Seneca Valley virus RNA detection in pig feed and feed ingredients in Brazil

First report and genetic characterization of Seneca Valley virus (SVV) in Chile

Seneca Valley virus (SVV) is a non-enveloped RNA virus and the only member of the Senecavirus A (SVA) species, in the Senecavirus genus, Picornaviridae family. SVV infection causes vesicular lesions in the oral cavity, snout and hooves of pigs. This infection is clinically indistinguishable from trade-restrictions-related diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease. Other clinical manifestations include diarrhoea, anorexia, lethargy, neurological signs and mortality in piglets during their first week of age. Before this study, Chile was considered free of vesicular diseases of swine, including SVV. In April 2022, a suspected case of vesicular disease in a swine farm was reported in Chile. The SVV was confirmed and other vesicular diseases were ruled out. An epidemiological investigation and phylogenetic analyses were performed to identify the origin and extent of the outbreak. Three hundred ninety-five samples from 44 swine farms were collected, including faeces (208), oral fluid (28), processing fluid (14), fresh semen (61), environmental samples (80) and tissue from lesions (4) for real-time RT-PCR detection. Until June 2022, the SVV has been detected in 16 out of 44 farms, all epidemiologically related to the index farm. The closest phylogenetic relationship of the Chilean SVV strain is with viruses collected from swine in California in 2017. The direct cause of the SVV introduction has not yet been identified; however, the phylogenetic analyses suggest the USA as the most likely source. Since the virus remains active in the environment, transmission by fomites such as contaminated feed cannot be discarded. Further studies are needed to determine the risk of the introduction of novel SVV and other transboundary swine pathogens to Chile.

Comprehensive phylogeographic and phylodynamic analyses of global Senecavirus A

Senecavirus A (SVA) is a member of the genus Senecavirus in the family Picornaviridae that infects pigs and shows symptoms similar to foot and mouth diseases and other vesicular diseases. It is difficult to prevent, thus, causing tremendous economic loss to the pig industry. However, the global transmission routes of SVA and its natural origins remain unclear. In this study, we processed representative SVA sequences from the GenBank database along with 10 newly isolated SVA strains from the field samples collected from our lab to explore the origins, population characteristics, and transmission patterns of SVA. The SVA strains were firstly systematically divided into eight clades including Clade I–VII and Clade Ancestor based on the maximum likelihood phylogenetic inference. Phylogeographic and phylodynamics analysis within the Bayesian statistical framework revealed that SVA originated in the United States in the 1980s and afterward spread to different countries and regions. Our analysis of viral transmission routes also revealed its historical spread from the United States and the risk of the global virus prevalence. Overall, our study provided a comprehensive assessment of the phylogenetic characteristics, origins, history, and geographical evolution of SVA on a global scale, unlocking insights into developing efficient disease management strategies.

The third wave of Seneca Valley virus outbreaks in pig herds in southern Brazil

Seneca Valley virus (SVV) is the only representative member of the Senecavirus genus of the Picornaviridae family. Since 2014, SVV has been identified as a causative agent of vesicular disease outbreaks in pigs of different ages from Brazil, the USA, Canada, China, Thailand, Colombia, Vietnam, and India. From May 2020, several pig herds, from the Brazilian states Parana and Santa Catarina reported vesicular disease in different pig categories. This study aimed to report the third wave of SVV outbreaks in pig herds in southern Brazil. A total of 263 biological samples from 150 pigs in 18 pig herds were evaluated. The samples were obtained from pigs with clinical signs of vesicular disease (n = 242) and asymptomatic animals (n = 21). Seneca Valley virus RNA was detected in 96 (36.5%) of the biological samples evaluated, with 89 samples from symptomatic and 7 from asymptomatic pigs. The data show that asymptomatic pigs, but in viremia, are possible sources of infection and can act as carriers and possibly spreaders of SVV to the herd. In this study, we report the third wave of vesicular disease outbreaks caused by SVV in different categories of pigs from herds located in southern Brazil.

