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Adel A, El-Sayed HS, Samir A, Abdelaty MF, Hamed EA, Roshdy H. A cross-sectional survey for the assessment of biosecurity measures in small-scale duck farms in Qalyoubia, Egypt: Comprehensive evaluation and procedural recommendations. Vet World 2023; 16:607-617. [PMID: 37041824 PMCID: PMC10082737 DOI: 10.14202/vetworld.2023.607-617] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2022] [Accepted: 02/07/2023] [Indexed: 03/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Background and Aim: Biosecurity implementation is fundamental to combating diseases and antibiotic resistance. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the correlation between the implementation of biosecurity measures in small-scale duck farms and the incidence of infectious diseases that threaten the duck industry.
Materials and Methods: Twenty small-scale duck farms of different breeds and production stages were collected as representative samples, focused on two districts in the Qalyoubia governorate, which possesses high-density small-scale farms. A 30-point structured questionnaire was designed to assess the level of biosecurity measures implemented in the sampled farms. These farms were examined for bacterial infection by cultivation, typing, and antibiotic sensitivity tests, in addition to molecular techniques for detecting suspected viral diseases.
Results: The results showed that the farms had high or low levels of biosecurity; only 25% possessed high-level biosecurity. Bacteria, including Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus, and Pasteurella, were isolated from all sampled farms. High rates of antimicrobial resistance-reaching up to 100% were observed against some drugs. However, viral causative agents, including HPAI-H5N8, duck viral hepatitis, and goose parvovirus, were isolated from only five farms.
Conclusion: The lack of commitment to biosecurity implementation, particularly personal hygiene, was observed in most sampled farms. Increasing the level of biosecurity reduced the incidence of mixed infections.
Keywords: antibiotic resistance, bacterial agents, biosecurity, co-infections, small-scale duck farms, viral diseases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amany Adel
- Reference Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production, Animal Health Research Institute, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Giza 12618, Egypt
- Corresponding author: Amany Adel, e-mail: Co-authors: HSE: , AS: , MFA: , EAH: , HR:
| | - Hemat S. El-Sayed
- Department of Poultry Diseases, Animal Health Research Institute, Benha-Branch, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Egypt
| | - Abdelhafez Samir
- Reference Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production, Animal Health Research Institute, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Giza 12618, Egypt
| | - May F. Abdelaty
- Reference Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production, Animal Health Research Institute, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Giza 12618, Egypt
| | - Engy A. Hamed
- Reference Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production, Animal Health Research Institute, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Giza 12618, Egypt
| | - Heba Roshdy
- Reference Laboratory for Veterinary Quality Control on Poultry Production, Animal Health Research Institute, Agriculture Research Center (ARC), Giza 12618, Egypt
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Zecchin B, Goujgoulova G, Monne I, Salviato A, Schivo A, Slavcheva I, Pastori A, Brown IH, Lewis NS, Terregino C, Fusaro A. Evolutionary Dynamics of H5 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses (Clade 2.3.4.4B) Circulating in Bulgaria in 2019-2021. Viruses 2021; 13:2086. [PMID: 34696516 PMCID: PMC8541051 DOI: 10.3390/v13102086] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2021] [Revised: 09/22/2021] [Accepted: 10/11/2021] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The first detection of a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N8 virus in Bulgaria dates back to December 2016. Since then, many outbreaks caused by HPAI H5 viruses from clade 2.3.4.4B have been reported in both domestic and wild birds in different regions of the country. In this study, we characterized the complete genome of sixteen H5 viruses collected in Bulgaria between 2019 and 2021. Phylogenetic analyses revealed a persistent circulation of the H5N8 strain for four consecutive years (December 2016-June 2020) and the emergence in 2020 of a novel reassortant H5N2 subtype, likely in a duck farm. Estimation of the time to the most recent common ancestor indicates that this reassortment event may have occurred between May 2019 and January 2020. At the beginning of 2021, Bulgaria experienced a new virus introduction in the poultry sector, namely a HPAI H5N8 that had been circulating in Europe since October 2020. The periodical identification in domestic birds of H5 viruses related to the 2016 epidemic as well as a reassortant strain might indicate undetected circulation of the virus in resident wild birds or in the poultry sector. To avoid the concealed circulation and evolution of viruses, and the risk of emergence of strains with pandemic potential, the implementation of control measures is of utmost importance, particularly in duck farms where birds display no clinical signs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bianca Zecchin
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Gabriela Goujgoulova
- National Reference Laboratory of Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, National Diagnostic and Research Veterinary Medical Institute, 1231 Sofia, Bulgaria; (G.G.); (I.S.)
