Evolution and stability of altruist strategies in microbial games

Coexisting ecotypes in long-term evolution emerged from interacting trade-offs

Evolution of complex communities of coexisting microbes remains poorly understood. The long-term evolution experiment on Escherichia coli (LTEE) revealed the spontaneous emergence of stable coexistence of multiple ecotypes, which persisted for more than 14,000 generations of continuous evolution. Here, using a combination of experiments and computer simulations, we show that the emergence and persistence of this phenomenon can be explained by the combination of two interacting trade-offs, rooted in biochemical constraints: First, faster growth is enabled by higher fermentation and obligate acetate excretion. Second, faster growth results in longer lag times when utilizing acetate after glucose is depleted. This combination creates an ecological niche for a slower-growing ecotype, specialized in switching to acetate. These findings demonstrate that trade-offs can give rise to surprisingly complex communities with evolutionarily stable coexistence of multiple variants in even the simplest environments.

Evolutionary Stabilization of Cooperative Toxin Production through a Bacterium-Plasmid-Phage Interplay

Colicins are toxins produced and released by Enterobacteriaceae to kill competitors in the gut. While group A colicins employ a division of labor strategy to liberate the toxin into the environment via colicin-specific lysis, group B colicin systems lack cognate lysis genes. In Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium (S. Tm), the group B colicin Ib (ColIb) is released by temperate phage-mediated bacteriolysis. Phage-mediated ColIb release promotes S. Tm fitness against competing Escherichia coli It remained unclear how prophage-mediated lysis is realized in a clonal population of ColIb producers and if prophages contribute to evolutionary stability of toxin release in S. Tm. Here, we show that prophage-mediated lysis occurs in an S. Tm subpopulation only, thereby introducing phenotypic heterogeneity to the system. We established a mathematical model to study the dynamic interplay of S. Tm, ColIb, and a temperate phage in the presence of a competing species. Using this model, we studied long-term evolution of phage lysis rates in a fluctuating infection scenario. This revealed that phage lysis evolves as bet-hedging strategy that maximizes phage spread, regardless of whether colicin is present or not. We conclude that the ColIb system, lacking its own lysis gene, is making use of the evolutionary stable phage strategy to be released. Prophage lysis genes are highly prevalent in nontyphoidal Salmonella genomes. This suggests that the release of ColIb by temperate phages is widespread. In conclusion, our findings shed new light on the evolution and ecology of group B colicin systems.IMPORTANCE Bacteria are excellent model organisms to study mechanisms of social evolution. The production of public goods, e.g., toxin release by cell lysis in clonal bacterial populations, is a frequently studied example of cooperative behavior. Here, we analyze evolutionary stabilization of toxin release by the enteric pathogen Salmonella The release of colicin Ib (ColIb), which is used by Salmonella to gain an edge against competing microbiota following infection, is coupled to bacterial lysis mediated by temperate phages. Here, we show that phage-dependent lysis and subsequent release of colicin and phage particles occurs only in part of the ColIb-expressing Salmonella population. This phenotypic heterogeneity in lysis, which represents an essential step in the temperate phage life cycle, has evolved as a bet-hedging strategy under fluctuating environments such as the gastrointestinal tract. Our findings suggest that prophages can thereby evolutionarily stabilize costly toxin release in bacterial populations.

Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations

BACKGROUND

Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution.

RESULTS

We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities.

Thermodynamics of evolutionary games

How cooperation can evolve between players is an unsolved problem of biology. Here we use Hamiltonian dynamics of models of the Ising type to describe populations of cooperating and defecting players to show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators is given by the expectation value of a thermal observable akin to a magnetization. We apply the formalism to the public goods game with three players and show that a phase transition between cooperation and defection occurs that is equivalent to a transition in one-dimensional Ising crystals with long-range interactions. We then investigate the effect of punishment on cooperation and find that punishment plays the role of a magnetic field that leads to an "alignment" between players, thus encouraging cooperation. We suggest that a thermal Hamiltonian picture of the evolution of cooperation can generate other insights about the dynamics of evolving groups by mining the rich literature of critical dynamics in low-dimensional spin systems.

Programmed cell death can increase the efficacy of microbial bet -hedging

Programmed cell death (PCD) occurs in both unicellular and multicellular organisms. While PCD plays a key role in the development and maintenance of multicellular organisms, explaining why single-celled organisms would evolve to actively commit suicide has been far more challenging. Here, we explore the potential for PCD to act as an accessory to microbial bet-hedging strategies that utilize stochastic phenotype switching. We consider organisms that face unpredictable and recurring disasters, in which fitness depends on effective phenotypic diversification. We show that when reproductive opportunities are limited by carrying capacity, PCD drives population turnover, providing increased opportunities for phenotypic diversification through stochastic phenotype switching. The main cost of PCD, providing resources for growth to a PCD(−) competitor, is ameliorated by genetic assortment in spatially structured populations. Using agent -based simulations, we explore how basic demographic factors, namely bottlenecks and local dispersal, can generate sufficient spatial structure to favor the evolution of high PCD rates.

