Ratio Abstraction by 6-Month-Old Infants

Spatial associations of number and pitch in human newborns

Humans use space to think, reason about, externally represent, and even talk about many dimensions (e.g., time, pitch height). One dimension that appears to exploit spatial resources is the mental representation of the numerosity of a set in the form of a mental number line. Although the horizontal number-space mapping is present from birth (small-left vs. large-right), it is unknown whether it extends to other spatial axes from birth or whether it is later acquired through development/experience. Moreover, newborns map changes in pitch height onto a vertical axis (low pitch-bottom vs. high pitch-top), but it is an open question whether it extends to other spatial axes. We presented newborns (N = 64 total, n = 16 per experiment, 0-4 days) with an auditory increase/decrease in magnitude along with a visual figure on a vertically oriented screen (bottom vs. top, change in number: Experiments 1 and 2; change in pitch: Experiment 3) or on a horizontally oriented screen (left vs. right, change in pitch: Experiment 4). Newborns associated changes in magnitude with a vertical axis only when experiencing an increase in magnitude (increase/up); however, the possibility that visuospatial biases could account for this asymmetric pattern are discussed. Newborns did not map changes in pitch horizontally (Experiment 4), in line with previous work showing that the horizontal mapping of number at birth does not generalize to other dimensions. These findings suggest that the flexible use of different spatial axes to map magnitude is not functional at birth and that the horizontal mapping of number might be privileged.

Crossing the Boundary: No Catastrophic Limits on Infants' Capacity to Represent Linguistic Sequences

The boundary effect, namely the infants' failures to compare small and large numerosities, is well documented in studies using visual stimuli. The prevailing explanation is that the numerical system used to process sets up to 3 is incompatible with the system employed for numbers >3. This study investigates the boundary effect in 10-month-old infants presented with linguistic sequences. In Condition 1 (2 vs. 3), infants can differentiate small syllable sequences (2 vs. 3), with better performance for the 2-syllable sequence, which imposes a lower memory load. Condition 2 (2 vs. 4) revealed that infants are capable of discriminating across bounds, with relatively higher performance for the 4-syllable sequence, possibly encoded as one large ensemble. This study offers evidence that, when processing linguistic sounds, infants flexibly deal with small and large numerical representations with no boundaries or incompatibilities between them. Simultaneously encoding units of different magnitudes might aid early speech processing beyond memory limits.

What Kinds of Computations Can Young Children Perform Over Non-Symbolic Representations of Small Quantities?

Children can manipulate non-symbolic representations of both small quantities of objects (about four or fewer, represented by the parallel individuation system) and large quantities of objects (represented by the analog magnitude system, or AMS). Previous work has shown that children can perform a variety of non-symbolic operations over AMS representations (like summing and solving for an unknown addend), but are not able to perform further operations on the derived solutions of such non-symbolic operations. However, while the computational capacity of AMS has been studied extensively in early childhood, less is known about the computational capacity of the parallel individuation system. In two experiments, we examined children's ability to perform two types of arithmetic-like operations over representations of small, exact quantities, and whether they could subsequently perform novel operations on derived quantity representations. Four-6-year-old US children (n = 99) solved two types of non-symbolic arithmetic-like problems with small quantities: summation and unknown addend problems. We then tested whether children could use the solutions to these problems as inputs to new operations. Results showed that children more readily solved non-symbolic small, exact addition problems compared to unknown addend problems. However, when children did successfully solve either kind of problem, they were able to use those derived solutions to solve a novel non-symbolic small, exact problem. These results suggest that the parallel individuation system is computationally flexible, contrasting with previous work showing that the AMS is more computationally limited, and shed light on the computational capacities and limitations of representing and operating over representations of small quantities of individual objects.

Continuous and discrete proportion elicit different cognitive strategies

Despite proportional information being ubiquitous, there is not a standard account of proportional reasoning. Part of the difficulty is that there are several apparent contradictions: in some contexts, proportion is easy and privileged, while in others it is difficult and ignored. One possibility is that although we see similarities across tasks requiring proportional reasoning, people approach them with different strategies. We test this hypothesis by implementing strategies computationally and quantitatively comparing them with Bayesian tools, using data from continuous (e.g., pie chart) and discrete (e.g., dots) stimuli and preschoolers, 2nd and 5th graders, and adults. Overall, people's comparisons of highly regular and continuous proportion are better fit by proportion strategy models, but comparisons of discrete proportion are better fit by a numerator comparison model. These systematic differences in strategies suggest that there is not a single, simple explanation for behavior in terms of success or failure, but rather a variety of possible strategies that may be chosen in different contexts.

Rational number representation by the approximate number system

The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known "connectedness illusion" to provide evidence that these ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results vindicate key predictions of the hypothesis that the ANS represents rational numbers.

Arithmetic fluency and number processing skills in identifying students with mathematical learning disabilities

BACKGROUND

Students with mathematical learning disabilities (MLD) struggle with number processing skills (e.g., enumeration and number comparison) and arithmetic fluency. Traditionally, MLD is identified based on arithmetic fluency. However, number processing skills are suggested to differentiate low achievement (LA) from MLD.

AIMS

This study investigated the accuracy of number processing skills in identifying students with MLD and LA, based on arithmetic fluency, and whether the classification ability of number processing skills varied as a function of grade level.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The participants were 18,405 students (girls = 9080) from Grades 3-9 (ages 9-15). Students' basic numerical skills were assessed with an online dyscalculia screener (Functional Numeracy Assessment -Dyscalculia Battery, FUNA-DB), which included number processing and arithmetic fluency as two factors.

