Children's Developing Ability to Resolve Disagreements by Integrating Perspectives

Children Use the Relative Confidence of People With Conflicting Perspectives to Form Their Own Beliefs

We provide evidence that children sensibly integrate the judgments of different people who disagree according to their confidence. We asked children (ages 5-10 years, N = 92) to make judgments about what happened during unobserved events by relying on two informants who sometimes disagreed. Children integrated the reports of informants and formed novel beliefs endorsed by neither party by 8 years old when the informants reported equal confidence-for example, they selected a monster with six spots when one informant reported seeing one with four spots and another reported seeing one with eight. Unequal confidence across the informants biased children toward the judgment of the more confident party. That children can integrate social confidence judgments with conflicting information-considering and weighing the relative confidence of others to make up their own minds about what is most likely-represents a previously unappreciated mechanism of learning that is crucial to children's development as independent social agents. It allows children to become independent thinkers who can form beliefs that build on the knowledge of others without relying on identical belief adoption of one social agent over another.

Children's Developing Understanding of the Value of Disagreement for Learning

Do children and adults recognize the value of disagreement for learning? Across two preregistered studies (data collected 2023), 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 200, 101 females, mixed ethnicities) and adults (N = 200, 99 females, mixed ethnicities) were asked whether a protagonist would learn more by talking to someone who agrees or disagrees with them about different beliefs. Across studies, participants more often endorsed learning from someone who disagreed with the protagonist when no "correct" answer existed, that is, when beliefs concerned preferences or ambiguous situations, or when the protagonist did not hold the typically "correct" belief. Adults endorsed learning from disagreement and articulated why disagreement is helpful for learning more often than children.

Three- and 5-year-old children know their current belief might be wrong

By 4 or 5 years of age, children understand when their own past beliefs were incorrect, or when others' current beliefs are incorrect. In the current study, we asked whether young children understand when their own current belief might be incorrect. 3- and 5-year old children (N = 77) made a judgment and then experienced a puppet making a judgment about the same situation. Children of both ages rechecked their evidence more often when the puppet disagreed with them than when it agreed with them (and the nature of their rechecking was different in the two conditions as well). These results suggest that already by 3 years of age children understand that they might currently be wrong, and they know that rechecking the evidence can resolve their uncertainty.

Children use disagreement to infer what happened

In a rapidly changing and diverse world, the ability to reason about conflicting perspectives is critical for effective communication, collaboration, and critical thinking. The current pre-registered experiments with children ages 7 to 11 years investigated the developmental foundations of this ability through a novel social reasoning paradigm and a computational approach. In the inference task, children were asked to figure out what happened based on whether two speakers agreed or disagreed in their interpretation. In the prediction task, children were provided information about what happened and asked to predict whether two speakers will agree or disagree. Together, these experiments assessed children's understanding that disagreement often results from ambiguity about what happened, and that ambiguity about what happened is often predictive of disagreement. Experiment 1 (N = 52) showed that children are more likely to infer that an ambiguous utterance occurred after learning that people disagreed (versus agreed) about what happened and found that these inferences become stronger with age. Experiment 2 (N = 110) similarly found age-related change in children's inferences and also showed that children could reason in the forward direction, predicting that an ambiguous utterance would lead to disagreement. A computational model indicated that although children's ability to predict when disagreements might arise may be critical for making the reverse inferences, it did not fully account for age-related change.

Young children's conceptualization of empirical disagreement

Chinese and American children aged 5-11 years (total N = 144) heard two child informants make conflicting empirical claims about each of 4 scenarios. For example, one informant claimed that a ball would float when dropped in water whereas the other informant claimed that it would sink. Children were asked to judge whether each informant could be right, and to justify their overall judgment. In both samples, there was a change with age. Older children often said that each informant could be right whereas younger children, especially in China, were more likely to say that only one informant could be right. Nevertheless, in the wake of decisive empirical evidence (e.g., the ball was shown to sink when dropped in water), almost all children, irrespective of age, drew appropriate conclusions about which of the two informants had been right. Thus, with increasing age, children differ in their prospective - but not in their retrospective - appraisal of empirical disagreement. Absent decisive evidence, older children are more likely than younger children to suspend judgment by acknowledging that either of two conflicting claims could be right. We argue that children's tendency to suspend judgment is linked to their developing awareness of empirical uncertainty, as expressed both in the justifications they give when judging the disagreement and in their own beliefs about the scenarios. Implications for children's understanding of disagreement are discussed.

Children's developing ability to adjust their beliefs reasonably in light of disagreement

Two preregistered experiments (N = 218) investigated children's developing ability to respond reasonably to disagreement. U.S. children aged 4-9, and adults (50% female, mostly white) formed an initial belief, and were confronted with the belief of a disagreeing other, whose evidence was weaker, stronger than, or equal to participants' evidence. With age, participants were increasingly likely to maintain their initial belief when their own evidence was stronger, adopt the other's belief when their evidence was weaker, and suspend judgment when both had equally strong evidence. Interestingly, 4- to 6-year-olds only suspended judgment reliably when this was assessed via the search for additional information (Experiment 2). Together, our experiments suggest that the ability to respond reasonably to disagreement develops over the preschool years.