Cultural transmission and the evolution of human behaviour: a general approach based on the Price equation

Why cultural distance can promote - or impede - group-beneficial outcomes

Quantifying the distance between cultural groups has received substantial recent interest. A key innovation, borrowed from population genetics, is the calculation of cultural FST (CFST) statistics on datasets of human culture. Measuring the variance between groups as a fraction of total variance, FST is theoretically important in additive models of cooperation. Consistent with this, recent empirical work has confirmed that high values of pairwise CFST (measuring cultural distance) strongly predict unwillingness to cooperate with strangers in coordination vignettes. As applications for CFST increase, however, there is greater need to understand its meaning in naturalistic situations beyond additive cooperation. Focusing on games with both positive and negative frequency dependence and high-diversity, mixed equilibria, we derive a simple relationship between FST and the evolution of group-beneficial traits across a broad spectrum of social interactions. Contrary to standard assumptions, this model shows why FST can have both positive and negative marginal effects on the spread of group-beneficial traits under certain realistic conditions. These results provide broader theoretical direction for empirical applications of CFST in the evolutionary study of culture.

Network traits driving knowledge evolution in open collaboration systems

Network interpretation illuminates our understanding of the dynamic nature of cultural evolution. Guided by cultural evolution theory, this article explores how people collectively develop knowledge through knowledge collaboration network traits. Using network data from 910 artifacts (the WikiProject Aquarium Fishes articles) over 163 weeks, two studies were designed to understand how collaboration network traits drive population and artifact-level knowledge evolution. The first study examines the selection pressure imposed by10 network traits (against 11 content traits) on population-level evolutionary outcomes. While network traits are vital in identifying natural selection pressure, intriguingly, no significant difference was found between network traits and content traits, challenging a recent theory on network-driven evolution. The second study utilizes time series analysis to reveal that three network traits (embeddedness, connectivity, and redundancy) at a prior time predict future artifact development trajectory. This implies that people collectively explore various positions in a potential solution space, suggesting content exploration as a possible explanation of knowledge evolution. In summary, understanding the interplay between network traits and content exploration provides valuable insights into the mechanisms driving knowledge evolution and offers new avenues for future research.

Cultural evolution from the producers' standpoint

Standard approaches to cultural evolution focus on the recipients or consumers. This does not take into account the fitness costs incurred in producing the behaviours or artefacts that become cultural, i.e. widespread in a social group. We argue that cultural evolution models should focus on these fitness costs and benefits of cultural production, particularly in the domain of 'symbolic' culture. In this approach, cultural products can be considered as a part of the extended phenotype of producers, which can affect the fitness of recipients in a positive way (through cooperation) but also in a detrimental way (through manipulation and exploitation). Taking the producers' perspective may help explain the specific features of many kinds of cultural products.

A generalised approach to the study and understanding of adaptive evolution

Evolutionary theory has made large impacts on our understanding and management of the world, in part because it has been able to incorporate new data and new insights successfully. Nonetheless, there is currently a tension between certain biological phenomena and mainstream evolutionary theory. For example, how does the inheritance of molecular epigenetic changes fit into mainstream evolutionary theory? Is niche construction an evolutionary process? Is local adaptation via habitat choice also adaptive evolution? These examples suggest there is scope (and perhaps even a need) to broaden our views on evolution. We identify three aspects whose incorporation into a single framework would enable a more generalised approach to the understanding and study of adaptive evolution: (i) a broadened view of extended phenotypes; (ii) that traits can respond to each other; and (iii) that inheritance can be non-genetic. We use causal modelling to integrate these three aspects with established views on the variables and mechanisms that drive and allow for adaptive evolution. Our causal model identifies natural selection and non-genetic inheritance of adaptive parental responses as two complementary yet distinct and independent drivers of adaptive evolution. Both drivers are compatible with the Price equation; specifically, non-genetic inheritance of parental responses is captured by an often-neglected component of the Price equation. Our causal model is general and simplified, but can be adjusted flexibly in terms of variables and causal connections, depending on the research question and/or biological system. By revisiting the three examples given above, we show how to use it as a heuristic tool to clarify conceptual issues and to help design empirical research. In contrast to a gene-centric view defining evolution only in terms of genetic change, our generalised approach allows us to see evolution as a change in the whole causal structure, consisting not just of genetic but also of phenotypic and environmental variables.