| | - Isabella Monne
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Annalisa Salviato
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Alessia Schivo
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Iskra Slavcheva
- National Reference Laboratory of Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, National Diagnostic and Research Veterinary Medical Institute, 1231 Sofia, Bulgaria; (G.G.); (I.S.)
| | - Ambra Pastori
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Ian H. Brown
- OIE/FAO International Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Swine Influenza and Newcastle Disease Virus, Animal and Plant Health Agency-Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (I.H.B.); (N.S.L.)
| | - Nicola S. Lewis
- OIE/FAO International Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Swine Influenza and Newcastle Disease Virus, Animal and Plant Health Agency-Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (I.H.B.); (N.S.L.)
- Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, Royal Veterinary College, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL9 7TA, UK
| | - Calogero Terregino
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
| | - Alice Fusaro
- EU/OIE/National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, 35020 Legnaro, Italy; (I.M.); (A.S.); (A.S.); (A.P.); (C.T.)
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3
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Venkatesh D, Brouwer A, Goujgoulova G, Ellis R, Seekings J, Brown IH, Lewis NS. Regional Transmission and Reassortment of 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Viruses in Bulgarian Poultry 2017/18. Viruses 2020; 12:v12060605. [PMID: 32492965 PMCID: PMC7354578 DOI: 10.3390/v12060605] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2020] [Revised: 05/26/2020] [Accepted: 05/28/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 2017 and 2018, several farms across Bulgaria reported outbreaks of H5 highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses. In this study we used genomic and traditional epidemiological analyses to trace the origin and subsequent spread of these outbreaks within Bulgaria. Both methods indicate two separate incursions, one restricted to the northeastern region of Dobrich, and another largely restricted to Central and Eastern Bulgaria including places such as Plovdiv, Sliven and Stara Zagora, as well as one virus from the Western region of Vidin. Both outbreaks likely originate from different European 2.3.4.4b virus ancestors circulating in 2017. The viruses were likely introduced by wild birds or poultry trade links in 2017 and have continued to circulate, but due to lack of contemporaneous sampling and sequences from wild bird viruses in Bulgaria, the precise route and timing of introduction cannot be determined. Analysis of whole genomes indicates a complete lack of reassortment in all segments but the matrix protein gene (MP), which presents as multiple smaller clusters associated with different European 2.3.4.4b viruses. Ancestral reconstruction of host states of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of viruses involved in the outbreaks suggests that transmission is driven by domestic ducks into galliform poultry. Thus, according to present evidence, we suggest the surveillance of domestic ducks as they are an epidemiologically relevant species for subclinical infection. Monitoring the spread due to movement between farms within regions and links to poultry production systems in European countries can help to predict and prevent future outbreaks. The 2.3.4.4b lineage which caused the largest recorded poultry epidemic in Europe continues to circulate, and the risk of further transmission by wild birds during migration remains.
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Affiliation(s)
- Divya Venkatesh
- Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, Royal Veterinary College, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL9 7TA, UK;
- Correspondence:
| | - Adam Brouwer
- OIE/FAO/ International Reference Laboratory for avian influenza, swine influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (A.B.); (J.S.); (I.H.B.)
| | - Gabriela Goujgoulova
- National Diagnostic Research Veterinary Medical Institute, 1231 Sofia, Bulgaria;
| | - Richard Ellis
- Surveillance and Laboratory Services Department, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK;
| | - James Seekings
- OIE/FAO/ International Reference Laboratory for avian influenza, swine influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (A.B.); (J.S.); (I.H.B.)
- Virology Department, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK
| | - Ian H. Brown
- OIE/FAO/ International Reference Laboratory for avian influenza, swine influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (A.B.); (J.S.); (I.H.B.)
| | - Nicola S. Lewis
- Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, Royal Veterinary College, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL9 7TA, UK;
- OIE/FAO/ International Reference Laboratory for avian influenza, swine influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK; (A.B.); (J.S.); (I.H.B.)
