How should different life expectancies be valued? Existential model may be better than scale that uses quality adjusted life years

Discounting health gain: a different view

At least since the Age of Enlightenment, good health has been a tenet for society. Healthy societies could learn better, work harder, improve their wealth, and live longer. Today societies focus on life expectancy, as we value long and healthy lives. As illustrated by the provision of COVID-19 vaccines first for the elderly, societies value life-saving actions. Paradoxically, health economic assessments conventionally devalue long-lasting health through the practice of discounting health benefits along with costs. However, health, with its intrinsic and instrumental characteristics, is not synonymous with money cash, a tradeable asset that devalues with time. If improving healthy life expectancy is a societal ambition, it seems counter-intuitive to value future health less as a result of an artificial mathematical construct when evaluating economically new medical interventions. In this paper, we investigate the application of discounting health in healthcare and consider paradoxical findings, especially in relation to disease prevention with vaccination. We argue that there is no economically sustainable argument to discount health gains, except for the benefit of the payer with a goal of spending less on life-saving products. If that is the objective for discounting health, there are other means to achieve the same goal in a more transparent and simpler way. From the long-term perspective of healthcare development, not discounting health gains would encourage research that values long-term effects. This in turn has the potential to benefit the investor, the payer, and the patient/consumer, improving the situation from multiple perspectives.

The Load Model: an alternative to QALY

BACKGROUND

QALYs are widely used in health economic evaluation, but remain controversial, largely because they do not reflect how many people behave in practice. This paper presents a new conceptual model (Load Model) and illustrates it in comparison with the QALY model.

METHODS

Load is the average annual weight attributed to morbidity and mortality over a defined period, using weightings based on preference judgements. Morbidity Load is attributed to states of illness, according to their perceived severity. When people are in full health, Load is zero (no morbidity). Death is treated as an event with negative consequences, incurred in the year following death. Deaths may be weighted equally, with a fixed negative weight such as -100, or differ according to the context of death. After death, Load is zero. In a worked example, we use the standard gamble method to obtain a weighting for an illness state, for both Load and QALY models. A judge is indifferent between certainty of 1.5 years' illness followed by death, or a 50/50 chance of 1.5 years' full health or 1-year illness, each followed by death. The weightings calculated are applied to a hypothetical life, 72 years in full health followed by 3 years with illness then death, using both models. Three other hypothetical outcomes are also compared.

RESULTS

For an example life, the relative size of the morbidity component compared with the mortality component is much higher in the Load model than in the QALY model. When comparing alternative outcomes, there are also substantial differences between the two models.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Load model the weight of morbidity, relative to mortality, is very different from that in the QALY model. Given the role of the QALYs in economic evaluation, the implications of an alternative, which generates very different results, warrant further exploration.

Rationalising rationing: economic and other considerations in the debate about funding of Viagra

Although the cost-effectiveness of Viagra for the treatment of patients with erectile dysfunction is favourable, both public and political opinions seem to be inclined not to fund, or merely to partially fund (i.e. by reimbursing only specific patient groups) this medicine. This shows that in funding discussions, cost-effectiveness information is not solely decisive. In a theoretical framework for choices in health care that was developed in The Netherlands (the Dunning report, 1991), two other criteria besides cost-effectiveness were put forward as being important for rationing decisions: "necessary care" and "individual responsibility". Overlooking the Viagra discussion, many of the arguments put forward seemed to be related to these two criteria. However, a clear operationalisation of the criteria necessary care and individual responsibility is lacking, which makes it difficult to use the arguments in funding decisions. In this paper, we try to demonstrate how these criteria were presented in the Viagra discussion and we will indicate how these criteria can be operationalised in relation to the outcomes of a cost-effectiveness analysis.