Fitting the Message to the Listener: Children Selectively Mention General and Specific Facts

Picture book reading improves children's learning understanding

Mental state reasoning is an integral part of children's teaching and learning understanding. This study investigated whether a picture book reading approach focusing on mental state discourse and contrasting perspectives in a preschool classroom setting would improve children's teaching and learning understanding and school readiness. In total, 104 children from four classrooms aged between 46 and 64 months (53 girls, M = 54.03 months, SD = 3.68) participated in the study. Half of the classrooms were randomly assigned to an experimental group where teachers read picture books rich in mental state discourse and engaged in intensive discussions with children for eight weeks. Children's false belief understanding and teaching and learning understanding were measured before and after the eight-week period. The result revealed that picture book reading improved children's learning understanding with a medium effect size, controlling for demographic variables, children's verbal ability, inhibition, and initial false belief understanding. The experimental group children further demonstrated more advanced school readiness 18 months after the intervention ended in a follow-up study using a teacher questionnaire.

Children's Selective Teaching and Informing: A Meta-Analysis

Empirical studies on selective teaching and informing indicate that children may vary what they teach depending on whom they are teaching, taking into account how helpful the information is for a given audience. The current meta-analysis quantifies the effect of selective informing and teaching in 2-7-year-olds by examining the relationship between the helpfulness of the information and the frequency of information transmission. Through a systematic search that yielded 1483 results, 28 studies (104 effect sizes, N = 2716) met the inclusion criteria. Using robust variance estimation, we found a medium average effect, Hedges' g = 0.578, 95% CI (0.331, 0.825), suggesting that children selectively share information based on its perceived helpfulness to the listener. Moderator analyses revealed that age and communicative context were significant factors. Children were more informative in their communication when asked to teach compared to other, nonpedagogical prompts. This finding supports and extends natural pedagogy theory-young children not only interpret pedagogical information differently than information acquired through other means, but they are more selective in their informing when teaching. Additionally, we observed a key developmental progression at age 4. Four- to 7-year-olds, but not 2-3-year-olds, selectively shared information that was most helpful for a given learner. This coincides with the development of false-belief understanding, which undergoes significant development at around age 4. Taken together, the present synthesis suggests that young children actively engage in selective social learning from both sides, that of beneficiaries and benefactors of valuable information.

Know thy audience: Children teach basic or complex facts depending on the learner's maturity

What kind of information is appropriate to teach depends on learner characteristics. In three experiments, 5- to 7-year-old children (N = 170, 50% female, 68% White; data collection: 2022-2023) chose between basic and complex information to teach an infant or adult audience. The older, but not younger, children, taught more complex information to adults and more basic information to infants, (OR = 2.03). Both ages overcame their own preference for complex information when teaching infants (h = .45). Children's reflections on why they made particular pedagogical choices did not predict audience-contingent teaching. The findings suggest that young children can infer what kind of information is suitable given a learner's maturity, with a key developmental progression between ages 5 and 7.

Toddlers do not preferentially transmit generalizable information to others

Children actively and selectively transmit information to others based on the type of information and the context during learning. Four- to 7-year-old children preferentially transmit generalizable information in teaching-like contexts. Although 2-year-old children are able to distinguish between generalizable and non-generalizable information, it is not known whether they likewise transmit generalizable information selectively. We designed a behavioral study to address this question. Two-year-old children were presented with three novel boxes, identical except for their color. In each box, one of two equally salient actions led to a generalizable outcome (e.g., playing a [different] tune in each box), whereas the other led to a non-generalizable outcome (e.g., turning on a light, vibrating the box, or making a noise). In the discovery phase, children had a chance to discover the functions of each box presented one-by-one. Then, in the exploration phase, they were given the opportunity to independently explore all three boxes presented together. Finally, in the transmission phase, an ignorant recipient entered the room and asked the child to show them how these toys work. We measured whether children preferentially transmitted either generalizable or non-generalizable information when they were asked to demonstrate the function of the toys to a naïve adult. We found that children did not display any preference for transmitting generalizable information. These findings are discussed with respect to toddlers' selectivity in transmitting information but also the development of sensitivity to information generalizability. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHT: Young children transmit information to others and do so with some degree of selectivity to a variety of factors. Generalizability is an important factor affecting information transmission, and older children tend to associate generalizable information with teaching-like interactions. We tested whether toddlers selectively transmitted it to others over non-generalizable information. We found that toddlers do not show a preference to transmit generalizable over non-generalizable information.