Rethinking the uncertainty of African swine fever virus contamination in feed ingredients and risk of introduction into the United States

Economically relevant pathogens, such as African swine fever virus (ASFV), have been shown to survive when experimentally inoculated in some feed ingredients under the environmental conditions in transoceanic transport models. However, these models did not characterize the likelihood of virus survival under various time and temperature processes that feed ingredients undergo before they are added to swine diets. Here, we developed a quantitative risk assessment model to estimate the probability that one or more corn or soybean meal ocean vessels (25,000 tonnes) contaminated with ASFV would be imported into the United States annually. This final probability estimate was conditionally based on five likelihoods: the probability of initial ASFV contamination (p0), ASFV inactivation during processing (p1) and transport (p2), recontamination (pR), and ASFV inactivation while awaiting customs clearance at United States entry (p3). The probability of ASFV inactivation was modelled using corn and soybean (extruded or solvent extracted) processing conditions (times and temperatures), D-values (time to reduce 90% or 1-log) estimated from studies of ASFV thermal inactivation in pork serum (p1), and survival in feed ingredients during transoceanic transport (p2 and p3). 'What-if' scenarios using deterministic values for p0 and pR (1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) were used to explore their impact on risk. The model estimated complete inactivation of ASFV after extrusion or solvent extraction processes regardless of the initial ASFV contamination probability assumed. The value of recontamination (ranging from 1% to 75%) was highly influential on the risk of one ASFV-contaminated soybean meal vessel entering the United States. Median risk estimates ranged from 0.064% [0.006%-0.60%; 95% probability interval (PI)], assuming a pR of 1.0%, up to 4.67% (0.45%-36.50% 95% PI) assuming a pR of 75.0%. This means that at least one vessel with ASFV-contaminated soybean meal would be imported once every 1563-21 years, respectively. When all raw corn was assumed to be contaminated (p0 = 100%), and no recontamination was assumed to occur (pR = 0%), the median probability of one vessel with ASFV-contaminated corn entering the United States was 2.02% (0.28%-9.43% 95% PI) or once every 50 years. Values of recontamination between 1% and 75% did not substantially change the risk of corn. Days of transport, virus survival during transport (D-value), and number of vessels shipped were the parameters most influential for increased likelihood of a vessel with ASFV-contaminated soybean meal or corn entering the United States. The model helped to identify knowledge gaps that are most influential on output values and serves as a framework that could be updated and parameterized as new scientific information becomes available. We propose that the quantitative risk assessment model developed in this study can be used as a framework for estimating the risk of ASFV entry into the United States and other ASFV-free countries through other types of imported feed ingredients that may potentially become contaminated. Ultimately, this model can be used to develop risk mitigation strategies and critical control points for inactivating ASFV during feed ingredient processing, storage, and transport, and contribute to the design and implementation of biosecurity measures to prevent the introduction of ASFV into the United States and other ASFV-free countries.

Pathogenicity of Seneca Valley virus in pigs and detection in Culicoides from an infected pig farm

Background

Porcine vesicular disease is caused by the Seneca Valley virus (SVV), it is a novel Picornaviridae, which is prevalent in several countries. However, the pathogenicity of SVV on 5–6 week old pigs and the transmission routes of SVV remain unknown.

Methods

This research mainly focuses on the pathogenicity of the CH-GX-01-2019 strain and the possible vector of SVV. In this study, 5–6 week old pigs infected with SVV (CH-GX-01-2019) and its clinical symptoms (including rectal temperatures and other clinical symptoms) were monitored, qRT-PCR were used to detect the viremia and virus distribution. Neutralization antibody assay was set up during this research. Mosquitoes and Culicoides were collected from pigsties after pigs challenge with SVV, and SVV detection within mosquitoes and Culicoides was done via RT-PCR.

Results

The challenged pigs presented with low fevers and mild lethargy on 5–8 days post infection. The viremia lasted more than 14 days. SVV was detected in almost all tissues on the 14th day following the challenge, and it was significantly higher in the hoofs (vesicles) and lymph nodes in comparison with other tissues. Neutralizing antibodies were also detected and could persist for more than 28 days, in addition neutralizing antibody titers ranged from 1:128 to 1:512. Mosquitoes and Culicoides were collected from the pigsty environments following SVV infection. Although SVV was not detected in the mosquitoes, it was present in the Culicoides, however SVV could not be isolated from the positive Culicoides.