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Muzyka D, Rula O, Tkachenko S, Muzyka N, Köthe S, Pishchanskyi O, Stegniy B, Pantin-Jackwood M, Beer M. Highly Pathogenic and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Subtype Viruses in Wild Birds in Ukraine. Avian Dis 2020; 63:219-229. [PMID: 31131580 DOI: 10.1637/11879-042718-resnote.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2018] [Accepted: 12/09/2018] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
There have been three waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in commercial, backyard poultry, and wild birds in Ukraine. The first (2005-2006) and second (2008) waves were caused by H5N1 HPAI virus, with 45 outbreaks among commercial poultry (chickens) and backyard fowl (chickens, ducks, and geese) in four regions of Ukraine (AR Crimea, Kherson, Odesa, and Sumy Oblast). H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from dead wild birds: cormorants (Phalacrocorax carbo) and great crested grebes (Podiceps cristatus) in 2006 and 2008. The third HPAI wave consisted of nine outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in wild and domestic birds, beginning in November 2016 in the central and south regions (Kherson, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, and Mykolaiv Oblast). H5N8 HPAI virus was detected in dead mute swans (Cygnus olor), peacocks (Pavo cristatus) (in zoo), ruddy shelducks (Tadorna ferruginea), white-fronted geese (Anser albifrons), and from environmental samples in 2016 and 2017. Wide wild bird surveillance for avian influenza (AI) virus was conducted from 2006 to 2016 in Ukraine regions suspected of being intercontinental (north-south and east-west) flyways. A total of 21 511 samples were collected from 105 species of wild birds representing 27 families and 11 orders. Ninety-five avian influenza (AI) viruses were isolated (including one H5N2 LPAI virus in 2010) from wild birds with a total of 26 antigenic hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) combinations. Fifteen of 16 known avian HA subtypes were isolated. Two H5N8 HPAI viruses (2016-2017) and two H5N2 LPAI viruses (2016) were isolated from wild birds and environmental samples (fresh bird feces) during surveillance before the outbreak in poultry in 2016-2017. The Ukrainian H5N1, H5N8 HPAI, and H5N2 LPAI viruses belong to different H5 phylogenetic groups. Our results demonstrate the great diversity of AI viruses in wild birds in Ukraine, as well as the importance of this region for studying the ecology of avian influenza.
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Affiliation(s)
- Denys Muzyka
- National Scientific Center "Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine", Kharkiv, 61023, Ukraine,
| | - Oleksandr Rula
- National Scientific Center "Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine", Kharkiv, 61023, Ukraine
| | - Semen Tkachenko
- National Scientific Center "Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine", Kharkiv, 61023, Ukraine
| | - Nataliia Muzyka
- State Poultry Research Station, v. Birky, Kharkiv Region, 63422, Ukraine
| | - Susanne Köthe
- Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, 17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Oleksandr Pishchanskyi
- National Scientific Center "Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine", Kharkiv, 61023, Ukraine
| | - Borys Stegniy
- National Scientific Center "Institute of Experimental and Clinical Veterinary Medicine", Kharkiv, 61023, Ukraine
| | - Mary Pantin-Jackwood
- Exotic and Emerging Avian Viral Diseases Unit, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, U.S. National Poultry Research Center, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Athens, GA 30677
| | - Martin Beer
- Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, 17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
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Delpont M, Racicot M, Durivage A, Fornili L, Guerin JL, Vaillancourt JP, Paul MC. Determinants of biosecurity practices in French duck farms after a H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza epidemic: The effect of farmer knowledge, attitudes and personality traits. Transbound Emerg Dis 2020; 68:51-61. [PMID: 31960594 DOI: 10.1111/tbed.13462] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2019] [Revised: 11/28/2019] [Accepted: 12/21/2019] [Indexed: 01/23/2023]
Abstract
