Does Perceptual Learning Require Consciousness or Attention?

Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework

Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.

Unpacking the black box of voice therapy: A clinical application and revision of the Motor Learning Classification Framework (MLCF)

PURPOSE

Voice therapy is a complex behavioural intervention. Understanding its components is integral for continued advancement of voice therapy research, translation of evidence into the clinical setting and improved client care. The Motor Learning Classification Framework (MLCF) offers an excellent opportunity for increasing such knowledge, specifically in relation to identifying variables that affect motor learning (ML), an important mechanism hypothesised to bring about voice change during voice therapy. The MLCF has shown promising results in identifying speech-language pathologists' (SLPs) use of ML variables during experimentally controlled voice therapy contexts. The purpose of this study was to test the feasibility of applying the framework in the clinical context of everyday voice therapy practice.

METHOD

Data consisted of two video-recorded voice therapy sessions representing usual voice therapy care. Classification of ML variables used by SLPs during the recorded sessions was attempted based on the MLCF.

RESULT

Several problematic features of the framework were identified. Based on deliberations between the authors of the current paper, the MLCF was revised using an iterative process. This resulted in the construction of an updated version of the framework (MLCF-V2). The MLCF-V2 organises ML strategies into two broad categories: directly observable behaviours and learning processes. The framework incorporates greater consideration of theory and empirical evidence supporting motivational, attentional focus and subjective error estimation influences on ML. Several examples of each ML variable are included as well as an attempt to provide clearer classification instruction.

CONCLUSION

It is anticipated that the MLCF-V2 will provide a more useful and reliable classification for use in future investigations of SLPs' use of ML variables during usual voice therapy practice.

Perceptual, procedural, and task learning for an auditory temporal discrimination task

Perceptual learning reflects experience-driven improvements in the ability to detect changes in stimulus characteristics. The time course for perceptual learning overlaps with that for procedural learning (acquiring general skills and strategies) and task learning (learning the perceptual judgment specific to the task), making it difficult to isolate their individual effects. This study was conducted to examine the role of exposure to stimulus, procedure, and task information on learning for auditory temporal-interval discrimination. Eighty-three listeners completed five online sessions that required temporal-interval discrimination (target task). Before the initial session, listeners were differentially exposed to information about the target task's stimulus, procedure, or task characteristics. Learning occurred across sessions, but an exposure effect was not observed. Given the significant learning across sessions and variability within and across listeners, contributions from stimulus, procedure, and task exposure to overall learning cannot be discounted. These findings clarify the influence of experience on temporal perceptual learning and could inform designs of training paradigms that optimize perceptual improvements.

Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption

I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which - hopefully - will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.

Exogenous attention facilitates perceptual learning in visual acuity to untrained stimulus locations and features

Visual perceptual learning (VPL) refers to the improvement in performance on a visual task due to practice. A hallmark of VPL is specificity, as improvements are often confined to the trained retinal locations or stimulus features. We have previously found that exogenous (involuntary, stimulus-driven) and endogenous (voluntary, goal-driven) spatial attention can facilitate the transfer of VPL across locations in orientation discrimination tasks mediated by contrast sensitivity. Here, we investigated whether exogenous spatial attention can facilitate such transfer in acuity tasks that have been associated with higher specificity. We trained observers for 3 days (days 2-4) in a Landolt acuity task (Experiment 1) or a Vernier hyperacuity task (Experiment 2), with either exogenous precues (attention group) or neutral precues (neutral group). Importantly, during pre-tests (day 1) and post-tests (day 5), all observers were tested with neutral precues; thus, groups differed only in their attentional allocation during training. For the Landolt acuity task, we found evidence of location transfer in both the neutral and attention groups, suggesting weak location specificity of VPL. For the Vernier hyperacuity task, we found evidence of location and feature specificity in the neutral group, and learning transfer in the attention group-similar improvement at trained and untrained locations and features. Our results reveal that, when there is specificity in a perceptual acuity task, exogenous spatial attention can overcome that specificity and facilitate learning transfer to both untrained locations and features simultaneously with the same training. Thus, in addition to improving performance, exogenous attention generalizes perceptual learning across locations and features.