Shared social groups or shared experiences? The effect of shared knowledge on children's perspective-taking

Although the ability to consider others' visual perspectives to interpret ambiguous communication emerges during childhood, people sometimes fail to attend to their partner's perspective. Two studies investigated whether 4- to 6-year-olds show a "closeness-communication bias" in their consideration of a partner's perspective in a communication task. Participants played a game that required them to take their partner's visual perspective in order to interpret an ambiguous instruction. If children, like adults, perform worse when they overestimate the extent to which their perspective is aligned with that of a partner, then they should make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a socially close partner compared with a more socially distant partner. In Study 1, social closeness was based on belonging to the same social group. In Study 2, social closeness was based on caregiving, a long-standing social relationship with a close kinship bond. Although social group membership did not affect children's consideration of their partner's perspective, children did make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a close caregiver compared with a novel experimenter. These findings suggest that close personal relationships may be more likely to lead children to overestimate perspective alignment and hinder children's perspective-taking than shared social group membership, and they highlight important questions about the mechanisms underlying the effects of partner characteristics in perspective-taking tasks.

Four-year-olds selectively transmit true information

Two experiments (N = 112) were conducted to examine preschoolers' concern for the truth when transmitting information. A first experiment (Pilot Experiment) revealed that 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, selectively transmitted information marked as true versus information marked as false. The second experiment (Main Experiment) showed that 4-year-olds selectively transmitted true information regardless of whether their audience lacked knowledge (Missing Knowledge Context) or information (Missing Information Context) about the subject matter. Children selected more true information when choosing between true versus false information (Falsity Condition) and when choosing between true information versus information the truth of which was undetermined (Bullshit Condition). The Main Experiment also revealed that 4-year-olds shared information more spontaneously, i.e., before being prompted, when it was knowledge, rather than information, the audience was seeking. The findings add to the field's growing understanding of young children as benevolent sharers of knowledge.

When Naïve Pedagogy Breaks Down: Adults Rationally Decide How to Teach, but Misrepresent Learners' Beliefs

From early in childhood, humans exhibit sophisticated intuitions about how to share knowledge efficiently in simple controlled studies. Yet, untrained adults often fail to teach effectively in real-world situations. Here, we explored what causes adults to struggle in informal pedagogical exchanges. In Experiment 1, we first showed evidence of this effect, finding that adult participants failed to communicate their knowledge to naïve learners in a simple teaching task, despite reporting high confidence that they taught effectively. Using a computational model of rational teaching, we found that adults assigned to our teaching condition provided highly informative examples but failed to teach effectively because their examples were tailored to learners who were only considering a small set of possible explanations. In Experiment 2, we then found experimental evidence for this possibility, showing that knowledgeable participants systematically misunderstand the beliefs of naïve participants. Specifically, knowledgeable participants assumed naïve agents would primarily consider hypotheses close to the correct one. Finally, in Experiment 3, we aligned learners' beliefs to knowledgeable agents' expectations and showed learners the same examples selected by participants assigned to teach in Experiment 1. We found that these same examples were significantly more informative once learners' hypothesis spaces were constrained to match teachers' expectations. Our findings show that, in informal settings, adult pedagogical failures result from an inaccurate representation of what naïve learners believe is plausible and not an inability to select informative data in a rational way.

Four-Year-Olds Share General Knowledge and Use Generic Language When Teaching

Young children's receptiveness to teaching is unquestioned, but their understanding of pedagogy has only begun to be explored. Two experiments (N = 90; 45 female) with 4-year-olds from racially and ethnically diverse backgrounds were conducted to test if they exchange general information and use generic language when teaching. Children in both experiments taught more general than episodic information and used more generic than episodic language when teaching. Experiment 2 showed that children did not prefer to report general information or use generic language in a non-pedagogical context. The findings suggest that by 4 years old, children understand that the goal of teaching is to transmit general knowledge.

Young children infer and manage what others think about them

We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.

Can bifocal stance theory explain children's selectivity in active information transmission?

To shed light on the key premise of the bifocal stance theory (BST) that social learners flexibly take instrumental and ritual stances, we focus on developmental origins of child-led information transmission, or teaching, as a core social learning strategy. We highlight children's emerging selectivity in information transmission influenced by epistemic and social factors and call for systematic investigation of proposed stance-taking.

Mini managers: Children strategically divide cognitive labor among collaborators, but with a self-serving bias

Strategic collaboration according to the law of comparative advantage involves dividing tasks based on the relative capabilities of group members. Three experiments (N = 405, primarily White and Asian, 45% female, collected 2016-2019 in Canada) examined how this strategy develops in children when dividing cognitive labor. Children divided questions about numbers between two partners. By 7 years, children allocated difficult questions to the skilled partner (Experiment 1, d = 1.42; Experiment 2, d = 0.87). However, younger children demonstrated a self-serving bias, choosing the easiest questions for themselves. Only when engaging in a third-party collaborative task did 5-year-olds assign harder questions to the more skilled individual (Experiment 3, d = 0.55). These findings demonstrate early understanding of strategic collaboration subject to a self-serving bias.

