Reward modulates perception in binocular rivalry

Open Iris - An Open Source Framework for Video-Based Eye-Tracking Research and Development

Eye-tracking is an essential tool in many fields, yet existing solutions are often limited for customized applications due to cost or lack of flexibility. We present OpenIris, an adaptable and user-friendly open-source framework for video-based eye-tracking. OpenIris is developed in C# with modular design that allows further extension and customization through plugins for different hardware systems, tracking, and calibration pipelines. It can be remotely controlled via a network interface from other devices or programs. Eye movements can be recorded online from camera stream or offline post-processing recorded videos. Example plugins have been developed to track eye motion in 3-D, including torsion. Currently implemented binocular pupil tracking pipelines can achieve frame rates of more than 500Hz. With the OpenIris framework, we aim to fill a gap in the research tools available for high-precision and high-speed eye-tracking, especially in environments that require custom solutions that are not currently well-served by commercial eye-trackers.

Cross-Modal Interactions Between Auditory Attention and Oculomotor Control

Microsaccades are small, involuntary eye movements that occur during fixation. Their role is debated with recent hypotheses proposing a contribution to automatic scene sampling. Microsaccadic inhibition (MSI) refers to the abrupt suppression of microsaccades, typically evoked within 0.1 s after new stimulus onset. The functional significance and neural underpinnings of MSI are subjects of ongoing research. It has been suggested that MSI is a component of the brain's attentional re-orienting network which facilitates the allocation of attention to new environmental occurrences by reducing disruptions or shifts in gaze that could interfere with processing. The extent to which MSI is reflexive or influenced by top-down mechanisms remains debated. We developed a task that examines the impact of auditory top-down attention on MSI, allowing us to disentangle ocular dynamics from visual sensory processing. Participants (N = 24 and 27; both sexes) listened to two simultaneous streams of tones and were instructed to attend to one stream while detecting specific task "targets." We quantified MSI in response to occasional task-irrelevant events presented in both the attended and unattended streams (frequency steps in Experiment 1, omissions in Experiment 2). The results show that initial stages of MSI are not affected by auditory attention. However, later stages (∼0.25 s postevent onset), affecting the extent and duration of the inhibition, are enhanced for sounds in the attended stream compared to the unattended stream. These findings provide converging evidence for the reflexive nature of early MSI stages and robustly demonstrate the involvement of auditory attention in modulating the later stages.

Temporal attention recruits fronto-cingulate cortex to amplify stimulus representations

The human brain receives a continuous stream of input, but it faces significant constraints in its ability to process every item in a sequence of stimuli. Voluntary temporal attention can alleviate these constraints by using information about upcoming stimulus timing to selectively prioritize a task-relevant item over others in a sequence. But the neural mechanisms underlying this ability remain unclear. Here, we manipulated temporal attention to successive stimuli in a two-target temporal cueing task, while controlling for temporal expectation by using fully predictable stimulus timing. We recorded magnetoencephalography (MEG) in human observers and measured the effects of temporal attention on orientation representations of each stimulus using time-resolved multivariate decoding in both sensor and source space. Voluntary temporal attention enhanced the orientation representation of the first target 235-300 milliseconds after target onset. Unlike previous studies that did not isolate temporal attention from temporal expectation, we found no evidence that temporal attention enhanced early visual evoked responses. Instead, and unexpectedly, the primary source of enhanced decoding for attended stimuli in the critical time window was a contiguous region spanning left frontal cortex and cingulate cortex. The results suggest that voluntary temporal attention recruits cortical regions beyond the ventral stream at an intermediate processing stage to amplify the representation of a target stimulus, which may serve to protect it from subsequent interference by a temporal competitor.

EasyEyes - Accurate fixation for online vision testing of crowding and beyond

Online methods allow testing of larger, more diverse populations, with much less effort than in-lab testing. However, many psychophysical measurements, including visual crowding, require accurate eye fixation, which is classically achieved by testing only experienced observers who have learned to fixate reliably, or by using a gaze tracker to restrict testing to moments when fixation is accurate. Alas, both approaches are impractical online since online observers tend to be inexperienced, and online gaze tracking, using the built-in webcam, has a low precision (±4 deg, Papoutsaki et al., 2016). The EasyEyes open-source software reliably measures peripheral thresholds online with accurate fixation achieved in a novel way, without gaze tracking. EasyEyes tells observers to use the cursor to track a moving crosshair. At a random time during successful tracking, a brief target is presented in the periphery. The observer responds by identifying the target. To evaluate EasyEyes fixation accuracy and thresholds, we tested 12 naive observers in three ways in a counterbalanced order: first, in the lab, using gaze-contingent stimulus presentation (Kurzawski et al., 2023; Pelli et al., 2016); second, in the lab, using EasyEyes while independently monitoring gaze; third, online at home, using EasyEyes. We find that crowding thresholds are consistent (no significant differences in mean and variance of thresholds across ways) and individual differences are conserved. The small root mean square (RMS) fixation error (0.6 deg) during target presentation eliminates the need for gaze tracking. Thus, EasyEyes enables fixation-dependent measurements online, for easy testing of larger and more diverse populations.