Biosecurity is crucial for infectious disease prevention, more importantly in the absence of vaccination. The need for improving the implementation of biosecurity practices was highlighted in French duck farms following the 2016-2017 H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) epidemic. Farmers have multiple reasons for not implementing biosecurity practices: external (time, money) and internal (socio-psychological). The purpose of this study was to determine how sets of socio-psychological factors (i.e. knowledge on biosecurity and avian influenza transmission, attitudes, personality traits, social background) affect the adoption of on-farm biosecurity practices. Biosecurity practices and socio-psychological determinants were assessed during 127 duck farm visits, in South West France, using both questionnaires and on-farm observations. Factorial analysis of mixed data (FAMD) and hierarchical clustering analysis (HCA) identified three groups of farmers with different socio-psychological profiles: the first group was characterized by minimal knowledge, negative attitudes towards biosecurity, little social pressure and a low level of conscientiousness. The second group was characterized by more extensive experience in poultry production, higher stress and social pressure. The third group was characterized by less experience in poultry production, better knowledge and positive attitudes towards biosecurity, increased self-confidence and orientation towards action. The first group had a significantly lower adoption of biosecurity measures than the two other groups. A better understanding of the factors involved in farmers' decision-making could improve the efficiency of interventions aiming at improving and maintaining the level of on-farm biosecurity in the duck industry.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Manon Racicot
- Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Department of Pathology and Microbiology, Université de Montréal, St-Hyacinthe, QC, Canada
| | - André Durivage
- Department of Administrative Science, Université du Québec en Outaouais, Gatineau, QC, Canada
| | - Lucie Fornili
- IHAP, Université de Toulouse, INRAE, ENVT, Toulouse, France
| | | | - Jean-Pierre Vaillancourt
- Department of Clinical Sciences, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Université de Montréal, St-Hyacinthe, QC, Canada
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Nikolov S, H. Marinova M, Murad B, Tsachev I. A review of wild and synantropic birds recorded as reservoirs of avian influenza viruses in Bulgaria. BULGARIAN JOURNAL OF VETERINARY MEDICINE 2020. [DOI: 10.15547/bjvm.2248] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
The aim of the present review is to summarise the information about the species diversity of wild and synanthropic birds, which have been recorded as reservoirs of influenza in Bulgaria until 2018. A total of 17 species of wild and synantropic birds were reported. They belong to 16 genera, 11 families and 10 orders of the class Aves. A list of wild and synantropic birds – potential reservoirs of influenza in Bulgaria is also presented.
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Guinat C, Artois J, Bronner A, Guérin JL, Gilbert M, Paul MC. Duck production systems and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 in France, 2016-2017. Sci Rep 2019; 9:6177. [PMID: 30992486 PMCID: PMC6467959 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-42607-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2018] [Accepted: 04/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
In winter 2016-2017, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N8 virus spread across Europe, causing unprecedented epizootics. France was massively affected, resulting in the culling of over 6 million poultry. Boosted regression tree (BRT) models were used to quantify the association between spatial risk factors and HPAI H5N8 infection in poultry holdings and to generate predictive maps for HPAI infection. Three datasets were combined to build the model: a dataset of the reported outbreaks in poultry, a dataset of the poultry holdings where the virus has not been reported and a set of relevant spatial risk factors, including poultry production and trade, and water bird habitat. Results identified key associations between the 'foie gras' production systems and HPAI H5N8 risk of occurrence and indicate that strengthening surveillance of fattening duck production systems and making the transportation of fattening ducks more secure would be key priority options for HPAI prevention and control.
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Affiliation(s)
- C Guinat
- IHAP, Université de Toulouse, INRA, ENVT, Toulouse, France.
