Cognitive Illusions of Authorship Reveal Hierarchical Error Detection in Skilled Typists

The right face at the wrong place: How motor intentions can override outcome monitoring

The concept of intentions is often taken for granted in the cognitive and neural sciences, and comparing outcomes with internal goals is seen as critical for our sense of agency. We created an experiment where participants decided which face they preferred, and we either created outcome errors by covertly switching the position of the chosen face or induced motor errors by deviating the mouse cursor, or we did both at the same time. In the final case, participants experienced a motor error, but the outcome ended up correct. The result showed that when they received the right face, but at the wrong place, participants rejected the outcome they actually wanted in a majority of the trials. Thus, contrary to common belief, higher-order outcomes do not always regulate our actions. Instead, motor "wrongness" might sometimes override goal "rightness" and lead us to reject the outcome we actually want.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Feeling and deciding: Subjective experiences rather than objective factors drive the decision to invest cognitive control

When presented with the choice to invest cognitive control in a task, several signals are monitored to reach a decision. Leading theoretical frameworks argued that the investment of cognitive control is determined by a cost-benefit computation. However, previous accounts remained silent on the potential role of subjective experience in this computation. We experience confidence when giving an answer, feel the excitement of an anticipated reward, and reflect on how much effort is required for successful task performance. Two questions are investigated in the present work: how objective task parameters give rise to subjective experience and whether these drive the decision to allocate cognitive control. To this end, we designed a task in which we manipulated three objective parameters in the same sequence of events (stimulus uncertainty, physical effort, and reward prediction error). We asked participants to report their subjective experiences associated with these manipulations: confidence, subjective physical effort, and reward satisfaction. At the end of each trial, participants indicated whether they wanted to repeat that trial on the next day. In response to the first question, we demonstrate that subjective ratings are reliable and selective. Subjective experiences closely mirrored their objective manipulations. In response to the second question, we demonstrate that subjective experiences provide a better fit for the decisions on future control investments. While objective task parameters are considered when deciding, they do not always produce the expected changes in subjective experience, and when dissociations occur, it is the subjective experience that better explains the decision to allocate cognitive control.

Neurophysiological mechanisms of error monitoring in human and non-human primates

Performance monitoring is an important executive function that allows us to gain insight into our own behaviour. This remarkable ability relies on the frontal cortex, and its impairment is an aspect of many psychiatric diseases. In recent years, recordings from the macaque and human medial frontal cortex have offered a detailed understanding of the neurophysiological substrate that underlies performance monitoring. Here we review the discovery of single-neuron correlates of error monitoring, a key aspect of performance monitoring, in both species. These neurons are the generators of the error-related negativity, which is a non-invasive biomarker that indexes error detection. We evaluate a set of tasks that allows the synergistic elucidation of the mechanisms of cognitive control across the two species, consider differences in brain anatomy and testing conditions across species, and describe the clinical relevance of these findings for understanding psychopathology. Last, we integrate the body of experimental facts into a theoretical framework that offers a new perspective on how error signals are computed in both species and makes novel, testable predictions.

Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations

We can monitor our intentional movements and form explicit representations about our movements, allowing us to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory - given that it is not directly relevant to our goal - and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched (congruent) or differed (incongruent). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d'/d') between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations.

Avatar error in your favor: Embodied avatars can fix users' mistakes without them noticing

In immersive Virtual Reality (VR), users can experience the subjective feeling of embodiment for the avatar representing them in a virtual world. This is known to be strongly supported by a high Sense of Agency (SoA) for the movements of the avatar that follows the user. In general, users do not self-attribute actions of their avatar that are different from the one they actually performed. The situation is less clear when actions of the avatar satisfies the intention of the user despite distortions and noticeable differences between user and avatar movements. Here, a within-subject experiment was condutected to determine wether a finger swap helping users to achieve a task would be more tolerated than one penalizing them. In particular, in a context of fast-paced finger movements and with clear correct or incorrect responses, we swapped the finger animation of the avatar (e.g. user moves the index finger, the avatar moves the middle one) to either automatically correct for spontaneous mistakes or to introduce incorrect responses. Subjects playing a VR game were asked to report when they noticed the introduction of a finger swap. Results based on 3256 trials (∼24% of swaps noticed) show that swaps helping users have significantly fewer odds of being noticed (and with higher confidence) than the ones penalizing users. This demonstrates how the context and the intention for motor action are important factors for the SoA and for embodiment, opening new perspectives on how to design and study interactions in immersive VR.

A little doubt saves many mistakes: Early and late error detection in copy-typing

Based on internal predictions, action-errors can be detected relatively early. Different kinds of sensory feedback further provide information about the occurrence of errors later on. To investigate the mechanisms underlying error detection in copy-typing, ten-finger-typists and hunt-and-peck-typists copy typed with and without visibility of the screen and keyboard. We expected that error detection evolves in slower typing before, during, and after an error. Results showed that more errors were reported with visible screen than with covered screen in both groups underpinning the importance of distal action-effects for error detection. Importantly, ten-finger-typists showed pre-error-slowing in the inter-keystroke-intervals (IKIs) before reported errors, but hunt-and-peck-typists did not. In both groups, error-slowing was observed in the last IKI before both reported and unreported errors. Hence, internal predictions play a role in error detection in both groups, but in ten-finger-typists, internal models may be more precise, leading to earlier error detection. Alternatively, slowing down may increase the probability of detecting errors. Finally, in both groups post-error-slowing indicates that sensory feedback from performing keystrokes contributes to error detection. In conclusion, feedback from distal action-effects (i.e., the screen), movement related feedback, and predictive mechanisms contribute to error detection in typing.