Recent evidence that attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious perception

Early descriptions of attention in the psychological literature highlighted its interdependence with conscious awareness. As the study of attention developed, consciousness and attention began to be considered separable phenomena, experimentally and theoretically. In recent years, an energetic debate has developed concerning the extent to which the two phenomena are related. One school of thought considers the two to be doubly dissociable, whereas the other considers them to be necessarily linked. In this review, we highlight experimental findings from the last 5 years that contribute to the leading consensus view: attention is necessary, but not sufficient, for conscious perception. We review studies that show attention operating in conjunction with unconscious information, and other evidence linking attention necessarily to conscious perception. By drawing upon evidence that attention comprises many cognitive and neural processes, we argue that by studying how different forms of attention are related to conscious perception, it is possible to gain new insights about the neural states or processes that are necessary for conscious perception to occur.

Endogenous spatial attention during perceptual learning facilitates location transfer

Covert attention and perceptual learning enhance perceptual performance. The relation between these two mechanisms is largely unknown. Previously, we showed that manipulating involuntary, exogenous spatial attention during training improved performance at trained and untrained locations, thus overcoming the typical location specificity. Notably, attention-induced transfer only occurred for high stimulus contrasts, at the upper asymptote of the psychometric function (i.e., via response gain). Here, we investigated whether and how voluntary, endogenous attention, the top-down and goal-based type of covert visual attention, influences perceptual learning. Twenty-six participants trained in an orientation discrimination task at two locations: half of participants received valid endogenous spatial precues (attention group), while the other half received neutral precues (neutral group). Before and after training, all participants were tested with neutral precues at two trained and two untrained locations. Within each session, stimulus contrast varied on a trial basis from very low (2%) to very high (64%). Performance was fit by a Weibull psychometric function separately for each day and location. Performance improved for both groups at the trained location, and unlike training with exogenous attention, at the threshold level (i.e., via contrast gain). The neutral group exhibited location specificity: Thresholds decreased at the trained locations, but not at the untrained locations. In contrast, participants in the attention group showed significant location transfer: Thresholds decreased to the same extent at both trained and untrained locations. These results indicate that, similar to exogenous spatial attention, endogenous spatial attention induces location transfer, but influences contrast gain instead of response gain.

Neural Correlates of Conscious Motion Perception

The nature of the proper neural signature of conscious perception remains a topic of active debate. Theoretical support from integrative theories of consciousness is consistent with such signature being P3b, one of the main candidates in the literature. Recent work has also put forward a mid-latency and more localized component, the Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN), as a proper Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC). Early local components like P1 have also been proposed. However, experiments exploring visual NCCs are conducted almost exclusively using static images as the content to be consciously perceived, favoring ventral stream processing, therefore limiting the scope of the NCCs that have been identified. Here we explored the visual NCCs isolating local motion, a dorsally processed feature, as the primary feature being consciously perceived. Physical equality between Seen and Unseen conditions in addition to a minimal contrast difference between target and no-target displays was employed. In agreement with previous literature, we found a P3b with a wide centro-parietal distribution that strongly correlated with the detection of the stimuli. P3b magnitude was larger for Seen vs. Unseen conditions, a result that was consistently observed at the single subject level. In contrast, we were unable to detect VAN in our data, regardless of whether the subject perceived or not the stimuli. In the 200-300 ms time window we found a N2pc component, consistent with the high attentional demands of our task. Early components like P1 were not observed in our data, in agreement with their proposed role in the processing of visual features, but not as proper NCCs. Our results extend the role of P3b as a content independent NCC to conscious visual motion perception.

A review of plasticity induced by auditory and visual tetanic stimulation in humans

Long-term potentiation is a form of synaptic plasticity thought to play an important role in learning and memory. Recently noninvasive methods have been developed to induce and measure activity similar to long-term potentiation in humans. Sensory tetani (trains of quickly repeating auditory or visual stimuli) alter the electroencephalogram in a manner similar to electrical stimulation that results in long-term potentiation. This review briefly covers the development of long-term potentiation research before focusing on in vivo human studies that produce long-term potentiation-like effects using auditory and visual stimulation. Similarities and differences between traditional (animal and brain tissue) long-term potentiation studies and human sensory tetanization studies will be discussed, as well as implications for perceptual learning. Although evidence for functional consequences of sensory tetanization remains scarce, studies involving clinical populations indicate that sensory induced plasticity paradigms may be developed into diagnostic and research tools in clinical settings. Individual differences in the effects of sensory tetanization are not well-understood and provide an interesting avenue for future research. Differences in effects found between research groups that have emerged as the field has progressed are also yet to be resolved.