OUTCOMES AND RESULTS

Confirmatory factor analyses supported a two-factor structure of FUNA-DB. The two-factor structure was invariant across language groups, gender, and grade levels. Receiver operating characteristics curve analyses indicated that number processing skills are a fair classifier of MLD and LA status across grade levels. The classification accuracy of number processing skills was better when predicting MLD (cut-off < 5 %) compared to LA (cut-off < 25 %).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Results highlight the need to measure both number processing and arithmetic fluency when identifying students with MLD.

Non-symbolic estimation of big and small ratios with accurate and noisy feedback

The ratio of two magnitudes can take one of two values depending on the order they are operated on: a 'big' ratio of the larger to smaller magnitude, or a 'small' ratio of the smaller to larger. Although big and small ratio scales have different metric properties and carry divergent predictions for perceptual comparison tasks, no psychophysical studies have directly compared them. Two experiments are reported in which subjects implicitly learned to compare pairs of brightnesses and line lengths by non-symbolic feedback based on the scaled big ratio, small ratio or difference of the magnitudes presented. Results of Experiment 1 showed all three operations were learned quickly and estimated with a high degree of accuracy that did not significantly differ across groups or between intensive and extensive modalities, though regressions on individual data suggested an overall predisposition towards differences. Experiment 2 tested whether subjects learned to estimate the operation trained or to associate stimulus pairs with correct responses. For each operation, Gaussian noise was added to the feedback that was constant for repetitions of each pair. For all subjects, coefficients for the added noise component were negative when entered in a regression model alongside the trained differences or ratios, and were statistically significant in 80% of individual cases. Thus, subjects learned to estimate the comparative operations and effectively ignored or suppressed the added noise. These results suggest the perceptual system is highly flexible in its capacity for non-symbolic computation, which may reflect a deeper connection between perceptual structure and mathematics.

Intuitive mapping between nonsymbolic quantity and observed action across development

Adults' concurrent processing of numerical and action information yields bidirectional interference effects consistent with a cognitive link between these two systems of representation. This link is in place early in life: infants create expectations of congruency across numerical and action-related stimuli (i.e., a small [large] hand aperture associated with a smaller [larger] numerosity). Although these studies point to a developmental continuity of this mapping, little is known about the later development and thus how experience shapes such relationships. We explored how number-action intuitions develop across early and later childhood using the same methodology as in adults. We asked 3-, 6-, and 8-year-old children, as well as adults, to relate the magnitude of an observed action (a static hand shape, open vs. closed, in Experiment 1; a dynamic hand movement, opening vs. closing, in Experiment 2) to either a small or large nonsymbolic quantity (numerosity in Experiment 1 and numerosity and/or object size in Experiment 2). From 6 years of age, children started performing in a systematic congruent way in some conditions, but only 8-year-olds (added in Experiment 2) and adults performed reliably above chance in this task. We provide initial evidence that early intuitions guiding infants' mapping between magnitude across nonsymbolic number and observed action are used in an explicit way only from late childhood, with a mapping between action and size possibly being the most intuitive. An initial coarse mapping between number and action is likely modulated with extensive experience with grasping and related actions directed to both arrays and individual objects.

Comparison of visual quantities in untrained neural networks

The ability to compare quantities of visual objects with two distinct measures, proportion and difference, is observed even in newborn animals. However, how this function originates in the brain, even before visual experience, remains unknown. Here, we propose a model in which neuronal tuning for quantity comparisons can arise spontaneously in completely untrained neural circuits. Using a biologically inspired model neural network, we find that single units selective to proportions and differences between visual quantities emerge in randomly initialized feedforward wirings and that they enable the network to perform quantity comparison tasks. Notably, we find that two distinct tunings to proportion and difference originate from a random summation of monotonic, nonlinear neural activities and that a slight difference in the nonlinear response function determines the type of measure. Our results suggest that visual quantity comparisons are primitive types of functions that can emerge spontaneously before learning in young brains.

Middle-schoolers' misconceptions in discretized nonsymbolic proportional reasoning explain fraction biases better than their continuous reasoning: Evidence from correlation and cluster analyses

Early emerging nonsymbolic proportional skills have been posited as a foundational ability for later fraction learning. A positive relation between nonsymbolic and symbolic proportional reasoning has been reported, as well as successful nonsymbolic training and intervention programs enhancing fraction magnitude skills. However, little is known about the mechanisms underlying this relationship. Of particular interest are nonsymbolic representations, which can be in continuous formats that may emphasize proportional relations and in discretized formats that may prompt erroneous whole-number strategies and hamper access to fraction magnitudes. We assessed the proportional comparison skills of 159 middle-school students (mean age = 12.54 years, 43% females, 55% males, 2% other or prefer not to say) across three types of representations: (a) continuous, unsegmented bars, (b) discretized, segmented bars that allowed counting strategies, and (c) symbolic fractions. Using both correlational and cluster approaches, we also examined their relations to symbolic fraction comparison ability. Within each stimulus type, we varied proportional distance, and in the discretized and symbolic stimuli, we also manipulated whole-number congruency. We found that fraction distance across all formats modulated middle-schoolers' performance; however, whole-number information affected discretized and symbolic comparison performance. Further, continuous and discretized nonsymbolic performance was related to fraction comparison ability; however, discretized skills explained variance above and beyond the contributions of continuous skills. Finally, our cluster analyses revealed three nonsymbolic comparison profiles: students who chose the bars with the largest number of segments (whole-number bias), chance-level performers, and high performers. Crucially, students with a whole-number bias profile showed this bias in their fraction skills and failed to show any symbolic distance modulation. Together, our results indicate that the relation between nonsymbolic and symbolic proportional skills may be determined by the (mis)conceptions based on discretized representations, rather than understandings of proportional magnitudes, suggesting that interventions focusing on competence with discretized representations may show dividends for fraction understanding.