Learned value modulates the access to visual awareness during continuous flash suppression

Monetary value enhances visual perception and attention and boosts activity in the primary visual cortex, however, it is still unclear whether monetary value can modulate the conscious access to rewarding stimuli. Here we investigate this issue by employing a breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) paradigm. We measured suppression durations of sinusoidal gratings having orthogonal orientations under CFS in adult volunteers before and after a short session of Pavlovian associative learning in which each orientation was arbitrarily associated either with high or low monetary reward. We found that monetary value accelerated the access to visual awareness during CFS. Specifically, after the associative learning, suppression durations of the visual stimulus associated with high monetary value were shorter compared to the visual stimulus associated with low monetary value. Critically, the effect was replicated in a second experiment using a detection task for b-CFS that was orthogonal to the reward associative learning. These results indicate that monetary reward facilitates the access to awareness of visual stimuli associated with monetary value probably by boosting their representation at the early stages of visual processing in the brain.

The role of eye-specific attention in ocular dominance plasticity

It is well known how selective attention biases information processing in real time, but few work investigates the aftereffects of prolonged attention, let alone the underlying neural mechanisms. To examine perceptual aftereffect after prolonged attention to a monocular pathway, movie images played normally were presented to normal adult's one eye (attended eye), while movie images of the same episode but played backwards were presented to the opposite eye (unattended eye). One hour of watching this dichoptic movie caused a shift of perceptual ocular dominance towards the unattended eye. Interestingly, the aftereffect positively correlated with the advantage of neural activity for the attended-eye over unattended-eye signals at the frontal electrodes measured with steady-state visual evoked potentials. Moreover, the aftereffect disappeared when interocular competition was minimized during adaptation. These results suggest that top-down eye-specific attention can induce ocular dominance plasticity through binocular rivalry mechanisms. The present study opens the route to explain at least part of short-term ocular dominance plasticity with the ocular-opponency-neuron model, which may be an interesting complement to the homeostatic compensation theory.

You see what you avoid: Fear of spiders and avoidance are associated with predominance of spiders in binocular rivalry

What we see is the result of an efficient selection of cues in the visual stream. In addition to physical characteristics this process is also influenced by emotional salience of the cues. Previously, we showed in spider phobic patients that fear-related pictures gain preferential access to consciousness in binocular rivalry. We set out to replicate this in an independent unselected sample and examine the relationship of this perceptual bias with a range of symptom clusters. To this end, we recruited 79 participants with variable degrees of fear of spiders. To induce binocular rivalry, a picture of either a spider or a flower was projected to one eye, and a neutral geometric pattern to the other eye. Participants continuously reported what they saw. We correlated indices of perceptual dominance (first percept, dominance duration) with individual fear of spiders and with scores on specific symptom clusters of fear of spiders (i.e., vigilance, fixation, and avoidance coping). Overall, higher fear of spiders correlates with more predominace of spider pictures. In addition, this perceptual bias is uniquely associated with avoidance coping. Interestingly, this demonstrates that a perceptual bias, which is not intentionally controlled, is linked with an instrumental coping behavior, that has been implicated in the maintenance of pathological fear.

Larger images are better remembered during naturalistic encoding

We are constantly exposed to multiple visual scenes, and while freely viewing them without an intentional effort to memorize or encode them, only some are remembered. It has been suggested that image memory is influenced by multiple factors, such as depth of processing, familiarity, and visual category. However, this is typically investigated when people are instructed to perform a task (e.g., remember or make some judgment about the images), which may modulate processing at multiple levels and thus, may not generalize to naturalistic visual behavior. Visual memory is assumed to rely on high-level visual perception that shows a level of size invariance and therefore is not assumed to be highly dependent on image size. Here, we reasoned that during naturalistic vision, free of task-related modulations, bigger images stimulate more visual system processing resources (from retina to cortex) and would, therefore, be better remembered. In an extensive set of seven experiments, naïve participants (n = 182) were asked to freely view presented images (sized 3° to 24°) without any instructed encoding task. Afterward, they were given a surprise recognition test (midsized images, 50% already seen). Larger images were remembered better than smaller ones across all experiments (∼20% higher accuracy or ∼1.5 times better). Memory was proportional to image size, faces were better remembered, and outdoors the least. Results were robust even when controlling for image set, presentation order, screen resolution, image scaling at test, or the amount of information. While multiple factors affect image memory, our results suggest that low- to high-level processes may all contribute to image memory.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Reward produces learning of a consciously inaccessible feature

