Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection

Evolutionary Dynamics of Population Games With an Aspiration-Based Learning Rule

Agents usually adjust their strategic behaviors based on their own payoff and aspiration in gaming environments. Hence, aspiration-based learning rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics in a population of competing agents. However, there exist different options for how to use the aspiration information for specifying the microscopic learning rules. It is also interesting to investigate under what conditions the aspiration-based learning rules can favor the emergence of cooperative behavior in population games. A new learning rule, called as "Satisfied-Cooperate, Unsatisfied-Defect," is proposed here, which is based on aspiration. Under this learning rule, agents prefer to cooperate when their income is satisfied; otherwise, they prefer the strategy of defection. We introduce this learning rule to a population of agents playing a generalized two-person game. We, respectively, obtain the mathematical conditions in which cooperation is more abundant in finite well-mixed, infinite well-mixed, and structured populations under weak selection. Interestingly, we find that these conditions are identical, no matter whether the aspiration levels for cooperators and defectors are the same or not. Furthermore, we consider the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) as an example and perform numerical calculations and computer simulations. Our numerical and simulation results agree well and both support our theoretical predictions in the three different types of populations. We further find that our aspiration-based learning rule can promote cooperation more effectively than alternative aspiration-based learning rules in the PDG.

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation driven by a mixed update rule in structured prisoner's dilemma games

How to understand the evolution of cooperation remains a scientific challenge. Individual strategy update rule plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation in a population. Previous works mainly assume that individuals adopt one single update rule during the evolutionary process. Indeed, individuals may adopt a mixed update rule influenced by different preferences such as payoff-driven and conformity-driven factors. It is still unclear how such mixed update rules influence the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation from a theoretical analysis perspective. In this work, in combination with the pairwise comparison rule and the conformity rule, we consider a mixed updating procedure into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game. We assume that individuals adopt the conformity rule for strategy updating with a certain probability in a structured population. By means of the pair approximation and mean-field approaches, we obtain the dynamical equations for the fraction of cooperators in the population. We prove that under weak selection, there exists one unique interior equilibrium point, which is stable, in the system. Accordingly, cooperators can survive with defectors under the mixed update rule in the structured population. In addition, we find that the stationary fraction of cooperators increases as the conformity strength increases, but is independent of the benefit parameter. Furthermore, we perform numerical calculations and computer simulations to confirm our theoretical predictions.

Deterministic theory of evolutionary games on temporal networks

Recent empirical studies have revealed that social interactions among agents in realistic networks merely exist intermittently and occur in a particular sequential order. However, it remains unexplored how to theoretically describe evolutionary dynamics of multiple strategies on temporal networks. Herein, we develop a deterministic theory for studying evolutionary dynamics of any [Formula: see text] pairwise games in structured populations where individuals are connected and organized by temporally activated edges. In the limit of weak selection, we derive replicator-like equations with a transformed payoff matrix characterizing how the mean frequency of each strategy varies over time, and then obtain critical conditions for any strategy to be evolutionarily stable on temporal networks. Interestingly, the re-scaled payoff matrix is a linear combination of the original payoff matrix with an additional one describing local competitions between any pair of different strategies, whose weights are solely determined by network topology and selection intensity. As a particular example, we apply the deterministic theory to analysing the impacts of temporal networks in the mini-ultimatum game, and find that temporally networked population structures result in the emergence of fairness. Our work offers theoretical insights into the subtle effects of network temporality on evolutionary game dynamics.

Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks through asymmetry between interaction and replacement

Cooperation is the foundation of society and has been the subject of numerous studies over the past three decades. However, the mechanisms underlying the spread of cooperation within a group are not yet fully comprehended. We analyze cooperation in multiplex networks, a model that has recently gained attention for successfully capturing certain aspects of human social connections. Previous studies on the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks have shown that cooperative behavior is promoted when the two key processes in evolution, interaction and strategy replacement, are performed with the same partner as much as possible, that is, symmetrically, in a variety of network structures. We focus on a particular type of symmetry, namely, symmetry in the scope of communication, to investigate whether cooperation is promoted or hindered when interactions and strategy replacements have different scopes. Through multiagent simulations, we found some cases where asymmetry can promote cooperation, contrasting with previous studies. These results hint toward the potential effectiveness of not only symmetrical but also asymmetrical approaches in fostering cooperation within particular groups under certain social conditions.