Semantics of European poetry is shaped by conservative forces: The relationship between poetic meter and meaning in accentual-syllabic verse

Recent advances in cultural analytics and large-scale computational studies of art, literature and film often show that long-term change in the features of artistic works happens gradually. These findings suggest that conservative forces that shape creative domains might be underestimated. To this end, we provide the first large-scale formal evidence of the association between poetic meter and semantics in 18-19th century European literatures, using Czech, German and Russian collections with additional data from English poetry and early modern Dutch songs. Our study traces this association through a series of unsupervised classifications using the abstracted semantic features of poems that are inferred for individual texts with the aid of topic modeling. Topics alone enable recognition of the meters in each observed language, as may be seen from the same-meter samples clustering together (median Adjusted Rand Index between 0.48 and 1 across traditions). In addition, this study shows that the strength of the association between form and meaning tends to decrease over time. This may reflect a shift in aesthetic conventions between the 18th and 19th centuries as individual innovation was increasingly favored in literature. Despite this decline, it remains possible to recognize semantics of the meters from past or future, which suggests the continuity in meter-meaning relationships while also revealing the historical variability of conditions across languages. This paper argues that distinct metrical forms, which are often copied in a language over centuries, also maintain long-term semantic inertia in poetry. Our findings highlight the role of the formal features of cultural items in influencing the pace and shape of cultural evolution.

A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene-culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

Quantifying the instrumental and noninstrumental underpinnings of Pavlovian responding with the Price equation

The Price equation is a mathematical expression of selectionist and non-selectionist pressures on biological, cultural, and behavioral change. We use it here to specify instrumental and noninstrumental behaviors as they arise within the context of the Pavlovian autoshaping procedure, for rats trained under reward certainty and reward uncertainty. The point of departure for this endeavor is that some portion of autoshaped behavior referred to as goal-tracking appears instrumental-a function of resource attainment (the individual approaches the location where the unconditioned stimulus is to be delivered). By contrast, some other portion of autoshaped behavior referred to as sign-tracking is noninstrumental-irrelevant to making contact with the to-be-delivered unconditioned stimulus. A Price equation model is proposed that unifies our understanding of Pavlovian autoshaping behavior by isolating operant and respondent influences on goal-tracking (instrumental) and sign-tracking (noninstrumental) behavior.

Why Do Individuals Seek Information? A Selectionist Perspective

Several authors have proposed that mechanisms of adaptive behavior, and reinforcement learning in particular, can be explained by an innate tendency of individuals to seek information about the local environment. In this article, I argue that these approaches adhere to an essentialist view of learning that avoids the question why information seeking should be favorable in the first place. I propose a selectionist account of adaptive behavior that explains why individuals behave as if they had a tendency to seek information without resorting to essentialist explanations. I develop my argument using a formal selectionist framework for adaptive behavior, the multilevel model of behavioral selection (MLBS). The MLBS has been introduced recently as a formal theory of behavioral selection that links reinforcement learning to natural selection within a single unified model. I show that the MLBS implies an average gain in information about the availability of reinforcement. Formally, this means that behavior reaches an equilibrium state, if and only if the Fisher information of the conditional probability of reinforcement is maximized. This coincides with a reduction in the randomness of the expected environmental feedback as captured by the information theoretic concept of expected surprise (i.e., entropy). The main result is that behavioral selection maximizes the information about the expected fitness consequences of behavior, which, in turn, minimizes average surprise. In contrast to existing attempts to link adaptive behavior to information theoretic concepts (e.g., the free energy principle), neither information gain nor surprise minimization is treated as a first principle. Instead, the result is formally deduced from the MLBS and therefore constitutes a mathematical property of the more general principle of behavioral selection. Thus, if reinforcement learning is understood as a selection process, there is no need to assume an active agent with an innate tendency to seek information or minimize surprise. Instead, information gain and surprise minimization emerge naturally because it lies in the very nature of selection to produce order from randomness.

