Evolutionary game analysis of factors influencing green innovation in Enterprises under environmental governance constraints

The key to controlling environmental pollution is to promote green innovation in relevant enterprises and achieve a healthy development of the environmental governance system. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental protection enterprises, polluting enterprises, and governments, and conducts in-depth research on the influencing factors that promote green innovation in two types of enterprises. MATLAB software is used to analyze the impact of different degrees of influencing variables on system evolution. It has found that (1) increasing the intensity of environmental governance and the level of innovation subsidies by the government can effectively promote green innovation in both types of enterprises. (2) The varying degrees of innovation compensation from polluting enterprises to environmental protection enterprises have a significant impact on system evolution. (3) The initial intention and population size of two types of enterprise entities will have a significant impact on system evolution. In the initial state, subjects with more green innovation are less willing to change their strategies during the evolution process, while the willingness of the other party to green innovation will be suppressed.

Can government subsidies promote the construction of "Blue Basic Farmland"? Analysis of multi-subject management model in mariculture areas

The implementation of the "Blue Basic Farmland" system for farming ocean is a crucial strategy to ensure food security. This study simulates and analyzes the impact of government fishery subsidies on promoting "Blue Basic Farmland" construction. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, fishermen and fishery enterprises was used". Subsequently, the fishery subsidy strategy of "Blue Basic Farmland" construction was simulated and analyzed. The following findings are derived. First, fishery subsidies contributed to "Blue Basic Farmland" construction by promoting the participation of fishing enterprises and supporting fishermen. Second, the amounts of fishery subsidies were not the high the better, and different amounts of fishery subsidies had varying effects. Third, subsidizing fishery enterprises was more effective in promoting the construction of "Blue Basic Farmland" compared to subsidizing fishermen. In light of these findings, we proposed the following policy recommendations. The government ought to establish subsidies specifically tailored for "Blue Basic Farmland" construction, while also judiciously controlling the subsidies amounts. Moreover, the focus of these subsidies should be directed towards supporting fishery enterprises.

Study on the evolution of collaborative innovation in marine economy considering the participation of financial institutions and two types of cooperation

In the realm of significant technological research and innovation within the marine economy, enterprises and academic research institutions often grapple with a lack of innovation motivation due to financial constraints. This paper introduces the factor of "capital constraints" into the marine innovation chain, establishing a technological innovation chain within the marine economy. Utilizing a three-party evolutionary game model, the study delves into the strategy selection and evolution of financial institutions, marine enterprises, and academic research institutions. In contrast to previous studies, this paper categorizes technological innovation cooperation into two types: "cooperative tackling type" and "market-oriented promotion type." Additionally, it posits that collaboration between academic research institutions and marine enterprises establishes an implicit guarantee relationship, facilitating access to higher loan amounts for both parties. The research reveals that the behavior of governments and marine enterprises is influenced by the initial willingness of participants. Higher basic benefits of cooperation and innovation between academic research institutions and marine enterprises lead to a quicker attainment of an evolutionary stable state. Moreover, in collaborations between marine enterprises and research institutions, an excessively high proportion of funds occupied by marine enterprises proves disadvantageous. The paper suggests that pure market-oriented promotion innovation cooperation could serve as a supplementary approach to traditional cooperation and innovation. Finally, numerical examples are presented to elucidate the outcomes of the theoretical model, accompanied by policy suggestions.

Game analysis of enterprise data sharing from a supply chain perspective

[Research Purpose] In the era of the digital economy, there is an urgent need to explore solutions to various problems faced by enterprises in their digital transformation, such as the lack of data resources, data silos, and information asymmetry within supply chains. [Method/Contribution] Leveraging evolutionary game theory and adopting a supply chain perspective, this study integrates the government and upstream/downstream enterprises into a unified analysis framework. In this study, a three-party evolutionary game model under government coordination aimed at fostering data openness and sharing among supply chain enterprises is constructed. Simulation analyses are conducted on decision-making strategies concerning data sharing between the government and supply chain enterprises across different scenarios. [Research Conclusion] It is observed that the high level of benefits and low costs associated with data sharing incentivize supply chain enterprises to actively open and share their data. Notably, government incentives significantly encourage data openness among these enterprises by subsidizing the cost of data sharing, "especially evident when the incentive coefficient exceeds 0.6," thereby guiding them toward collaborative data-sharing initiatives. Finally, it is also found that data sharing further promotes the digital transformation of the supply chain, optimizing decision-making processes, resource allocation, and operational efficiency. Through data sharing, better forecasting, inventory management, and risk mitigation strategies can be implemented. Moreover, data sharing fosters collaboration among supply chain partners enhances transparency and trust, and makes the supply chain more synchronized and responsive, which leads to value cocreation within the supply chain, with downstream enterprises being more incentivized than upstream enterprises by this value cocreation.

Research on safety risk control of prepared foods from the perspective of supply chain

Prepared foods bring great convenience to people's lives, but they also entail safety risks in all aspects, from production to sales. The cooperation of the supply chain and the supervision of the government are key to promoting the safety management of prepared foods. This paper considers the government's regulation, focuses on the interaction relationship between the producer and the retailer of prepared foods, and builds an evolutionary game model to analyze the influence of collaborative decision-making between prepared food producers and retailers in preventing and controlling food safety risks under the government's regulatory strategy. The research finds that: (1) Under certain conditions, there are three stable equilibrium strategies within the prepared foods supply chain: bilateral low-safety inputs, unilateral high-safety inputs, and bilateral high-safety inputs. (2) Government regulators can influence the safety input behaviors of prepared food supply chain enterprises by adjusting investigation probabilities and punishment severity. (3) The safety input behaviors of these enterprises are influenced by various factors, including costs, revenues, brand image, reputation, and the consequences associated with contractual violations. This paper represents the first systematic analysis of prepared food safety from a supply chain perspective. It fills a gap in the existing literature in this area, offering guidance and suggestions for prepared food supply chain enterprises, as well as references and recommendations for government regulators.

Dynamic simulation for reclaimed water reuse under multi-intervention policies in China

Unconventional water constitutes the fundamental approach to addressing global water scarcity and achieving the sustainable circulation of water resources. Due to the significant environmental advantages and economical production costs, reclaimed water has emerged as a preeminent unconventional source. However, the use in China confronts the predicament of oversupply relative to demand, requiring policy measures to overcome this challenge. Limited research exists on the combined impact of subsidies and water quality information disclosure supervision on reclaimed water utilization, potentially underestimating the practical incentivizing role of water quality information disclosure. Therefore, based on the framework of 'external environment-perceived value-utilization intention,' a multi-agent-based simulation model driven by evolutionary game theory is constructed, from micro to macro perspective, to investigate the composite effects of subsidies and water quality information disclosure supervision on public intentions for reclaimed water utilization and the evolutionary track of public decision-making. The results showed that (1) The influence of subsidies on the public's inclination toward reclaimed water has regional heterogeneity. In regions with average economic development, the subsidy policy shows an inverted U-shaped correlation with the public's intention to reclaimed water, indicating the presence of an optimal value for maximizing the promotional effect of subsidies. Conversely, the effect is less discernible in regions with higher economic development. (2) In regions with average economic development, supervision of information disclosure behavior can avert the diminishing incentivizing effects under radical subsidies, but the assistance of various supervision intensities is different. (3) In regions with higher economic development, the incentive effect of subsidies can be positively modulated by the supervision policy. Interactions between subsidy and supervision policies evoke diverse chain reactions under varying intensities in these regions, and the combination of moderate subsidies and high supervision emerges as the most optimal strategy to advance reclaimed water development.