The developmental relationship between nonsymbolic and symbolic fraction abilities

A fundamental research question in quantitative cognition concerns the developmental relationship between nonsymbolic and symbolic quantitative abilities. This study examined this developmental relationship in abilities to process nonsymbolic and symbolic fractions. There were 99 6th graders (M_age = 11.86 years), 101 10th graders (M_age = 15.71 years), and 102 undergraduate and graduate students (M_age = 21.97 years) participating in this study, and their nonsymbolic and symbolic fraction abilities were measured with nonsymbolic and symbolic fraction comparison tasks, respectively. Nonsymbolic and symbolic fraction abilities were significantly correlated in all age groups even after controlling for the ability to process nonsymbolic absolute quantity and general cognitive abilities, including working memory and inhibitory control. Moreover, the strength of nonsymbolic-symbolic correlations was higher in 6th graders than in 10th graders and adults. These findings suggest a weakened association between nonsymbolic and symbolic fraction abilities during development, and this developmental pattern may be related with participants' increasing proficiency in symbolic fractions.

Leveraging Math Cognition to Combat Health Innumeracy

Rational numbers (i.e., fractions, percentages, decimals, and whole-number frequencies) are notoriously difficult mathematical constructs. Yet correctly interpreting rational numbers is imperative for understanding health statistics, such as gauging the likelihood of side effects from a medication. Several pernicious biases affect health decision-making involving rational numbers. In our novel developmental framework, the natural-number bias-a tendency to misapply knowledge about natural numbers to all numbers-is the mechanism underlying other biases that shape health decision-making. Natural-number bias occurs when people automatically process natural-number magnitudes and disregard ratio magnitudes. Math-cognition researchers have identified individual differences and environmental factors underlying natural-number bias and devised ways to teach people how to avoid these biases. Although effective interventions from other areas of research can help adults evaluate numerical health information, they circumvent the core issue: people's penchant to automatically process natural-number magnitudes and disregard ratio magnitudes. We describe the origins of natural-number bias and how researchers may harness the bias to improve rational-number understanding and ameliorate innumeracy in real-world contexts, including health. We recommend modifications to formal math education to help children learn the connections among natural and rational numbers. We also call on researchers to consider individual differences people bring to health decision-making contexts and how measures from math cognition might identify those who would benefit most from support when interpreting health statistics. Investigating innumeracy with an interdisciplinary lens could advance understanding of innumeracy in theoretically meaningful and practical ways.

Children's understanding of most is dependent on context

Children struggle with the quantifier "most". Often, this difficulty is attributed to an inability to interpret most proportionally, with children instead relying on absolute quantity comparisons. However, recent research in proportional reasoning more generally has provided new insight into children's apparent difficulties, revealing that their overreliance on absolute amount is unique to contexts in which the absolute amount can be counted and interferes with proportional information. Across two experiments, we test whether 4- to 6-year-old children's interpretation of most is similarly dependent on the discreteness of the stimuli when comparing two different quantities (e.g., who ate most of their chocolate?) and when verifying whether a single amount can be described with the term most (e.g., is most of the butterfly colored in?). We find that children's interpretation of most does depend on the stimulus format. When choosing between absolutely more vs. proportionally more as depicting most, children showed stronger absolute-based errors with discrete stimuli than continuous stimuli, and by 6-years-old were able to reason proportionally with continuous stimuli, despite still demonstrating strong absolute interference with discrete stimuli. In contrast, children's yes/no judgements of single amounts, where conflicting absolute information is not a factor, showed a weaker understanding of most for continuous stimuli than for discrete stimuli. Together, these results suggest that children's difficulty with most is more nuanced than previously understood: it depends on the format and availability of proportional vs. absolute amounts and develops substantially from 4- to 6-years-old.

Young Children Intuitively Divide Before They Recognize the Division Symbol

Children bring intuitive arithmetic knowledge to the classroom before formal instruction in mathematics begins. For example, children can use their number sense to add, subtract, compare ratios, and even perform scaling operations that increase or decrease a set of dots by a factor of 2 or 4. However, it is currently unknown whether children can engage in a true division operation before formal mathematical instruction. Here we examined the ability of 6- to 9-year-old children and college students to perform symbolic and non-symbolic approximate division. Subjects were presented with non-symbolic (dot array) or symbolic (Arabic numeral) dividends ranging from 32 to 185, and non-symbolic divisors ranging from 2 to 8. Subjects compared their imagined quotient to a visible target quantity. Both children (Experiment 1 N = 89, Experiment 2 N = 42) and adults (Experiment 3 N = 87) were successful at the approximate division tasks in both dots and numeral formats. This was true even among the subset of children that could not recognize the division symbol or solve simple division equations, suggesting intuitive division ability precedes formal division instruction. For both children and adults, the ability to divide non-symbolically mediated the relation between Approximate Number System (ANS) acuity and symbolic math performance, suggesting that the ability to calculate non-symbolically may be a mechanism of the relation between ANS acuity and symbolic math. Our findings highlight the intuitive arithmetic abilities children possess before formal math instruction.