| | - J Artois
- Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
| | - A Bronner
- Direction Générale de l'Alimentation, Paris, France
| | - J L Guérin
- IHAP, Université de Toulouse, INRA, ENVT, Toulouse, France
| | - M Gilbert
- Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
- Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique, Brussels, Belgium
| | - M C Paul
- IHAP, Université de Toulouse, INRA, ENVT, Toulouse, France
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8
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Emergence and multiple reassortments of French 2015-2016 highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza viruses. INFECTION GENETICS AND EVOLUTION 2018; 61:208-214. [PMID: 29649578 DOI: 10.1016/j.meegid.2018.04.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2018] [Revised: 03/26/2018] [Accepted: 04/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
From November 2015 to August 2016, 81 outbreaks of highly pathogenic (HP) H5 avian influenza virus were detected in poultry farms from South-Western France. These viruses were mainly detected in farms raising waterfowl, but also in chicken or guinea fowl flocks, and did not induce severe signs in waterfowl although they did meet the HP criteria. Three different types of neuraminidases (N1, N2 and N9) were associated with the HP H5 gene. Full genomes sequences of 24 H5HP and 6 LP viruses that circulated in the same period were obtained by next generation sequencing, from direct field samples or after virus isolation in SPF embryonated eggs. Phylogenetic analyses of the eight viral segments confirmed that they were all related to the avian Eurasian lineage. In addition, analyses of the "Time of the Most Recent Common Ancestor" showed that the common ancestor of the H5HP sequences from South-Western France could date back to early 2014 (±1 year). This pre-dated the first detection of H5 HP in poultry farms and was consistent with a silent circulation of these viruses for several months. Finally, the phylogenetic study of the different segments showed that several phylogenetic groups could be established. Twelve genotypes of H5HP were detected implying that at least eleven reassortment events did occur after the H5HP cleavage site emerged. This indicates that a large number of co-infections with both highly pathogenic H5 and other avian influenza viruses must have occurred, a finding that lends further support to prolonged silent circulation.
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More S, Bicout D, Bøtner A, Butterworth A, Calistri P, Depner K, Edwards S, Garin-Bastuji B, Good M, Gortázar Schmidt C, Michel V, Miranda MA, Nielsen SS, Raj M, Sihvonen L, Spoolder H, Thulke HH, Velarde A, Willeberg P, Winckler C, Breed A, Brouwer A, Guillemain M, Harder T, Monne I, Roberts H, Baldinelli F, Barrucci F, Fabris C, Martino L, Mosbach-Schulz O, Verdonck F, Morgado J, Stegeman JA. Avian influenza. EFSA J 2017; 15:e04991. [PMID: 32625288 PMCID: PMC7009867 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.
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Marinova-Petkova A, Georgiev G, Petkov T, Darnell D, Franks J, Kayali G, Walker D, Seiler P, Danner A, Graham A, McKenzie P, Krauss S, Webby RJ, Webster RG. Influenza surveillance on 'foie gras' duck farms in Bulgaria, 2008-2012. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2016; 10:98-108. [PMID: 26663739 PMCID: PMC4746559 DOI: 10.1111/irv.12368] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/29/2015] [Indexed: 01/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Objectives Ducks can shed and spread influenza A viruses (IAVs) while showing no disease signs. Our objective was to clarify the role of ‘foie gras’ ducks in the circulation of IAVs in Bulgaria. Methods Monthly avian influenza surveillance was conducted on 63 ‘foie gras’ duck farms, 52 of which were surveyed throughout the study between November 2008 and April 2012. Virologic and serologic samples were collected and tested. During this time, wild bird samples were collected at major wild bird‐resting areas near the Black Sea coast and Danube River. Results The study showed high isolation frequency of low‐pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. In the raising population (<75 days old), subtypes H3, H4, and H6 were detected monthly and H5 LPAIV, sporadically. Different subtypes (H1, H10, H11) were isolated from the fattening premises (75‐ to 100‐day‐old ducks), suggesting different routes of introduction. Only 6 of the 52 farms that were surveyed both virologically and serologically were influenza‐free throughout the study, possibly due to higher biosecurity measures implemented. No evidence of direct transmission of IAV from wild birds was found. Wild bird surveillance showed low isolation frequency of IAV. IAV prevalence of 0·55% for migratory ducks and 0·53% for migratory geese was estimated in November–December 2011 and January–February 2012, respectively, at two ornithologically important locations near the Black Sea coast. Conclusions The ‘foie gras’ duck farms in Bulgaria are an optimal niche where Eurasian‐like IAVs are maintained and reassorted unapparent to farmers and veterinarians.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Todor Petkov
- Bulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | | | - John Franks
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
| | - Ghazi Kayali
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
| | - David Walker
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
| | | | - Angela Danner
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
| | | | | | - Scott Krauss
- St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA
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