected partners. We compare and contrast numerical simulations with existing pair approximation differential equations for describing this system, as well as more accurate equations developed here using the framework of approximate master equations. We explore the parameter space of the model, demonstrating the relatively high accuracy of the approximate master equations for describing the system observations made from simulations. We study two variations of this partner-switching model to investigate the system evolution, predict stationary states, and compare the total utilities and other qualitative differences between these two model variants.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hsuan-Wei Lee
- Department of Sociology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
| | | | - Peter J Mucha
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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14
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Santos M, Ferreira AL, Figueiredo W. Phase diagram and criticality of the two-dimensional prisoner's dilemma model. Phys Rev E 2018; 96:012120. [PMID: 29347229 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.96.012120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The stationary states of the prisoner's dilemma model are studied on a square lattice taking into account the role of a noise parameter in the decision-making process. Only first neighboring players-defectors and cooperators-are considered in each step of the game. Through Monte Carlo simulations we determined the phase diagrams of the model in the plane noise versus the temptation to defect for a large range of values of the noise parameter. We observed three phases: cooperators and defectors absorbing phases, and a coexistence phase between them. The phase transitions as well as the critical exponents associated with them were determined using both static and dynamical scaling laws.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Santos
- Physics Department, I3N, Aveiro University, Aveiro 3810-193, Portugal
| | - A L Ferreira
- Physics Department, I3N, Aveiro University, Aveiro 3810-193, Portugal
| | - W Figueiredo
- Physics Department, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, SC 88040-900, Brazil
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15
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Wang J, Zhang Y, Guan J, Zhou S. Divide-and-conquer Tournament on Social Networks. Sci Rep 2017; 7:15484. [PMID: 29138411 PMCID: PMC5686164 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-15616-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2016] [Accepted: 10/30/2017] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
In social gaming networks, previous studies extensively investigated the influence of a variety of strategies on reciprocal behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma game. The studied frameworks range from the case that an individual uniformly cooperates or defects with all social contacts, to the recently reported divide-and-conquer games, where an individual can choose a particular move to play with each neighbor. In this paper, we investigate a divide-and-conquer tournament among 14 well-known strategies on social gaming networks. In the tournament, an individual's fitness is measured by accumulated and average payoff aggregated for a certain number of rounds. On the base of their fitness, the evolution of the population follows a local learning mechanism. Our observation indicates that the distribution of individuals adopting a strategy in degree ranking fundamentally changes the frequency of the strategy. In the divide-and-conquer gaming networks, our result suggests that the connectivity in social networks and strategy are two key factors that govern the evolution of the population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jiasheng Wang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tongji University, 4800 Cao'an Road, Shanghai, 201804, China
- Key Laboratory of Embedded System and Service Computing (Tongji University), Ministry of Education, Shanghai, 200092, China
| | - Yichao Zhang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tongji University, 4800 Cao'an Road, Shanghai, 201804, China.
- Key Laboratory of Embedded System and Service Computing (Tongji University), Ministry of Education, Shanghai, 200092, China.
| | - Jihong Guan
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tongji University, 4800 Cao'an Road, Shanghai, 201804, China
- Key Laboratory of Embedded System and Service Computing (Tongji University), Ministry of Education, Shanghai, 200092, China
| | - Shuigeng Zhou
- School of Computer Science, Fudan University, 220 Handan Road, Shanghai, 200433, China
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing, Shanghai, 200433, China
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16
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Akin M, Onderdonk A, Guo Y. Effects of local network topology on the functional reconstruction of spiking neural network models. APPLIED NETWORK SCIENCE 2017; 2:22. [PMID: 30443577 PMCID: PMC6214275 DOI: 10.1007/s41109-017-0044-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/17/2017] [Accepted: 06/30/2017] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
The representation of information flow through structural networks, as depicted by functional networks, does not coincide exactly with the anatomical configuration of the networks. Model free correlation methods including transfer entropy (TE) and a Gaussian convolution-based correlation method (CC) detect functional networks, i.e. temporal correlations in spiking activity among neurons, and depict information flow as a graph. The influence of synaptic topology on these functional correlations is not well-understood, though nonrandom features of the resulting functional structure (e.g. small-worldedness, motifs) are believed to play a crucial role in information-processing. We apply TE and CC to simulated networks with prescribed small-world and recurrence properties to obtain functional reconstructions which we compare with the underlying synaptic structure using multiplex networks. In particular, we examine the effects of the surrounding local synaptic circuitry on functional correlations by comparing dyadic and triadic subgraphs within the structural and functional graphs in order to explain recurring patterns of information flow on the level of individual neurons. Statistical significance is demonstrated by employing randomized null models and Z-scores, and results are obtained for functional networks reconstructed across a range of correlation-threshold values. From these results, we observe that certain triadic structural subgraphs have strong influence over functional topology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Myles Akin