Correction Without Consciousness in Complex Tasks: Evidence from Typing

It has been demonstrated that with practice, complex tasks can become independent of conscious control, but even in those cases, repairing errors is thought to remain dependent on conscious control. This paper reports two studies probing conscious awareness over repairs in nearly 15,000 typing errors collected from 145 participants in a single-word typing-to-dictation task. We provide evidence for subconscious repairs by ruling out alternative accounts, and report two sets of analyses showing that a) such repairs are not confined to a specific stage of processing and b) that they are sensitive to the final outcome of repair. A third set of analyses provides a detailed comparison of the timeline of trials with conscious and subconscious repairs, revealing that the difference is confined to the repair process itself. We propose an account of repair processing that accommodates these empirical findings.

Towards a unified neural mechanism for reactive adaptive behaviour

Surviving in natural environments requires animals to sense sudden events and swiftly adapt behaviour accordingly. The study of such Reactive Adaptive Behaviour (RAB) has been central to a number of research streams, all orbiting around movement science but progressing in parallel, with little cross-field fertilization. We first provide a concise review of these research streams, independently describing four types of RAB: (1) cortico-muscular resonance, (2) stimulus locked response, (3) online motor correction and (4) action stopping. We then highlight remarkable similarities across these four RABs, suggesting that they might be subserved by the same neural mechanism, and propose directions for future research on this topic.

What am I doing? It depends: agency and action identification

Actions can be identified at a range of levels, from higher level, outcome-related descriptions to lower level, movement-related descriptions. But how do these levels of identification influence the experience of control (agency) over a task? We addressed the relation between the level of action identification and agency using a hierarchical task modeled from typing. Participants memorized letter sequences and reported them by moving a cursor to targets that contained letters. To manipulate lower level (aiming) difficulty, the targets were either large or small. To manipulate higher level (memory) difficulty, the letter sequences were either constant or random within a block. We found effects of higher and lower level difficulty on agency and action identification. Moreover, we found interactive effects of higher and lower level difficulty on performance. We discuss these findings in terms of contributions to the study of agency, and some differences from the results of previous studies of action identification.

The neural basis of consciousness

Consciousness has evolved and is a feature of all animals with sufficiently complex nervous systems. It is, therefore, primarily a problem for biology, rather than physics. In this review, I will consider three aspects of consciousness: level of consciousness, whether we are awake or in a coma; the contents of consciousness, what determines how a small amount of sensory information is associated with subjective experience, while the rest is not; and meta-consciousness, the ability to reflect upon our subjective experiences and, importantly, to share them with others. I will discuss and compare current theories of the neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in producing these three aspects of consciousness and conclude that the research in this area is flourishing and has already succeeded to delineate these mechanisms in surprising detail.

Neural and behavioral traces of error awareness

Monitoring for errors and behavioral adjustments after errors are essential for daily life. A question that has not been addressed systematically yet, is whether consciously perceived errors lead to different behavioral adjustments compared to unperceived errors. Our goal was to develop a task that would enable us to study different commonly observed neural correlates of error processing and post-error adjustments in their relation to error awareness and accuracy confidence in a single experiment. We assessed performance in a new number judgement error awareness task in 70 participants. We used multiple, robust, single-trial EEG regressions to investigate the link between neural correlates of error processing (e.g., error-related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe)) and error awareness. We found that only aware errors had a slowing effect on reaction times in consecutive trials, but this slowing was not accompanied by post-error increases in accuracy. On a neural level, error awareness and confidence had a modulating effect on both the ERN and Pe, whereby the Pe was most predictive of participants' error awareness. Additionally, we found partial support for a mediating role of error awareness on the coupling between the ERN and behavioral adjustments in the following trial. Our results corroborate previous findings that show both an ERN/Pe and a post-error behavioral adaptation modulation by error awareness. This suggests that conscious error perception can support meta-control processes balancing the recruitment of proactive and reactive control. Furthermore, this study strengthens the role of the Pe as a robust neural index of error awareness.

Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition

Metacognition - the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive processes - helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals, we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations. There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning and therefore that cultural selection might shape human metacognition. The cultural origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a substantial new programme of research.

Consistency, not speed: temporal regularity as a metacognitive cue

We examined the hypothesis that skilled performance is monitored on the basis of fluency, where fluency is operationally defined as temporal regularity or rhythmicity rather than speed. Since error is often associated with variable timing, we tested the possibility that people use varied timing as a metacognitive cue. Using a sequential counting task, which may be representative of the broader class of skilled, multi-step tasks, we found that shifting between irregular and regular timing led to greater confidence ratings when the timing associated with the task was regular. We argue that regular, consistent timing, when compared directly to irregular timing, produced feelings of fluent task performance, leading to increased confidence. In the first experiment, we demonstrated that both accuracy and confidence were higher when participants completed a task presented with regular timing. In the second experiment, we found a dissociation between accuracy and confidence, strengthening the argument that individuals relied on monitoring of fluency to support their metacognitive judgments. In Study 3 and an assessment of naïve beliefs, we ruled out alternative explanations for these findings.