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2) and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition-'cognitive gadgets' specialized for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on 'animal culture'. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Social finance as cultural evolution, transmission bias, and market dynamics

The thoughts and behaviors of financial market participants depend upon adopted cultural traits, including information signals, beliefs, strategies, and folk economic models. Financial traits compete to survive in the human population and are modified in the process of being transmitted from one agent to another. These cultural evolutionary processes shape market outcomes, which in turn feed back into the success of competing traits. This evolutionary system is studied in an emerging paradigm, social finance. In this paradigm, social transmission biases determine the evolution of financial traits in the investor population. It considers an enriched set of cultural traits, both selection on traits and mutation pressure, and market equilibrium at different frequencies. Other key ingredients of the paradigm include psychological bias, social network structure, information asymmetries, and institutional environment.

Cultural selection and biased transformation: two dynamics of cultural evolution

Here, I discuss two broad versions of human cultural evolution which currently exist in the literature and which emphasize different underlying dynamics. One, which originates in population-genetic-style modelling, emphasizes how cultural selection causes some cultural variants to be favoured and gradually increase in frequency over others. The other, which draws more from cognitive science, holds that cultural change is driven by the biased transformation of cultural variants by individuals in non-random and consistent directions. Despite claims that cultural evolution is characterized by one or the other of these dynamics, these are neither mutually exclusive nor a dichotomy. Different domains of human culture are likely to be more or less strongly weighted towards cultural selection or biased transformation. Identifying cultural dynamics in real-world cultural data is challenging given that they can generate the same population-level patterns, such as directional change or cross-cultural stability, and the same cognitive and emotional mechanisms may underlie both cultural selection and biased transformation. Nevertheless, fine-grained historical analysis and laboratory experiments, combined with formal models to generate quantitative predictions, offer the best way of distinguishing them. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Plasticity-Led Evolution and Human Culture

Some human traits arise via organic evolution while others are acquired from the prevailing culture via a process of social learning. A mainstream interpretation is that evolution amounts to a change in the relative frequency of gene variants in a population and that culture coevolves at arm's length. Matters look different if one starts instead from the view that organisms are modified during evolution because of changes in gene expression as much as changes in the relative frequency of gene variants. Gene expression, i.e. generation of the product encoded by a gene, is not under genetic control, for it requires location- and time-specific triggers, which cannot be provided by genes. The genes present in an individual are present in every cell, hence at all locations in the individual's body and at all times during the individual's life. The necessary location- and time-specific triggers are provided internally by developmental events and conditions, or externally by environmental events and conditions, i.e. non-genetically. Socially-learned traits, having no special connection with genes, may nevertheless influence evolution, as for any trait. Like organic traits generally, socially-learned traits can be positively or negatively selected, for they similarly influence survival and reproduction. Like learned traits generally, they can play an important role in evolution by providing repeated selective pressure. The resulting evolutionary change typically affects an associated trait (e.g. adult ability to digest the sugar contained in milk), not the socially-learned trait itself (e.g. dairying), which continues under the influence of cultural processes of change.

Cultural change beyond adoption dynamics: Evolutionary approaches to the discontinuation of contraception

Numerous evolutionary mechanisms have been proposed for the origins, spread and maintenance of low fertility. Such scholarship has focused on explaining the adoption of fertility-reducing behaviour, especially the use of contraceptive methods. However, this work has yet to engage fully with the dynamics of contraceptive behaviour at the individual level. Here we highlight the importance of considering not just adoption but also discontinuation for understanding contraceptive dynamics and their impact on fertility. We start by introducing contemporary evolutionary approaches to understanding fertility regulation behaviours, discussing the potential for integrating behavioural ecology and cultural evolution frameworks. Second, we draw on family planning studies to highlight the importance of contraceptive discontinuation owing to side-effects for understanding fertility rates and suggest evolutionary hypotheses for explaining patterns of variation in discontinuation rates. Third, we sketch a framework for considering how individual flexibility in contraceptive behaviour might impact the evolution of contraceptive strategies and the demographic transition. We argue that integrating public health and evolutionary approaches to reproductive behaviour might advance both fields by providing (a) a predictive framework for comparing the effectiveness of various public health strategies and (b) a more realistic picture of behaviour by considering contraceptive dynamics at the individual level more explicitly when modelling the cultural evolution of low fertility.