An approach to complex transboundary water management in Central Asia: Evolutionary cooperation in transboundary basins under the water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus

Water-related issues in transboundary basins are generally complicated by the challenges of climate change, the historical evolution of the basin characteristics, and the different interests of the riparian countries. Therefore, dealing with water-sharing and water cooperation problems among basin countries needs to be based on multi-factor system analysis in the context of regional water, energy, food (land) resources, and ecosystems. In the present study, the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia, where transboundary water problems are extremely prominent and complex, was selected as the research area. Firstly, the characteristics of the water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus of the Aral Sea basin are analyzed. Then, based on the game theory, a multi-objective game model is constructed, and the multi-objective evolutionary game process and evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of both the upstream and downstream countries are explored. Finally, the evolutionary stable strategy under the intervention of the basin commission is simulated. The results show that there are obvious reciprocal feedbacks among water, land, energy, and ecosystem in the Aral Sea basin, and the uneven distribution of natural resources, fragile ecosystems, and conflicting demands of multiple actors lead to the unstable evolution of the nexus. Driven by the maximization of upstream and downstream countries' respective interests, the optimal stabilization strategy of the system cannot be realized. Whereas, the introduction of the basin commission intervention and its restraint mechanism is conducive to promoting cooperation and maximizing the overall benefits of the basin. The incentives and penalties of the basin commission have significant effects on whether the system can reach Pareto optimality, and higher incentive coefficient and penalty coefficient help the system converge to the ideal state more quickly. The evolution of the water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus based on the perspective of the whole basin can provide theoretical support for dealing with the transboundary water conflicts, and the cooperation strategy aiming at maximizing the overall benefits of the basin can provide decision-making basis for promoting transboundary water cooperation and synergistic development of the water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus.

Effectively solve the obstacle in the old residential building energy-saving renovation from the perspective of a four-party evolutionary game

Although the government highly focuses on old residential building energy-saving renovation (ORBESR), many hinders still exist and the efficiency of it is still low. This paper proposes a four-party evolutionary game model to study the impact of relative stakeholders' choices, involving developers, residents, neighborhood councils, and governments. Using this model, this paper studies what influences the conflicts between developers and residents take on the efficiency of ORBESR. In addition, what influence the residents, neighborhood councils, and developers' strategies will take on the ORBESR under the condition of evolutionary stability strategy. This paper finally concludes that governments could propose high penalties first to accelerate the stability of the system, then suitable subsidies to relieve the financial burden and to achieve high efficiency. The governments could provide a suitable plan for residents' investment to promote residents' participation. The neighborhood councils arouse the ways and facilities to help residents understand and participate in the ORBESR and try to solve the conflicts between developers and residents can improve the residents' participation and the developers' willingness to implement the ORBESR.

Influencing factors of environmental efficiency of strategic emerging industries and their power cooperation mechanism design

We investigate the influencing factors of environmental efficiency of strategic emerging industries (SEIs) and cooperative game mechanism design amongst diversified actors by using China's provincial panel data from 2004 to 2019. Firstly, we find that the following factors improve the environmental efficiency of SEIs: rationalisation of the industrial structure, proportion of the tertiary industry, government's ability to intervene in the economy and fairness and integrity of environmental law enforcement. Conversely, factors, such as intensity of ecological construction and environmental regulation, hamper the environmental efficiency of SEIs. Secondly, evolutionary game analysis indicates that the behavioural strategies of game decision-making subjects depend on the behavioural decisions of the relative actors, social supervision and government regulation, which work together in influencing the environmental efficiency of SEIs. {innovation, supervision} is the optimal equilibrium state of the game. Thirdly, simulation results show that in the absence of government regulation, foreign direct investment (FDI) slows down the speed of firms tending to the equilibrium state of green innovation. The potential gain and loss of social supervision on corporate behaviour is an important factor affecting government behaviour decision making. Governments prefer punishment tools in environmental regulation, therefore influencing noninnovative firms in SEIs. We contribute to prior works by unifying various policy tools into the same econometric model framework based on an evolutionary game model.

Steady-state analysis of social responsibility strategy of coal power enterprises from the perspective of game theory

Under the dual-carbon background, coal power enterprises are required to actively fulfill their social responsibility in order to achieve energy saving and emission reduction as soon as possible. Considering the uncertainty of the external environment and the potential conflict of interest of the key stakeholders in the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility, coal power enterprises are not always positive in fulfilling their social responsibility. This paper combines prospect theory and mental account theory with evolutionary game to construct an evolutionary game model involving coal power enterprises, government regulators and the public to study the social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises. The results of the study show that: (1) The social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises under the dual-carbon background is a typical cost-driven behavior, and coal power enterprises are more sensitive to costs compared to benefits. (2) The formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators largely depends on the decision inertia of coal power enterprises, and the formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators will also affect the decision inertia of coal power enterprises. (3) The public's strategic choices do not entirely depend on the strategic choices of coal and power enterprises and government regulators, and are more closely related to the setting of the reference point. (4) In addition to the realistic factors, the subjective factors of decision makers are also important factors affecting the fulfillment of social responsibility of coal and power enterprises. Based on the results of the study, this paper proposes countermeasures to enhance the internal driving force of coal power enterprises to fulfill their social responsibility behaviors from the aspects of establishing a communication mechanism, improving the reward and punishment system, and strengthening risk management.

Challenging the nexus of power: The gaming dilemma of collaboration between government and enterprises in environmental management

This study presents a novel approach to analysing environmental governance by Chinese governments through the lens of a tripartite evolutionary game model. The key novelty of our research lies in the explicit incorporation of a reputation mechanism into the evolutionary game analysis, which significantly influences government decision-making, environmental governance strategies, and the dynamics of the relationship between government and polluting enterprises. By assessing the marginal effects of conventional governance and mobilization-based governance on the environmental mechanism, as well as the collusion behaviours between government and polluting enterprises, our study sheds light on previously unexplored aspects of environmental governance. Our findings indicate that the reputation mechanism plays a crucial role within the evolutionary game system of environmental governance, exerting a substantial impact on government decision-making. Furthermore, we demonstrate that policy interventions, such as increasing the cost of penalties under regulatory policies, can encourage compliance strategies among enterprises. Additionally, our research highlights the high sensitivity of reputation signals towards local government's environmental governance strategies, directly impacting their credibility and influencing the adoption of proactive environmental governance strategies. Moreover, we emphasize the role of the central environmental inspection system as a means to facilitate the transmission of environmental governance pressures between central and local governments, ultimately fostering a green development concept and promoting coordinated development between the economy and ecological civilization. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the intricacies of environmental governance in China and underscores the importance of reputation mechanisms and policy interventions in promoting sustainable development.

Vertical decentralization, environmental regulation, and enterprise pollution: An evolutionary game analysis

Achieving sustainable economic development and mitigating climate change require effective green transformation management. This study builds an evolutionary game model for industrial enterprises, local governments, and the central government, analyzing the dynamic interactions among vertical decentralization, environmental regulation, and enterprise pollution. Our research reveals that increasing environmental taxes can incentivize industrial enterprises to adopt green transformation practices and promote governments at all administrative levels to supervise and enforce environmental regulations. Moreover, in the context of vertical decentralization, financial incentives provided by the central government to local governments become critical drivers for promoting green transformation. Furthermore, the additional social benefits resulting from local government supervision and governance are key factors in green transformation management, while the negative social effects of industrial enterprises not rectifying their actions are noteworthy. Our study emphasizes the need for an integrated framework incorporating these critical elements for successful green transition management. The findings of this research provide valuable insights for developing nations seeking to enhance their governance capacity throughout the green transformation process.