- Department of Mathematics, Drexel University, Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, USA
| | - Alexander Onderdonk
- Department of Mathematics, Drexel University, Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, USA
| | - Yixin Guo
- Department of Mathematics, Drexel University, Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, USA
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17
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18
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Zhang Y, Chen G, Guan J, Zhang Z, Zhou S. Unfavorable Individuals in Social Gaming Networks. Sci Rep 2015; 5:17481. [PMID: 26648549 PMCID: PMC4673536 DOI: 10.1038/srep17481] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2015] [Accepted: 10/14/2015] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
In social gaming networks, the current research focus has been on the origin of widespread reciprocal behaviors when individuals play non-cooperative games. In this paper, we investigate the topological properties of unfavorable individuals in evolutionary games. The unfavorable individuals are defined as the individuals gaining the lowest average payoff in a round of game. Since the average payoff is normally considered as a measure of fitness, the unfavorable individuals are very likely to be eliminated or change their strategy updating rules from a Darwinian perspective. Considering that humans can hardly adopt a unified strategy to play with their neighbors, we propose a divide-and-conquer game model, where individuals can interact with their neighbors in the network with appropriate strategies. We test and compare a series of highly rational strategy updating rules. In the tested scenarios, our analytical and simulation results surprisingly reveal that the less-connected individuals in degree-heterogeneous networks are more likely to become the unfavorable individuals. Our finding suggests that the connectivity of individuals as a social capital fundamentally changes the gaming environment. Our model, therefore, provides a theoretical framework for further understanding the social gaming networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yichao Zhang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tongji University, 4800 Cao’an Road, Shanghai 201804, China
| | - Guanrong Chen
- Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Hong Kong SAR, China
| | - Jihong Guan
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tongji University, 4800 Cao’an Road, Shanghai 201804, China
| | - Zhongzhi Zhang
- Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
- Shanghai Key Lab of Intelligent Information Processing, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
| | - Shuigeng Zhou
- Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
- Shanghai Key Lab of Intelligent Information Processing, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
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19
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Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games. Phys Life Rev 2015; 14:1-30. [PMID: 25979121 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2015.04.033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 345] [Impact Index Per Article: 38.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2015] [Revised: 04/20/2015] [Accepted: 04/20/2015] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research including (i) how to handle the dilemma strength in the context of co-evolution and (ii) where to seek opportunities for applying the game theoretical approach with meaningful impact.
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20
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Wang X, Nie S, Wang B. Dependency links can hinder the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on lattices and networks. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0121508. [PMID: 25798579 PMCID: PMC4370660 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0121508] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2015] [Accepted: 02/03/2015] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Networks with dependency links are more vulnerable when facing the attacks. Recent research also has demonstrated that the interdependent groups support the spreading of cooperation. We study the prisoner's dilemma games on spatial networks with dependency links, in which a fraction of individual pairs is selected to depend on each other. The dependency individuals can gain an extra payoff whose value is between the payoff of mutual cooperation and the value of temptation to defect. Thus, this mechanism reflects that the dependency relation is stronger than the relation of ordinary mutual cooperation, but it is not large enough to cause the defection of the dependency pair. We show that the dependence of individuals hinders, promotes and never affects the cooperation on regular ring networks, square lattice, random and scale-free networks, respectively. The results for the square lattice and regular ring networks are demonstrated by the pair approximation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xuwen Wang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
| | - Sen Nie
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
| | - Binghong Wang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
- College of Physics and Electronic Information Engineering, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou, Zhejiang, 325035, P. R. China
- School of Science, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, Sichuan, 621010, P. R. China
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21
