Intelligence and Neurophysiological Markers of Error Monitoring Relate to Children's Intellectual Humility

The role of accuracy in children's judgments of experts' knowledge

Across two studies, children ages 6-9 (N = 160, 82 boys, 78 girls; 75% White, 91% non-Hispanic) rated an inaccurate expert's knowledge and provided explanations for the expert's inaccurate statements. In Study 1, children's knowledge ratings decreased as he provided more inaccurate information. Ratings were predicted by age (i.e., older children gave lower ratings than younger children) and how children explained the error. Children's ratings followed similar patterns in Study 2. However, children delegated new questions to the inaccurate expert, even after rating him as having little to no knowledge. These results suggest that 6- to 9-year-olds weigh accuracy over expertise when making epistemic judgments, but, when they need assistance, they will still seek out information from a previously inaccurate expert.

Intergenerational transmission of cognitive control capacity among children at risk for depression

A maternal history of major depressive disorder (MDD) is a well-known risk factor for depression in offspring. However, the mechanism through which familial risk is transmitted remains unclear. Cognitive control alterations are common in MDD, and thus, the current study investigated whether altered control capacity is transmitted intergenerationally, and whether it then contributes to the developmental pathways through which depression is passed from mothers to children. We recruited children (N = 65) ages 4-10-years-old, of which 47.7 % (n = 31) reported a maternal history of MDD, and their biological mother (N = 65). Children performed a child-friendly Go/NoGo task while electroencephalography (EEG) data were recorded, and mothers performed a Flanker task. Children exhibited heightened sensitivity to error versus correct responses, which was characterized by an error-related negativity (ERN), error positivity (Pe) as well as prominent delta and frontal midline theta (FMT) oscillations. Interestingly, worse maternal performance on the Flanker task associated with an increased Go/NoGo error rate and a smaller ERN and Pe in children. However, there was no association between maternal or child control indices with child depression symptoms. Our results suggest a familial influence of cognitive control capacity in mother-child dyads, but it remains unclear whether this confers risk for depressive symptoms in children. Further research is necessary to determine whether alterations in cognitive control over time may influence symptom development in at-risk children.

The Relationship between Executive Functions, Working Memory, and Intelligence in Kindergarten Children

Executive functions (EF), working memory (WM), and intelligence are closely associated, but distinct constructs. What underlies the associations between these constructs, especially in childhood, is not well understood. In this pre-registered study, along with the traditional aggregate accuracy and RT-based measures of EF, we investigated post-error slowing (PES) in EF as a manifestation of metacognitive processes (i.e., monitoring and cognitive control) in relation to WM and intelligence. Thereby, we aimed to elucidate whether these metacognitive processes may be one underlying component to explain the associations between these constructs. We tested kindergarten children (M_age = 6.4 years, SD_age = 0.3) in an EF, WM (verbal and visuospatial), and fluid (non-verbal) intelligence task. We found significant associations of mainly the inhibition component of EF with fluid intelligence and verbal WM, and between verbal WM and intelligence. No significant associations emerged between the PES in EF and intelligence or WM. These results suggest that in the kindergarten age, inhibition rather than monitoring and cognitive control might be the underlying component that explains the associations between EF, WM, and intelligence.

Children's developing ability to adjust their beliefs reasonably in light of disagreement

Two preregistered experiments (N = 218) investigated children's developing ability to respond reasonably to disagreement. U.S. children aged 4-9, and adults (50% female, mostly white) formed an initial belief, and were confronted with the belief of a disagreeing other, whose evidence was weaker, stronger than, or equal to participants' evidence. With age, participants were increasingly likely to maintain their initial belief when their own evidence was stronger, adopt the other's belief when their evidence was weaker, and suspend judgment when both had equally strong evidence. Interestingly, 4- to 6-year-olds only suspended judgment reliably when this was assessed via the search for additional information (Experiment 2). Together, our experiments suggest that the ability to respond reasonably to disagreement develops over the preschool years.

Six- to eight-year-olds’ performance in the Heart and Flower task: Emerging proactive cognitive control