Evolution of cooperation under a generalized death-birth process

According to the evolutionary death-birth protocol, a player is chosen randomly to die and neighbors compete for the available position proportional to their fitness. Hence, the status of the focal player is completely ignored and has no impact on the strategy update. In this paper, we revisit and generalize this rule by introducing a weight factor to compare the payoff values of the focal and invading neighbors. By means of evolutionary graph theory, we analyze the model on joint transitive graphs to explore the possible consequences of the presence of a weight factor. We find that focal weight always hinders cooperation under weak selection strength. Surprisingly, the results show a nontrivial tipping point of the weight factor where the threshold of cooperation success shifts from positive to negative infinity. Once focal weight exceeds this tipping point, cooperation becomes unreachable. Our theoretical predictions are confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice of different sizes. We also verify the robustness of the conclusions to arbitrary two-player prisoner's dilemmas, to dispersal graphs with arbitrary edge weights, and to interaction and dispersal graphs overlapping arbitrarily.

Global dynamics of microbial communities emerge from local interaction rules

Most microbes live in spatially structured communities (e.g., biofilms) in which they interact with their neighbors through the local exchange of diffusible molecules. To understand the functioning of these communities, it is essential to uncover how these local interactions shape community-level properties, such as the community composition, spatial arrangement, and growth rate. Here, we present a mathematical framework to derive community-level properties from the molecular mechanisms underlying the cell-cell interactions for systems consisting of two cell types. Our framework consists of two parts: a biophysical model to derive the local interaction rules (i.e. interaction range and strength) from the molecular parameters underlying the cell-cell interactions and a graph based model to derive the equilibrium properties of the community (i.e. composition, spatial arrangement, and growth rate) from these local interaction rules. Our framework shows that key molecular parameters underlying the cell-cell interactions (e.g., the uptake and leakage rates of molecules) determine community-level properties. We apply our model to mutualistic cross-feeding communities and show that spatial structure can be detrimental for these communities. Moreover, our model can qualitatively recapitulate the properties of an experimental microbial community. Our framework can be extended to a variety of systems of two interacting cell types, within and beyond the microbial world, and contributes to our understanding of how community-level properties emerge from microscopic interactions between cells.

Microorganisms perform essential processes on our planet. Many of these processes result from interactions between different species growing in spatially structured communities. A central goal is to understand how community processes emerge from such interactions between cells. Here we develop a mathematical framework to derive community-level properties, such as the community composition, growth rate, and spatial organization, from the molecular mechanisms underlying these cell-cell interactions. We focus on mutualistic communities consisting of two cell types that need to interact with each other in order to grow. We derive equations that describe how changes in the molecular parameters of cellular interactions affect individuals’ and community properties. We find that spatial structure has a negative impact on these mutualistic communities: as cells become surrounded by their own type, they have less access to the other cell type with which they need to interact to grow well. We show that our framework can also be applied to other types of microbial communities and potentially to non-microbial systems such as tissues. More generally, this work advances our understanding of how scales are connected in biological systems, both in the microbial world and beyond.

Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions in heterogeneous populations

Update rules, which describe how individuals adjust their behavior over time, affect the outcome of social interactions. Theoretical studies have shown that evolutionary outcomes are sensitive to model details when update rules are imitation-based but are robust when update rules are self-evaluation based. However, studies of self-evaluation based rules have focused on homogeneous population structures where each individual has the same number of neighbors. Here, we consider heterogeneous population structures represented by weighted networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the condition for strategy success, which coincides with the classical condition of risk-dominance. This condition holds for all weighted networks and distributions of aspiration levels, and for individualized ways of self-evaluation. Our findings recover previous results as special cases and demonstrate the universality of the robustness property under self-evaluation based rules. Our work thus sheds light on the intrinsic difference between evolutionary dynamics under self-evaluation based and imitation-based update rules.

Social interaction outcomes can depend on the type of information individuals possess and how it is used in decision-making. Here, Zhou et al. find that self-evaluation based decision-making rules lead to evolutionary outcomes that are robust to different population structures and ways of self-evaluation.

Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management

Social organizations, especially human society, rely on egalitarian social norm, which can be characterized by high levels of fairness, empathy and collective conformity. Nevertheless, the evolution of egalitarian social norm remains a conundrum, as it suffers the persistent challenge from individual self-interest. To address this issue, we construct an evolutionary game theoretical model by employing the Ultimatum Game, in which rational individuals are able to perform resource management. We show that resource management drives a population evolving into an oscillatory state with high equilibrium degrees of fairness, empathy and collective conformity and thus constitutes a key mechanism for the evolution of egalitarian social norm in social dilemma situations. Specifically, it results in (1) the formation of egalitarian social norm from diverse individual norms, (2) the emergence of egalitarian social norm in a selfish and unfair world, and (3) the maintenance of egalitarian social norm despite the presence of norm violators. The constructive role of resource management is explained by a mean-field analysis revealing that resource management can effectively enlarge the attraction basin of egalitarian norms or even change the dynamical property of the mini Ultimatum Game from bistability between egalitarian norms and less egalitarian norms to complete-dominance of egalitarian norms over less egalitarian norms. Furthermore, we find that the capacity of resource management can be evolutionarily selected by a coevolution between egalitarian social norm and resource management. Our study suggests that efficiency and equity are linked to each other.

Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games. We find that labor division can promote collective cooperation markedly. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.

Properties of network structures, structure coefficients, and benefit-to-cost ratios

In structured populations the spatial arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the interaction graph together with the structure of the graph itself determines the game dynamics and particularly whether or not fixation of cooperation (or defection) is favored. For networks described by regular graphs and for a single cooperator (and a single defector) the question of fixation can be addressed by a single parameter, the structure coefficient. This quantity is invariant with respect to the location of the cooperator on the graph and also does not vary over different networks. We may therefore consider it to be generic for regular graphs and call it the generic structure coefficient. For two and more cooperators (or several defectors) fixation properties can also be assigned by structure coefficients. These structure coefficients, however, depend on the arrangement of cooperators and defectors which we may interpret as a configuration of the game. Moreover, the coefficients are specific for a given interaction network modeled as a regular graph, which is why we may call them specific structure coefficients. In this paper, we study how specific structure coefficients vary over interaction graphs and analyze how spectral properties of interaction networks relate to specific structure coefficients. We also discuss implications for the benefit-to-cost ratios of donation games.

Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs

Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. The population structure can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations extend scenarios with a single cooperator among defectors to any number of cooperators and any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the network. For interaction networks modeled as regular graphs and for weak selection, the emergence of cooperation can be assessed by structure coefficients, which can be specified for each configuration and each regular graph. Thus, as a single cooperator can be interpreted as a lone mutant, the configuration-based structure coefficients also describe fixation properties of multiple mutants. We analyze the structure coefficients and particularly show that under certain conditions, the coefficients strongly correlate to the average shortest path length between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. Thus, for multiple cooperators fixation properties on regular evolutionary graphs can be linked to cooperator path lengths.

Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics

In this paper we are concerned with how aggregated outcomes of individual behaviours, during interactions with other individuals (games) or with environmental factors, determine the vital rates constituting the growth rate of the population. This approach needs additional elements, namely the rates of event occurrence (interaction rates). Interaction rates describe the distribution of the interaction events in time, which seriously affects the population dynamics, as is shown in this paper. This leads to the model of a population of individuals playing different games, where focal game affected by the considered trait can be extracted from the general model, and the impact on the dynamics of other events (which is not neutral) can be described by an average background fertility and mortality. This leads to a distinction between two types of background fitness, strategically neutral elements of the focal games (correlated with the focal game events) and the aggregated outcomes of other interactions (independent of the focal game). The new approach is useful for clarification of the biological meaning of concepts such as weak selection. Results are illustrated by a Hawk-Dove example.