Errors in Imagined and Executed Typing

In motor imagery (MI), internal models may predict the action effects. A mismatch between predicted and intended action effects may result in error detection. To compare error detection in MI and motor execution (ME), ten-finger typists and hunt-and-peck typists performed a copy-typing task. Visibility of the screen and visibility of the keyboard were manipulated. Participants reported what type of error occurred and by which sources they detected the error. With covered screen, fewer errors were reported, showing the importance of distal action effects for error detection. With covered screen, the number of reported higher-order planning errors did not significantly differ between MI and ME. However, the number of reported motor command errors was lower in MI than in ME. Hence, only errors that occur in advance to internal modeling are equally observed in MI and ME. MI may require more attention than ME, leaving fewer resources to monitor motor command errors in MI. In comparison to hunt-and-peck typists, ten-finger typists detected more higher-order planning errors by kinesthesis/touch and fewer motor command errors by vision of the keyboard. The use of sources for error detection did not significantly differ between MI and ME, indicating similar mechanisms.

Electrophysiological Correlates of Monitoring in Typing with and without Visual Feedback

New theories of monitoring in language production, regardless of their mechanistic differences, all posit monitoring mechanisms that share general computational principles with action monitoring. This perspective, if accurate, would predict that many electrophysiological signatures of performance monitoring should be recoverable from language production tasks. In this study, we examined both error-related and feedback-related EEG indices of performance monitoring in the context of a typing-to-dictation task. To disentangle the contribution of the external from internal monitoring processes, we created a condition where participants immediately saw the word they typed (the immediate-feedback condition) versus one in which displaying the word was delayed until the end of the trial (the delayed-feedback condition). The removal of immediate visual feedback prompted a stronger reliance on internal monitoring processes, which resulted in lower correction rates and a clear error-related negativity. Compatible with domain-general monitoring views, an error positivity was only recovered under conditions where errors were detected or had a high likelihood of being detected. Examination of the feedback-related indices (feedback-related negativity and frontocentral positivity) revealed a two-stage process of integration of internal and external information. The recovery of a full range of well-established EEG indices of action monitoring in a language production task strongly endorses domain-general views of monitoring. Such indices, in turn, are helpful in understanding how information from different monitoring channels are combined.

Meta-analysis of aberrant post-error slowing in substance use disorder: implications for behavioral adaptation and self-control

Individual with substance use disorders have well-recognized impairments in cognitive control, including in behavioral adaptation after mistakes. One way in which this impairment manifests is via diminished post-error slowing, the increase in reaction time following a task-related error that is posited to reflect cautionary or corrective behavior. Yet, in the substance use disorder literature, findings with regard to post-error slowing have been inconsistent, and thus could benefit from quantitative integration. Here, we conducted a meta-analysis of case-control studies examining post-error slowing in addiction. Twelve studies with 15 unique comparisons were identified, comprising 567 substance users and 384 healthy controls across three broad types of inhibitory control paradigms (go-no/go, conflict resolution, and stop signal tasks, respectively). Results of the random-effects meta-analysis revealed a moderate group difference across all studies (Cohen's d = 0.31), such that the individuals with substance use disorder had diminished post-error slowing compared with controls. Despite this omnibus effect, there was also large variability in the magnitude of the effects, explained in part by differences between studies in task complexity. These findings suggest that post-error slowing may serve as a promising and easy-to-implement measure of cognitive control impairment in substance use disorder, with potential links to aberrant brain function in cognitive control areas such as the anterior cingulate cortex.

Human Error: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Attention-Related Cognitive Errors and Error Detection

(1) Background: Work-related stress is a major contributor to human error. One significant workplace stressor is job insecurity, which has been linked to an increased likelihood of experiencing burnout. This, in turn, might affect human error, specifically attention-related cognitive errors (ARCES) and the ability to detect errors. ARCES can be costly for organizations and pose a safety risk. Equally detrimental effects can be caused by failure to detect errors before they can cause harm. (2) Methods: We gathered self-report and behavioral data from 148 employees working in educational, financial and medical sectors in China. We designed and piloted an error detection task in which employees had to compare fictitious customer orders to deliveries of an online shop. We tested for indirect effects using the PROCESS macro with bootstrapping (3) Results: Our findings confirmed indirect effects of job insecurity on both ARCES and the ability to detect errors via burnout. (4) Conclusions: The present research shows that job insecurity influences making and detecting errors through its relationship with burnout. These findings suggest that job insecurity could increase the likelihood for human error with potential implications for employees' safety and the safety of others.

"Twisting fingers": The case for interactivity in typed language production

Despite the obvious linguistic nature of typing, current psychological models of typing are, to a large extent, divorced from models of spoken language production. This gap has left unanswered many questions regarding the cognitive architecture of typing. In this article we advocate the use of a psycholinguistic framework for studying typing, by showing that such a framework could reveal important similarities and differences between spoken and typed production. Specifically, we investigated the interaction between the lexical and postlexical layers by using a phenomenon known in spoken production as the "repeated-phoneme effect." Participants typed four-word sequences of "finger-twisters" (equivalent to tongue-twisters in spoken production), in which the vowel in the last two words was either repeated (e.g., "fog top") or not (e.g., "fog tip"). We found reliably more migration errors between the consonants of the two typed words when the vowel was repeated, even after the effect of phonology was accounted for. This finding is compatible with an interactive typing system in which postlexical representations send feedback to lexical representations and reveals similar dynamics between spoken and typed production. Additional analyses showed further similarities to spoken production, such as distinct lexical and postlexical error categories, but also revealed that typing errors were much more likely than spoken errors to violate phonotactic constraints. These results provide the first demonstration of feedback between the postlexical and lexical layers in typing, and more generally demonstrate the utility of adopting a psycholinguistic framework tailored specifically to the study of typing.