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Szolnoki A, Perc M. Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas. J R Soc Interface 2015; 12:20141299. [PMID: 25540242 PMCID: PMC4305429 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2014.1299] [Citation(s) in RCA: 160] [Impact Index Per Article: 17.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/23/2014] [Accepted: 12/04/2014] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behaviour in humans and social animals also compel to conformity in their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favour of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, PO Box 49, 1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia CAMTP-Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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22
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Kun Á, Dieckmann U. Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation. Nat Commun 2014; 4:2453. [PMID: 24088665 PMCID: PMC3806347 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3453] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2012] [Accepted: 08/16/2013] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Although social structure is known to promote cooperation, by locally exposing selfish agents to their own deeds, studies to date assumed that all agents have access to the same level of resources. This is clearly unrealistic. Here we find that cooperation can be maintained when some agents have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then emerge even in populations in which the temptation to defect is so strong that players would act fully selfishly if their resources were distributed uniformly. Resource heterogeneity can thus be crucial for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We also show that resource heterogeneity can hinder cooperation once the temptation to defect is significantly lowered. In all cases, the level of cooperation can be maximized by managing resource heterogeneity. Differences in resource availability or inequality of wealth are common both in nature and in human societies. Here the authors find that such inequality facilitates cooperation when the generation of public goods is inefficient, but hinders cooperation when the efficiency of joint actions is high.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ádám Kun
- 1] Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Advanced System Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria [2] Parmenides Center for the Conceptual Foundations of Science, Kirchplatz 1, D-82049 Munich/Pullach, Germany [3] Department of Plant Systematics, Ecology and Theoretical Biology, Institute of Biology, Eötvös University, Pázmány Péter sétány 1/C, 1117 Budapest, Hungary [4] Research Group of Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology, Eötvös University and The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pázmány P. sétány 1/C, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
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23
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Wang Z, Wang L, Perc M. Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2014; 89:052813. [PMID: 25353850 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.89.052813] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2013] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
Traditionally, the evolution of cooperation has been studied on single, isolated networks. Yet a player, especially in human societies, will typically be a member of many different networks, and those networks will play different roles in the evolutionary process. Multilayer networks are therefore rapidly gaining on popularity as the more apt description of a networked society. With this motivation, we here consider two-layer scale-free networks with all possible combinations of degree mixing, wherein one network layer is used for the accumulation of payoffs and the other is used for strategy updating. We find that breaking the symmetry through assortative mixing in one layer and/or disassortative mixing in the other layer, as well as preserving the symmetry by means of assortative mixing in both layers, impedes the evolution of cooperation. We use degree-dependent distributions of strategies and cluster-size analysis to explain these results, which highlight the importance of hubs and the preservation of symmetry between multilayer networks for the successful resolution of social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Wang
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong and Center for Nonlinear Studies and Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Institute of Computational and Theoretical Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
| | - Lin Wang
- Centre for Chaos and Complex Networks, Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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24
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Tang C, Wang Z, Li X. Moderate intra-group bias maximizes cooperation on interdependent populations. PLoS One 2014; 9:e88412. [PMID: 24533084 PMCID: PMC3922813 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0088412] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2013] [Accepted: 01/07/2014] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory on spatial structures has received increasing attention during the past decades. However, the majority of these achievements focuses on single and static population structures, which is not fully consistent with the fact that real structures are composed of many interactive groups. These groups are interdependent on each other and present dynamical features, in which individuals mimic the strategy of neighbors and switch their partnerships continually. It is however unclear how the dynamical and interdependent interactions among groups affect the evolution of collective behaviors. In this work, we employ the prisoner's dilemma game to investigate how the dynamics of structure influences cooperation on interdependent populations, where populations are represented by group structures. It is found that the more robust the links between cooperators (or the more fragile the links between cooperators and defectors), the more prevalent of cooperation. Furthermore, theoretical analysis shows that the intra-group bias can favor cooperation, which is only possible when individuals are likely to attach neighbors within the same group. Yet, interestingly, cooperation can be even inhibited for large intra-group bias, allowing the moderate intra-group bias maximizes the cooperation level.