Stirring does not make populations well mixed

In evolutionary dynamics, the notion of a ‘well-mixed’ population is usually associated with all-to-all interactions at all times. This assumption simplifies the mathematics of evolutionary processes, and makes analytical solutions possible. At the same time the term ‘well-mixed’ suggests that this situation can be achieved by physically stirring the population. Using simulations of populations in chaotic flows, we show that in most cases this is not true: conventional well-mixed theories do not predict fixation probabilities correctly, regardless of how fast or thorough the stirring is. We propose a new analytical description in the fast-flow limit. This approach is valid for processes with global and local selection, and accurately predicts the suppression of selection as competition becomes more local. It provides a modelling tool for biological or social systems with individuals in motion.

Promoting cooperation by preventing exploitation: The role of network structure

A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative behavior can be affected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the existence of state-based decision-making mechanisms that may have emerged by evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a simple mechanism of anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity-a concept organized around the premise "help anyone if helped by someone'-and study its dynamics on random graphs. In the presence of such a mechanism, the evolution of cooperation is related to the dynamics of the levels of investments (i.e., probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is determined by a network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood importance index and discuss relevant implications to natural and artificial systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies to an invasion of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results for the case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.

Fixation Probabilities for Any Configuration of Two Strategies on Regular Graphs

Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evolutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure can promote the emergence of cooperation in some populations and suppress it in others. Here, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation on regular graphs for any configuration, meaning any arrangement of cooperators and defectors. Our results extend previous work on fixation probabilities of rare mutants. We find that for any configuration cooperation is never favored for birth-death (BD) updating. In contrast, for death-birth (DB) updating, we derive a simple, computationally tractable formula for weak selection to favor cooperation when starting from any configuration containing any number of cooperators. This formula elucidates two important features: (i) the takeover of cooperation can be enhanced by the strategic placement of cooperators and (ii) adding more cooperators to a configuration can sometimes suppress the evolution of cooperation. These findings give a formal account for how selection acts on all transient states that appear in evolutionary trajectories. They also inform the strategic design of initial states in social networks to maximally promote cooperation. We also derive general results that characterize the interaction of any two strategies, not only cooperation and defection.

Topological chaos of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular networks

The spatial version of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on infinitely large regular lattice with purely deterministic strategies and no memories among players is investigated in this paper. Based on the statistical inferences, it is pertinent to confirm that the frequency of cooperation for characterizing its macroscopic behaviors is very sensitive to the initial conditions, which is the most practically significant property of chaos. Its intrinsic complexity is then justified on firm ground from the theory of symbolic dynamics; that is, this game is topologically mixing and possesses positive topological entropy on its subsystems. It is demonstrated therefore that its frequency of cooperation could not be adopted by simply averaging over several steps after the game reaches the equilibrium state. Furthermore, the chaotically changing spatial patterns via empirical observations can be defined and justified in view of symbolic dynamics. It is worth mentioning that the procedure proposed in this work is also applicable to other deterministic spatial evolutionary games therein.

Speed of evolution on graphs

The likelihood that a mutant fixates in the wild population, i.e., fixation probability, has been intensively studied in evolutionary game theory, where individuals' fitness is frequency dependent. However, it is of limited interest when it takes long to take over. Thus the speed of evolution becomes an important issue. In general, it is still unclear how fixation times are affected by the population structure, although the fixation times have already been addressed in the well-mixed populations. Here we theoretically address this issue by pair approximation and diffusion approximation on regular graphs. It is shown (i) that under neutral selection, both unconditional and conditional fixation time are shortened by increasing the number of neighbors; (ii) that under weak selection, for the simplified prisoner's dilemma game, if benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the degree of the graph, then the unconditional fixation time of a single cooperator is slower than that in the neutral case; and (iii) that under weak selection, for the conditional fixation time, limited neighbor size dilutes the counterintuitive stochastic slowdown which was found in well-mixed populations. Interestingly, we find that all of our results can be interpreted as that in the well-mixed population with a transformed payoff matrix. This interpretation is also valid for both death-birth and birth-death processes on graphs. This interpretation bridges the fixation time in the structured population and that in the well-mixed population. Thus it opens the avenue to investigate the challenging fixation time in structured populations by the known results in well-mixed populations.