Classic motor chunking theory fails to account for behavioural diversity and speed in a complex naturalistic task

In tasks that demand rapid performance, actions must be executed as efficiently as possible. Theories of expert motor performance such as the motor chunking framework suggest that efficiency is supported by automatization, where many serial actions are automatized into smaller chunks, or groups of commonly co-occuring actions. We use the fast-paced, professional eSport StarCraft 2 as a test case of the explanatory power of the motor chunking framework and assess the importance of chunks in explaining expert performance. To do so, we test three predictions motivated by a simple motor chunking framework. (1) StarCraft 2 players should exhibit an increasing number of chunks with expertise. (2) The proportion of actions falling within a chunk should increase with skill. (3) Chunks should be faster than non-chunks containing the same atomic behaviours. Although our findings support the existence of chunks, they also highlight two problems for existing accounts of rapid motor execution and expert performance. First, while better players do use more chunks, the proportion of actions within a chunks is stable across expertise and expert sequences are generally more varied (the diversity problem). Secondly, chunks, which are supposed to enjoy the most extreme automatization, appear to save little or no time overall (the time savings problem). Instead, the most parsimonious description of our latency analysis is that players become faster overall regardless of chunking.

Developing a Reflective Mind: From Core Metacognition to Explicit Self-Reflection

Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control cognition. Because young children often provide inaccurate metacognitive judgments when prompted to do so verbally, it has long been assumed that this ability does not develop until late childhood. This claim is now challenged by new studies using nonverbal paradigms and revealing that basic forms of metacognition—such as the ability to estimate decision confidence or to monitor errors—are present even in preverbal infants. This new line of evidence suggests that young children adapt to their environment not only by considering their physical and social surroundings but also by reflecting on their own cognitive states.

Thinking about thinking: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of metacognitive judgements

Metacognition supports reflection upon and control of other cognitive processes. Despite metacognition occupying a central role in human psychology, its neural substrates remain underdetermined, partly due to study-specific differences in task domain and type of metacognitive judgement under study. It is also unclear how metacognition relates to other apparently similar abilities that depend on recursive thought such as theory of mind or mentalising. Now that neuroimaging studies of metacognition are more prevalent, we have an opportunity to characterise consistencies in neural substrates identified across different analysis types and domains. Here we used quantitative activation likelihood estimation methods to synthesise findings from 47 neuroimaging studies on metacognition, divided into categories based on the target of metacognitive evaluation (memory and decision-making), analysis type (judgement-related activation, confidence-related activation, and predictors of metacognitive sensitivity), and, for metamemory judgements, temporal focus (prospective and retrospective). A domain-general network, including medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and insula was associated with the level of confidence in self-performance in both decision-making and memory tasks. We found preferential engagement of right anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in metadecision experiments and bilateral parahippocampal cortex in metamemory experiments. Results on metacognitive sensitivity were inconclusive, likely due to fewer studies reporting this contrast. Finally, by comparing our results to meta-analyses of mentalising, we obtain evidence for common engagement of the ventromedial and anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in both metacognition and mentalising, suggesting that these regions may support second-order representations for thinking about the thoughts of oneself and others.

Response time distribution parameters show posterror behavioral adjustment in mental arithmetic

After making an error, we usually slow down before our next response. This phenomenon is known as the posterror slowing (PES) effect. It has been interpreted to be an indicator of posterror behavioral adjustments and, therefore, has been linked to cognitive control. However, contradictory findings regarding PES and posterror accuracy cast doubt on such a relation. To determine whether behavior is adjusted after making an error, we investigated other features of behavior, such as the distribution of response times (RT) in a mental arithmetic task. Participants performed an arithmetic task with (Experiments 1 and 2) and without (Experiment 1) an accuracy-tracking procedure. On both tasks, participants responded more slowly and less accurately after errors. However, the RT distribution was more symmetrical on posterror trials compared to postcorrect trials, suggesting that a change in processing mode occurred after making an error, thus linking cognitive control to error monitoring, even in cases when accuracy decreased after errors. These findings expand our understanding on how posterror behavior is adjusted in mental arithmetic, and we propose that the measures of the RT distribution can be further used in other domains of error-monitoring research.

An adaptive orienting theory of error processing

The ability to detect and correct action errors is paramount to safe and efficient goal-directed behaviors. Existing work on the neural underpinnings of error processing and post-error behavioral adaptations has led to the development of several mechanistic theories of error processing. These theories can be roughly grouped into adaptive and maladaptive theories. While adaptive theories propose that errors trigger a cascade of processes that will result in improved behavior after error commission, maladaptive theories hold that error commission momentarily impairs behavior. Neither group of theories can account for all available data, as different empirical studies find both impaired and improved post-error behavior. This article attempts a synthesis between the predictions made by prominent adaptive and maladaptive theories. Specifically, it is proposed that errors invoke a nonspecific cascade of processing that will rapidly interrupt and inhibit ongoing behavior and cognition, as well as orient attention toward the source of the error. It is proposed that this cascade follows all unexpected action outcomes, not just errors. In the case of errors, this cascade is followed by error-specific, controlled processing, which is specifically aimed at (re)tuning the existing task set. This theory combines existing predictions from maladaptive orienting and bottleneck theories with specific neural mechanisms from the wider field of cognitive control, including from error-specific theories of adaptive post-error processing. The article aims to describe the proposed framework and its implications for post-error slowing and post-error accuracy, propose mechanistic neural circuitry for post-error processing, and derive specific hypotheses for future empirical investigations.