Does incentive-based green governance compensate for green innovation in enterprises? The role of green orientation

Government-led green governance, as a crucial tool for achieving green and sustainable development, has garnered significant attention among researchers worldwide. Nevertheless, research on incentive-based green governance and green orientation remains insufficient. This study adopts an evolutionary game theory framework to elucidate the mechanisms underlying incentive-based green governance and green orientation in facilitating green innovation. The effectiveness of this framework is then verified through the utilization of propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences (DID) methods using data from Chinese companies. The main findings include the following: (1) Government incentive-based green governance exhibits a compensatory effect on green innovation, which is validated through robustness testing. (2) Internal green orientation serves as an intermediary factor between incentive-based green governance and green innovation, while external green orientation exerts a positive regulatory effect. (3) Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the impact of incentive-based green governance on green innovation is more pronounced in non-high-pollution industries, high-tech corporations, and companies operating in areas with lower governance intensity. This study is conducive to illustrate the compensatory effect of government incentive-based green governance on green innovation and also provides reference for the government to issue targeted green governance policies.

How to systematically reduce the carbon emissions of the manufacturing industry? Evidence from four-party evolutionary game analysis

To effectively reduce carbon emissions from the manufacturing industry and promote green and sustainable developments evolutionary game theory is widely used. This study has constructed a four-party evolutionary game model, in which the government, civil environmental protection organisations, manufacturing enterprises, and consumers participate. A local robustness analysis and numerical simulation were used to assess the stability conditions under which the strategic behaviour of the four parties reaches an ideal state, and the influence of government parameter changes on the game system were further analysed. The results show that when the government's penalty is greater, the decision-making time of civil environmental protection organisations and manufacturing enterprises is shortened to varying degrees. When the subsidy coefficient provided by the government increases, civil environmental protection organisations, manufacturing enterprises, and consumers can reduce the time required for the system to stabilise to varying degrees. As the subsidy coefficient increases, the government's strategic choice evolves and strict regulations are loosened. The government should thus actively establish a reward and penalty mechanism, according to its own actual situation, set reasonable punishment and subsidy coefficients, and actively guide the subjective initiative of civil environmental protection organisations to reduce carbon emissions in the manufacturing industry.

An evolutionary game-based simulation study of a multi-agent governance system for smart senior care services in China

BACKGROUND

The competing interests of the government, smart senior care technology service providers, and older adults have led to a serious fragmentation of governance in China. This study aims to identify the collaboration mechanisms and evolutionary stabilization strategies for these agents.

METHODS

An evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the strategic decisions made by the government, smart senior care technology service providers, and older adults. A sensitivity analysis is conducted using data from Anhui Province, China, to verify the effects of relevant parameters on the strategy decisions of each agent.

RESULTS

The results of the simulation and sensitivity analysis indicated that, first, despite changes in the initial willingness values of the tripartite agents, the system eventually converges on 1. Second, the collaboration mechanism of the tripartite agents in the smart senior care system is related to government incentives, penalties, and subsidies, smart senior care service costs, and the additional benefits provided to smart senior care technology service providers.

CONCLUSION

The strategy decisions of the government, providers, and older adults interact with each other. To promote collaboration among the tripartite agents and improve governance effectiveness, the government should strengthen the regulations for providers, increase penalties for providers that engage in a breach of trust, provide moderate incentives and subsidies, and control smart senior care service costs.

Evolutionary game analysis of forestry carbon sink trading model under blockchain technology

As a new balanced economy, the green economy guides the upgrade and transformation of industrial structures based on the original concept of sustainable development. Reducing carbon emissions is indispensable for achieving better and faster green economic development. From a functional perspective, forestry carbon sinks have good carbon sequestration potential and have positive attributes, such as climate regulation and biodiversity maintenance, for the entire ecosystem. To promote the continuous development of forestry carbon sink trading in China, blockchain, a new technology with several advantages such as traceability, supervision, and tamper-proofness, has emerged, which creates a good market trading environment and has made a breakthrough in the trading mode. If forestry carbon sink trading is effectively supported, organic combinations and simultaneous synergistic development can be conducted, which will open new avenues for the carbon sink economy. In this study, a game model of the forest carbon sink trading mode under blockchain technology was constructed from the perspective of traders, and influential factors, such as the carbon sink available for sale by the supply side and the demand side's perspective towards emission reduction, were considered. Subsequently, the MATLAB R2020b software was used to conduct a simulation analysis of the transactions, thereby showing the evolutionary path of the game between the two sides and the influence mechanism of the addition of blockchain technology on the evolution trajectory of the demand-side decision. The findings indicate that, from the perspective of participating traders, the inclusion of blockchain technology in forestry carbon sink trading resulted in positive effects. Moreover, the greater the probability that the carbon sinks available for sale in the market can meet the demand, the more likely the demand side is to participate in the transaction.

Impact of carbon border adjustment mechanism on China's manufacturing sector: A dynamic recursive CGE model based on an evolutionary game

As the global carbon emission problem is getting more and more serious, the European Union has proposed the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to prevent carbon leakage, which will have an impact on China's foreign trade. Based on this background and the problems of current research that ignores factors such as commodity prices, long-term impacts, intertemporal substitution analysis, and changes in national strategies for foreign exports, this paper propose a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model based on an evolutionary game as a dynamic recursive basis to study the impact of the CBAM on the Chinese manufacturing industry. For the industries mentioned in the CBAM, 18 affected sectors are collated, and a CGE model containing multiple blocks such as production, trade, and carbon emissions is built. Meanwhile, we establish an evolutionary game model with EU suppliers, manufacturers, and the government, allowing Chinese suppliers to compete with EU suppliers. Based on the above model, the impact of carbon tariff policies from 2020 to 2050 is studied. The results indicate that under the intra-EU competition condition, carbon tariffs will reduce the price of Chinese exports and slightly decrease China's real GDP, as well as the carbon emission intensity of 18 sectors and fossil energy. However, the impact of carbon tariffs on overall carbon emissions is small and is essentially a protective policy. In addition, the evolutionary game-based CGE model takes into account the dynamic strategies of both sides and is therefore less affected by carbon tariff shocks and recovers more quickly and more realistically. Finally, the article argues that the advantage of carbon tariffs for local suppliers is unsustainable and Chinese suppliers will still dominate, and local suppliers need more subsidies from the EU government. On the other hand, the Chinese government needs to implement a stricter carbon tax regime and export subsidies to improve the competitiveness of Chinese products in terms of green levels and price advantages. The purpose of this paper is to examine the quantitative impacts of CBAM on China's related manufacturing industries and strategies to maximize the benefits to both governments.

A tripartite game analysis of industrial structure upgrading and green development of regional economy: A case study of Shanxi Province, China

In the contemporary context, both the upgrading of the industrial structure and the implementation of environmentally sustainable practices within the regional economy have emerged as central avenues for achieving quality development. This study examines the strategic behavior of local governments, capital, and people through the construction of a tripartite evolutionary game model. Subsequently, six different evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) are subjected to a comprehensive analysis. Finally, the parameters influencing the strategic decisions of each party are meticulously examined through simulation. The results of this study can be summarized as follows: First, it is shown that under appropriate conditions, all three entities support the scenario of stable development prospects associated with industrial structure upgrading (1, 1, 1). Second, the strategic choices made by capital and people depend on several factors, including existing profits, future benefits, and the costs associated with transformation. At the same time, local governments show a propensity to adopt incentive strategies. Ultimately, the research underscores the pronounced impact of future benefits, transformation costs, and the probability of success in industrial upgrading on all stakeholders, shaping their evolutionary trajectories and results. In particular, the probability of successful industrial structure upgrading exerts the greatest influence on evolutionary trajectories, while the possibility of government imposing carbon taxes and initial willingness primarily determine the evolutionary trajectory. This paper attempts to provide a new perspective on industrial structure upgrading and green development of the regional economy by combining evolutionary game theory and scenario analysis methods to promote the process of industrial structure upgrading and sustainable development.