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Affiliation(s)
- Changbing Tang
- Adaptive Networks and Control Lab, Department of Electronic Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, PR China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
- Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex systems (Hong Kong), Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
| | - Xiang Li
- Adaptive Networks and Control Lab, Department of Electronic Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, PR China
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25
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Miyaji K, Tanimoto J, Hagishima A, Ikegaya N. Influence of stochastic perturbation of both action updating and strategy updating in mixed-strategy 2×2 games on evolution of cooperation. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2013; 88:062149. [PMID: 24483427 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.88.062149] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2013] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Abstract
In a mixed-strategy game framework, each agent's strategy is defined by a real number; on the other hand, in a discrete strategy game framework, only binary strategies, either cooperation or defection, are allowed. In a spatial mixed-strategy game, with respect to the process for updating action (offer), either a synchronous or an asynchronous strategy update should be presumed. This study elucidates how stochastic perturbation that results from a synchronous or an asynchronous process for updating action significantly affects the enhancement of cooperation in an evolutionary process. Especially, when a synchronous process for updating action is assumed, the extent of cooperation increases with an increase in degree.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kohei Miyaji
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Aya Hagishima
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Naoki Ikegaya
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
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26
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Zhang Y, Aziz-Alaoui MA, Bertelle C, Zhou S, Wang W. Fence-sitters protect cooperation in complex networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2013; 88:032127. [PMID: 24125233 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.88.032127] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2013] [Indexed: 06/02/2023]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. In complex networks, because of the difficulty of formulating the replicator dynamics, most of the previous studies are confined to a numerical level. In this paper, we introduce a vectorial formulation to derive three classes of individuals' payoff analytically. The three classes are pure cooperators, pure defectors, and fence-sitters. Here, fence-sitters are the individuals who change their strategies at least once in the strategy evolutionary process. As a general approach, our vectorial formalization can be applied to all the two-strategy games. To clarify the function of the fence-sitters, we define a parameter, payoff memory, as the number of rounds that the individuals' payoffs are aggregated. We observe that the payoff memory can control the fence-sitters' effects and the level of cooperation efficiently. Our results indicate that the fence-sitters' role is nontrivial in the complex topologies, which protects cooperation in an indirect way. Our results may provide a better understanding of the composition of cooperators in a circumstance where the temptation to defect is larger.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yichao Zhang
- Univ Normandy, France; ULH, LMAH, F-76600 Le Havre, FR CNRS 3335, ISCN, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, 76600 Le Havre, France and Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom
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27
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Direct reciprocity in spatial populations enhances R-reciprocity as well as ST-reciprocity. PLoS One 2013; 8:e71961. [PMID: 23951272 PMCID: PMC3737211 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0071961] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/18/2013] [Accepted: 07/06/2013] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
As is well-known, spatial reciprocity plays an important role in facilitating the emergence of cooperative traits, and the effect of direct reciprocity is also obvious for explaining the cooperation dynamics. However, how the combination of these two scenarios influences cooperation is still unclear. In the present work, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 games via considering both spatial structured populations and direct reciprocity driven by the strategy with 1-memory length. Our results show that cooperation can be significantly facilitated on the whole parameter plane. For prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation dominates the system even at strong dilemma, where maximal social payoff is still realized. In this sense, R-reciprocity forms and it is robust to the extremely strong dilemma. Interestingly, when turning to chicken game, we find that ST-reciprocity is also guaranteed, through which social average payoff and cooperation is greatly enhanced. This reciprocity mechanism is supported by mean-field analysis and different interaction topologies. Thus, our study indicates that direct reciprocity in structured populations can be regarded as a more powerful factor for the sustainability of cooperation.
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28
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Li Q, Iqbal A, Perc M, Chen M, Abbott D. Coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on evolving random networks. PLoS One 2013; 8:e68423. [PMID: 23874622 PMCID: PMC3709921 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0068423] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2013] [Accepted: 05/29/2013] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on weighted and directed random networks in the realm of the prisoner's dilemma game. During the evolution, agents can break and rewire their links with the aim of maximizing payoffs, and they can also adjust the weights to indicate preferences, either positive or negative, towards their neighbors. The network structure itself is thus also subject to evolution. Importantly, the directionality of links does not affect the accumulation of payoffs nor the strategy transfers, but serves only to designate the owner of each particular link and with it the right to adjust the link as needed. We show that quantum strategies outperform classical strategies, and that the critical temptation to defect at which cooperative behavior can be maintained rises, if the network structure is updated frequently. Punishing neighbors by reducing the weights of their links also plays an important role in maintaining cooperation under adverse conditions. We find that the self-organization of the initially random network structure, driven by the evolutionary competition between quantum and classical strategies, leads to the spontaneous emergence of small average path length and a large clustering coefficient.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qiang Li