Modelling the on-going natural selection of educational attainment in contemporary societies

There has been substantial increase in education attainment (EA) in both developing and developed countries over the past century. I present a simulation model to examine the potential evolutionary trajectories of EA under current selective pressure in western populations. With the assumption that EA is negatively correlated with fitness and has both a genetic component and a cultural component, I show that when prestige-biased transmission of the EA (i.e. people with more education are more likely to be copied) is present, the phenotype of EA is likely to keep increasing in the short term, yet the genetic component of EA may undergo a constant decline and become the limiting factor in further phenotypic increase.

Selection, adaptation, inheritance and design in human culture: the view from the Price equation

For decades, parts of the literature on human culture have been gripped by an analogy: culture changes in a way that is substantially isomorphic to genetic evolution. This leads to a number of sub-claims: that design-like properties in cultural traditions should be explained in a parallel way to the design-like features of organisms, namely with reference to selection; that culture is a system of inheritance; and that cultural evolutionary processes can produce adaptation in the genetic sense. The Price equation provides a minimal description of any evolutionary system, and a method for identifying the action of selection. As such, it helps clarify some of these claims about culture conceptually. Looking closely through the lens of the Price equation, the differences between genes and culture come into sharp relief. Culture is only a system of inheritance metaphorically, or as an idealization, and the idealization may lead us to overlook causally important features of how cultural influence works. Design-like properties in cultural systems may owe more to transmission biases than to cultural selection. Where culture enhances genetic fitness, it is ambiguous whether what is doing the work is cultural transmission, or just the genetically evolved properties of the mind. I conclude that there are costs to trying to press culture into a template based on Darwinian evolution, even if one broadens the definition of 'Darwinian'. This article is part of the theme issue 'Fifty years of the Price equation'.

Modelling cultural selection on biological fitness to integrate social transmission and adaptive explanations for human behaviour

One of the difficulties with cultural group selection theory highlighted in the review by Smith (2020, Evol. Hum. Sci., 2, e7) is its inability to separate the evolutionary effects of selection of cultural traits based on biological fitness (Cultural Selection 1) from the effects of selection based on cultural fitness (Cultural Selection 2). Confusing these two processes can hinder the integration of adaptive explanations for human behaviour, which focus on biological fitness, and cultural evolution explanations, which often focus on social transmission. Recent empirical work is starting to bridge this gap, but progress in mathematical modelling has been considerably slower. Here, I suggest that modellers can contribute to achieving this integration by further developing models of Cultural Selection 1, where behaviours are influenced by culturally inherited traits selected on the basis of their effects on biological fitness. These models should build on existing social evolution theory methods and replace genetic relatedness with cultural relatedness, that is the probability that two individuals share a cultural variant.

Different perspectives on non-genetic inheritance illustrate the versatile utility of the Price equation in evolutionary biology

The diversity of genetic and non-genetic processes that make offspring resemble their parents are increasingly well understood. In addition to genetic inheritance, parent-offspring similarity is affected by epigenetic, behavioural and cultural mechanisms that collectively can be referred to as non-genetic inheritance. Given the generality of the Price equation as a description of evolutionary change, is it not surprising that the Price equation has been adopted to model the evolutionary implications of non-genetic inheritance. In this paper, we briefly introduce the heredity perspectives on which those models rely, discuss the extent to which these perspectives make different assumptions and place different emphases on the roles of heredity and development in evolution, and the types of empirical research programmes they motivate. The existence of multiple perspectives and explanatory aims highlight, on the one hand, the versatility of the Price equation and, on the other hand, the importance of understanding how heredity and development can be conceptualized in evolutionary studies. This article is part of the theme issue 'Fifty years of the Price equation'.