Amplifiers of selection

When a new mutant arises in a population, there is a probability it outcompetes the residents and fixes. The structure of the population can affect this fixation probability. Suppressing population structures reduce the difference between two competing variants, while amplifying population structures enhance the difference. Suppressors are ubiquitous and easy to construct, but amplifiers for the large population limit are more elusive and only a few examples have been discovered. Whether or not a population structure is an amplifier of selection depends on the probability distribution for the placement of the invading mutant. First, we prove that there exist only bounded amplifiers for adversarial placement—that is, for arbitrary initial conditions. Next, we show that the Star population structure, which is known to amplify for mutants placed uniformly at random, does not amplify for mutants that arise through reproduction and are therefore placed proportional to the temperatures of the vertices. Finally, we construct population structures that amplify for all mutational events that arise through reproduction, uniformly at random, or through some combination of the two.

Fixation probabilities on superstars, revisited and revised

Population structures can be crucial determinants of evolutionary processes. For the Moran process on graphs certain structures suppress selective pressure, while others amplify it (Lieberman et al., 2005). Evolutionary amplifiers suppress random drift and enhance selection. Recently, some results for the most powerful known evolutionary amplifier, the superstar, have been invalidated by a counter example (Díaz et al., 2013). Here we correct the original proof and derive improved upper and lower bounds, which indicate that the fixation probability remains close to 1-1/(r(4)H) for population size N→∞ and structural parameter H⪢1. This correction resolves the differences between the two aforementioned papers. We also confirm that in the limit N,H→∞ superstars remain capable of eliminating random drift and hence of providing arbitrarily strong selective advantages to any beneficial mutation. In addition, we investigate the robustness of amplification in superstars and find that it appears to be a fragile phenomenon with respect to changes in the selection or mutation processes.

Heterogeneous Coupling between Interdependent Lattices Promotes the Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In the research realm of game theory, interdependent networks have extended the content of spatial reciprocity, which needs the suitable coupling between networks. However, thus far, the vast majority of existing works just assume that the coupling strength between networks is symmetric. This hypothesis, to some extent, seems inconsistent with the ubiquitous observation of heterogeneity. Here, we study how the heterogeneous coupling strength, which characterizes the interdependency of utility between corresponding players of both networks, affects the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with two types of coupling schemes (symmetric and asymmetric ones). Compared with the traditional case, we show that heterogeneous coupling greatly promotes the collective cooperation. The symmetric scheme seems much better than the asymmetric case. Moreover, the role of varying amplitude of coupling strength is also studied on these two interdependent ways. Current findings are helpful for us to understand the evolution of cooperation within many real-world systems, in particular for the interconnected and interrelated systems.

Evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration

Individual migration plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics of population on networks. In this paper, we generalize the networked ultimatum game by diluting population structures as well as endowing individuals with migration ability, and investigate evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration in the ultimatum game. We first revisit the impact of node degree on the evolution of fairness. Interestingly, numerical simulations reveal that there exists an optimal value of node degree resulting in the maximal offer level of populations. Then we explore the effects of dilution and migration on the evolution of fairness, and find that both the dilution of population structures and the endowment of migration ability to individuals would lead to the drop of offer level, while the rise of acceptance level of populations. Notably, natural selection even favors the evolution of self-incompatible strategies, when either vacancy rate or migration rate exceeds a critical threshold. To confirm our simulation results, we also propose an analytical method to study the evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration. This method can be applied to explore any games governed by pairwise interactions in finite populations.

The duality of spatial death-birth and birth-death processes and limitations of the isothermal theorem

Evolutionary models on graphs, as an extension of the Moran process, have two major implementations: birth-death (BD) models (or the invasion process) and death-birth (DB) models (or voter models). The isothermal theorem states that the fixation probability of mutants in a large group of graph structures (known as isothermal graphs, which include regular graphs) coincides with that for the mixed population. This result has been proved by Lieberman et al. (2005 Nature 433, 312-316. (doi:10.1038/nature03204)) in the case of BD processes, where mutants differ from the wild-types by their birth rate (and not by their death rate). In this paper, we discuss to what extent the isothermal theorem can be formulated for DB processes, proving that it only holds for mutants that differ from the wild-type by their death rate (and not by their birth rate). For more general BD and DB processes with arbitrary birth and death rates of mutants, we show that the fixation probabilities of mutants are different from those obtained in the mass-action populations. We focus on spatial lattices and show that the difference between BD and DB processes on one- and two-dimensional lattices is non-small even for large population sizes. We support these results with a generating function approach that can be generalized to arbitrary graph structures. Finally, we discuss several biological applications of the results.