- State Key Laboratory of Power Transmission Equipment and System Security and New Technology, College of Electrical Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
- School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
| | - Azhar Iqbal
- School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Minyou Chen
- State Key Laboratory of Power Transmission Equipment and System Security and New Technology, College of Electrical Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
| | - Derek Abbott
- School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
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29
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Wang Z, Szolnoki A, Perc M. Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games. Sci Rep 2013; 3:1183. [PMID: 23378915 PMCID: PMC3560361 DOI: 10.1038/srep01183] [Citation(s) in RCA: 333] [Impact Index Per Article: 30.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/29/2012] [Accepted: 01/15/2013] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Wang
- Department of Physics Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
- Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of SciencesP.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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30
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Jiang LL, Perc M. Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups. Sci Rep 2013; 3:2483. [PMID: 23963495 PMCID: PMC3748424 DOI: 10.1038/srep02483] [Citation(s) in RCA: 117] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2013] [Accepted: 08/05/2013] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Luo-Luo Jiang
- College of Physics and Electronic Information Engineering, Wenzhou University, 325035 Wenzhou, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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31
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Wang Z, Szolnoki A, Perc M. Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation. Sci Rep 2013; 3:2470. [PMID: 23959086 PMCID: PMC3747507 DOI: 10.1038/srep02470] [Citation(s) in RCA: 221] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2013] [Accepted: 08/02/2013] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Wang
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
- Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of SciencesP.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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32
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Yang Z, Zhou T, Hui PM, Ke JH. Instability in evolutionary games. PLoS One 2012; 7:e49663. [PMID: 23209587 PMCID: PMC3510218 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0049663] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2011] [Accepted: 10/15/2012] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Background Phenomena of instability are widely observed in many dissimilar systems, with punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution and economic crises being noticeable examples. Recent studies suggested that such instabilities, quantified by the abrupt changes of the composition of individuals, could result within the framework of a collection of individuals interacting through the prisoner's dilemma and incorporating three mechanisms: (i) imitation and mutation, (ii) preferred selection on successful individuals, and (iii) networking effects. Methodology/Principal Findings We study the importance of each mechanism using simplified models. The models are studied numerically and analytically via rate equations and mean-field approximation. It is shown that imitation and mutation alone can lead to the instability on the number of cooperators, and preferred selection modifies the instability in an asymmetric way. The co-evolution of network topology and game dynamics is not necessary to the occurrence of instability and the network topology is found to have almost no impact on instability if new links are added in a global manner. The results are valid in both the contexts of the snowdrift game and prisoner's dilemma. Conclusions/Significance The imitation and mutation mechanism, which gives a heterogeneous rate of change in the system's composition, is the dominating reason of the instability on the number of cooperators. The effects of payoffs and network topology are relatively insignificant. Our work refines the understanding on the driving forces of system instability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zimo Yang
- Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, People's Republic of China
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Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS One 2011; 6:e26724. [PMID: 22066006 PMCID: PMC3204981 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0026724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2011] [Accepted: 10/02/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
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Learning to cooperate in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by means of social attachments. JOURNAL OF THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER SOCIETY 2011. [DOI: 10.1007/s13173-011-0038-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) has been used as a paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperation among individual agents. Many computer experiments show that cooperation does arise under certain conditions. In particular, the spatial version of the IPD has been used and analyzed to understand the role of local interactions in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. It is known that individual learning leads players to the Nash equilibrium of the game, which means that cooperation is not selected. Therefore, in this paper we propose that when players have social attachment, learning may lead to a certain rate of cooperation. We perform experiments where agents play the spatial IPD considering social relationships such as belonging to a hierarchy or to coalition. Results show that learners end up cooperating, especially when coalitions emerge.