Cultural group selection and human cooperation: a conceptual and empirical review

Cultural group selection has been proposed as an explanation for humans' highly cooperative nature. This theory argues that social learning mechanisms, combined with rewards and punishment, can stabilise any group behaviour, cooperative or not. Equilibrium selection can then operate, resulting in cooperative groups outcompeting less-cooperative groups. This process may explain the widespread cooperation between non-kin observed in humans, which is sometimes claimed to be altruistic. This review explores the assumptions of cultural group selection to assess whether it provides a convincing explanation for human cooperation. Although competition between cultural groups certainly occurs, it is unclear whether this process depends on specific social learning mechanisms (e.g. conformism) or a norm psychology (to indiscriminately punish norm-violators) to stabilise groups at different equilibria as proposed by existing cultural group selection models. Rather than unquestioningly adopt group norms and institutions, individuals and groups appear to evaluate, design and shape them for self-interested reasons (where possible). As individual fitness is frequently tied to group fitness, this often coincides with constructing group-beneficial norms and institutions, especially when groups are in conflict. While culture is a vital component underlying our species' success, the extent to which current conceptions of cultural group selection reflect human cooperative evolution remains unclear.

Compression in cultural evolution: Homogeneity and structure in the emergence and evolution of a large-scale online collaborative art project

Cultural evolutionary theory provides a framework for explaining change in population-level distributions. A consistent finding in the literature is that multiple transmission episodes shape a distribution of cultural traits to become more compressible, i.e., a set of derived traits are more compressed than their ancestral forms. Importantly, this amplification of compressible patterns can become manifest in two ways, either via the homogenisation of variation or through the organisation of variation into structured and specialised patterns. Using a novel, large-scale dataset from Reddit Place, an online collaborative art project, we investigate the emergence and evolution of compressible patterns on a 1000x1000 pixel canvas. Here, all Reddit users could select a coloured pixel, place it on the canvas, and then wait for a fixed period before placing another pixel. By analysing all 16.5 million pixel placements by over 1 million individuals, we found that compression follows a quadratic trajectory through time. From a non-structured state, where individual artworks exist relatively independently from one another, Place gradually transitions to a structured state where pixel placements form specialised, interdependent patterns.

Gene-Culture Coinheritance of a Behavioral Trait

Many physical and behavioral traits in animals, including humans, are inherited both genetically and culturally. The presence of different inheritance systems affecting the same trait can result in complex evolutionary dynamics. Here, we present a general model that elucidates the distinct roles of cultural and genetic inheritance systems and their interaction in driving the evolution of complex phenotypes. In particular, we derive a Price equation that incorporates both cultural and genetic inheritance of a phenotype where the effects of genes and culture are additive. We then use this equation to investigate whether a genetically maladaptive phenotype can evolve under dual transmission. We examine the special case of altruism using an illustrative model and show that cultural selection can overcome genetic selection when the variance in culture is sufficiently high with respect to genes. We also show that the presence of cultural transmission can modify genetic selection itself, making genetic selection more favorable to a trait than under purely genetic inheritance. Last, we consider the effect of different timescales of genetic and cultural transmission. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding the evolution of important coinherited behaviors, including how our framework can be used to generate quantitative estimates of selection pressures required for a genetically maladaptive trait to evolve.