Divide-and-conquer Tournament on Social Networks

In social gaming networks, previous studies extensively investigated the influence of a variety of strategies on reciprocal behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma game. The studied frameworks range from the case that an individual uniformly cooperates or defects with all social contacts, to the recently reported divide-and-conquer games, where an individual can choose a particular move to play with each neighbor. In this paper, we investigate a divide-and-conquer tournament among 14 well-known strategies on social gaming networks. In the tournament, an individual's fitness is measured by accumulated and average payoff aggregated for a certain number of rounds. On the base of their fitness, the evolution of the population follows a local learning mechanism. Our observation indicates that the distribution of individuals adopting a strategy in degree ranking fundamentally changes the frequency of the strategy. In the divide-and-conquer gaming networks, our result suggests that the connectivity in social networks and strategy are two key factors that govern the evolution of the population.

Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods

Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations.

Negative frequency-dependent interactions can underlie phenotypic heterogeneity in a clonal microbial population

Genetically identical cells in microbial populations often exhibit a remarkable degree of phenotypic heterogeneity even in homogenous environments. Such heterogeneity is commonly thought to represent a bet‐hedging strategy against environmental uncertainty. However, evolutionary game theory predicts that phenotypic heterogeneity may also be a response to negative frequency‐dependent interactions that favor rare phenotypes over common ones. Here we provide experimental evidence for this alternative explanation in the context of the well‐studied yeast GAL network. In an environment containing the two sugars glucose and galactose, the yeast GAL network displays stochastic bimodal activation. We show that in this mixed sugar environment, GAL‐ON and GAL‐OFF phenotypes can each invade the opposite phenotype when rare and that there exists a resulting stable mix of phenotypes. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the resulting stable mix of phenotypes is not necessarily optimal for population growth. We find that the wild‐type mixed strategist GAL network can invade populations of both pure strategists while remaining uninvasible by either. Lastly, using laboratory evolution we show that this mixed resource environment can directly drive the de novo evolution of clonal phenotypic heterogeneity from a pure strategist population. Taken together, our results provide experimental evidence that negative frequency‐dependent interactions can underlie the phenotypic heterogeneity found in clonal microbial populations.

Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies

We study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals adopting the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which always defect), ATFT (almost tit-for-tat: individuals which almost always repeat the opponent's last move) and G (generous individuals, which always cooperate when the opponent cooperated in the last move and have a positive probability q of cooperating when their opponent has defected). Our aim is studying in a mathematically rigorous fashion the dynamics of a simplified version for the computer experiment in Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 355:250-253, 1992) involving 100 reactive strategies. We see that as the generosity degree of the G individuals varies, equilibria (rest points) of the dynamics appear or disappear, and the dynamics changes accordingly. Not only we prove that the results of the experiment are true in our simplified version, but we also have complete control on the existence or non-existence of the equilbria for the dynamics for all possible values of the parameters, given that ATFT individuals are close enough to TFT. For most values of the parameters the dynamics can be completely determined.

Unfavorable Individuals in Social Gaming Networks

In social gaming networks, the current research focus has been on the origin of widespread reciprocal behaviors when individuals play non-cooperative games. In this paper, we investigate the topological properties of unfavorable individuals in evolutionary games. The unfavorable individuals are defined as the individuals gaining the lowest average payoff in a round of game. Since the average payoff is normally considered as a measure of fitness, the unfavorable individuals are very likely to be eliminated or change their strategy updating rules from a Darwinian perspective. Considering that humans can hardly adopt a unified strategy to play with their neighbors, we propose a divide-and-conquer game model, where individuals can interact with their neighbors in the network with appropriate strategies. We test and compare a series of highly rational strategy updating rules. In the tested scenarios, our analytical and simulation results surprisingly reveal that the less-connected individuals in degree-heterogeneous networks are more likely to become the unfavorable individuals. Our finding suggests that the connectivity of individuals as a social capital fundamentally changes the gaming environment. Our model, therefore, provides a theoretical framework for further understanding the social gaming networks.

Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory

In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context.

Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything

Zero-determinant strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma irrespective of the opponent’s strategy (coercive strategies), or else to set the ratio between the player’s and their opponent’s expected payoff (extortionate strategies). Here we show that zero-determinant strategies are at most weakly dominant, are not evolutionarily stable, and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that zero-determinant strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize each other can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.

In iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, zero-determinant strategies are able to define the opponent’s payoff regardless of the opponent’s strategy. Here the authors show that zero-determinant strategies are not evolutionary stable in adapting populations, and instead evolve into non-coercive strategies.