Analytical description for the critical fixations of evolutionary coordination games on finite complex structured populations

Evolutionary game theory is crucial to capturing the characteristic interaction patterns among selfish individuals. In a population of coordination games of two strategies, one of the central problems is to determine the fixation probability that the system reaches a state of networkwide of only one strategy, and the corresponding expectation times. The deterministic replicator equations predict the critical value of initial density of one strategy, which separates the two absorbing states of the system. However, numerical estimations of this separatrix show large deviations from the theory in finite populations. Here we provide a stochastic treatment of this dynamic process on complex networks of finite sizes as Markov processes, showing the evolutionary time explicitly. We describe analytically the effects of network structures on the intermediate fixations as observed in numerical simulations. Our theoretical predictions are validated by various simulations on both random and scale free networks. Therefore, our stochastic framework can be helpful in dealing with other networked game dynamics.

Martingales and fixation probabilities of evolutionary graphs

Evolutionary graph theory is the study of birth–death processes that are constrained by population structure. A principal problem in evolutionary graph theory is to obtain the probability that some initial population of mutants will fixate on a graph, and to determine how that fixation probability depends on the structure of that graph. A fluctuating mutant population on a graph can be considered as a random walk. Martingales exploit symmetry in the steps of a random walk to yield exact analytical expressions for fixation probabilities. They do not require simplifying assumptions such as large population sizes or weak selection. In this paper, we show how martingales can be used to obtain fixation probabilities for symmetric evolutionary graphs. We obtain simpler expressions for the fixation probabilities of star graphs and complete bipartite graphs than have been previously reported and show that these graphs do not amplify selection for advantageous mutations under all conditions.

Spontaneous symmetry breaking in interdependent networked game

Spatial evolution game has traditionally assumed that players interact with direct neighbors on a single network, which is isolated and not influenced by other systems. However, this is not fully consistent with recent research identification that interactions between networks play a crucial rule for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. In this work, we introduce the simple game model into the interdependent networks composed of two networks. By means of imitation dynamics, we display that when the interdependent factor α is smaller than a threshold value α(C), the symmetry of cooperation can be guaranteed. Interestingly, as interdependent factor exceeds α(C), spontaneous symmetry breaking of fraction of cooperators presents itself between different networks. With respect to the breakage of symmetry, it is induced by asynchronous expansion between heterogeneous strategy couples of both networks, which further enriches the content of spatial reciprocity. Moreover, our results can be well predicted by the strategy-couple pair approximation method.

Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.

In evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations, selection intensity plays a key role in determining the impact of the game on reproductive success. Weak selection is often employed to obtain analytical results in evolutionary game theory. We investigate the validity of weak selection predictions for stronger intensities of selection. We prove that in general qualitative results obtained under weak selection fail to extend even to moderate selection strengths for games with either more than two strategies or more than two players. In particular, we find that even in pairwise interactions qualitative changes with changing selection intensity arise almost certainly in the case of a large number of strategies.

Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent collective behavior

Containing the spreading of crime is a major challenge for society. Yet, since thousands of years, no effective strategy has been found to overcome crime. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that crime is recurrent, a fact that is not captured well by rational choice theories of crime. According to these, strong enough punishment should prevent crime from happening. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between crime and punishment, we consider that the latter requires prior discovery of illicit behavior and study a spatial version of the inspection game. Simulations reveal the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between "criminals", "inspectors", and "ordinary people" as a consequence of spatial interactions. Such cycles dominate the evolutionary process, in particular when the temptation to commit crime or the cost of inspection are low or moderate. Yet, there are also critical parameter values beyond which cycles cease to exist and the population is dominated either by a stable mixture of criminals and inspectors or one of these two strategies alone. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions to different final states are possible, indicating that successful strategies to contain crime can be very much counter-intuitive and complex. Our results demonstrate that spatial interactions are crucial for the evolutionary outcome of the inspection game, and they also reveal why criminal behavior is likely to be recurrent rather than evolving towards an equilibrium with monotonous parameter dependencies.