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Zhang C, Zhang J, Xie G, Wang L. Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner's dilemma players. Theor Popul Biol 2011; 80:226-31. [PMID: 21763708 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2011.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/10/2011] [Revised: 06/24/2011] [Accepted: 06/29/2011] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games, whereby each player extends its interaction scope by trying to interact with a certain number of encounters randomly chosen from its non-neighbors, in addition to its permanently linked nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the non-neighbors treat the initiative interactions in two scenarios: definitely accepting that from the cooperators, whereas guardedly interacting with defectors with an acceptance probability which may take arbitrary value in [0,1]. Importantly, our results reveal that the proposed encounter mechanism is a potent extrinsic factor that is able to boost cooperation when appropriately adjusting the values of the encounter number and acceptance probability, though rational players would always defect in one-shot encounters, regardless of the action from the counterparts. We hope our studies may help understand that the proposed encounter mechanism is also an important ingredient of a flourishing cooperative society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunyan Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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Zhang J, Zhang C, Chu T. Cooperation enhanced by the 'survival of the fittest' rule in prisoner's dilemma games on complex networks. J Theor Biol 2010; 267:41-7. [PMID: 20708630 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2010] [Revised: 07/25/2010] [Accepted: 08/01/2010] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection, whereby we introduce a model of strategy evolution taking place on evolving networks based on Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' rule. In the present work, players whose payoffs are below a certain threshold will be deleted and the same number of new nodes will be added to the network to maintain the constant system size. Furthermore, the networking effect is also studied via implementing simulations on four typical network structures. Numerical results show that cooperators can obtain the biggest boost if the elimination threshold is fine-tuned. Notably, this coevolutionary rule drives the initial networks to evolve into statistically stationary states with a broad-scale degree distribution. Our results may provide many more insights for understanding the coevolution of strategy and network topology under the mechanism of nature selection whereby superior individuals will prosper and inferior ones be eliminated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jianlei Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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Barbosa VC, Donangelo R, Souza SR. Early appraisal of the fixation probability in directed networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2010; 82:046114. [PMID: 21230352 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.82.046114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2010] [Revised: 08/11/2010] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
In evolutionary dynamics, the probability that a mutation spreads through the whole population, having arisen from a single individual, is known as the fixation probability. In general, it is not possible to find the fixation probability analytically given the mutant's fitness and the topological constraints that govern the spread of the mutation, so one resorts to simulations instead. Depending on the topology in use, a great number of evolutionary steps may be needed in each of the simulation events, particularly in those that end with the population containing mutants only. We introduce two techniques to accelerate the determination of the fixation probability. The first one skips all evolutionary steps in which the number of mutants does not change and thereby reduces the number of steps per simulation event considerably. This technique is computationally advantageous for some of the so-called layered networks. The second technique, which is not restricted to layered networks, consists of aborting any simulation event in which the number of mutants has grown beyond a certain threshold value and counting that event as having led to a total spread of the mutation. For advantageous mutations in large populations and regardless of the network's topology, we demonstrate, both analytically and by means of simulations, that using a threshold of about [N/(r-1)](1/4) mutants, where N is the number of simulation events and r is the ratio of the mutants' fitness to that of the remainder of the population, leads to an estimate of the fixation probability that deviates in no significant way from that obtained from the full-fledged simulations. We have observed speedups of two orders of magnitude for layered networks with 10,000 nodes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valmir C Barbosa
- Programa de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computação, COPPE, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68511, 21941-972 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
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38
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Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure. GAMES 2010. [DOI: 10.3390/g1030317] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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Jiang LL, Wang WX, Lai YC, Wang BH. Role of adaptive migration in promoting cooperation in spatial games. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2010; 81:036108. [PMID: 20365816 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.81.036108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/19/2009] [Revised: 02/10/2010] [Indexed: 05/29/2023]
Abstract
Recent work has revealed that success-driven migration can promote cooperation among selfish individuals in evolutionary games. This migration mechanism relies, however, on nonlocal information about the states of the individuals and their computational capabilities for prediction. We investigate the role of adaptive migration in cooperative behavior in the framework of spatial game by proposing an alternative migration strategy that requires only local information obtainable through game interactions. Our results demonstrate that adaptive migration can be effective in promoting cooperation in two ways. First, there exists an optimal degree of migration associated with the density of empty sites and migration speed, which leads to the highest level of cooperation. Second, adaptive migration can induce an outbreak of cooperation from an environment dominated by defectors. These findings hold for common types of evolutionary games that involve pairwise interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Luo-Luo Jiang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
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40
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Du WB, Cao XB, Hu MB. The effect of asymmetric payoff mechanism on evolutionary networked prisoner’s dilemma game. PHYSICA A: STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 2009; 388:5005-5012. [DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.08.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/01/2023]
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41
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Coevolutionary games--a mini review. Biosystems 2009; 99:109-25. [PMID: 19837129 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 583] [Impact Index Per Article: 38.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2009] [Revised: 10/02/2009] [Accepted: 10/05/2009] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.
