Negative impact of laws regarding biosecurity and bioterrorism on real diseases

Comparison of Brazilian High- and Maximum-Containment Laboratories Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulations to Legal Frameworks in the United States and Other Countries: Gaps and Opportunities

Introduction

Although the United States and other countries have implemented comprehensive legislation, regulations, and policies to support biosafety and biosecurity of high- and maximum-containment laboratories, Brazil's legislation has notable gaps and inconsistencies.

Objective

To evaluate the Brazilian approach to ensuring nationwide biosafety and biosecurity oversight and governance of high- and maximum-containment laboratories.

Methods

A systematic gap analysis was conducted to compare Brazilian biosafety and biosecurity legislation, regulations, and policies with their international counterparts, with a particular focus on the oversight and governance of high- and maximum-containment laboratories.

Results

We found that Brazilian biosafety and biosecurity legislation, regulations, and policies have relevant gaps. Governance and regulatory oversight of Brazil's high- and maximum-containment laboratories are decentralized with variable levels of adherence to commonly accepted global biosafety and biosecurity compliance standards. These findings represent a limitation not only to governance but also to the preparedness to face current and future challenges related to emergent infectious diseases in Brazil. Enhancing the Brazilian legal framework on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity is necessary and urgent. Reviewing the lessons learned and regulations applied in the United States and other international frameworks helped identify potential areas for improving Brazil's ability to inventory and manage its diverse biocontainment laboratory capabilities and assure these valuable resources align with national needs and priorities.

Conclusion

The Brazilian government has an opportunity to revise and improve upon a national set of legislation, regulations, and policies for its high- and maximum-containment laboratories, taking advantage of legislation and guidelines published by other countries.

Gaps and inconsistencies in the current knowledge and implementation of biosafety and biosecurity practices for rickettsial pathogens

INTRODUCTION

Rickettsia spp. and Orientia spp. are the causes of neglected infections that can lead to severe febrile and systemic illnesses in humans. Implementing proper biosafety practices when handling these pathogens is crucial to ensure a safe and sustainable work environment. It is essential to assess the current knowledge and identify any potential gaps to develop effective measures that minimise the risk of exposure to these pathogens. By doing so, we can establish a comprehensive framework that promotes safety, mitigates hazards, and safeguards the well-being of personnel and the surrounding community.

METHODS AND RESULTS

This review aimed to synthesise and determine the evidence base for biosafety precautions for Rickettsia spp. and Orientia spp. pathogens. Enhancing our understanding of the relative infectious risk associated with different strains of Rickettsia and Orientia spp. requires identifying the infectious dose of these pathogens that can cause human disease. The application of risk groups for Rickettsia and Orientia spp. is inconsistent across jurisdictions. There is also incomplete evidence regarding decontamination methods for these pathogens. With regards to Orientia spp. most of the available information is derived from experiments conducted with Rickettsia spp.

CONCLUSIONS

Rickettsia and Orientia spp. are neglected diseases, as demonstrated by the lack of evidence-based and specific biosafety information about these pathogens. In the case of Orientia spp., most of the available information is derived from Rickettsia spp., which may not be appropriate and overstate the risks of working with this pathogen. The advent of effective antibiotic therapy and a better understanding of the true hazards and risks associated with pathogen manipulation should inform decisions, allowing a sustainable and safe work environment.

Biosafety and biosecurity requirements for Orientia spp. diagnosis and research: recommendations for risk-based biocontainment, work practices and the case for reclassification to risk group 2

Scrub typhus is an important arthropod-borne disease causing significant acute febrile illness by infection with Orientia spp.Using a risk-based approach, this review examines current practice, the evidence base and regulatory requirements regarding matters of biosafety and biosecurity, and presents the case for reclassification from Risk Group 3 to Risk Group 2 along with recommendations for safe working practices of risk-based activities during the manipulation of Orientia spp. in the laboratory.We recommend to reclassify Orientia spp. to Risk Group 2 based on the classification for RG2 pathogens as being moderate individual risk, low community risk. We recommend that low risk activities, can be performed within a biological safety cabinet located in a Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 core laboratory using standard personal protective equipment. But when the risk assessment indicates, such as high concentration and volume, or aerosol generation, then a higher biocontainment level is warranted. For, the majority of animal activities involving Orientia spp., Animal BSL 2 (ABSL2) is recommended however where high risk activities are performed including necropsies, Animal BSL (ABSL3) is recommended.

Laboratory-acquired Scrub Typhus and Murine Typhus Infections: The Argument for a Risk-based Approach to Biosafety Requirements for Orientia tsutsugamushi and Rickettsia typhi Laboratory Activities

This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.

International Biological Reference Preparations for Epidemic Infectious Diseases

Recent years have seen unprecedented investment in research and development for countermeasures for high-threat pathogens, including specific and ambitious objectives for development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. The inadequate availability of biological reference materials for these pathogens poses a genuine obstacle in pursuit of these objectives, and the lack of a comprehensive and equitable framework for developing reference materials is a weakness. We outline the need for internationally standardized biological materials for high-threat pathogens as a core element of global health security. We also outline the key components of a framework for addressing this deficiency.

Survey of laboratory-acquired infections around the world in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories

Laboratory-acquired infections due to a variety of bacteria, viruses, parasites, and fungi have been described over the last century, and laboratory workers are at risk of exposure to these infectious agents. However, reporting laboratory-associated infections has been largely voluntary, and there is no way to determine the real number of people involved or to know the precise risks for workers. In this study, an international survey based on volunteering was conducted in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories to determine the number of laboratory-acquired infections and the possible underlying causes of these contaminations. The analysis of the survey reveals that laboratory-acquired infections have been infrequent and even rare in recent years, and human errors represent a very high percentage of the cases. Today, most risks from biological hazards can be reduced through the use of appropriate procedures and techniques, containment devices and facilities, and the training of personnel.

Historical evolution of human anthrax from occupational disease to potentially global threat as bioweapon

PURPOSE

Anthrax is caused by Bacillus anthracis, which can naturally infect livestock, wildlife and occupationally exposed humans. However, for its resistance due to spore formation, ease of dissemination, persistence in the environment and high virulence, B. anthracis has been considered the most serious bioterrorism agent for a long time. During the last century anthrax evolved from limited natural disease to potentially global threat if used as bioweapon. Several factors may mitigate the consequences of an anthrax attack, including 1. the capability to promptly recognize and manage the illness and its public health consequences; 2. the limitation of secondary contamination risk through an appropriate decontamination; and 3. the evolution of genotyping methods (for microbes characterization at high resolution level) that can influence the course and/or focus of investigations, impacting the response of the government to an attack.

METHODS

A PubMed search has been done using the key words “bioterrorism anthrax”.

RESULTS

Over one thousand papers have been screened and the most significant examined to present a comprehensive literature review in order to discuss the current knowledge and strategies in preparedness for a possible deliberate release of B. anthracis spores and to indicate the most current and complete documents in which to deepen.

CONCLUSIONS

The comprehensive analysis of the two most relevant unnatural anthrax release events, Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union (1979) and the contaminated letters in the USA (2001), shows that inhalational anthrax may easily and cheaply be spread resulting in serious consequences. The damage caused by an anthrax attack can be limited if public health organization, first responders, researchers and investigators will be able to promptly manage anthrax cases and use new technologies for decontamination methods and in forensic microbiology.