Emerging regulatory challenges of next-generation synthetic biology

Design and regulation of engineered bacteria for environmental release

Emerging products of biotechnology involve the release of living genetically modified microbes (GMMs) into the environment. However, regulatory challenges limit their use. So far, GMMs have mainly been tested in agriculture and environmental cleanup, with few approved for commercial purposes. Current government regulations do not sufficiently address modern genetic engineering and limit the potential of new applications, including living therapeutics, engineered living materials, self-healing infrastructure, anticorrosion coatings and consumer products. Here, based on 47 global studies on soil-released GMMs and laboratory microcosm experiments, we discuss the environmental behaviour of released bacteria and offer engineering strategies to help improve performance, control persistence and reduce risk. Furthermore, advanced technologies that improve GMM function and control, but lead to increases in regulatory scrutiny, are reviewed. Finally, we propose a new regulatory framework informed by recent data to maximize the benefits of GMMs and address risks.

The whack-a-mole governance challenge for AI-enabled synthetic biology: literature review and emerging frameworks

AI-enabled synthetic biology has tremendous potential but also significantly increases biorisks and brings about a new set of dual use concerns. The picture is complicated given the vast innovations envisioned to emerge by combining emerging technologies, as AI-enabled synthetic biology potentially scales up bioengineering into industrial biomanufacturing. However, the literature review indicates that goals such as maintaining a reasonable scope for innovation, or more ambitiously to foster a huge bioeconomy do not necessarily contrast with biosafety, but need to go hand in hand. This paper presents a literature review of the issues and describes emerging frameworks for policy and practice that transverse the options of command-and-control, stewardship, bottom-up, and laissez-faire governance. How to achieve early warning systems that enable prevention and mitigation of future AI-enabled biohazards from the lab, from deliberate misuse, or from the public realm, will constantly need to evolve, and adaptive, interactive approaches should emerge. Although biorisk is subject to an established governance regime, and scientists generally adhere to biosafety protocols, even experimental, but legitimate use by scientists could lead to unexpected developments. Recent advances in chatbots enabled by generative AI have revived fears that advanced biological insight can more easily get into the hands of malignant individuals or organizations. Given these sets of issues, society needs to rethink how AI-enabled synthetic biology should be governed. The suggested way to visualize the challenge at hand is whack-a-mole governance, although the emerging solutions are perhaps not so different either.

Biofoundries and citizen science can accelerate disease surveillance and environmental monitoring

A biofoundry is a highly automated facility for processing of biological samples. In that capacity it has a major role in accelerating innovation and product development in engineering biology by implementing design, build, test and learn (DBTL) cycles. Biofoundries bring public and private stakeholders together to share resources, develop standards and forge collaborations on national and international levels. In this paper we argue for expanding the scope of applications for biofoundries towards roles in biosurveillance and biosecurity. Reviewing literature on these topics, we conclude that this could be achieved in multiple ways including developing measurement standards and protocols, engaging citizens in data collection, closer collaborations with biorefineries, and processing of samples. Here we provide an overview of these roles that despite their potential utility have not yet been commonly considered by policymakers and funding agencies and identify roadblocks to their realization. This document should prove useful to policymakers and other stakeholders who wish to strengthen biosecurity programs in ways that synergize with bioeconomy.

Establishing an incentive-based multi-stakeholder approach to Dual Use DNA screening

Fast, accessible, and high-quality DNA is fundamental to advancement in the life sciences that will drive forward fields like agriculture, energy, and medicine. Despite their importance in accelerating global progress, bioscience research and biotechnologies can also be misused, endangering humans, animals, and the environment. The ability to accidentally or deliberately endow or enhance pathogenicity of biological systems is of particular concern. Access to DNA sequences with a clear potential for Dual Use should be limited to responsible and identifiable groups with legitimate uses. Yet, none of the 195 countries party to the International Health Regulations have national laws that mandate this type of screening. Many DNA providers voluntarily screen orders and absorb increased costs, but this practice is not universally adopted for a variety of reasons. This article explores the incentives and regulatory structures that can bring the screening coverage of DNA orders towards 100%, which may include: expedited orders for approved customers, better tools and technology for more efficient screening, funding requirements that grantees use screened DNA, and early education in biosecurity aimed at researchers and students. Ultimately, an incentive-based multi-stakeholder approach to DNA screening can benefit researchers, industry, and global health security.