Non-symbolic Ratio Reasoning in Kindergarteners: Underlying Unidimensional Heuristics and Relations With Math Abilities

Although it is thought that young children focus on the magnitude of the target dimension across ratio sets during binary comparison of ratios, it is unknown whether this is the default approach to ratio reasoning, or if such approach varies across representation formats (discrete entities and continuous amounts) that naturally afford different opportunities to process the dimensions in each ratio set. In the current study, 132 kindergarteners (Mage = 68 months, SD = 3.5, range = 62-75 months) performed binary comparisons of ratios with discrete and continuous representations. Results from a linear mixed model revealed that children followed an additive strategy to ratio reasoning-i.e., they focused on the magnitude of the target dimension across ratio sets as well as on the absolute magnitude of the ratio set. This approach did not vary substantially across representation formats. Results also showed an association between ratio reasoning and children's math problem-solving abilities; children with better math abilities performed better on ratio reasoning tasks and processed additional dimensions across ratio sets. Findings are discussed in terms of the processes that underlie ratio reasoning and add to the extant debate on whether true ratio reasoning is observed in young children.

Children's gesture use provides insight into proportional reasoning strategies

Children struggle with proportional reasoning when discrete countable information is available because they over-rely on this numerical information even when it leads to errors. In the current study, we investigated whether different types of gesture can exacerbate or mitigate these errors. Children aged 5-7 years (N = 135) were introduced to equivalent proportions using discrete gestures that highlighted separate parts, continuous gestures that highlighted continuous amounts, or no gesture. After training, children completed a proportional reasoning match-to-sample task where whole number information was occasionally pitted against proportional information. After the task, we measured children's own gesture use. Overall, we did not find condition differences in proportional reasoning; however, children who observed continuous gestures produced more continuous gestures than those who observed discrete gestures (and vice versa for discrete gestures). Moreover, producing fewer discrete gestures and more continuous gestures was associated with lower numerical interference on the match-to-sample task. Lastly, to further investigate individual differences, we found that children's inhibitory control and formal math knowledge were correlated with proportional reasoning in general but not with numerical interference in particular. Taken together, these findings highlight that children's own gestures may be a powerful window into the information they attend to during proportional reasoning.

Contents of the approximate number system

Clarke and Beck argue that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers, like 1/3 or 3.5. I think this claim is not supported by the evidence. Rather, I argue, ANS should be interpreted as representing natural numbers and ratios among them; and we should view the contents of these representations are genuinely approximate.

Perceived number is not abstract

To support the claim that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers, Clarke and Beck (C&B) argue that number perception is abstract and characterized by a second-order character. However, converging evidence from visual illusions and psychophysics suggests that perceived number is not abstract, but rather, is perceptually interdependent with other magnitudes. Moreover, number, as a concept, is second-order, but number, as a percept, is not.

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented -just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.

More than the sum of its parts: Exploring the development of ratio magnitude versus simple magnitude perception

Humans perceptually extract quantity information from our environments, be it from simple stimuli in isolation, or from relational magnitudes formed by taking ratios of pairs of simple stimuli. Some have proposed that these two types of magnitude are processed by a common system, whereas others have proposed separate systems. To test these competing possibilities, the present study examined the developmental trajectories of simple and relational magnitude discrimination and relations among these abilities for preschoolers (n = 42), 2nd-graders (n = 31), 5th-graders (n = 29), and adults (n = 32). Participants completed simple magnitude and ratio discrimination tasks in four different nonsymbolic formats, using dots, lines, circles, and irregular blobs. All age cohorts accurately discriminated both simple and ratio magnitudes. Discriminability differed by format such that performance was highest with line and lowest with dot stimuli. Moreover, developmental trajectories calculated for each format were similar across simple and ratio discriminations. Although some characteristics were similar for both types of discrimination, ratio acuity in a given format was more closely related with ratio acuities in alternate formats than to within-format simple magnitude acuity. Results demonstrate that ratio magnitude processing shares several similarities to simple magnitude processing, but is also substantially different.

The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers

On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals possess a "number sense," or approximate number system (ANS), that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques that question whether the ANS genuinely represents number. We distinguish three lines of critique-the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision-and show that none succeed. We then provide positive reasons to think that the ANS genuinely represents numbers, and not just non-numerical confounds or exotic substitutes for number, such as "numerosities" or "quanticals," as critics propose. In so doing, we raise a neglected question: numbers of what kind? Proponents of the orthodox view have been remarkably coy on this issue. But this is unsatisfactory since the predictions of the orthodox view, including the situations in which the ANS is expected to succeed or fail, turn on the kind(s) of number being represented. In response, we propose that the ANS represents not only natural numbers (e.g. 7), but also non-natural rational numbers (e.g. 3.5). It does not represent irrational numbers (e.g. √2), however, and thereby fails to represent the real numbers more generally. This distances our proposal from existing conjectures, refines our understanding of the ANS, and paves the way for future research.