On the Globality of Motor Suppression: Unexpected Events and Their Influence on Behavior and Cognition

Unexpected events are part of everyday experience. They come in several varieties-action errors, unexpected action outcomes, and unexpected perceptual events-and they lead to motor slowing and cognitive distraction. While different varieties of unexpected events have been studied largely independently, and many different mechanisms are thought to explain their effects on action and cognition, we suggest a unifying theory. We propose that unexpected events recruit a fronto-basal-ganglia network for stopping. This network includes specific prefrontal cortical nodes and is posited to project to the subthalamic nucleus, with a putative global suppressive effect on basal-ganglia output. We argue that unexpected events interrupt action and impact cognition, partly at least, by recruiting this global suppressive network. This provides a common mechanistic basis for different types of unexpected events; links the literatures on motor inhibition, performance monitoring, attention, and working memory; and is relevant for understanding clinical symptoms of distractibility and mental inflexibility.

The impact of evidence reliability on sensitivity and bias in decision confidence

Human observers effortlessly and accurately judge their probability of being correct in their decisions, suggesting that metacognitive evaluation is an integral part of decision making. It remains a challenge for most models of confidence, however, to explain how metacognitive judgments are formed and which internal signals influence them. While the decision-making literature has suggested that confidence is based on privileged access to the evidence that gives rise to the decision itself, other lines of research on confidence have commonly taken the view of a multicue model of confidence. The present study aims at manipulating one such cue: the perceived reliability of evidence supporting an initial decision. Participants made a categorical judgment of the average color of an array of eight colored shapes, for which we critically manipulated both the distance of the mean color from the category boundary (evidence strength) and the variability of colors across the eight shapes (evidence reliability). Our results indicate that evidence reliability has a stronger impact on confidence than evidence strength. Specifically, we found that evidence reliability affects metacognitive readout, the mapping from subjectively experienced certainty to expressed confidence, allowing participants to adequately adjust their confidence ratings to match changes in objective task performance across conditions.

People constantly face various types of decisions, which are commonly accompanied by an inherent feeling of (in)correctness: Just as realizing the tennis ball we played will most likely hit the net, we can feel more or less confident regarding our recent car purchase. People’s confidence judgments have been found to be surprisingly accurate. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms that give rise to them. In this study, we suggest that variability in the information we receive from the outside world is of particular importance for how confident we feel in our decisions—more so than the extent to which evidence favors one over another choice option. Specifically, we find that this variability affects how people translate their internal feelings of certainty into the confidence judgments they express.

Typing Style and the Use of Different Sources of Information during Typing: An Investigation Using Self-Reports

We investigated to what extent different sources of information are used in typing on a computer keyboard. Using self-reports 10 finger typists and idiosyncratic typists estimated how much attention they pay to different sources of information during copy typing and free typing and how much they use them for error detection. 10 finger typists reported less attention to the keyboard and the fingers and more attention to the template and the screen than idiosyncratic typists. The groups did not differ in attention to touch/kinaesthesis in copy typing and free typing, but 10 finger typists reported more use of touch/kinaesthesis in error detection. This indicates that processing of tactile/kinaesthetic information may occur largely outside conscious control, as long as no errors occur. 10 finger typists reported more use of internal prediction of movement consequences for error detection than idiosyncratic typists, reflecting more precise internal models. Further in copy typing compared to free typing attention to the template is required, thus leaving less attentional capacity for other sources of information. Correlations showed that higher skilled typists, regardless of typing style, rely more on sources of information which are usually associated with 10 finger typing. One limitation of the study is that only self-reports were used. We conclude that typing task, typing proficiency, and typing style influence how attention is distributed during typing.

Behavioral and Neural Indices of Metacognitive Sensitivity in Preverbal Infants

Humans adapt their behavior not only by observing the consequences of their actions but also by internally monitoring their performance. This capacity, termed metacognitive sensitivity [1, 2], has traditionally been denied to young children because they have poor capacities in verbally reporting their own mental states [3, 4, 5]. Yet, these observations might reflect children’s limited capacities for explicit self-reports, rather than limitations in metacognition per se. Indeed, metacognitive sensitivity has been shown to reflect simple computational mechanisms [1, 6, 7, 8], and can be found in various non-verbal species [7, 8, 9, 10]. Thus, it might be that this faculty is present early in development, although it would be discernible through implicit behaviors and neural indices rather than explicit self-reports. Here, by relying on such non-verbal indices, we show that 12- and 18-month-old infants internally monitor the accuracy of their own decisions. At the behavioral level, infants showed increased persistence in their initial choice after making a correct as compared to an incorrect response, evidencing an appropriate evaluation of decision confidence. Moreover, infants were able to use decision confidence adaptively to either confirm their initial choice or change their mind. At the neural level, we found that a well-established electrophysiological signature of error monitoring in adults, the error-related negativity, is similarly elicited when infants make an incorrect choice. Hence, although explicit forms of metacognition mature later during childhood, infants already estimate decision confidence, monitor their errors, and use these metacognitive evaluations to regulate subsequent behavior.