Fixation probabilities for simple digraphs

The problem of finding birth–death fixation probabilities for configurations of normal and mutants on an N -vertex graph is formulated in terms of a Markov process on the 2 N -dimensional state space of possible configurations. Upper and lower bounds on the fixation probability after any given number of iterations of the birth–death process are derived in terms of the transition matrix of this process. Consideration is then specialized to a family of graphs called circular flows, and we present a summation formula for the complete bipartite graph, giving the fixation probability for an arbitrary configuration of mutants in terms of a weighted sum of the single-vertex fixation probabilities. This also yields a closed-form solution for the fixation probability of bipartite graphs. Three entropy measures are introduced, providing information about graph structure. Finally, a number of examples are presented, illustrating cases of graphs that enhance or suppress fixation probability for fitness r >1 as well as graphs that enhance fixation probability for only a limited range of fitness. Results are compared with recent results reported in the literature, where a positive correlation is observed between vertex degree variance and fixation probability for undirected graphs. We show a similar correlation for directed graphs, with correlation not directly to fixation probability but to the difference between fixation probability for a given graph and a complete graph.

The effect of population structure on the rate of evolution

Ecological factors exert a range of effects on the dynamics of the evolutionary process. A particularly marked effect comes from population structure, which can affect the probability that new mutations reach fixation. Our interest is in population structures, such as those depicted by 'star graphs', that amplify the effects of selection by further increasing the fixation probability of advantageous mutants and decreasing the fixation probability of disadvantageous mutants. The fact that star graphs increase the fixation probability of beneficial mutations has lead to the conclusion that evolution proceeds more rapidly in star-structured populations, compared with mixed (unstructured) populations. Here, we show that the effects of population structure on the rate of evolution are more complex and subtle than previously recognized and draw attention to the importance of fixation time. By comparing population structures that amplify selection with other population structures, both analytically and numerically, we show that evolution can slow down substantially even in populations where selection is amplified.

Consolidating birth-death and death-birth processes in structured populations

Network models extend evolutionary game theory to settings with spatial or social structure and have provided key insights on the mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation. However, network models have also proven sensitive to seemingly small details of the model architecture. Here we investigate two popular biologically motivated models of evolution in finite populations: Death-Birth (DB) and Birth-Death (BD) processes. In both cases reproduction is proportional to fitness and death is random; the only difference is the order of the two events at each time step. Although superficially similar, under DB cooperation may be favoured in structured populations, while under BD it never is. This is especially troubling as natural populations do not follow a strict one birth then one death regimen (or vice versa); such constraints are introduced to make models more tractable. Whether structure can promote the evolution of cooperation should not hinge on a simplifying assumption. Here, we propose a mixed rule where in each time step DB is used with probability and BD is used with probability . We derive the conditions for selection favouring cooperation under the mixed rule for all social dilemmas. We find that the only qualitatively different outcome occurs when using just BD (). This case admits a natural interpretation in terms of kin competition counterbalancing the effect of kin selection. Finally we show that, for any mixed BD-DB update and under weak selection, cooperation is never inhibited by population structure for any social dilemma, including the Snowdrift Game.

Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games

By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.

Cooperation, structure, and hierarchy in multiadaptive games

Game-theoretical models where the rules of the game and the interaction structure both coevolve with the game dynamics--multiadaptive games--capture very flexible situations where cooperation among selfish agents can emerge. In this work, we will discuss a multiadaptive model presented in a recent Letter [Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 028702 (2011)] as well as generalizations of it. The model captures a nonequilibrium situation where social unrest increases the incentive to cooperate and, simultaneously, agents are partly free to influence with whom they interact. First, we investigate the details of how feedback from the behavior of agents determines the emergence of cooperation and hierarchical contact structures. We also study the stability of the system to different types of noise, and find that different regions of parameter space show very different response. Some types of noise can destroy an all-cooperator (C) state. If, on the other hand, hubs are stable, then so is the all-C state. Finally, we investigate the dependence of the ratio between the time scales of strategy updates and the evolution of the interaction structure. We find that a comparatively fast strategy dynamics is a prerequisite for the emergence of cooperation.