Food manufacturer willingness to employ blockchain technology system under the social Co-governance framework: China's situation

The blockchain technology system has gradually come to be employed in the food supply chain system, and it has emerged that the system offers the unique function of effectively curbing counterfeiting by food manufacturers. Unlike previous research on adoption by enterprises of new technology, this paper probes into the specific evolutionary routes of game subjects from the perspective of the precondition for enterprises' willingness to employ blockchain technology on the basis of China's social co-governance framework and by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model of food manufacturer, government and consumer. The study then tests and verifies the stability conditions of equilibrium points and the relationship between these equilibrium points and the social co-governance level through numerical simulation analysis. On the above basis, the expected market proceeds of food producers employing blockchain technology and the influence of government and consumer behavior on enterprises' selection of a behavior strategy and the level of social co-governance are analyzed. The results show that every subject selects their own behavior strategy on the basis of the balance of their respective interests, and the final stability condition of the system is independent of their initial intentions. Rather, the expected sales volume of foods employing blockchain technology, governmental behavior (e.g., supervision, casual inspection, economic punishment, and fiscal subsidies), and complaints made by consumers constitute the main factors that influence food enterprises' selection of a behavior strategy. The level of social co-governance and the behavior of both government and consumers will ultimately be accomplished by influencing enterprises' expected economic returns, and the selection of an enterprise behavior strategy internally depends on the expected economic returns from producing foods employing blockchain technology. Therefore, this paper makes relevant proposals in an attempt to assist the Chinese government to better promote and popularize the blockchain technology system among food manufacturing enterprises.

Towards a green mining future: A dynamic evolutionary game model for collaborative waste recycling

In the realm of environmental concerns, the management of mining waste has consistently emerged as a prominent issue. The accumulation of such waste not only results in substantial pollution but also signifies an inefficient use of resources. Rich in heavy metals and an array of toxic substances, mining waste poses a considerable challenge. In China, the situation is exacerbated by mining companies' inadequate and untimely efforts to address the extensive buildup of waste material. The long-term policy of recycling and regulating mining waste can be seen as the result of a long-term game between the government's regulatory decisions and the enterprises' fulfillment of their responsibilities, and the public's ability to participate in monitoring the decisions also changes the pattern of the game. In this study, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model involving mining enterprises, the public, and local government. System dynamics are used to simulate the dynamic evolution of each stakeholder's strategy, examining the influence of various parameters on the evolution trajectory. Our findings show that: (1) reducing public subsidies, along with increasing enterprise supervision and penalties, effectively encourages public involvement in oversight and promotes proactive waste recycling by enterprises; (2) as enterprises actively engage in recycling efforts, the resulting environmental benefits boost public enthusiasm for participation in monitoring; (3) over time, heightened environmental awareness among the public and advances in recycling technology allow enterprises to improve the profitability of recycling, fostering a sustainable mine waste recycling industry; (4) once a virtuous mine waste recycling industry is established, enterprises autonomously engage in waste recycling, and the public actively participates in supervision, making strict government oversight unnecessary.

How to promote the adoption of intelligent spray technology in farmers' cooperatives? --Based on the perspective of evolutionary game

In order to accelerate the development of smart agriculture and realize the green transformation of agriculture, the coupling of prospect theory and evolutionary game theory is introduced. Construct a two-party evolutionary game model for the adoption of intelligent spray technology in farmers' cooperatives, analyze the evolution of farmers' cooperatives and government strategy selection and its influencing factors according to the replication dynamic equation, and conduct numerical simulation experiments through Matlab software. The results show that the adoption of intelligent spray technology by farmers' cooperatives and the government's choice of subsidies are the two optimal stable states of the evolutionary system. The government's subsidy policy can effectively stimulate farmers' cooperatives to adopt intelligent spray technology, but when the government subsidy coefficient is greater than or equal to 70%, the decision-making evolution of the government and farmers' cooperatives is unstable. The increase in farmers' awareness of pesticide hazards, the scale of operation of farmers' cooperatives, the price of high-quality agricultural products, and the sensitivity of farmers' cooperatives to profits and losses contribute to the promotion of intelligent spray technology, and the damage probability of intelligent spray technology has a restraining effect.

Research on immature wheat harvesting behavior of farmers from the perspective of food security: An evolutionary game based analysis

Food security constitutes a foundational cornerstone for social stability, with the achievement of sustainable agricultural production serving as a vital step towards this objective. Currently, the untimely harvesting of unripe wheat by farmers has led to a decline in food production, thereby posing a significant threat to the sustainability of China's food system and exacerbating food insecurity. Although the Chinese government has implemented various measures in response, their effectiveness has been limited. Limited scholarly literature exists on this particular issue. To advance food security in China, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving farmers, the government, and breeding enterprises. Adopting a systemic perspective, this study examines the interactions and impact mechanisms among these key actors during the wheat harvesting process. The findings indicate that the government should prioritize policies that enforce penalties. By implementing penalties within a reasonable range, the government can mitigate farmers' production costs and enhance the market price of grain. This approach discourages farmers from harvesting immature wheat and contributes to enhancing food security. Based on the research findings, this paper provides practical recommendations to guide the government in addressing food security governance issues.

Perturbation theory for evolution of cooperation on networks

Network structure is a mechanism for promoting cooperation in social dilemma games. In the present study, we explore graph surgery, i.e., to slightly perturb the given network, towards a network that better fosters cooperation. To this end, we develop a perturbation theory to assess the change in the propensity of cooperation when we add or remove a single edge to/from the given network. Our perturbation theory is for a previously proposed random-walk-based theory that provides the threshold benefit-to-cost ratio, [Formula: see text], which is the value of the benefit-to-cost ratio in the donation game above which the cooperator is more likely to fixate than in a control case, for any finite networks. We find that [Formula: see text] decreases when we remove a single edge in a majority of cases and that our perturbation theory captures at a reasonable accuracy which edge removal makes [Formula: see text] small to facilitate cooperation. In contrast, [Formula: see text] tends to increase when we add an edge, and the perturbation theory is not good at predicting the edge addition that changes [Formula: see text] by a large amount. Our perturbation theory significantly reduces the computational complexity for calculating the outcome of graph surgery.

Evolutionary game study of crowdsourcing open innovation synergy mechanism

Open innovation crowdsourcing can help enterprises meet the challenges of a rapidly changing environment and improve their innovation performance. This study introduces network externalities as influencing factors of the crowdsourcing open innovation synergy mechanism. This study constructed the game payment matrix of the crowdsourcing open innovation synergy mechanism, and the evolutionary game method obtained the equilibrium solution of the crowdsourcing open innovation synergy mechanism. The impact of changes in the main influencing factors on the issuers' and receivers' willingness to collaborate and innovate was explored through numerical and case studies. The study shows that the higher the synergy benefit and its allocation coefficient need to be within a reasonable range for the willingness to collaborate and innovate to increase; the lower the original cost of both parties, and the higher the cost reduction coefficient under the policy support of the crowdsourcing platform, the higher the willingness to collaborate and innovate; the higher the network externality and the lower the penalty for breach of contract, the higher the desire to collaborate and innovate. The study recommends strengthening non-school education to guide innovation for all, and refining relevant policies to tailor innovation to local conditions. This study provides a new perspective and theoretical guidance for enterprises to build a crowdsourcing open innovation synergy mechanism and is a valuable reference for open innovation management.