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems-these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness.

Exogenous Attention Enables Perceptual Learning

Practice can improve visual perception, and these improvements are considered to be a form of brain plasticity. Training-induced learning is time-consuming and requires hundreds of trials across multiple days. The process of learning acquisition is understudied. Can learning acquisition be potentiated by manipulating visual attentional cues? We developed a protocol in which we used task-irrelevant cues for between-groups manipulation of attention during training. We found that training with exogenous attention can enable the acquisition of learning. Remarkably, this learning was maintained even when observers were subsequently tested under neutral conditions, which indicates that a change in perception was involved. Our study is the first to isolate the effects of exogenous attention and to demonstrate its efficacy to enable learning. We propose that exogenous attention boosts perceptual learning by enhancing stimulus encoding.

Event-related potentials elicited by social commerce and electronic-commerce reviews

There is an increasing interest regarding the use of electroencephalography (EEG) in social commerce and electronic commerce (e-commerce) research. There are several reviews in the field of social commerce or e-commerce; these have great potential value and mining them is fundamental and significant. To our knowledge, EEG is rarely applied to study these. In this study, we examined the neural correlates of social commerce reviews (SCRs) and e-commerce reviews (ECRs) by using them as stimuli to evoke event-related potentials. All SCRs were from friends through a social media platform, whereas ECRs were from strangers through an e-commerce platform. The experimental design was similar to that of a priming paradigm, and included 40 pairs of stimuli consisting of product information (prime stimulus) and reviews (target stimulus). The results showed that the P300 component was successfully evoked by SCR and ECR stimuli. Moreover, the P300 components elicited by SCRs had higher amplitudes than those elicited by ECRs. These findings indicate that participants paid more attention to SCRs than to ECRs. In addition, the associations between neural responses and reviews in social commerce have the potential to assist companies in studying consumer behaviors, thus permitting them to enhance their social commerce strategies.

Exogenous attention facilitates location transfer of perceptual learning

Perceptual skills can be improved through practice on a perceptual task, even in adulthood. Visual perceptual learning is known to be mostly specific to the trained retinal location, which is considered as evidence of neural plasticity in retinotopic early visual cortex. Recent findings demonstrate that transfer of learning to untrained locations can occur under some specific training procedures. Here, we evaluated whether exogenous attention facilitates transfer of perceptual learning to untrained locations, both adjacent to the trained locations (Experiment 1) and distant from them (Experiment 2). The results reveal that attention facilitates transfer of perceptual learning to untrained locations in both experiments, and that this transfer occurs both within and across visual hemifields. These findings show that training with exogenous attention is a powerful regime that is able to overcome the major limitation of location specificity.

Latent memory of unattended stimuli reactivated by practice: an FMRI study on the role of consciousness and attention in learning

Although we can only report about what is in the focus of our attention, much more than that is actually processed. And even when attended, stimuli may not always be reportable, for instance when they are masked. A stimulus can thus be unreportable for different reasons: the absence of attention or the absence of a conscious percept. But to what extent does the brain learn from exposure to these unreportable stimuli? In this fMRI experiment subjects were exposed to textured figure-ground stimuli, of which reportability was manipulated either by masking (which only interferes with consciousness) or with an inattention paradigm (which only interferes with attention). One day later learning was assessed neurally and behaviorally. Positive neural learning effects were found for stimuli presented in the inattention paradigm; for attended yet masked stimuli negative adaptation effects were found. Interestingly, these inattentional learning effects only became apparent in a second session after a behavioral detection task had been administered during which performance feedback was provided. This suggests that the memory trace that is formed during inattention is latent until reactivated by behavioral practice. However, no behavioral learning effects were found, therefore we cannot conclude that perceptual learning has taken place for these unattended stimuli.