Ultimate and proximate explanations of strong reciprocity

Strong reciprocity (SR) has recently been subject to heated debate. In this debate, the "West camp" (West et al. in Evol Hum Behav 32(4):231-262, 2011), which is critical of the case for SR, and the "Laland camp" (Laland et al. in Science, 334(6062):1512-1516, 2011, Biol Philos 28(5):719-745, 2013), which is sympathetic to the case of SR, seem to take diametrically opposed positions. The West camp criticizes advocates of SR for conflating proximate and ultimate causation. SR is said to be a proximate mechanism that is put forward by its advocates as an ultimate explanation of human cooperation. The West camp thus accuses advocates of SR for not heeding Mayr's original distinction between ultimate and proximate causation. The Laland camp praises advocates of SR for revising Mayr's distinction. Advocates of SR are said to replace Mayr's uni-directional view on the relation between ultimate and proximate causes by the bi-directional one of reciprocal causation. The paper argues that both the West camp and the Laland camp misrepresent what advocates of SR are up to. The West camp is right that SR is a proximate cause of human cooperation. But rather than putting forward SR as an ultimate explanation, as the West camp argues, advocates of SR believe that SR itself is in need of ultimate explanation. Advocates of SR tend to take gene-culture co-evolutionary theory as the correct meta-theoretical framework for advancing ultimate explanations of SR. Appearances notwithstanding, gene-culture coevolutionary theory does not imply Laland et al.'s notion of reciprocal causation. "Reciprocal causation" suggests that proximate and ultimate causes interact simultaneously, while advocates of SR assume that they interact sequentially. I end by arguing that the best way to understand the debate is by disambiguating Mayr's ultimate-proximate distinction. I propose to reserve "ultimate" and "proximate" for different sorts of explanations, and to use other terms for distinguishing different kinds of causes and different parts of the total causal chain producing behavior.

Social learning and the demise of costly cooperation in humans

Humans have a sophisticated ability to learn from others, termed social learning, which has allowed us to spread over the planet, construct complex societies, and travel to the moon. It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection. However, this hypothesis lacks direct experimental testing, and the opposite prediction has also been made, that social learning disfavours cooperation. We experimentally tested how different aspects of social learning affect the level of cooperation in public-goods games. We found that: (i) social information never increased cooperation and usually led to decreased cooperation; (ii) cooperation was lowest when individuals could observe how successful individuals behaved; and (iii) cooperation declined because individuals preferred to copy successful individuals, who cooperated less, rather than copy common behaviours. Overall, these results suggest that individuals use social information to try and improve their own success, and that this can lead to lower levels of cooperation.

Rethinking inheritance, yet again: inheritomes, contextomes and dynamic phenotypes

In recent years, there have been many calls for an extended evolutionary synthesis, based in part upon growing evidence for nongenetic mechanisms of inheritance, i.e., similarities in phenotype between parents and offspring that are not due to shared genes. While there has been an impressive marshalling of evidence for diverse forms of nongenetic inheritance (epigenetic, ecological, behavioural and symbolic), there have been relatively few studies trying to integrate the different forms of inheritance into a common conceptual structure, a development that would be important to formalize elements of the extended evolutionary synthesis. Here, we propose a framework for an extended view of inheritance and introduce some conceptual distinctions that we believe, are important to this issue. In this framework, the phenotype is conceived of as a dynamic entity, its state, at any point in time resulting from intertwined effects of previous phenotypic state, and of hereditary materials (DNA and otherwise) and environment. We contrast our framework with the standard gene-based view of inheritance, and also discuss our framework in the specific context of recent attempts to accommodate nongenetic inheritance within the framework of classical quantitative genetics and the Price equation. In particular, we believe that the extended view of inheritance and effects on the phenotype developed here is particularly well-suited to individual-based simulation studies of evolutionary dynamics. The results of such simulations, in turn, could be useful for assessing, how well extended models based on quantitative genetics or the Price equation perform at capturing complex evolutionary dynamics.

Reasons to be fussy about cultural evolution

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich's models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions.