Conclusions

Our work has enriched the knowledge relating to SVV pathogenicity and possible transmission routes, which may lay the foundation for further research into the prevention and control of this virus.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12985-021-01679-w.

Stability of Senecavirus A in animal feed ingredients and infection following consumption of contaminated feed

Animal feed and feed ingredients have recently been investigated as sources of pathogen introduction to farms and as a potential source of infection to animals post-consumption of contaminated feed. Survival of several viruses for a prolonged period has been demonstrated in feed. Here, we determined the rate of decay of Senecavirus A (SVA) in swine feed ingredients as a function of time and temperature and established half-life estimates for the virus. Select feed ingredients were spiked with a constant amount of SVA (10⁵ median tissue culture infectious dose 50) and incubated at 4, 15 and 30°C for up to 91 days. Virus viability and the presence of viral RNA were assessed in samples collected over time. At the three different temperatures investigated, dried distillers' grains with solubles (DDGS) and soybean meal (SBM) provided the most stable matrices for SVA, resulting in half-lives of 25.6 and 9.8 days, respectively. At 30°C, SVA was completely inactivated in all feed ingredients and in the control sample, which did not contain a feed matrix. Although virus infectivity was lost, viral RNA remained stable and at consistent levels throughout the experimental period. Additionally, the ability of SVA to infect swine via ingestion of contaminated feed was investigated in 3-week-old, weaned pigs. Animals were provided complete feed spiked with three concentrations of SVA (10⁵ , 10⁶ and 10⁷ per 200 g of feed) and allowed to naturally consume the contaminated feed. This procedure was repeated for three consecutive days. Infection of pigs through consumption of contaminated feed was confirmed by virus neutralization assay and the detection of SVA in serum, feces and in the tonsil of exposed animals by real-time reverse transcriptase PCR. Our findings demonstrate that feed matrices are able to extend the survival of SVA, protecting the virus from decay. Additionally, we demonstrated that consumption of contaminated feed can lead to productive SVA infection.

Can we effectively manage parasites, prions, and pathogens in the global feed industry to achieve One Health?

Prions and certain endoparasites, bacteria, and viruses are internationally recognized as types of disease-causing biological agents that can be transmitted from contaminated feed to animals. Historically, foodborne biological hazards such as prions (transmissible spongiform encephalopathy), endoparasites (Trichinella spiralis, Toxoplasma gondii), and pathogenic bacteria (Salmonella spp., Listeria monocytogenes, Escherichia coli O157, Clostridium spp., and Campylobacter spp.) were major food safety concerns from feeding uncooked or improperly heated animal-derived food waste and by-products. However, implementation of validated thermal processing conditions along with verifiable quality control procedures has been effective in enabling safe use of these feed materials in animal diets. More recently, the occurrence of global Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus and African Swine Fever Virus epidemics, dependence on international feed ingredient supply chains, and the discovery that these viruses can survive in some feed ingredient matrices under environmental conditions of trans-oceanic shipments has created an urgent need to develop and implement rigorous biosecurity protocols that prevent and control animal viruses in feed ingredients. Implementation of verifiable risk-based preventive controls, traceability systems from origin to destination, and effective mitigation procedures is essential to minimize these food security, safety, and sustainability threats. Creating a new biosafety and biosecurity framework will enable convergence of the diverging One Health components involving low environmental impact and functional feed ingredients that are perceived as having elevated biosafety risks when used in animal feeds.

New perspectives for evaluating relative risks of African swine fever virus contamination in global feed ingredient supply chains

There are no published reports indicating that the African swine fever virus (ASFV) has been detected in feed ingredients or complete feed. This is primarily because there are only a few laboratories in the world that have the biosecurity and analytical capabilities of detecting ASFV in feed. Several in vitro studies have been conducted to evaluate ASFV concentration, viability and inactivation when ASFV was added to various feed ingredients and complete feed. These inoculation studies have shown that some feed matrices support virus survival longer than others and the reasons for this are unknown. Current analytical methodologies have significant limitations in sensitivity, repeatability, ability to detect viable virus particles and association with infectivity. As a result, interpretation of findings using various measures may lead to misleading conclusions. Because of analytical and technical challenges, as well as the lack of ASFV contamination data in feed supply chains, quantitative risk assessments have not been conducted. A few qualitative risk assessments have been conducted, but they have not considered differences in potential scenarios for ASFV contamination between various types of feed ingredient supply chains. Therefore, the purpose of this review is to provide a more holistic understanding of the relative potential risks of ASFV contamination in various global feed ingredient supply chains and provide recommendations for addressing the challenges identified.