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Preverbal infants internally monitor the accuracy of their own decisions

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Infants’ post-decision persistence reflects decision confidence

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Infants can rely on decision confidence to regulate subsequent behavior

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After errors, a typical EEG marker of performance monitoring is elicited

HiTEC: a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning

Increasing evidence suggests that perception and action planning do not represent separable stages of a unidirectional processing sequence, but rather emerging properties of highly interactive processes. To capture these characteristics of the human cognitive system, we have developed a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning: HiTEC, based on the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al. in Behav Brain Sci 24:849–937, 2001). The model is characterized by representations at multiple levels and by shared representations and processes. It complements available models of stimulus–response translation by providing a rationale for (1) how situation-specific meanings of motor actions emerge, (2) how and why some aspects of stimulus–response translation occur automatically and (3) how task demands modulate sensorimotor processing. The model is demonstrated to provide a unitary account and simulation of a number of key findings with multiple experimental paradigms on the interaction between perception and action such as the Simon effect, its inversion (Hommel in Psychol Res 55:270–279, 1993), and action–effect learning.

Neuronal Substrates Underlying Performance Variability in Well-Trained Skillful Motor Task in Humans

Motor performance fluctuates trial by trial even in a well-trained motor skill. Here we show neural substrates underlying such behavioral fluctuation in humans. We first scanned brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while healthy participants repeatedly performed a 10 s skillful sequential finger-tapping task. Before starting the experiment, the participants had completed intensive training. We evaluated task performance per trial (number of correct sequences in 10 s) and depicted brain regions where the activity changes in association with the fluctuation of the task performance across trials. We found that the activity in a broader range of frontoparietocerebellar network, including the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior cingulate and anterior insular cortices, and left cerebellar hemisphere, was negatively correlated with the task performance. We further showed in another transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) experiment that task performance deteriorated, when we applied anodal tDCS to the right DLPFC. These results indicate that fluctuation of brain activity in the nonmotor frontoparietocerebellar network may underlie trial-by-trial performance variability even in a well-trained motor skill, and its neuromodulation with tDCS may affect the task performance.

Error-related brain activity and error awareness in an error classification paradigm

Error-related brain activity has been linked to error detection enabling adaptive behavioral adjustments. However, it is still unclear which role error awareness plays in this process. Here, we show that the error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), an event-related potential reflecting early error monitoring, is dissociable from the degree of error awareness. Participants responded to a target while ignoring two different incongruent distractors. After responding, they indicated whether they had committed an error, and if so, whether they had responded to one or to the other distractor. This error classification paradigm allowed distinguishing partially aware errors, (i.e., errors that were noticed but misclassified) and fully aware errors (i.e., errors that were correctly classified). The Ne/ERN was larger for partially aware errors than for fully aware errors. Whereas this speaks against the idea that the Ne/ERN foreshadows the degree of error awareness, it confirms the prediction of a computational model, which relates the Ne/ERN to post-response conflict. This model predicts that stronger distractor processing - a prerequisite of error classification in our paradigm - leads to lower post-response conflict and thus a smaller Ne/ERN. This implies that the relationship between Ne/ERN and error awareness depends on how error awareness is related to response conflict in a specific task. Our results further indicate that the Ne/ERN but not the degree of error awareness determines adaptive performance adjustments. Taken together, we conclude that the Ne/ERN is dissociable from error awareness and foreshadows adaptive performance adjustments. Our results suggest that the relationship between the Ne/ERN and error awareness is correlative and mediated by response conflict.

Unreliable numbers: error and harm induced by bad design can be reduced by better design

Number entry is a ubiquitous activity and is often performed in safety- and mission-critical procedures, such as healthcare, science, finance, aviation and in many other areas. We show that Monte Carlo methods can quickly and easily compare the reliability of different number entry systems. A surprising finding is that many common, widely used systems are defective, and induce unnecessary human error. We show that Monte Carlo methods enable designers to explore the implications of normal and unexpected operator behaviour, and to design systems to be more resilient to use error. We demonstrate novel designs with improved resilience, implying that the common problems identified and the errors they induce are avoidable.

Dual-process theories and consciousness: the case for 'Type Zero' cognition

A step towards a theory of consciousness would be to characterize the effect of consciousness on information processing. One set of results suggests that the effect of consciousness is to interfere with computations that are optimally performed non-consciously. Another set of results suggests that conscious, system 2 processing is the home of norm-compliant computation. This is contrasted with system 1 processing, thought to be typically unconscious, which operates with useful but error-prone heuristics. These results can be reconciled by separating out two different distinctions: between conscious and non-conscious representations, on the one hand, and between automatic and deliberate processes, on the other. This pair of distinctions is used to illuminate some existing experimental results and to resolve the puzzle about whether consciousness helps or hinders accurate information processing. This way of resolving the puzzle shows the importance of another category, which we label 'type 0 cognition', characterized by automatic computational processes operating on non-conscious representations.

Aging, Emotion, Attention, and Binding in the Taboo Stroop Task: Data and Theories

How does aging impact relations between emotion, memory, and attention? To address this question, young and older adults named the font colors of taboo and neutral words, some of which recurred in the same font color or screen location throughout two color-naming experiments. The results indicated longer color-naming response times (RTs) for taboo than neutral base-words (taboo Stroop interference); better incidental recognition of colors and locations consistently associated with taboo versus neutral words (taboo context-memory enhancement); and greater speed-up in color-naming RTs with repetition of color-consistent than color-inconsistent taboo words, but no analogous speed-up with repetition of location-consistent or location-inconsistent taboo words (the consistency type by repetition interaction for taboo words). All three phenomena remained constant with aging, consistent with the transmission deficit hypothesis and binding theory, where familiar emotional words trigger age-invariant reactions for prioritizing the binding of contextual features to the source of emotion. Binding theory also accurately predicted the interaction between consistency type and repetition for taboo words. However, one or more aspects of these phenomena failed to support the inhibition deficit hypothesis, resource capacity theory, or socio-emotional selectivity theory. We conclude that binding theory warrants further test in a range of paradigms, and that relations between aging and emotion, memory, and attention may depend on whether the task and stimuli trigger fast-reaction, involuntary binding processes, as in the taboo Stroop paradigm.