Small-range numerical representations of linguistic sounds in 9- to 10-month-old infants

Coordinated studies provide evidence that very young infants, like human adults and nonhuman animals, readily discriminate small and large number of visual displays on the basis of numerical information. This capacity has been considerably less studied in the auditory modality. Surprisingly, the available studies yielded mixed evidence concerning whether numerical representations of auditory items in the small number range (1 to 3) are present early in human development. Specifically, while newborns discriminate 2- from 3-syllable sequences, older infants at 6 and 9 months of age fail to differentiate 2 from 3 tones. This study tested the hypothesis that infants can represent small sets more precisely when listening to ecologically relevant linguistic sounds. The aim was to probe 9- to 10-month-olds' (N = 74) ability to represent sound sets in a working memory test. In experiments 1 and 2, infants successfully discriminated 2- and 3-syllable sequences on the basis of their numerosity, when continuous variables, such as individual item duration, inter-stimulus duration, pitch, intensity, and total duration, were controlled for. In experiment 3, however, infants failed to discriminate 3- from 4-syllable sequences under similar conditions. Finally, in experiment 4, infants were tested on their ability to distinguish 2 and 3 tone sequences. The results showed no evidence that infants discriminated these non-linguistic stimuli. These findings indicate that, by means of linguistic sounds, infants can access a numerical system that yields precise auditory representations in the small number range.

First and Second Graders Successfully Reason About Ratios With Both Dot Arrays and Arabic Numerals

Children struggle with exact, symbolic ratio reasoning, but prior research demonstrates children show surprising intuition when making approximate, nonsymbolic ratio judgments. In the current experiment, eighty-five 6- to 8-year-old children made approximate ratio judgments with dot arrays and numerals. Children were adept at approximate ratio reasoning in both formats and improved with age. Children who engaged in the nonsymbolic task first performed better on the symbolic task compared to children tested in the reverse order, suggesting that nonsymbolic ratio reasoning may function as a scaffold for symbolic ratio reasoning. Nonsymbolic ratio reasoning mediated the relation between children's numerosity comparison performance and symbolic mathematics performance in the domain of probabilities, but numerosity comparison performance explained significant unique variance in general numeration skills.

Symbolic fractions elicit an analog magnitude representation in school-age children

A fundamental question about fractions is whether they are grounded in an abstract nonsymbolic magnitude code similar to that postulated for whole numbers. Mounting evidence suggests that symbolic fractions could be grounded in mechanisms for perceiving nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes. However, systematic examination of such mechanisms in children has been lacking. We asked second- and fifth-grade children (prior to and after formal instructions with fractions, respectively) to compare pairs of symbolic fractions, nonsymbolic ratios, and mixed symbolic-nonsymbolic pairs. This paradigm allowed us to test three key questions: (a) whether children show an analog magnitude code for rational numbers, (b) whether that code is compatible with mental representations of symbolic fractions, and (c) how formal education with fractions affects the symbolic-nonsymbolic relation. We examined distance effects as a marker of analog ratio magnitude processing and notation effects as a marker of converting across numerical codes. Second and fifth graders' reaction times and error rates showed classic distance and notation effects. Nonsymbolic ratios were processed most efficiently, with mixed and symbolic notations being relatively slower. Children with more formal instruction in symbolic fractions had a significant advantage in comparing symbolic fractions but had a smaller advantage for nonsymbolic ratio stimuli. Supplemental analyses showed that second graders relied on numerator distance more than holistic distance and that fifth graders relied on holistic fraction magnitude distance more than numerator distance. These results suggest that children have a nonsymbolic ratio magnitude code and that symbolic fractions can be translated into that magnitude code.

No calculation necessary: Accessing magnitude through decimals and fractions

Research on how humans understand the relative magnitude of symbolic fractions presents a unique case of the symbol-grounding problem with numbers. Specifically, how do people access a holistic sense of rational number magnitude from decimal fractions (e.g. 0.125) and common fractions (e.g. 1/8)? Researchers have previously suggested that people cannot directly access magnitude information from common fraction notation, but instead must use a form of calculation to access this meaning. Questions remain regarding the nature of calculation and whether a division-like conversion to decimals is a necessary process that permits access to fraction magnitudes. To test whether calculation is necessary to access fractions magnitudes, we carried out a series of six parallel experiments in which we examined how adults access the magnitude of rational numbers (decimals and common fractions) under varying task demands. We asked adult participants to indicate which of two fractions was larger in three different conditions: decimal-decimal, fraction-fraction, and mixed decimal-fraction pairs. Across experiments, we manipulated two aspects of the task demands. 1) Response windows were limited to 1, 2 or 5 s, and 2) participants either did or did not have to identify when the two stimuli were the same magnitude (catch trials). Participants were able to successfully complete the task even at a response window of 1 s and showed evidence of holistic magnitude processing. These results indicate that calculation strategies with fractions are not necessary for accessing a sense of a fractions meaning but are strategic routes to magnitude that participants may use when granted sufficient time. We suggest that rapid magnitude processing with fractions and decimals may occur by mapping symbolic components onto common amodal mental representations of rational numbers.