Assessing the effectiveness of intervention policies for reclaimed water reuse in China considering multi-scenario simulations

The reclaimed water is an effective tool for water environmental management. And in China, government intervention is regarded as a powerful instrument to realize its large-scale utilization due to the public welfare and social characteristics. Therefore, the tripartite evolutionary game and multi-agent simulation system were combined to explore how intervention policies, such as price subsidies and regulation of water information disclosure, can influence the behaviors of stakeholders involved in the reclaimed water market, so as to alleviate water environment crisis. The results showed that: (1) The incentive of price subsidy shows noticeable regional differences due to different initial reclaimed water utilization rates, and the policy effect on regions with medium level utilization (25%-40%) > regions with high utilization (higher than 40%) > regions with low utilization (lower than 25%); (2) enhancing water information supervision can positively regulate the stimulation of subsidy policy in regions with low wastewater reuse; (3) the intensity of price subsidies has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the market stability in regions with high wastewater reuse; (4) diverse regulatory models on water information disclosure show various chain effects on improving wastewater reuse.

Evolutionary game model based on cumulative prospect theory for information management mechanism in SIoT

As nodes in Social Internet of Things (SIoT) become more intelligent, malicious information occurs more frequently and spreads more widely. This problem can severely affect the trustworthiness of services and applications in SIoT. Methods to effectively control malicious information spreading in SIoT are essential and necessary. Reputation mechanism provides a powerful tool to tackle this challenge. In this paper, we propose a reputation-based mechanism to activate the self-purification capacity of the SIoT network by balancing information conflicts triggered by reporters and supporters. In order to find the best rewarding and punishment strategy, a bilateral cumulative-prospect-based evolutionary game model of SIoT network information conflict is constructed. Using local stability analysis and numerical simulation, the evolutionary trends of the proposed game model under different theoretical application scenarios are analyzed. The findings indicate that the basic income and deposit of both sides, the popularity of information as well as the importance of the conformity effect all have a significant impact on the system's steady state and evolutionary path. The specific conditions that both participating sides of the game tend to treat conflicts relatively rationally are analyzed. Dynamic evolution analysis and sensitivity analysis of selected parameters show that basic income is positively related to smart object's feedback strategies, while deposit is negatively related to that. While weight of conformity effect or the information popularity goes up, the rising of feedback probability is observed. Based on the above results, suggestions on dynamic reward and punishment strategies are given. The proposed model is a helpful attempt to model the evolution of information spreading in SIoT networks, with the ability to simulate several well-known regularities of message dissemination. Proposed model and suggested quantitative strategies can be helpful to build feasible malicious information control facilities in SIoT networks.

Research on the evolution of supervision strategy of renewable energy+energy storage under China's carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goal

The renewable energy+energy storage model has an important role to play in achieving China's proposal of the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goal. In order to study the development mechanism of renewable energy+storage cooperation with government participation, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among government, renewable energy generators, and energy storage service suppliers, based on the data of a renewable energy+storage project in a Chinese province. In this paper, we analyze the game process and the factors affecting the behavioral strategies of the three parties through numerical simulation. The study shows that the government regulation has a positive effect on the cooperative development of renewable energy+energy storage, and it can effectively restrain the wasteful phenomenon of renewable energy generation by means of punishment and improve the operating income of cooperative projects by means of subsidies, which can help the enterprises to broaden the application scenarios of energy storage. The government can effectively promote the improvement of renewable energy+energy storage cooperation mechanism by formulating regulatory mechanism, controlling the cost of supervision, and dynamically adjusting the intensity of supervision. Therefore, the research in this paper not only enriches the research related to renewable energy+energy storage mode but also provides valuable reference for the government to formulate regulatory policies related to renewable energy+energy storage.

How to effectively prevent alienation behavior of prefabricated construction developers: an optimization analysis of regulatory strategies

Prefabricated buildings (PBs) contribute to sustainable development, and their development largely depends on the active participation of developers. However, based on the characteristics of different stages of PBs' development and the goals of "14th Five-Year Plan" for architecture in China, it is an urgent practical problem for the government to encourage developers' active participation while regulating their alienation behavior. To address such problem, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to explore the government's reasonable regulatory strategies for developers' behavior in different development stages of PBs. Meanwhile, this paper explores the boundary of government's regulatory strength on PBs based on actual situation in China, which help the government to drive high-quality development of PBs with effective policy resources. Results reveal that the strict regulatory strategies have limited effects in the incubation stage of PBs. In the growth stage, it is necessary to adjust the regulatory strategies appropriately. The dynamic linear regulatory strategy can enable the PBs to achieve the phased goal, and the dynamic nonlinear regulatory strategy can help to achieve the optimal goal of PBs in China. In the maturity stage, the government does not need to deliberately regulate due to the considerable profits of developers. The regulatory strategy of "light reward and heavy punishment" is better when it is adopted to promote the development of PBs in the growth stage. The research also provides valuable suggestions for government regulators to formulate reasonable and dynamic regulatory policies for PBs.

Dynamic game and simulation for low-carbon development of industrial land under the Chinese decentralization: a case study in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region

To achieve low-carbon development of industrial land in China, it is important to coordinate the conflicts of interest among stakeholders in the process of land expropriation and utilization. However, the complex interaction mechanism and influencing factors among stakeholders make it difficult to achieve the goal under the Chinese decentralization and unique land development pattern. To solve these problems, this paper first analyzes the four main stakeholders' conflicts of interest in the process of land expropriation and utilization, that is, the central government, local government, peasant, and enterprise. Then, we construct two evolutionary game models to examine the dynamic changes of stakeholders' different strategies and take the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as an example to compare the impacts of factors on strategies under different conditions using simulation analysis. The research shows that under the Chinese decentralization, adjusting the action strengths of different stakeholders can have different effects on system equilibrium. In terms of the central government's reward and penalty, increasing the reward and penalty for local government will shorten the time of system equilibrium to a different degree, and there is little difference between the effects of political and economic penalties. Interestingly, increasing the incentives for peasants cannot promote the system equilibrium in advance. In addition, the key to local governments' decision on illegal land expropriation lies in benefits rather than costs, and investment in low-carbon technology reform with positive externalities is easier to control than investment in economic production with negative externalities associated with pollution emissions.

Game analysis of enterprise safety investment and employee safety behavior strategy evolution in high-risk industries

This paper aims to explore the influential relationship between the decision-making of investment of enterprise safety and employee safety behavior strategy selection, thus improve the effectiveness of decision-making. Based on traditional game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of enterprise safety investment and employee safety behavior strategy selection, and conducts numerical simulation analysis. The result shows:when the security investment cost is greater than the security investment benefit, the employee's security behavior strategy choice is significant for the enterprise security investment strategy decision; when the security investment benefit is greater than the security investment cost, the enterprise security investment decision is not affected by the employee safety behavior strategy; the choice of employee safety behavior strategy is not affected by the choice of enterprise safety investment strategy. The conclusion can provide a reference basis for enterprise safety production decision-making, which has certain theoretical and practical significance.