Hierarchical error representation in medial prefrontal cortex

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is reliably activated by both performance and prediction errors. Error signals have typically been treated as a scalar, and it is unknown to what extent multiple error signals may co-exist within mPFC. Previous studies have shown that lateral frontal cortex (LFC) is arranged in a hierarchy of abstraction, such that more abstract concepts and rules are represented in more anterior cortical regions. Given the close interaction between lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, we explored the hypothesis that mPFC would be organized along a similar rostro-caudal gradient of abstraction, such that more abstract prediction errors are represented further anterior and more concrete errors further posterior. We show that multiple prediction error signals can be found in mPFC, and furthermore, these are arranged in a rostro-caudal gradient of abstraction which parallels that found in LFC. We used a task that requires a three-level hierarchy of rules to be followed, in which the rules changed without warning at each level of the hierarchy. Task feedback indicated which level of the rule hierarchy changed and led to corresponding prediction error signals in mPFC. Moreover, each identified region of mPFC was preferentially functionally connected to correspondingly anterior regions of LFC. These results suggest the presence of a parallel structure between lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, with the medial regions monitoring and evaluating performance based on rules maintained in the corresponding lateral regions.

Violating body movement semantics: Neural signatures of self-generated and external-generated errors

How do we recognize ourselves as the agents of our actions? Do we use the same error detection mechanisms to monitor self-generated vs. externally imposed actions? Using event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we identified two different error-monitoring loops involved in providing a coherent sense of the agency of our actions. In the first ERP experiment, the participants were embodied in a virtual body (avatar) while performing an error-prone fast reaction time task. Crucially, in certain trials, participants were deceived regarding their own actions, i.e., the avatar movement did not match the participant's movement. Self-generated real errors and false (avatar) errors showed very different ERP signatures and with different processing latencies: while real errors showed a classical frontal-central error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), peaking 100ms after error commission, false errors elicited a larger and delayed parietal negative component (at about 350-400ms). The violation of the sense of agency elicited by false avatar errors showed a strong similarity to ERP signatures related to semantic or conceptual violations (N400 component). In a follow-up ERP control experiment, a subset of the same participants merely acted as observers of the avatar correct and error movements. This experimental situation did not elicit the N400 component associated with agency violation. Thus, the results show a clear neural dissociation between internal and external error-monitoring loops responsible for distinguishing our self-generated errors from those imposed externally, opening new avenues for the study of the mental processes underlying the integration of internal and sensory feedback information while being actors of our own actions.

Extracting latent brain states--Towards true labels in cognitive neuroscience experiments

Neuroscientific data is typically analyzed based on the behavioral response of the participant. However, the errors made may or may not be in line with the neural processing. In particular in experiments with time pressure or studies where the threshold of perception is measured, the error distribution deviates from uniformity due to the structure in the underlying experimental set-up. When we base our analysis on the behavioral labels as usually done, then we ignore this problem of systematic and structured (non-uniform) label noise and are likely to arrive at wrong conclusions in our data analysis. This paper contributes a remedy to this important scenario: we present a novel approach for a) measuring label noise and b) removing structured label noise. We demonstrate its usefulness for EEG data analysis using a standard d2 test for visual attention (N=20 participants).

Interplay of approximate planning strategies

Humans routinely formulate plans in domains so complex that even the most powerful computers are taxed. To do so, they seem to avail themselves of many strategies and heuristics that efficiently simplify, approximate, and hierarchically decompose hard tasks into simpler subtasks. Theoretical and cognitive research has revealed several such strategies; however, little is known about their establishment, interaction, and efficiency. Here, we use model-based behavioral analysis to provide a detailed examination of the performance of human subjects in a moderately deep planning task. We find that subjects exploit the structure of the domain to establish subgoals in a way that achieves a nearly maximal reduction in the cost of computing values of choices, but then combine partial searches with greedy local steps to solve subtasks, and maladaptively prune the decision trees of subtasks in a reflexive manner upon encountering salient losses. Subjects come idiosyncratically to favor particular sequences of actions to achieve subgoals, creating novel complex actions or "options."

The point of no return: A fundamental limit on the ability to control thought and action

Bartlett (1958. Thinking. New York: Basic Books) described the point of no return as a point of irrevocable commitment to action, which was preceded by a period of gradually increasing commitment. As such, the point of no return reflects a fundamental limit on the ability to control thought and action. I review the literature on the point of no return, taking three perspectives. First, I consider the point of no return from the perspective of the controlled act, as a locus in the architecture and anatomy of the underlying processes. I review experiments from the stop-signal paradigm that suggest that the point of no return is located late in the response system. Then I consider the point of no return from the perspective of the act of control that tries to change the controlled act before it becomes irrevocable. From this perspective, the point of no return is a point in time that provides enough "lead time" for the act of control to take effect. I review experiments that measure the response time to the stop signal as the lead time required for response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm. Finally, I consider the point of no return in hierarchically controlled tasks, in which there may be many points of no return at different levels of the hierarchy. I review experiments on skilled typing that suggest different points of no return for the commands that determine what is typed and the countermands that inhibit typing, with increasing commitment to action the lower the level in the hierarchy. I end by considering the point of no return in perception and thought as well as action.