Extensive fitness and human cooperation

Evolution depends on the fitness of organisms, the expected rate of reproducing. Directly getting offspring is the most basic form of fitness, but fitness can also be increased indirectly by helping genetically related individuals (such as kin) to increase their fitness. The combined effect is known as inclusive fitness. Here it is argued that a further elaboration of fitness has evolved, particularly in humans. It is called extensive fitness and it incorporates producing organisms that are merely similar in phenotype. The evolvability of this mechanism is illustrated by computations on a simple model combining heredity and behaviour. Phenotypes are driven into the direction of high fitness through a mechanism that involves an internal estimate of fitness, implicitly made within the organism itself. This mechanism has recently been conjectured to be responsible for producing agency and goals. In the model, inclusive and extensive fitness are both implemented by letting fitness increase nonlinearly with the size of subpopulations of similar heredity (for the indirect part of inclusive fitness) and of similar phenotype (for the phenotypic part of extensive fitness). Populations implementing extensive fitness outcompete populations implementing mere inclusive fitness. This occurs because groups with similar phenotype tend to be larger than groups with similar heredity, and fitness increases more when groups are larger. Extensive fitness has two components, a direct component where individuals compete in inducing others to become like them and an indirect component where individuals cooperate and help others who are already similar to them.

Why humans might help strangers

Humans regularly help strangers, even when interactions are apparently unobserved and unlikely to be repeated. Such situations have been simulated in the laboratory using anonymous one-shot games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma) where the payoff matrices used make helping biologically altruistic. As in real-life, participants often cooperate in the lab in these one-shot games with non-relatives, despite that fact that helping is under negative selection under these circumstances. Two broad explanations for such behavior prevail. The "big mistake" or "mismatch" theorists argue that behavior is constrained by psychological mechanisms that evolved predominantly in the context of repeated interactions with known individuals. In contrast, the cultural group selection theorists posit that humans have been selected to cooperate in anonymous one-shot interactions due to strong between-group competition, which creates interdependence among in-group members. We present these two hypotheses before discussing alternative routes by which humans could increase their direct fitness by cooperating with strangers under natural conditions. In doing so, we explain why the standard lab games do not capture real-life in various important aspects. First, asymmetries in the cost of perceptual errors regarding the context of the interaction (one-shot vs. repeated; anonymous vs. public) might have selected for strategies that minimize the chance of making costly behavioral errors. Second, helping strangers might be a successful strategy for identifying other cooperative individuals in the population, where partner choice can turn strangers into interaction partners. Third, in contrast to the assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma model, it is possible that benefits of cooperation follow a non-linear function of investment. Non-linear benefits result in negative frequency dependence even in one-shot games. Finally, in many real-world situations individuals are able to parcel investments such that a one-shot interaction is turned into a repeated game of many decisions.

If we are all cultural Darwinians what's the fuss about? Clarifying recent disagreements in the field of cultural evolution

Cultural evolution studies are characterized by the notion that culture evolves accordingly to broadly Darwinian principles. Yet how far the analogy between cultural and genetic evolution should be pushed is open to debate. Here, we examine a recent disagreement that concerns the extent to which cultural transmission should be considered a preservative mechanism allowing selection among different variants, or a transformative process in which individuals recreate variants each time they are transmitted. The latter is associated with the notion of "cultural attraction". This issue has generated much misunderstanding and confusion. We first clarify the respective positions, noting that there is in fact no substantive incompatibility between cultural attraction and standard cultural evolution approaches, beyond a difference in focus. Whether cultural transmission should be considered a preservative or reconstructive process is ultimately an empirical question, and we examine how both preservative and reconstructive cultural transmission has been studied in recent experimental research in cultural evolution. Finally, we discuss how the relative importance of preservative and reconstructive processes may depend on the granularity of analysis and the domain being studied.

How Darwinian is cultural evolution?

Darwin-inspired population thinking suggests approaching culture as a population of items of different types, whose relative frequencies may change over time. Three nested subtypes of populational models can be distinguished: evolutionary, selectional and replicative. Substantial progress has been made in the study of cultural evolution by modelling it within the selectional frame. This progress has involved idealizing away from phenomena that may be critical to an adequate understanding of culture and cultural evolution, particularly the constructive aspect of the mechanisms of cultural transmission. Taking these aspects into account, we describe cultural evolution in terms of cultural attraction, which is populational and evolutionary, but only selectional under certain circumstances. As such, in order to model cultural evolution, we must not simply adjust existing replicative or selectional models but we should rather generalize them, so that, just as replicator-based selection is one form that Darwinian selection can take, selection itself is one of several different forms that attraction can take. We present an elementary formalization of the idea of cultural attraction.