The social meaning of common knowledge across development

Common knowledge can be a potent sign of shared social attributes among people, but not all knowledge is socially meaningful to the same extent. For instance, compared to shared knowledge of cultural practices, knowledge of self-evident facts might be a poorer indicator of shared group membership among individuals. Two studies explored adults' and 6-to-9 years old children's social inferences based on what others know as well as their sensitivity to the distinctions in the diagnostic potential of different kinds of knowledge. Participants were presented with targets who were knowledgeable about familiar things that are either culture-specific (e.g., a traditional dance) or general (e.g., a self-evident fact), and asked to make inferences about their language and where they live. Adults and 8-year-olds privileged culture-specific knowledge over general knowledge when making both kinds of inferences about the targets, whereas 6-year-olds did not distinguish between the two knowledge types. Thus, what others know is socially meaningful from early in life, and across development, children become increasingly aware of the diagnostic potential of culture-specific knowledge when making social inferences about others. These findings suggest novel social implications of knowledge assessment.

When a Circle Becomes the Letter O: Young Children's Conceptualization of Learning and Its Relation With Theory of Mind Development

In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children’s conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind (ToM) ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age (M = 65.45, SD = 11.45, 36 girls) judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did not involve knowledge change. Children’s learning judgments in familiar contexts improved with age and correlated with their ToM understanding. However, the correlation was no longer significant once age was held constant. Another sample of 72 children aged between 40 and 90 months (M = 66.87, SD = 11.83, 31 girls) participated in study 2, where children were asked to judge whether the story protagonists intended to learn and whether they eventually learned. The results suggested that children over-attributed learning intention to discovery and implicit learning. Stories with conflict between the learning intention and outcome appeared to be most challenging for children. Children’s intention judgment was correlated with their ToM understanding, and ToM marginally predicted intention judgment when the effect of age was accounted for. The implication of the findings for school readiness was discussed. Training studies and longitudinal designs in the future are warranted to better understand the relation between ToM development and children’s learning understanding.

Preschoolers refer to direct and indirect evidence in their collaborative reasoning

Collaborative reasoning requires partners to evaluate options and the evidence for or against each option. We investigated whether preschoolers can explain why one option is best (direct reasons) and why the other option is not (indirect reasons), looking at both problems that have a correct answer and those that require choosing the better option. In Study 1, both age groups produced direct reasons equally frequently in both problems. However, 5-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than 3-year-olds, especially when there was a correct answer. In Study 2 with a nonverbal task with a correct answer, 3-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than in Study 1, although 5-year-olds' indirect reasons were more efficiently stated. These results demonstrate that even 3-year-olds, and even nonverbally, can point out to a partner a fact that constitutes a reason for them to arrive at a correct joint decision.

Children's selective information sharing based on the recipient's role

Two experiments investigate whether children ages 5 through 10 (n = 121) take into account an individual's role when choosing what information to share or with whom to share it. In Experiment 1, children heard statements about an unfamiliar animal's behavior and appearance. They then chose one statement to share with each of two characters with different job descriptions. Seven-year-olds consistently shared the information that aligned with each character's role, but 5-year-olds and a subset of 9-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that children's decisions about what to share were not driven by their personal preferences for the information they were sharing. In addition, when children were provided with a single fact and had to choose with whom to share it, 7- and 9-year-olds shared information with the recipient for whom it was most relevant. Together, the findings suggest that by age 7, children can use information about an individual's occupational role in order to infer what information to share.

The Pervasive Role of Pragmatics in Early Language

Language is a fundamentally social endeavor. Pragmatics is the study of how speakers and listeners use social reasoning to go beyond the literal meanings of words to interpret language in context. In this article, we take a pragmatic perspective on language development and argue for developmental continuity between early nonverbal communication, language learning, and linguistic pragmatics. We link phenomena from these different literatures by relating them to a computational framework (the rational speech act framework), which conceptualizes communication as fundamentally inferential and grounded in social cognition. The model specifies how different information sources (linguistic utterances, social cues, common ground) are combined when making pragmatic inferences. We present evidence in favor of this inferential view and review how pragmatic reasoning supports children's learning, comprehension, and use of language.

Young children consider the expected utility of others' learning to decide what to teach

Direct instruction facilitates learning without the costs of exploration, yet teachers must be selective because not everything can nor needs to be taught. How do we decide what to teach and what to leave for learners to discover? Here we investigate the cognitive underpinnings of the human ability to prioritize what to teach. We present a computational model that decides what to teach by maximizing the learner's expected utility of learning from instruction and from exploration, and we show that children (aged 5-7 years) make decisions that are consistent with the model's predictions (that is, minimizing the learner's costs and maximizing the rewards). Children flexibly considered either the learner's utility or their own, depending on the context, and even considered costs they had not personally experienced, to decide what to teach. These results suggest that utility-based reasoning may play an important role in curating cultural knowledge by supporting selective transmission of high-utility information.