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42
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Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabó G, Stark HU. Impact of aging on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 80:021901. [PMID: 19792145 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.80.021901] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2009] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
Aging is always present, tailoring our interactions with others, and postulating a finite lifespan during which we are able to exercise them. We consider the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice and examine how quenched age distributions and different aging protocols influence the evolution of cooperation when taking the life experience and knowledge accumulation into account as time passes. In agreement with previous studies, we find that a quenched assignment of age to players, introducing heterogeneity to the game, substantially promotes cooperative behavior. Introduction of aging and subsequent death as a coevolutionary process may act detrimental on cooperation but enhances it efficiently if the offspring of individuals that have successfully passed their strategy is considered newborn. We study resulting age distributions of players and show that the heterogeneity is vital-yet insufficient-for explaining the observed differences in cooperator abundance on the spatial grid. The unexpected increment of cooperation levels can be explained by a dynamical effect that has a highly selective impact on the propagation of cooperator and defector states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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43
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Barbosa VC, Donangelo R, Souza SR. Network growth for enhanced natural selection. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 80:026115. [PMID: 19792208 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.80.026115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/23/2008] [Revised: 03/23/2009] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
Natural selection and random drift are competing phenomena for explaining the evolution of populations. Combining a highly fit mutant with a population structure that improves the odds that the mutation spreads through the whole population tips the balance in favor of natural selection. The probability that the spread occurs, known as the fixation probability, depends heavily on how the population is structured. Certain topologies, albeit highly artificially contrived, have been shown to exist that favor fixation. We present a randomized mechanism for network growth that is loosely inspired in some of these topologies' key properties and demonstrate, through simulations, that it is capable of giving rise to structured populations for which the fixation probability significantly surpasses that of an unstructured population. This discovery provides important support to the notion that natural selection can be enhanced over random drift in naturally occurring population structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valmir C Barbosa
- Programa de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computação, COPPE, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68511, 21941-972 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
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Yang HX, Wang WX, Wu ZX, Lai YC, Wang BH. Diversity-optimized cooperation on complex networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 79:056107. [PMID: 19518521 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.79.056107] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2008] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
We propose a strategy for achieving maximum cooperation in evolutionary games on complex networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter that controls the level of diversity among individuals in the network. During the evolution, every individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to the weight of the neighbor, and updates its strategy depending on their payoff difference. It is found that there exists an optimal value of alpha, for which the level of cooperation reaches maximum. This phenomenon indicates that, although high-degree individuals play a prominent role in maintaining the cooperation, too strong influences from the hubs may counterintuitively inhibit the diffusion of cooperation. Other pertinent quantities such as the payoff, the cooperator density as a function of the degree, and the payoff distribution are also investigated computationally and theoretically. Our results suggest that in order to achieve strong cooperation on a complex network, individuals should learn more frequently from neighbors with higher degrees, but only to a certain extent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Han-Xin Yang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
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45
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Fu F, Wang L, Nowak MA, Hauert C. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 79:046707. [PMID: 19518380 PMCID: PMC2735202 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.79.046707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/17/2008] [Revised: 03/02/2009] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
Investigating the evolutionary dynamics of game theoretical interactions in populations where individuals are arranged on a graph can be challenging in terms of computation time. Here, we propose an efficient method to study any type of game on arbitrary graph structures for weak selection. In this limit, evolutionary game dynamics represents a first-order correction to neutral evolution. Spatial correlations can be empirically determined under neutral evolution and provide the basis for formulating the game dynamics as a discrete Markov process by incorporating a detailed description of the microscopic dynamics based on the neutral correlations. This framework is then applied to one of the most intriguing questions in evolutionary biology: the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that the degree heterogeneity of a graph impedes cooperation and that the success of tit for tat depends not only on the number of rounds but also on the degree of the graph. Moreover, considering the mutation-selection equilibrium shows that the symmetry of the stationary distribution of states under weak selection is skewed in favor of defectors for larger selection strengths. In particular, degree heterogeneity--a prominent feature of scale-free networks--generally results in a more pronounced increase in the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for evolution to favor cooperation as compared to regular graphs. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of the effects of population structures on the fixation probabilities of strategies in general 2 x 2 games for different types of graphs. Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
| | - Christoph Hauert
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver B.C. Canada V6T 1Z2
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Fu F, Wu T, Wang L. Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 79:036101. [PMID: 19392012 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.79.036101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 70] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2008] [Revised: 01/21/2009] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
Previous studies suggest that cooperation prevails when individuals can switch their interaction partners quickly. However, it is still unclear how quickly individuals should switch adverse partners to maximize cooperation. To address this issue, we propose a simple model of coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which individuals are allowed to either adjust their strategies or switch their defective partners. Interestingly, we find that, depending on the game parameter, there is an optimal tendency of switching adverse partnerships that maximizes the fraction of cooperators in the population. We confirm that the stabilization of cooperation by partner switching remains effective under some situations, where either normalized or accumulated payoff is used in strategy updating, and where either only cooperators or all individuals are privileged to sever disadvantageous partners. We also provide an extended pair approximation to study the coevolutionary dynamics. Our results may be helpful in understanding the role of partner switching in the stabilization of cooperation in the real world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA.