Research on the strategy of knowledge sharing among logistics enterprises under the goal of digital transformation

Accelerating the digital transformation of the traditional logistics industry is an important step toward the high-quality development of China's economy, a fundamental task to ensure the smooth operation of the entire industrial chain, and a necessary path to building the Digital-China. Carrying out knowledge sharing can help promote knowledge integration and absorption among logistics enterprises, optimize the allocation of enterprise resources and enhance their business capabilities. To explore the knowledge sharing strategy selection mechanism of logistics enterprises in the process of digital transformation, this paper establishes a dynamic game model of knowledge sharing among logistics enterprises based on evolutionary game theory, and further demonstrates the reliability of the model by combining enterprise data with Matlab2022a for case analysis. The results show that: (1) the higher the cost of knowledge sharing in the digital transformation of logistics, the lower the willingness of enterprises to share; (2) when a single enterprise provides too much knowledge, it may trigger the breach of trust of the other party to "hitchhiking"; (3) appropriately increasing the amount of penalty for breach of trust helps promote both parties to reach a knowledge sharing strategy; (4) The benefit distribution coefficient significantly affects the knowledge sharing strategies of both parties, and a reasonable benefit distribution coefficient can prompt both parties to reach a stable strategy quickly; (5) Government financial incentives positively promote enterprises' willingness to share knowledge, and both parties can obtain higher revenue when a sharing strategy is reached. Thus, this paper explores the knowledge sharing strategy and evolution mechanism in the process of digital transformation of the logistics industry from the micro perspective of enterprises, which is of great practical significance and reference value.

Model analysis of smart supply chain finance of platform-based enterprises under government supervision

The COVID-19 pandemic has made it more difficult and expensive for medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to finance. In this context, relying on the network platform, smart supply chain finance effectively solves financing problems for small and SMEs. However, in the development of smart supply chain finance, there are still some problems such as unstable willingness of SMEs to participate in financing, difficulty in determining the optimal development mode of platform-based core enterprises and lack of appropriate regulatory measures. Based on whether the network platform can use its own capitals for lending, this study introduces two smart supply chain financial models (the dominant and cooperation models of platform-based core enterprises) to solve the above problems. In this study, we construct two evolutionary game models: the tripartite model, including government, platform-based core enterprises, and SMEs, and the quadrilateral model, including government, financial institutions, platform-based core enterprises, and SMEs. This study presents the evolution and stability strategies of each participant under different modes. In addition, we discuss the willingness of platforms to choose different modes and corresponding government supervision measures. This study offers several important conclusions. (1) Core enterprises that do not have the conditions to build a highly intelligent platform choose the cooperation model; otherwise, they will preferentially choose the dominant mode. (2) Under the dominant mode, the stable development of smart supply chain finance must rely on strict government supervision. (3) By adjusting the scope of tax rates and subsidies, the government can control the trend of mutual transformation of the two modes, so that the dominant mode and the cooperative mode can develop in a balanced way in the market.

Pollution prevention strategies of SMEs in a green supply chain finance under external government intervention

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important force in the promotion of economic development. However, SMEs in the supply chain are often severely punished by the government for polluting the environment through their production processes. Therefore, it is crucial to solve the environmental pollution problem of SMEs. To compensate for the "common knowledge" assumption of participants in traditional game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of a green supply chain composed of SMEs, core enterprises, and commercial banks. The strategic decisions of the supply chain members are analyzed in relation to external interventions of the government. Subsequently, the impact of government incentives and penalties on these strategic choices is considered. The results show that government incentives can promote SMEs' choice to use pollution control strategies, and government penalties can reduce the risk of an SME defaulting, thus promoting the healthy development of a green supply chain finance system. Furthermore, increasing the new income of SMEs, raising the guarantee rate of core enterprises, and reducing the cost of green loans reviewed by banks and the guarantee cost of core enterprises can effectively promote the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game. These findings indicate that the game model introduced here can effectively solve the environmental pollution problems of SMEs and promote the healthy development of a green supply chain finance system.

Evolutionary game of stakeholders' behavioral strategies in wetland ecosystems from the vulnerability perspective

Wetland ecosystems have been seriously degraded by human activities and natural factors, and its restoration and coordinated development depend on long-term effective cooperation between the government and investors and providers. From the perspective of vulnerability of wetland ecosystem construction, this paper takes the government and investors, providers as the research object and propose a wetland ecosystem cooperation network, the article considers the "Matthew effect" of network connection and relationship cost, and uses the method of the evolutionary game on complex networks to construct the cooperative game model of wetland ecosystems. This research finds that (1) the vulnerability of wetland ecosystem varies greatly in different development stages, especially when the government subsidy coefficient for providers is reduced to 0.3, the vulnerability index is instead smaller.(2) The cooperative strategy adopted by investors can produce synergistic effect, which plays a major role in the healthy function of wetland ecosystem. (3) When the government subsidy coefficient for investors reaches 0.8, wetland ecosystem vulnerability shows a significant downward trend; when the provider loss coefficient reaches 0.8, wetland ecosystem vulnerability is significantly reduced and system stability is significantly enhanced. Thus, when the government actively promotes cooperation by adopting appropriate subsidies and regulation for investors and providers, the willingness of investors and providers to cooperate rapidly converges to 1, wetland ecosystem in vulnerability is at the lowest level. Finally, the findings combined with the numerical simulation analysis indicates that the importance of investors cooperating with the government in taking cooperative strategies actively, showing that stakeholder behavioral strategies can improve wetland ecosystem vulnerability. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the cooperation of wetland ecosystem stakeholders and a new direction for effectively reducing the vulnerability of wetland ecosystems and building efficient and benign wetland ecosystems in practice, which is of far-reaching significance for promoting wetland conservation management and an important reference value for wetland conservation planning, governance and improving the level of wetland conservation management.

How does government regulation promote green product diffusion in complex network? An evolutionary analysis considering supply side and demand side

China has launched a series of regulation policies that promote the diffusion of green products to drive the green development of resources and environment. This study proposes an evolutionary game model of green product diffusion by providing a joint "supply side - demand side" regulatory framework. It simulates the effects of government regulation on green product diffusion in complex network, the related numerical simulation analysis is carried out through a case of electric vehicles diffusion. The study confirms that (1) On the supply side, green subsidies, environmental taxes, and carbon trading market can successfully increase green product diffusion to 0.84, 0.7, and 0.65. On the demand side, green consumption vouchers, as well as publicity and education can increase green product diffusion to 0.7 and 0.67. (2) Among the order-based regulatory instruments, high environmental taxes and poor participation in carbon trading market can inhibit the spread of green products, while low green consumption vouchers fail to stimulate the purchase of green products. It is crucial to enhance emotion-based regulatory instruments like publicity and education. (3) Neither order-based nor emotion-based regulation can achieve complete diffusion of green products. This study provides new insights of green product diffusion under government regulation and its implementation effects.

Stakeholders' evolutionary relationship analysis of China's national park ecotourism development

To mitigate the conflict of economic development and ecological protection, China government initiates its national park plan in recent years. In this stage, addressing the benefit contradictories among stakeholders is of importance. Around this issue, this paper focuses on the one of most keen-edged topics in China, which is how to deal well with the coordination issue among local government, tourism development enterprise and local residents. To disentangle the complexly dynamic relationships among them, a set of mathematical models are built and derived, based on evolutionary game theory. The corresponding results indicate that the intensity of regulation by local governments, the degree of compensation to ecotourism development projects by tourism development enterprises, and the participation degree of local residents to the projects are closely related to ultimate game stabilization; some propositions are gained accordingly, which suggest the bounded conditions to achieve the optimal stabilization. To validate and broaden the results, the relevant numerical simulation and discussion are provided.