Training nonsymbolic proportional reasoning in children and its effects on their symbolic math abilities

Our understanding of proportions can be both symbolic, as when doing calculations in school mathematics, or intuitive, as when folding a bed sheet in half. While an understanding of symbolic proportions is crucial for school mathematics, the cognitive foundations of this ability remain unclear. Here we implemented a computerized training game to test a causal link from intuitive (nonsymbolic) to symbolic proportional reasoning and other math abilities in 4th grade children. An experimental group was trained in nonsymbolic proportional reasoning (PR) with continuous extents, and an active control group was trained on a remarkably similar nonsymbolic magnitude comparison. We found that the experimental group improved at nonsymbolic PR across training sessions, showed near transfer to a paper-and-pencil nonsymbolic PR test, transfer to symbolic proportions, and far transfer to geometry. The active control group showed only a predicted far transfer to geometry. In a second experiment, these results were replicated with an independent cohort of children. Overall this study extends previous correlational evidence, suggesting a functional link between nonsymbolic PR on one hand and symbolic PR and geometry on the other.

Measuring Spontaneous Focus on Space in Preschool Children

Previous work on children's Spontaneous Focus on Numerosity (SFON) has shown the value of measuring children's spontaneous attention within naturalistic interactions. SFON is the spontaneous tendency to focus attention on, and explicitly enumerate the exact number of, items in a set. This measure predicts later math skills above and beyond general IQ and other cognitive factors such as attention. The utility of SFON suggests that a parallel construct for space is a worthy pursuit; spatial cognition underlies many of our mathematical skills, especially as children are first learning these skills. We developed a measure of children's Spontaneous Focus on Space - the spontaneous tendency to attend to absolute and relative spatial components of the environment - and studied its relation to reasoning about the important spatial-numerical concept of proportions. Fifty-five 3- to 6-year-olds were tested at a local children's museums in New York City. Children participated in tasks designed to measure their spontaneous focus on space and number, and their ability to reason about spatial proportions. Results indicate that as children grow older, their Spontaneous Focus on Space becomes more complete and is positively related to proportional reasoning performance. These findings suggest that spatial awareness is rapidly increasing in the preschool years, alongside numerical awareness and spatial-numerical proportional reasoning.

A primarily serial, foveal accumulator underlies approximate numerical estimation

The approximate number system (ANS) has attracted broad interest due to its potential importance in early mathematical development and the fact that it is conserved across species. Models of the ANS and behavioral measures of ANS acuity both assume that quantity estimation is computed rapidly and in parallel across an entire view of the visual scene. We present evidence instead that ANS estimates are largely the product of a serial accumulation mechanism operating across visual fixations. We used an eye-tracker to collect data on participants' visual fixations while they performed quantity-estimation and -discrimination tasks. We were able to predict participants' numerical estimates using their visual fixation data: As the number of dots fixated increased, mean estimates also increased, and estimation error decreased. A detailed model-based analysis shows that fixated dots contribute twice as much as peripheral dots to estimated quantities; people do not "double count" multiply fixated dots; and they do not adjust for the proportion of area in the scene that they have fixated. The accumulation mechanism we propose explains reported effects of display time on estimation and earlier findings of a bias to underestimate quantities.

The Relational SNARC: Spatial Representation of Nonsymbolic Ratios

Recent research in numerical cognition has begun to systematically detail the ability of humans and nonhuman animals to perceive the magnitudes of nonsymbolic ratios. These relationally defined analogs to rational numbers offer new potential insights into the nature of human numerical processing. However, research into their similarities with and connections to symbolic numbers remains in its infancy. The current research aims to further explore these similarities by investigating whether the magnitudes of nonsymbolic ratios are associated with space just as symbolic numbers are. In two experiments, we found that responses were faster on the left for smaller nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes and faster on the right for larger nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes. These results further elucidate the nature of nonsymbolic ratio processing, extending the literature of spatial-numerical associations to nonsymbolic relative magnitudes. We discuss potential implications of these findings for theories of human magnitude processing in general and how this general processing relates to numerical processing.

Infant Statisticians: The Origins of Reasoning Under Uncertainty

Humans frequently make inferences about uncertain future events with limited data. A growing body of work suggests that infants and other primates make surprisingly sophisticated inferences under uncertainty. First, we ask what underlying cognitive mechanisms allow young learners to make such sophisticated inferences under uncertainty. We outline three possibilities, the logic, probabilistic, and heuristics views, and assess the empirical evidence for each. We argue that the weight of the empirical work favors the probabilistic view, in which early reasoning under uncertainty is grounded in inferences about the relationship between samples and populations as opposed to being grounded in simple heuristics. Second, we discuss the apparent contradiction between this early-emerging sensitivity to probabilities with the decades of literature suggesting that adults show limited use of base-rate and sampling principles in their inductive inferences. Third, we ask how these early inductive abilities can be harnessed for improving later mathematics education and inductive inference. We make several suggestions for future empirical work that should go a long way in addressing the many remaining open questions in this growing research area.

The Additive-Area Heuristic: An Efficient but Illusory Means of Visual Area Approximation

How do we determine how much of something is present? A large body of research has investigated the mechanisms and consequences of number estimation, yet surprisingly little work has investigated area estimation. Indeed, area is often treated as a pesky confound in the study of number. Here, we describe the additive-area heuristic, a means of rapidly estimating visual area that results in substantial distortions of perceived area in many contexts, visible even in simple demonstrations. We show that when we controlled for additive area, observers were unable to discriminate on the basis of true area, per se, and that these results could not be explained by other spatial dimensions. These findings reflect a powerful perceptual illusion in their own right but also have implications for other work, namely, that which relies on area controls to support claims about number estimation. We discuss several areas of research potentially affected by these findings.