Inertia in strategy switching transforms the strategy evolution

A recent experimental study [Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962 (2010)] shows that human strategy updating involves both direct payoff comparison and the cost of switching strategy, which is equivalent to inertia. However, it remains largely unclear how such a predisposed inertia affects 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population of finite size. To address this issue, the "inertia bonus" (strategy switching cost) is added to the learner payoff in the Fermi process. We find how inertia quantitatively shapes the stationary distribution and that stochastic stability under inertia exhibits three regimes, with each covering seven regions in the plane spanned by two inertia parameters. We also obtain the extended "1/3" rule with inertia and the speed criterion with inertia; these two findings hold for a population above two. We illustrate the above results in the framework of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. As inertia varies, two intriguing stationary distributions emerge: the probability of coexistence state is maximized, or those of two full states are simultaneously peaked. Our results may provide useful insights into how the inertia of changing status quo acts on the strategy evolution and, in particular, the evolution of cooperation.

Learning dynamics in public goods games

We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multiplayer games and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit and present an analytical computation of spectral properties of fluctuations in multiplayer public goods games. This extends existing work on two-player games. In particular we show that coherent cycles may emerge driven by noise in the adaptation dynamics. These phenomena are not too dissimilar from cyclic strategy switching observed in experiments of behavioral game theory.

Emergent hierarchical structures in multiadaptive games

We investigate a game-theoretic model of a social system where both the rules of the game and the interaction structure are shaped by the behavior of the agents. We call this type of model, with several types of feedback couplings from the behavior of the agents to their environment, a multiadaptive game. Our model has a complex behavior with several regimes of different dynamic behavior accompanied by different network topological properties. Some of these regimes are characterized by heterogeneous, hierarchical interaction networks, where cooperation and network topology coemerge from the dynamics.

Early appraisal of the fixation probability in directed networks

In evolutionary dynamics, the probability that a mutation spreads through the whole population, having arisen from a single individual, is known as the fixation probability. In general, it is not possible to find the fixation probability analytically given the mutant's fitness and the topological constraints that govern the spread of the mutation, so one resorts to simulations instead. Depending on the topology in use, a great number of evolutionary steps may be needed in each of the simulation events, particularly in those that end with the population containing mutants only. We introduce two techniques to accelerate the determination of the fixation probability. The first one skips all evolutionary steps in which the number of mutants does not change and thereby reduces the number of steps per simulation event considerably. This technique is computationally advantageous for some of the so-called layered networks. The second technique, which is not restricted to layered networks, consists of aborting any simulation event in which the number of mutants has grown beyond a certain threshold value and counting that event as having led to a total spread of the mutation. For advantageous mutations in large populations and regardless of the network's topology, we demonstrate, both analytically and by means of simulations, that using a threshold of about [N/(r-1)](1/4) mutants, where N is the number of simulation events and r is the ratio of the mutants' fitness to that of the remainder of the population, leads to an estimate of the fixation probability that deviates in no significant way from that obtained from the full-fledged simulations. We have observed speedups of two orders of magnitude for layered networks with 10,000 nodes.

Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

We have studied the impact of time-dependent learning capacities of players in the framework of spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In our model, this capacity of players may decrease or increase in time after strategy adoption according to a steplike function. We investigated both possibilities separately and observed significantly different mechanisms that form the stationary pattern of the system. The time decreasing learning activity helps cooperator domains to recover the possible intrude of defectors hence supports cooperation. In the other case the temporary restrained learning activity generates a cyclic dominance between defector and cooperator strategies, which helps to maintain the diversity of strategies via propagating waves. The results are robust and remain valid by changing payoff values, interaction graphs or functions characterizing time dependence of learning activity. Our observations suggest that dynamically generated mechanisms may offer alternative ways to keep cooperators alive even at very larger temptation to defect.

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.

Coevolutionary games--a mini review

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.

Strategy selection in structured populations

Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd). We study a mutation and selection process. For weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if sigma a+b>c+sigma d. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, sigma. We present the values of sigma for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs, games in phenotype space and games on sets. We give a proof for the existence of such a sigma, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between sigma and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, sigma, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.