Profit distribution and stability analysis of joint distribution alliance based on tripartite evolutionary game theory under the background of green and low carbon

Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieves high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that (1) it is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

Evolutionary game model of health care and social care collaborative services for the elderly population in China

INTRODUCTION

The synergy of health care and elderly social care organizations has become the focus of the research on integrated health care and social care. This study aims to propose a collaborative strategy among health care and elderly social care service providers.

METHODS

An evolutionary game model is applied for performance analysis and optimization of the cooperation between health care and elderly social care organizations. The behavioural strategies and the impact of key parameters on promoting the cooperation of the players are presented in detail.

RESULTS

Simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis results indicate that (1) the behavioural evolution of health care organizations and elderly social care organizations forms three types of integrated health care and social care services, namely, the bilateral cooperation type, health care organization-led type and elderly social care organization-led type. (2) Increasing the additional benefits for cooperation and reducing the additional costs for cooperation can promote the willingness to synergize to provide integrated health care and elderly social care services. At the early stage of evolution, increasing the costs that elderly social care organizations pay to purchase health care services or pay for negotiation in the bilateral cooperation type can provide incentives for health care organizations to cooperate while reducing the cooperation preferences of elderly social care organizations. However, the long-term impact of the costs on the behavioural strategies for cooperation of the two players cannot be determined.

CONCLUSION

The behavioural decisions on cooperation between health care and elderly social care organizations influence each other; commitment to integration and effective collaboration can be achieved by increasing the additional benefits and reducing the marginal costs. The findings suggest that the political-economic context and government policies have a greater influence on promoting cooperation, thus yielding positive or negative results for integrated care practice.

Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games

Several studies have confirmed the existence of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated social dilemmas since Press and Dyson's ingenious discovery of ZD strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemmas. However, less research studies evolutionary performance of multiplayer ZD strategies, especially from a theoretical perspective. Here, we use a state-clustering method to theoretically analyze evolutionary dynamics of two representative ZD strategies: generous ZD strategies and extortionate ZD strategies. We consider two new settings for multiplayer ZD strategies: competitions with all ZD strategies and competitions with all memory-one strategies, apart from the competitions between these strategies and some classical ones. Moreover, we investigate the influence of the level of generosity and extortion on evolutionary dynamics of generous and extortionate ZD strategies, which was commonly ignored in previous studies. Theoretical results show that players with limited generosity are at an advantageous place and extortioners extorting more severely hold their ground more readily. Our results may provide new insights into better understanding evolutionary dynamics of ZD strategies in repeated multiplayer games.

China's Jinshan Yinshan sustainability evolutionary game equilibrium research under government and enterprises resource constraint dilemma

This paper is based on analyzing the process of green innovation inspiration and green innovation compensation effect after the implementation of environmental regulations by the Chinese Government. This paper tests the hypothesis using the evolutionary game model and studies the underlying behavioral characteristics of the government, enterprises, and the relevant influencing factors. These influencing factors further aid in examining the evolution law applicable on both sides, which are aligned with the dynamic replication equation and evolutionary equilibrium states under different situations. The key variables used in this study include the concentration of government's environmental regulation, the cost of the regulations, economic penalties, enterprise's green innovation-related income, expenditures, and the enterprise's performance appraisal. Moreover, the results of this study reflect the system stability and equilibrium strategy on the proportion of retained earnings spent by enterprises on green innovation activities and the Government's strict environmental regulations. In the process of game strategy selection between the government and enterprises, the net income and weight of eco-efficiency indicators of the enterprises actively carrying out green innovation activities play a decisive role. Moreover, there should be reduced weight of economic benefits and increase the economic sanctions and innovation subsidies of enterprise pollution behaviors. Furthermore, reduced cost of regulations and innovation expenditures help guide enterprises to rationally allocate superior resources to enhance green enterprise innovation and take the level of innovation to the point that it achieves a win-win green sustainable development of economic performance and environmental performance.

Exploring the dilemma and influencing factors of ecological transformation of resource-based cities in China: perspective on a tripartite evolutionary game

The ecological transformation of the mineral resource-based cities (MRBCs) is the key to promoting the construction of ecological civilization and realizing the sustainable development of the social economy and society in China. Existing research ignores the influence of public participation on other subjects in the process of transformation, which is essential to solve the dilemma faced by the ecological transformation of MRBCs. In view of this, from the perspective of stakeholders, this study constructs a new evolutionary game model, which is jointly participated in by the government, enterprises, and social factors (SF) (including public, self-media, and non-governmental organizations). This paper discusses the interests of the main parties and their inter-relationships and reveals the causal mechanism and influencing factors of the dilemma of the ecological transformation of the MRBCs. Our results demonstrate that the evolution and convergence of strategies among the tripartite game agents exhibit strong interaction. First, the single industrial structure, low regulatory efficiency, and weak ecological awareness substantially increase the cost of transformation, thus exacerbating the dilemma of MRBC transformation. Second, the transformation intensity and comprehensive income are important factors affecting the transformation, and the effect intensity of influencing factors in different transition stages is different, which implies that the focus of policies in different stages is different. Third, in the process of promoting enterprise ecological transformation, government supervision and SF supervision have significant complementary effects. However, high-intensity supervision has a significant crowding-out effect on the willingness of SF to participate. Therefore, the government needs to balance the intensity of supervision and willingness of SF to participate. Compared with the existing research, this study comprehensively reflects the complex dynamic game process of the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China and can provide a reference for the policy of promoting the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China.

Evolutionary game analysis between employees and employers about working overtime from the perspective of information asymmetry

Background

Overtime is an international phenomenon, especially in some Chinese Internet technology companies, the 996 work regime is a common corporate atmosphere. This paper holds that overtime work is the result of a long-term dynamic game between employees and employers. In such a dynamic evolution process, employers and employees both cooperate and conflict, they will choose a strategy conducive to their own development through long-term learning and improvement.

Methods

Based on the evolutionary game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper constructs a \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2\times 2$$\end{document}2×2 evolutionary game matrix. The strategies of employees can be divided into voluntary overtime and involuntary overtime, while the strategies of employers can be divided into providing overtime pay and not providing overtime pay. The stability of the system is related to four parameters: resource consumption, information asymmetry coefficient, trust coefficient, and moral hazard coefficient.

Results

Through an in-depth study of the model and data simulation, the system has five equilibrium points, an ESS point, and a saddle point in any case. Accordingly, we put forward two theorems and three propositions, which are verified not only theoretically but also by data simulation. Besides, the strategies of the employees and the employers will evolve from the initial state to (Involuntarily, Not pay) or (Voluntarily, Pay) under different situations. This is closely related to the initial parameters of the evolutionary game model and the payment matrix.

Conclusions

By summarizing the influence of each parameter on the evolutionary path, we believe that fairness and information equivalence between employees and employers can effectively promote both parties to reach the Pareto optimal state. In other words, employees and employers need to communicate and share information promptly to ensure the unity of information acquired by each other and achieve a win–win situation. This paper contributes to providing theoretical guidance and practical enlightenment for organizations to manage employees' overtime behavior scientifically and improve their work psychology reasonably.

Elucidating competing strategic behaviors using prospect theory, system dynamics, and evolutionary game: a case of transjurisdictional water pollution problem in China

Water is a critical natural resource for socio-economic and environmental systems. In transjurisdictional river basins, when basin-wide water pollution management scheme is absent, stakeholders tend to adopt utility-maximizing behavior based on incomplete information. Such a scenario could lead to a free-riding problem. This paper attempts to elucidate the strategic behavior of riparian regions using prospect theory, evolutionary game, and system dynamics. The evolution of riparian regions' strategic behaviors is explained, and the impacts of different factors on their strategic selections are simulated. The results showed that the prospective value of factors and stakeholders' attitude to risk are a key for resolving transjurisdictional river water pollution problems. Improving the subjective judgment of the probability of water pollution, raising awareness, strengthening the penalties in "polluter pays" schemes, abandoning segmented river basin management, and building a basin-wide water management system are vital for maintaining the ecological integrity of any transjurisdictional river basin and accelerate the sustainable development of its riparian regions.