The risk of viral transmission in feed: What do we know, what do we do?

The role of animal feed as a vehicle for the transport and transmission of viral diseases was first identified in 2014 during the porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus epidemic in North America. Since the identification of this novel risk factor, scientists have conducted numerous studies to understand its relevance. Over the past few years, the body of scientific evidence supporting the reality of this risk has grown substantially. In addition, numerous papers describing actions and interventions designed to mitigate this risk have been published. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to review the literature on the risk of feed (what do we know) and the protocols developed to reduce this risk (what do we do) in an effort to develop a comprehensive document to raise awareness, facilitate learning, improve the accuracy of risk assessments and to identify knowledge gaps for future studies.

Impact of storage conditions and premix type on phytase stability

Potential use of medium-chain fatty acids (MCFA), increased temperatures and exposure time may be implemented to mitigate biological hazards in premixes and feed ingredients. However, there are no data on how these strategies influence phytase stability. For Exp. 1, there were no four- and three-way interactions among premix type (PT), oil type (OT), storage condition (SC), and storage time (ST) for phytase stability (P > 0.111). There were two-way interactions for PT × SC (P < 0.001) and SC × ST (P < 0.001). The OT did not affect phytase stability when premixes-containing phytase were added as either mineral oil (MO) or MCFA (P = 0.382). For Exp. 2, there was no interaction between PT and OT (P = 0.121). There were also no differences for phytase stability between vitamin premix (VP)- and vitamin trace mineral (VTM) premix-containing phytase were heated at 60 °C (P = 0.141) and between premixes-containing phytase were mixed with 1% MO added and 1% MCFA (P = 0.957). Therefore, the phytase was stable when mixed with both VP and VTM premix and stored at 22 °C with 28.4% relative humidity (RH). The phytase stability was dramatically decreased when the phytase was mixed with premixes and stored at 39.5 °C with 78.8% RH. Also, MCFA did not influence phytase degradation during storage up to 90 d and in the heat pulse process. The phytase activity was decreased by 20% after the premixes containing the phytase was heated at 60 °C for approximately 9.5 h. If both MCFA and heat pulse treatment have similar efficiency at neutralizing or reducing the target pathogen, the process of chemical treatment could become a more practical practice.

Reviewing the risk of feed as a vehicle for swine pathogen transmission

BACKGROUND

While porcine biological hazards have had the potential to be transmitted through feed and feed mills for decades, the emerging threat of foreign animal disease has elevated the concern that these may enter or be transmitted throughout the domestic swine herd via a feed vehicle.

OBJECTIVE

The goal of this review was to describe the current classification for emerging porcine biological pathogen transmission through the feed supply chain so resources can be best directed towards those of highest risk.

METHODS

By assessing the pathogen severity to pigs and the probability of pathogen transmission through feed, an overall risk can be established using a hazard analysis matrix.

RESULTS

There is negligible risk for feed-based transmission of a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, Trichinella spiralis, Toxoplasma gondii, Salmonella Choleraesuis, Salmonella spp. except Choleraesuis and I 4,[5],12:i:-, porcine deltacoronavirus, Senecavirus A, mammalian orthoreovirus 3, foot and mouth disease virus, classical swine fever virus or Chinese pseudorabies virus. However, the combined severity and probability of Salmonella enterica serotype I 4,[5],12:i:-, porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus and African swine fever virus warrant a moderate risk characterization for transmission through the US feed supply chain.

CONCLUSIONS

This risk can be maintained below critical status by minimizing the likelihood that a pathogen can enter the feed supply chain, such as by excluding high-risk ingredients from facilities, extending biosecurity to mills, and considering proactive mitigation strategies. In reality, all these actions may be necessary to prevent the detrimental transmission of porcine biological hazards into the US swine herd through the feed supply chain.