Peeking and lying in the temptation resistance paradigm in 2.5-year-olds: The role of inhibitory control

The main aim of the present study was to establish whether inhibitory control (IC) abilities influence the peeking and lying behaviours of 2.5-year-olds, as measured by a modified temptation resistance paradigm (mTRP). Using a longitudinal design, 252 children's IC abilities were tested at ages 1.5, 2 and 2.5, as well as their ability to lie at age 2.5. Results showed that 35% of 2.5-year-olds peeked, 27% of peekers lied and 40% of non-peekers falsely confessed they had peeked. Non-peekers had higher IC than peekers at ages 2 and 2.5. Lower IC at age 2 increased the probability of peeking at age 2.5 by 6 times. The highest level of IC was presented in children who followed the adult's restrictions in the mTRP and were then able to tell the truth about their behaviour. These results suggested that the first, or so-called primary, lies of 2.5-year-olds are probably spontaneous, rather than deliberate. Implications for further research were discussed.

Give and take: A microgenetic study of preschoolers' deceptive and prosocial behavior in relation to their socio-cognitive development

Early on, young children begin to learn the social skills which will help them navigate through an increasingly complex social world. We explored how deceiving for personal gain potentially interacts with sharing the resulting resources and how they both relate to theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 92, 43 girls). Children played a hide-and-seek zero-sum game in which they could win stickers if they discovered how to deceive the experimenter. Then they were prompted to share their stickers in a dictator game paradigm. Using a microgenetic design, we tracked deceptive behavior across ten sessions and sharing behavior across five of these sessions, plus a follow-up session 15 months later. Children polarized into a group who never deceived across all sessions, and a group who constantly deceived above chance levels (around 85 % of the time). Sharing behavior was extremely low (under 6 % of stickers) across the sessions. At follow-up, deceptive behavior was above 80 %, while sharing remained at a low level (under 5 %). The novelty of our findings was that children who initially discovered how to deceive shared less than the children who didn't use this deceptive strategy. Nonetheless, this pattern was reversed at follow-up. Furthermore, ToM positively predicted deceptive behavior across all sessions and improved after the microgenetic sessions but wasn't related with deception at follow-up. Implications for enabling children to deploy the growing understanding of their worlds in a more prosocial way are discussed.

Deceptive behaviour in autism: A scoping review

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to deceive others is an important skill that usually develops in early childhood. In this review, we give an overview of studies that have examined deceptive behaviour in autistic children, adolescents and adults. We separated the study findings into three main categories and seven sub-categories: (1) Deception ability and prevalence (1a) gameplay deception; (1b) naturalistic deception; (2) Psychological processes in deception (2a) verbal, intellectual and social ability; (2b) ability to understand others' thoughts and beliefs; (2c) cognitive ability; and (3) Social learning (3a) training; (3b) social contexts. Contrary to some stereotypes, we found that autistic people can and do deceive but often find this more difficult than non-autistic people. We also found that autistic people may use different psychological processes than non-autistic people when deceiving and may get better at deception in adulthood.

Children strategically conceal selfishness

Can children exploit knowledge asymmetries to get away with selfishness? This question was addressed by testing 6- to 9-year-old children (N = 164; 81 girls) from the Northeastern United States in a modified Ultimatum Game. Children were assigned to the roles of proposers (who offered some proportion of an endowment) and responders (who could accept or reject offers). Both players in the Informed condition knew the endowment quantity in each trial. However, in the Uninformed condition, only proposers knew this information. In this condition, many proposers made "strategically selfish" offers that seemed fair based on the responders' incomplete knowledge but were actually highly selfish. These results indicate that even young children possess the ability to deceive others about their selfishness.

The coin that is most current is flattery? Stability and discontinuity of false praise-telling from 5 to 7 years of life

Preschool children engage in flattery behaviors, including expressing opinions toward other people or objects that-although favorable-are not truly held. Research shows that in the following years, the number and complexity of motives underlying such insincere behavior increase. The current study focused on children's overt behavior, examining two aspects of the development of false praise-telling: individual stability and group-level discontinuity. Using an art-rating task, a total of 164 children aged 5 to 7 years were tested at three points in time (T1/2/3): M_T1 age = 5.66 years, SD = 0.1; M_T2 age = 6.65 years, SD = 0.16; M_T3 age = 7.61 years, SD = 0.14. The results show that, having become capable of giving false praise in politeness settings at 5.5 years of age, children continue to flatter others in this way at later ages, indicating that false praise-telling is an individually stable characteristic. In addition, a statistically significant increase in the proportion of false praise-telling to non-lying behavior in children over the 2-year study period was observed. This indicates that the discontinuity, namely the growth in children's flattery behavior, occurs from 5 to 7 years of age. The findings are discussed with respect to the diverse factors that might underlie and affect children's tendency to praise others falsely in politeness settings.

Progress in Psychological Science. The Importance of Informed Ignorance and Curiosity-Driven Questions

In recent decades we have seen an exponential growth in the amount of data gathered within psychological research without a corresponding growth of theory that could meaningfully organize these research findings. For this reason, considerable attention today is given to discussions of such broader, higher-order concepts as theory and paradigm. However, another area important to consider is the nature of the questions psychologists are asking. Key to any discussion about the scientific status of psychology or about progress in the field (scientific or otherwise) is the nature of the questions that inspire psychological research. Psychologists concerned about scientific progress and the growth of theory in the field would be well served by more robust conversations about the nature of the questions being asked. Honest, curiosity-driven questions-questions that admit to our ignorance and that express an active and optimistic yearning for what we do not yet know-can help to propel psychology forward in a manner similar to the development of theory or paradigm. However, existing as it does in the "twilight zone" between the natural sciences and the humanities, psychology is fertile ground for questions of wide-ranging natures, and thus the nature of progress in the field can be variously understood, not all of which will be "scientific." Recent psychological research in three areas (cognition, memory, and disorders/differences of sex development) are discussed as examples of how curiosity-driven questions being asked from a position of informed ignorance can lead to progress in the field.