The Heart and Flower task is used worldwide to measure age-dependent and individual differences in executive functions and/or cognitive control. The task reliably maps age and individual differences and these have consistently been found to be predictive for different aspects of school readiness and academic achievement. The idea has been put forward that there is a developmental shift in how children approach such a task. While 6-year-olds’ tend to adapt their task strategy ad hoc and reactively, older children increasingly engage in proactive cognitive control. Proactive cognitive control entails finding the right response speed without risking errors, always dependent on the cognitive conflict. The main goal of the present contribution was to examine children’s adjustments of response speed as a function of age and cognitive conflict by addressing RTs surrounding errors (i.e., errors and post-error trials). Data from a large sample with three age groups was used (N = 106 6-year-olds’ with a mean age of 6 years; 3 months; N = 108 7-year-olds’ with a mean age of 7 years; 4 months; N = 78 8-year-olds’ with a mean age of 8 years; 1 month). Response speed adjustments and the development thereof were targeted both across the Flower and Mixed block, respectively, and within these blocks focusing on errors and post-error slowing. Results revealed evidence for a developmental shift toward more efficient proactive cognitive control between 6 and 8 years of age, with the older but not the younger children strategically slowing down in the Mixed block and smoother post-error slowing. At the same time, we found that even the youngest age group has emerging proactive cognitive control skills at their disposal when addressing post-error slowing in the Flower block. The present study thus tracks the early roots of later efficient executive functions and cognitive control, contributes to a better understanding of how developmental progression in cognitive control is achieved, and highlights new avenues for research in this domain.

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote — intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one’s beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.

Intellectual humility involves acknowledging the limitations of one’s knowledge and that one’s beliefs might be incorrect. In this Review, Porter and colleagues synthesize concepts of intellectual humility across fields and describe the complex interplay between intellectual humility and related individual and societal factors.

Clarifying the Content of Intellectual Humility: A Systematic Review and Integrative Framework

During the last decade, intellectual humility has gone from a topic of philosophical inquiry to one of serious scientific investigation. It has been variously described as a remedy for political polarization, a tool for advancing scientific credibility, and a disposition that promotes learning. However, less attention has been paid to how intellectual humility has been defined and measured or how well psychologists' definitions and measures align with one another or with philosophers' accounts. Through a systematic review of empirical intellectual humility research, we identified 18 separate definitions and 20 measures including16 unique questionnaires. We then synthesized this research to advance a new framework of intellectual humility. Implications of this framework for measurement and future research on intellectual humility are discussed.

Mind the gap: How incomplete explanations influence children's interest and learning behaviors

Children rely on others' explanations to learn scientific concepts, yet sometimes the explanations they receive are incomplete. Three studies explore how receiving incomplete or complete explanations influences children's subsequent interest and engagement in learning behaviors to obtain additional information about a topic. Children ages 7-10 (N = 275; 49% female, 51% male; 55% white) viewed question-and-answer exchanges about animal behaviors that included either a complete causal explanation of the behavior or an explanation that was missing a key step. Children rated how knowledgeable they felt after hearing the explanation (Study 1) or how much information was missing from the explanation (Studies 2 and 3) and reported how interested they were in learning more about the topic. They also completed two measures of learning behaviors: a book choice task (all studies) and a card choice task (Studies 1 and 2). In the book choice task, children opted to learn about the topics of the incomplete explanations more frequently than the topics of the complete explanations. However, there was no evidence of selective learning behaviors in the card choice task and children's self-reported interest in learning more about each animal behavior was not directly related to the type of explanation they had received. Individual differences in children's interest and learning behaviors were linked to verbal intelligence and domain-specific biological knowledge. Implications for the information-gap theory of learning and children's learning in multiple contexts are discussed.

Intellectual humility: an old problem in a new psychological perspective

Though having been emphasised by philosophers and theologians for centuries, it is only in the last few years that the concept of intellectual humility has been explicitly defined and studied by empirical psychology. However, it has been long enough to recognise the prominent role that being intellectually humble plays for humane functioning, both at an intra- and inter-individual level. Having started with a broader philosophical and historical context, the present paper discusses the psychological conceptualisations of intellectual humility. Then the recent empirical studies are reviewed, including four strands of research referring to personality traits, cognitive functioning, social relations and religiosity. After presenting selected results, the prospects of psychological research on intellectual humility are discussed, including the limitations and challenges of measurement techniques as well as possible directions for future studies.

Supporting Early Scientific Thinking Through Curiosity

Curiosity and curiosity-driven questioning are important for developing scientific thinking and more general interest and motivation to pursue scientific questions. Curiosity has been operationalized as preference for uncertainty (Jirout and Klahr, 2012), and engaging in inquiry-an essential part of scientific reasoning-generates high levels of uncertainty (Metz, 2004; van Schijndel et al., 2018). This perspective piece begins by discussing mechanisms through which curiosity can support learning and motivation in science, including motivating information-seeking behaviors, gathering information in response to curiosity, and promoting deeper understanding through connection-making related to addressing information gaps. In the second part of the article, a recent theory of how to promote curiosity in schools is discussed in relation to early childhood science reasoning. Finally, potential directions for research on the development of curiosity and curiosity-driven inquiry in young children are discussed. Although quite a bit is known about the development of children’s question asking specifically, and there are convincing arguments for developing scientific curiosity to promote science reasoning skills, there are many important areas for future research to address how to effectively use curiosity to support science learning.