Facilities for chemical decontamination in accident and emergency departments in the United Kingdom

Emergency Department Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Events: A Systematic Review

Introduction

A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and explosive (CBRNe) event is an emergency which can result in injury, illness, or loss of life. The emergency department (ED) as a health system is at the forefront of the CBRNe response with staff acting as first receivers. Emergency departments are under-prepared to respond to CBRNe events - recognizing key factors which underlie the ED CBRNe response is crucial to provide evidence-based knowledge to inform policies and, most importantly, clinical practice.

Problem

Challenges in detection, decontamination, and diagnosis are associated with the ED CBRNe response when faced with self-presenting patients.

Methods

A systematic review was carried out in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). An in-depth search strategy was devised to identify studies which focused on the ED and CBRNe events. The inclusion criteria were stringent in terms of the environment (ED), participants (first receivers), situation (CBRNe response), and actions (detection, decontamination, and diagnosis). Fifteen databases and topic-specific journals were searched. Studies were critically appraised using the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT). Papers were thematically coded and synthesized using NVivo 10 (QSR International Ltd, Melbourne, Australia).

Results

Sixty-seven full-text papers were critically appraised using the MMAT; 70% were included (n = 60) as medium- or high-quality studies. Data were grouped into four themes: preparedness, response, decontamination, and personal protective equipment (PPE) problems.

Discussion

This study has recognized the ED as a system which depends on four key factors - preparedness, response, decontamination, and PPE problems - which highlight challenges, uncertainties, inconsistencies, and obstacles associated with the ED CBRNe response. This review suggests that response planning and preparation should be considered at three levels: organizational (policies and procedures); technological (decontamination, communication, security, clinical care, and treatment); and individual (willingness to respond, PPE, knowledge, and competence). Finally, this study highlighted that there was a void specific to detection and diagnosis of CBRNe exposure on self-presenting patients in the ED.

Conclusion:

The review identified concerns for both knowledge and behaviors which suggests that a systems approach would help understand the ED response to CBRNe events more effectively. The four themes provide an evidence-based summary for the state of science in ED CBRNe response, which can be used to inform future policies and clinical procedures.

RazakS,HignettS,BarnesJ.Emergency department response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive events: a systematic review.Prehosp Disaster Med.2018;33(5):543–549.

Hospital Decontamination: What Nurses Need to Know

Incidents involving the release of hazardous materials challenge medical providers with safely, quickly, and correctly removing contaminants from the victim. While doing so, the safety of the first receiver, current patients, bystanders, as well as the victim all have to be considered. Key challenges with hospital decontamination include, but are not limited to, selection of team members, training protocols, employee turnover, and funding. Best practices, based on the available literature and evidence, include administration buy-in and support; strong policy and procedure documentation; equipment maintenance programs; and team member recruitment, retention, and education.

Decontamination of Multiple Casualties Who Are Chemically Contaminated: A Challenge for Acute Hospitals

Patients who have been contaminated by chemical compounds present a number of difficulties to emergency departments, in particular, the risk of secondary contamination of healthcare staff and facilities. The Department of Health in the United Kingdom has provided equipment to decontaminate chemically contaminated casualties who present at emergency departments. The capacity of this equipment is limited, and although both the ambulance and fire services have equipment to cope with mass casualties at the scene of a chemical incident, there is still the possibility that acute hospitals will be overwhelmed by large numbers of self-presenting patients. The risks and potential consequences of this gap in resilience are discussed and a number of possible practical solutions are proposed.

Preparedness of emergency departments in northwest England for managing chemical incidents: a structured interview survey

Background

A number of significant chemical incidents occur in the UK each year and may require Emergency Departments (EDs) to receive and manage contaminated casualties. Previously UK EDs have been found to be under-prepared for this, but since October 2005 acute hospital Trusts have had a statutory responsibility to maintain decontamination capacity. We aimed to evaluate the level of preparedness of Emergency Departments in North West England for managing chemical incidents.

Methods

A face-to-face semi-structured interview was carried out with the Nurse Manager or a nominated deputy in all 18 Emergency Departments in the Region.

Results

16/18 departments had a written chemical incident plan but only 7 had the plan available at interview. All had a designated decontamination area but only 11 felt that they were adequately equipped. 12/18 had a current training programme for chemical incident management and 3 had no staff trained in decontamination. 13/18 could contain contaminated water from casualty decontamination and 6 could provide shelter for casualties before decontamination.

Conclusion

We have identified major inconsistencies in the preparedness of North West Emergency Departments for managing chemical incidents. Nationally recognized standards on incident planning, facilities, equipment and procedures need to be agreed and implemented with adequate resources. Issues of environmental safety and patient dignity and comfort should also be addressed.

Delphi based consensus study into planning for chemical incidents

OBJECTIVE

To achieve consensus in all phases of chemical incident planning and response.

DESIGN

A three round Delphi study was conducted using a panel of 39 experts from specialties involved in the management of chemical incidents. Areas that did not reach consensus in the Delphi study were presented as synopsis statements for discussion in four syndicate groups at a conference hosted by the Department of Health Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit.

RESULTS

A total of 183 of 322 statements had reached consensus upon completion of the Delphi study. This represented 56.8% of the total number of statements. Of these, 148 reached consensus at >94% and 35 reached consensus at >89%. The results of the process are presented as a series of synopsis consensus statements that cover all phases of chemical incident planning and response.

CONCLUSIONS

The use of a Delphi study and subsequent syndicate group discussions achieved consensus in aspects of all phases of chemical incident planning and response that can be translated into practical guidance for use at regional prehospital and hospital level. Additionally, areas of non-consensus have been identified where further work is required.

Secondary contamination in organophosphate poisoning: analysis of an incident

BACKGROUND

Acute organophosphate poisoning is rare in the UK, and the risks to attending staff are seldom appreciated.

STUDY DESIGN

Report of an incident.

RESULTS

In May 2001, a 45-year-old man attempted suicide by drinking organophosphate insecticide, and was brought to an urban general hospital in a collapsed state. Twenty-five hospital workers and paramedics sought medical advice after coming into contact with the poisoned patient, of whom ten complained of symptoms related to toxin exposure. Provision of emergency services by the hospital was compromised, and the emergency department was closed until the area was decontaminated and staffing levels could be restored.

DISCUSSION

Ingestion of OP compounds can present a significant risk to health professionals as well as patients. Problems with the management of this patient included late recognition of the need for decontamination, large numbers of non-essential staff coming into contact with the patient, and the difficulty of carrying out medical procedures while wearing protective equipment. Decontamination should always be considered early, and the possibility of an ingested poison being vomited and causing a chemical spill should not be overlooked.