The structure of semantic person memory: Evidence from semantic priming in person recognition

Exploring the Representations of Individual Entities in the Brain Combining EEG and Distributional Semantics

Semantic knowledge about individual entities (i.e., the referents of proper names such as Jacinta Ardern) is fine-grained, episodic, and strongly social in nature, when compared with knowledge about generic entities (the referents of common nouns such as politician). We investigate the semantic representations of individual entities in the brain; and for the first time we approach this question using both neural data, in the form of newly-acquired EEG data, and distributional models of word meaning, employing them to isolate semantic information regarding individual entities in the brain. We ran two sets of analyses. The first set of analyses is only concerned with the evoked responses to individual entities and their categories. We find that it is possible to classify them according to both their coarse and their fine-grained category at appropriate timepoints, but that it is hard to map representational information learned from individuals to their categories. In the second set of analyses, we learn to decode from evoked responses to distributional word vectors. These results indicate that such a mapping can be learnt successfully: this counts not only as a demonstration that representations of individuals can be discriminated in EEG responses, but also as a first brain-based validation of distributional semantic models as representations of individual entities. Finally, in-depth analyses of the decoder performance provide additional evidence that the referents of proper names and categories have little in common when it comes to their representation in the brain.

Getting connected: Both associative and semantic links structure semantic memory for newly learned persons

The present study examined whether semantic memory for newly learned people is structured by visual co-occurrence, shared semantics, or both. Participants were trained with pairs of simultaneously presented (i.e., co-occurring) preexperimentally unfamiliar faces, which either did or did not share additionally provided semantic information (occupation, place of living, etc.). Semantic information could also be shared between faces that did not co-occur. A subsequent priming experiment revealed faster responses for both co-occurrence/no shared semantics and no co-occurrence/shared semantics conditions, than for an unrelated condition. Strikingly, priming was strongest in the co-occurrence/shared semantics condition, suggesting additive effects of these factors. Additional analysis of event-related brain potentials yielded priming in the N400 component only for combined effects of visual co-occurrence and shared semantics, with more positive amplitudes in this than in the unrelated condition. Overall, these findings suggest that both semantic relatedness and visual co-occurrence are important when novel information is integrated into person-related semantic memory.

Prosopagnosia after stroke: potentials for impairment and treatment

The ability to recognize and identify people and determine how they may be feeling from looking at their faces is an important skill that people normally achieve effortlessly in infancy. Effective face recognition skills remain essential for social competence throughout the life course. A major cause of impairment in face processing, conventionally known as prosopagnosia, is stroke. In this article, the potentials for acquired prosopagnosia after stroke are examined. The incidence of prosopagnosia after stroke is difficult to establish, but in one clinical sample about half of those who survived a right hemisphere stroke had prosopagnosia. The recently published National Clinical Guideline for Stroke 2012 omits reference to assessment for prosopagnosia, which suggests that the personal distress and negative impact on social life that can accompany prosopagnosia is not fully appreciated or at least not considered a priority after stroke. The few published cases where there has been a focused attempt to provide rehabilitation for chronic prosopagnosia suggest that lesions in face-processing areas are resistant to treatment but that some recovery can accompany extended practice. It is concluded that where there is evidence of prosopagnosia following stroke, treatment should be offered, although rehabilitation may be better focused on supporting and extending existing compensatory strategies, such as the use of voice, body shape, and gait to assist in person recognition and, as an important consequence, social functioning.

Aversive priming: cognitive processing of threatening stimuli is facilitated by aversive primes

It would be reasonable to expect that our previous experience regarding a stimulus that predicts harm would make the subsequent identification of that stimulus easier when harm happens again. Forty-eight volunteers were submitted to both phases of this sequence of events: learning of the predictive relationship and later priming. A face with neutral expression (CS+) was paired with a moderately aversive electric shock and another (CS-) with a neutral tone. Subsequently, these two faces, as well as other known and new faces, were presented for familiarity judgments. Both the CS+ and the CS- faces were preceded by an aversive stimulus (aversive prime) in one occasion and by a neutral stimulus (neutral prime) in another. The familiarity judgment regarding the CS+ was faster after the aversive prime than after the neutral prime, but there was no difference regarding the CS-. The differential effect of the aversive prime over the CS+ and the CS- showed a significant but small correlation with the differential skin conductance response to CS+ and CS- (signal learning), and with the differential evaluation of those stimuli in terms of like-dislike (evaluative learning). The scope of these results, as well as the usefulness of this methodological model, is discussed.