Decision-making dynamic evolution among groups regarding express packaging waste recycling under different reference dependence and information policy

The reveal of express packaging waste recycling behavior evolution trend is crucial to waste management. Current models are mostly based on the classic expected utility theory, without considering groups are susceptible to internal and external factors. To address this drawback, we construct an evolutionary game model of express packaging waste recycling behavior by considering information policy and reference dependence factors to explore groups' decision-making with different initial adoption rates. A system dynamics simulation model based on survey data is then built, and simulation experiments are also designed to reveal the impacts of key factors on the evolution path of recycling behavior. The results show that, without information policy, groups cyclically oscillate around the initial state. The stable trend depends on the information intensity, and the information effect is marginal diminishing. Groups with a lower initial adoption rate will evolve to an ideal stable strategy only when information intensity exceeds the threshold of ten. Reference points can change behavior strategies and are characterized by significant loss aversion. The benefits and costs affect groups' adoption or rejection behaviors. These findings can provide new ideas for related research and offer a reference for the government to formulate efficient waste management policies.

Herd Behaviors in Epidemics: A Dynamics-Coupled Evolutionary Games Approach

The recent COVID-19 pandemic has led to an increasing interest in the modeling and analysis of infectious diseases. The pandemic has made a significant impact on the way we behave and interact in our daily life. The past year has witnessed a strong interplay between human behaviors and epidemic spreading. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to study the coupled evolution of herd behaviors and epidemics. Our framework extends the classical degree-based mean-field epidemic model over complex networks by coupling it with the evolutionary game dynamics. The statistically equivalent individuals in a population choose their social activity intensities based on the fitness or the payoffs that depend on the state of the epidemics. Meanwhile, the spreading of the infectious disease over the complex network is reciprocally influenced by the players' social activities. We analyze the coupled dynamics by studying the stationary properties of the epidemic for a given herd behavior and the structural properties of the game for a given epidemic process. The decisions of the herd turn out to be strategic substitutes. We formulate an equivalent finite-player game and an equivalent network to represent the interactions among the finite populations. We develop a structure-preserving approximation technique to study time-dependent properties of the joint evolution of the behavioral and epidemic dynamics. The resemblance between the simulated coupled dynamics and the real COVID-19 statistics in the numerical experiments indicates the predictive power of our framework.

Evolutionary game analysis on industrial pollution control of local government in China

The pollution control of local government to industrial enterprises is actually a long-term, complex and dynamic game process. This study develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the operation mechanism of local governments' different expenditure preferences on the production behavior of industrial polluting enterprises, so as to specify the behavioral characteristics and optimal strategy of local environmental governance. The results indicated that whether the relationship between local governments and polluting enterprises in environmental governance becomes cooperative or collusive depends on their game sequence and initial endowment. Under the condition of realizing a steady state of cooperation, polluting enterprises would advance faster toward clean production if local governments distribute more environmental expenditures on cost subsidies for enterprises to implement clean production. The findings of this study provide decision-making basis for local governments to control industrial pollution.

An evolutionary analysis of corruption in the process of collecting environmental tax in China

Considering the bargaining power of enterprises, this paper distinguishes between "Offering Bribes Voluntarily" (OBV) and "Offering Bribes under Pressure from Environmental Inspectors" (NOBV). An evolutionary game model between environmental inspectors and enterprises is constructed to study the corruption of environmental inspectors in the process of environmental tax collection under the system of upward accountability. At the same time, numerical simulations are carried out using China's pollution discharge data and pollution discharge fee collection standards in 2017. The results show that when enterprises have different bargaining powers, there are differences in the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the process of environmental tax collection. Enterprises with weak bargaining power may adopt "OBV" strategy. Under the system of upward accountability, it is difficult for the public to form adequate supervision over polluting enterprises and environmental inspectors. Only with the power of the upper-level government can the public's supervisory role be brought into play. High audit costs and environmental tax rates may be objective incentives for environmental inspectors' corruption and enterprises' bribery.

Evolutionary game of inland shipping pollution control under government co-supervision

In the context of the environmental improvement of inland shipping, this paper studies the interaction mechanism of tripartite behavioral strategy selection among the upstream and downstream governments and shipping companies in neighboring provinces. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model that introduces the prospect theory, and verifies numerical examples in combination with system dynamics simulation methods. Therefore, this study discusses the influence of evolutionary stability strategies on the development of electric ship industry. The results show that in order to realize effective governance of inland shipping pollution, the optimal evolutionary stability strategies of the three stakeholders should be as follows: active supervision in both upstream and downstream governments, and using clean energy in shipping companies. The improvement of the initial probability and risk preference of the three parties is conducive to promoting the faster and more stable industrial development, while reasonable profit distribution coefficient and compensation cost can promote the benign development of the inland river environmental governance system. In addition, the probability of upstream and downstream governments and shipping companies choosing the optimal strategies is positively related to the government fines, and negatively related to the regulatory costs. In particular, the application of prospect theory makes the result of evolutionary equilibrium more obvious.

Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis

Green building incentives are widely adopted in the world to promote green building construction. However, the incentives from the government are usually predetermined, which cannot obtain a stable effect in green construction practice. To better promote green building construction, this paper studies dynamic government's reward and penalty evolution during the construction process. Based on the prospect theory, the decision of government reward and penalty is formulated as evolutionary game model under four different scenarios: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. Through theoretical analysis, our results revealed that the dynamic reward and static penalty is the best strategy to promote green building construction. More specifically, if the intensity of subsidy and penalty increases, contractors tend to green construction; while the probability of active supervision by government is inversely proportional to subsidy and positively proportional to penalty. This study can provide a useful insight for the policy makers to formulate effective reward and penalty policy, thereby standardizing the behavior of contractors, and reducing the negative impact of the construction industry on the environment.

Analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies on heterogeneous networks: Based on SEIRV model and evolutionary game

Nowadays, vaccination is the most effective way to control the epidemic spreading. In this paper, an epidemic SEIRV (susceptible-exposed-infected-removed -vaccinated) model and an evolutionary game model are established to analyze the difference between mandatory vaccination method and voluntary vaccination method on heterogeneous networks. Firstly, we divide the population into four categories, including susceptible individuals, exposed individuals, infected individuals and removed individuals. Based on the mean field approximation theory, differential equations are developed to characterize the changes of the proportions of the four groups over time under mandatory vaccination. Then through the analysis of the differential equations, the disease-free equilibrium point (DFE) and the endemic disease equilibrium point (EDE) are obtained. Also, the basic reproduction number is obtained by the next-generation matrix method and the stability analysis of the equilibrium points is performed. Next, by considering factors such as vaccination cost, treatment cost and government subsidy rate, differential equations are established to represent the change of vaccination rate over time. By analyzing the final vaccination coverage rate, we can get the minimum vaccination cost to make infectious disease disappear. Finally, the Monte Carlo method is used for numerical simulation to verify the results obtained from the theoretical analysis. Using the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic data from Wuhan, China, the experimental results show that when the effectiveness rate of vaccination is 0.75, the vaccination cost is not higher than 0.886 so that the vaccination strategy can be spread among the population. If mandatory vaccination is adopted, the minimum vaccination rate is 0.146.