The Development of Nonsymbolic Probability Judgments in Children

Two experiments were designed to investigate the developmental trajectory of children's probability approximation abilities. In Experiment 1, results revealed 6- and 7-year-old children's (N = 48) probability judgments improve with age and become more accurate as the distance between two ratios increases. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with 7- to 12-year-old children (N = 130) while also accounting for the effect of the size and the perceived numerosity of target objects. Older children's performance suggested the correct use of proportions for estimating probability; but in some cases, children relied on heuristic shortcuts. These results suggest that children's nonsymbolic probability judgments show a clear distance effect and that the acuity of probability estimations increases with age.

Task Constraints Affect Mapping From Approximate Number System Estimates to Symbolic Numbers

The Approximate Number System (ANS) allows individuals to assess nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., the number of apples on a tree) without counting. Several prominent theories posit that human understanding of symbolic numbers is based – at least in part – on mapping number symbols (e.g., 14) to their ANS-processed nonsymbolic analogs. Number-line estimation – where participants place numerical values on a bounded number-line – has become a key task used in research on this mapping. However, some research suggests that such number-line estimation tasks are actually proportion judgment tasks, as number-line estimation requires people to estimate the magnitude of the to-be-placed value, relative to set upper and lower endpoints, and thus do not so directly reflect magnitude representations. Here, we extend this work, assessing performance on nonsymbolic tasks that should more directly interface with the ANS. We compared adults’ (n = 31) performance when placing nonsymbolic numerosities (dot arrays) on number-lines to their performance with the same stimuli on two other tasks: Free estimation tasks where participants simply estimate the cardinality of dot arrays, and ratio estimation tasks where participants estimate the ratio instantiated by a pair of arrays. We found that performance on these tasks was quite different, with number-line and ratio estimation tasks failing to the show classic psychophysical error patterns of scalar variability seen in the free estimation task. We conclude the constraints of tasks using stimuli that access the ANS lead to considerably different mapping performance and that these differences must be accounted for when evaluating theories of numerical cognition. Additionally, participants showed typical underestimation patterns in the free estimation task, but were quite accurate on the ratio task. We discuss potential implications of these findings for theories regarding the mapping between ANS magnitudes and symbolic numbers.

The problem with percentages

A great many students at a major research university make basic conceptual mistakes in responding to simple questions about two successive percentage changes. The mistakes they make follow a pattern already familiar from research on the difficulties that elementary school students have in coming to terms with fractions and decimals. The intuitive core knowledge of arithmetic with the natural numbers makes learning to count and do simple arithmetic relatively easy. Those same principles become obstacles to understanding how to operate with rational numbers.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The origins of numerical abilities'.

Intuitive statistical inferences in chimpanzees and humans follow Weber's law

Humans and nonhuman great apes share a sense for intuitive statistical reasoning, making intuitive probability judgments based on proportional information. This ability is of fundamental importance, in particular for inferring general regularities from finite numbers of observations and, vice versa, for predicting the outcome of single events using prior information. To date it remains unclear which cognitive mechanism underlies and enables this capacity. The aim of the present study was to gain deeper insights into the cognitive structure of intuitive statistics by probing its signatures in chimpanzees and humans. We tested 24 sanctuary-living chimpanzees in a previously established paradigm which required them to reason from populations of food items with different ratios of preferred (peanuts) and non-preferred items (carrot pieces) to randomly drawn samples. In a series of eight test conditions, the ratio between the two ratios to be discriminated (ROR) was systematically varied ranging from 1 (same proportions in both populations) to 16 (high magnitude of difference between populations). One hundred and forty-four human adults were tested in a computerized version of the same task. The main result was that both chimpanzee and human performance varied as a function of the log(ROR) and thus followed Weber's law. This suggests that intuitive statistical reasoning relies on the same cognitive mechanism that is used for comparing absolute quantities, namely the analogue magnitude system.

Natural Alternatives to Natural Number: The Case of Ratio

The overwhelming majority of efforts to cultivate early mathematical thinking rely primarily on counting and associated natural number concepts. Unfortunately, natural numbers and discretized thinking do not align well with a large swath of the mathematical concepts we wish for children to learn. This misalignment presents an important impediment to teaching and learning. We suggest that one way to circumvent these pitfalls is to leverage students' non-numerical experiences that can provide intuitive access to foundational mathematical concepts. Specifically, we advocate for explicitly leveraging a) students' perceptually based intuitions about quantity and b) students' reasoning about change and variation, and we address the affordances offered by this approach. We argue that it can support ways of thinking that may at times align better with to-be-learned mathematical ideas, and thus may serve as a productive alternative for particular mathematical concepts when compared to number. We illustrate this argument using the domain of ratio, and we do so from the distinct disciplinary lenses we employ respectively as a cognitive psychologist and as a mathematics education researcher. Finally, we discuss the potential for productive synthesis given the substantial differences in our preferred methods and general epistemologies.

From continuous magnitudes to symbolic numbers: The centrality of ratio

Leibovich et al.'s theory neither accounts for the deep connections between whole numbers and other classes of number nor provides a potential mechanism for mapping continuous magnitudes to symbolic numbers. We argue that focusing on non-symbolic ratio processing abilities can furnish a more expansive account of numerical cognition that remedies these shortcomings.