Maintenance of non-consciously presented information engages the prefrontal cortex

Conscious processing is generally seen as required for flexible and willful actions, as well as for tasks that require durable information maintenance. Here we present research that questions the assumption that only consciously perceived information is durable (>500 ms). Using the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon, we rendered otherwise relatively clearly perceived letters non-conscious. In a first experiment we systematically manipulated the delay between stimulus presentation and response, for the purpose of estimating the durability of non-conscious perceptual representations. For items reported not seen, we found that behavioral performance was better than chance across intervals up to 15 s. In a second experiment we used fMRI to investigate the neural correlates underlying the maintenance of non-conscious perceptual representations. Critically, the relatively long delay period demonstrated in experiment 1 enabled isolation of the signal change specifically related to the maintenance period, separate from stimulus presentation and response. We found sustained BOLD signal change in the right mid-lateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and crus II of the cerebellum during maintenance of non-consciously perceived information. These findings are consistent with the controversial claim that working-memory mechanisms are involved in the short-term maintenance of non-conscious perceptual representations.

Making and monitoring errors based on altered auditory feedback

Previous research has demonstrated that altered auditory feedback (AAF) disrupts music performance and causes disruptions in both action planning and the perception of feedback events. It has been proposed that this disruption occurs because of interference within a shared representation for perception and action (Pfordresher, 2006). Studies reported here address this claim from the standpoint of error monitoring. In Experiment 1 participants performed short melodies on a keyboard while hearing no auditory feedback, normal auditory feedback, or alterations to feedback pitch on some subset of events. Participants overestimated error frequency when AAF was present but not for normal feedback. Experiment 2 introduced a concurrent load task to determine whether error monitoring requires executive resources. Although the concurrent task enhanced the effect of AAF, it did not alter participants' tendency to overestimate errors when AAF was present. A third correlational study addressed whether effects of AAF are reduced for a subset of the population who may lack the kind of perception/action associations that lead to AAF disruption: poor-pitch singers. Effects of manipulations similar to those presented in Experiments 1 and 2 were reduced for these individuals. We propose that these results are consistent with the notion that AAF interference is based on associations between perception and action within a forward internal model of auditory-motor relationships.

Acquisition process of typing skill using hierarchical materials in the Japanese language

In the present study, using a new keyboard layout with only eight keys, we conducted typing training for unskilled typists. In this task, Japanese college students received training in typing words consisting of a pair of hiragana characters with four keystrokes, using the alphabetic input method, while keeping the association between the keys and typists' finger movements; the task was constructed so that chunking was readily available. We manipulated the association between the hiragana characters and alphabet letters (hierarchical materials: overlapped and nonoverlapped mappings). Our alphabet letter materials corresponded to the regular order within each hiragana word (within the four letters, the first and third referred to consonants, and the second and fourth referred to vowels). Only the interkeystroke intervals involved in the initiation of typing vowel letters showed an overlapping effect, which revealed that the effect was markedly large only during the early period of skill development (the effect for the overlapped mapping being larger than that for the nonoverlapped mapping), but that it had diminished by the time of late training. Conversely, the response time and the third interkeystroke interval, which are both involved in the latency of typing a consonant letter, did not reveal an overlapped effect, suggesting that chunking might be useful with hiragana characters rather than hiragana words. These results are discussed in terms of the fan effect and skill acquisition. Furthermore, we discuss whether there is a need for further research on unskilled and skilled Japanese typists.

Auditory feedback of one's own voice is used for high-level semantic monitoring: the "self-comprehension" hypothesis

What would it be like if we said one thing, and heard ourselves saying something else? Would we notice something was wrong? Or would we believe we said the thing we heard? Is feedback of our own speech only used to detect errors, or does it also help to specify the meaning of what we say? Comparator models of self-monitoring favor the first alternative, and hold that our sense of agency is given by the comparison between intentions and outcomes, while inferential models argue that agency is a more fluent construct, dependent on contextual inferences about the most likely cause of an action. In this paper, we present a theory about the use of feedback during speech. Specifically, we discuss inferential models of speech production that question the standard comparator assumption that the meaning of our utterances is fully specified before articulation. We then argue that auditory feedback provides speakers with a channel for high-level, semantic “self-comprehension”. In support of this we discuss results using a method we recently developed called Real-time Speech Exchange (RSE). In our first study using RSE (Lind et al., in press) participants were fitted with headsets and performed a computerized Stroop task. We surreptitiously recorded words they said, and later in the test we played them back at the exact same time that the participants uttered something else, while blocking the actual feedback of their voice. Thus, participants said one thing, but heard themselves saying something else. The results showed that when timing conditions were ideal, more than two thirds of the manipulations went undetected. Crucially, in a large proportion of the non-detected manipulated trials, the inserted words were experienced as self-produced by the participants. This indicates that our sense of agency for speech has a strong inferential component, and that auditory feedback of our own voice acts as a pathway for semantic monitoring. We believe RSE holds great promise as a tool for investigating the role of auditory feedback during speech, and we suggest a number of future studies to serve this purpose.