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47
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Szabó G, Szolnoki A. Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 79:016106. [PMID: 19257106 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.79.016106] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2008] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) prisoner's dilemma game with two types ( A and B ) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability depending on the payoff difference and also on the type of the neighbor. The strategy adoption probability is reduced by a prefactor (w<1) from the players of type B . We consider the competition between two opposite effects when increasing the number of neighbors ( k=4 , 8, and 24). Within a range of the portion of influential players (type A ) the inhomogeneous activity in strategy transfer yields a relevant increase (dependent on w ) in the density of cooperators. The noise dependence of this phenomenon is also discussed by evaluating phase diagrams.
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Affiliation(s)
- György Szabó
- Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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48
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Perc M, Szolnoki A, Szabó G. Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2008; 78:066101. [PMID: 19256899 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.78.066101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2008] [Revised: 08/11/2008] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players mu can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized by the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability p , thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished players. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that, as the temptation to defect increases the optimal mu decreases, and moreover only minute values of p warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection-prone environment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matjaz Perc
- Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroska cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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49
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Van Segbroeck S, Santos FC, Nowé A, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T. The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties. BMC Evol Biol 2008; 8:287. [PMID: 18928551 PMCID: PMC2576237 DOI: 10.1186/1471-2148-8-287] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2008] [Accepted: 10/17/2008] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Background In recent years it has been found that the combination of evolutionary game theory with population structures modelled in terms of dynamical graphs, in which individuals are allowed to sever unwanted social ties while keeping the good ones, provides a viable solution to the conundrum of cooperation. It is well known that in reality individuals respond differently to disadvantageous interactions. Yet, the evolutionary mechanism determining the individuals' willingness to sever unfavourable ties remains unclear. Results We introduce a novel way of thinking about the joint evolution of cooperation and social contacts. The struggle for survival between cooperators and defectors leads to an arms race for swiftness in adjusting social ties, based purely on a self-regarding, individual judgement. Since defectors are never able to establish social ties under mutual agreement, they break adverse ties more rapidly than cooperators, who tend to evolve stable and long-term relations. Ironically, defectors' constant search for partners to exploit leads to heterogeneous networks that improve the survivability of cooperators, compared to the traditional homogenous population assumption. Conclusion When communities face the prisoner's dilemma, swift reaction to adverse ties evolves when competition is fierce between cooperators and defectors, providing an evolutionary basis for the necessity of individuals to adjust their social ties. Our results show how our innate resilience to change relates to mutual agreement between cooperators and how "loyalty" or persistent social ties bring along an evolutionary disadvantage, both from an individual and group perspective.
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50
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Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak MA, Wang L. Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2008; 78:026117. [PMID: 18850907 PMCID: PMC2699261 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.78.026117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 196] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2008] [Indexed: 05/10/2023]
Abstract
We investigate the cooperation dynamics attributed to the interplay between the evolution of individual strategies and evolution of individual partnerships. We focus on the effect of reputation on an individual's partner-switching process. We assume that individuals can either change their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their partnerships based on local information about reputations. We manipulate the partner switching in two ways; that is, individuals can switch from the lowest reputation partners, either to their partners' partners who have the highest reputation (i.e., ordering in partnership) or to others randomly chosen from the entire population (i.e., randomness in partnership). We show that when individuals are able to alter their behavioral strategies and their social interaction partnerships on the basis of reputation, cooperation can prevail. We find that the larger temptation to defect and the denser the partner network, the more frequently individuals need to shift their partnerships in order for cooperation to thrive. Furthermore, an increasing tendency of switching to partners' partners is more likely to lead to a higher level of cooperation. We show that when reputation is absent in such partner-switching processes, cooperation is much less favored than that of the reputation involved. Moreover, we investigate the effect of discounting an individual's reputation on the evolution of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of the consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on the promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering and Key Laboratory of Machine Perception (Ministry of Education), Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Christoph Hauert
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia,1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver B.C. Canada V6T 1Z2
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering and Key Laboratory of Machine Perception (Ministry of Education), Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
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