Are Books Like Number Lines? Children Spontaneously Encode Spatial-Numeric Relationships in a Novel Spatial Estimation Task

Do children spontaneously represent spatial-numeric features of a task, even when it does not include printed numbers (Mix et al., 2016)? Sixty first grade students completed a novel spatial estimation task by seeking and finding pages in a 100-page book without printed page numbers. Children were shown pages 1 through 6 and 100, and then were asked, “Can you find page X?” Children’s precision of estimates on the page finder task and a 0-100 number line estimation task was calculated with the Percent Absolute Error (PAE) formula (Siegler and Booth, 2004), in which lower PAE indicated more precise estimates. Children’s numerical knowledge was further assessed with: (1) numeral identification (e.g., What number is this: 57?), (2) magnitude comparison (e.g., Which is larger: 54 or 57?), and (3) counting on (e.g., Start counting from 84 and count up 5 more). Children’s accuracy on these tasks was correlated with their number line PAE. Children’s number line estimation PAE predicted their page finder PAE, even after controlling for age and accuracy on the other numerical tasks. Children’s estimates on the page finder and number line tasks appear to tap a general magnitude representation. However, the page finder task did not correlate with numeral identification and counting-on performance, likely because these tasks do not measure children’s magnitude knowledge. Our results suggest that the novel page finder task is a useful measure of children’s magnitude knowledge, and that books have similar spatial-numeric affordances as number lines and numeric board games.

Social, cognitive, and physiological aspects of humour perception from 4 to 8 months: Two longitudinal studies

Infants laugh by 4 months, but whether they understand humour based on social or cognitive factors is unclear. We conducted two longitudinal studies of 4-, 6-, and 8-month-olds (N = 60), and 5-, 6-, and 7-month-olds (N = 53) to pinpoint the onset of independent humour perception and determine when social and cognitive factors are most salient. Infants were shown six events in randomized repeated-measures designs: two ordinary events and two absurd iterations of those events, with parents' affect manipulated (laugh or neutral) during the latter. Four-month-olds did not smile/laugh more at absurd events, but exhibited a significant heart rate deceleration. Five-month-olds independently appraised absurd events as humorous, smiling/laughing despite their parents' neutrality. Parent laughter did not influence infants of any age to smile more, but captured 4-month-olds' attention. Results suggest that 4-month-olds laugh in response to social cues, while 5-month-olds' can laugh in response to cognitive features. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? By 6 months, infants can independently appraise absurd events as humorous, but it is not known whether younger infants can. What does this study add? This study replicated the finding on younger infants, showing that 5-month-olds are similarly capable of independent humour appraisal. These studies also found that although 4-month-olds do not respond to absurd events with positive affect, they do exhibit a heart rate decrease that is unrelated to looking. These studies help delineate when social and cognitive factors contribute to infant humour perception.

Fraction magnitude understanding and its unique role in predicting general mathematics achievement at two early stages of fraction instruction

BACKGROUND

Prior studies on fraction magnitude understanding focused mainly on students with relatively sufficient formal instruction on fractions whose fraction magnitude understanding is relatively mature.

AIM

This study fills a research gap by investigating fraction magnitude understanding in the early stages of fraction instruction. It extends previous findings to children with limited and primary formal fraction instruction.

SAMPLE(S)

Thirty-five fourth graders with limited fraction instruction and forty fourth graders with primary fraction instruction were recruited from a Chinese primary school.

METHODS

Children's fraction magnitude understanding was assessed with a fraction number line estimation task. Approximate number system (ANS) acuity was assessed with a dot discrimination task. Whole number knowledge was assessed with a whole number line estimation task. General reading and mathematics achievements were collected concurrently and 1 year later.

RESULTS

In children with limited fraction instruction, fraction representation was linear and fraction magnitude understanding was concurrently related to both ANS and whole number knowledge. In children with primary fraction instruction, fraction magnitude understanding appeared to (marginally) significantly predict general mathematics achievement 1 year later.

CONCLUSIONS

Fraction magnitude understanding emerged early during formal instruction of fractions. ANS and whole number knowledge were related to fraction magnitude understanding when children first began to learn about fractions in school. The predictive value of fraction magnitude understanding is likely constrained by its sophistication level.

Are great apes able to reason from multi-item samples to populations of food items?

Inductive learning from limited observations is a cognitive capacity of fundamental importance. In humans, it is underwritten by our intuitive statistics, the ability to draw systematic inferences from populations to randomly drawn samples and vice versa. According to recent research in cognitive development, human intuitive statistics develops early in infancy. Recent work in comparative psychology has produced first evidence for analogous cognitive capacities in great apes who flexibly drew inferences from populations to samples. In the present study, we investigated whether great apes (Pongo abelii, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla) also draw inductive inferences in the opposite direction, from samples to populations. In two experiments, apes saw an experimenter randomly drawing one multi-item sample from each of two populations of food items. The populations differed in their proportion of preferred to neutral items (24:6 vs. 6:24) but apes saw only the distribution of food items in the samples that reflected the distribution of the respective populations (e.g., 4:1 vs. 1:4). Based on this observation they were then allowed to choose between the two populations. Results show that apes seemed to make inferences from samples to populations and thus chose the population from which the more favorable (4:1) sample was drawn in Experiment 1. In this experiment, the more attractive sample not only contained proportionally but also absolutely more preferred food items than the less attractive sample. Experiment 2, however, revealed that when absolute and relative frequencies were disentangled, apes performed at chance level. Whether these limitations in apes' performance reflect true limits of cognitive competence or merely performance limitations due to accessory task demands is still an open question.