Reward has a significant impact on behaviour and perception. Most past work in associative reward learning has used perceptually distinct visual cues to associate with different reward values. Thus, it remains unknown to what extent the learned bias towards reward-associated stimuli depends on consciousness of the apparent differences between stimuli. Here, we resolved this issue by using an inter-ocular suppression paradigm with the monetary rewarding and non-rewarding cues identical to each other except for their eye-of-origin information. Thus, the reward coding system cannot rely on consciousness to select the reward-associated cue. Surprisingly, the targets in the rewarded eye broke into awareness faster than those in the non-rewarded eye. We further revealed that producing this effect required both top-down attention and inter-ocular suppression. These findings suggest that the human's reward coding system can produce two different types of reward-based learning. One is independent of consciousness yet fairly consuming attentional resources. The other one results from volitional selection of stimuli of behavioural significance.

Useful misrepresentation: perception as embodied proactive inference

According to the predictive processing framework, perception is geared to represent the environment in terms of embodied action opportunities as opposed to objective truth. Here, we argue that such an optimisation is reflected by biases in expectations (i.e., prior predictive information) that facilitate 'useful' inferences of external sensory causes. To support this, we highlight a body of literature suggesting that perception is systematically biased away from accurate estimates under conditions where utility and accuracy conflict with one another. We interpret this to reflect the brain's attempt to adjudicate between conflicting sources of prediction error, as external accuracy is sacrificed to facilitate actions that proactively avoid physiologically surprising outcomes. This carries important theoretical implications and offers new insights into psychopathology.

Perceptual Difficulty Persistently Increases Dominance in Binocular Rivalry-Even Without a Task

A major objective of perception is the reduction of uncertainty about the outside world. Eye-movement research has demonstrated that attention and oculomotor control can subserve the function of decreasing uncertainty in vision. Here, we ask whether a similar effect exists for awareness in binocular rivalry, when two distinct stimuli presented to the two eyes compete for awareness. We tested whether this competition can be biased by uncertainty about the stimuli and their relevance for a perceptual task. Specifically, we have stimuli that are perceptually difficult (i.e., carry high perceptual uncertainty) compete with stimuli that are perceptually easy (low perceptual uncertainty). Using a no-report paradigm and reading the dominant stimulus continuously from the observers' eye movements, we find that the perceptually difficult stimulus becomes more dominant than the easy stimulus. This difference is enhanced by the stimuli's relevance for the task. In trials with task, the difference in dominance emerges quickly, peaks before the response, and then persists throughout the trial (further 10 s). However, the difference is already present in blocks before task instruction and still observable when the stimuli have ceased to be task relevant. This shows that perceptual uncertainty persistently increases perceptual dominance, and this is magnified by task relevance.

Idiosyncratic preferences in transparent motion and binocular rivalry are dissociable

Previous studies revealed that there are idiosyncratic preferences to perceive certain motion directions in front during motion transparency depth rivalry (Mamassian & Wallace, 2010; Schütz, 2014). Meanwhile, other studies reported idiosyncratic preferences in binocular rivalry during the onset stage (Carter & Cavanagh, 2007; Stanley, Carter, & Forte, 2011). Here we investigated the relationship of idiosyncratic preferences in transparent motion and binocular rivalry. We presented two dot clouds that were moving in opposite directions. In the transparent motion condition, both dot clouds were presented to both eyes and participants had to report the dot cloud they perceived in front. In the binocular rivalry condition, the dot clouds were presented to different eyes and participants had to report the dominant dot cloud. There were strong idiosyncratic directional preferences in transparent motion and rather weak directional preferences in binocular rivalry. In general, binocular rivalry was dominated by biases in contrast polarity, whereas transparent motion was dominated by biases in motion direction. A circular correlation analysis showed no correlation between directional preferences in transparent motion and binocular rivalry. These findings show that idiosyncratic preferences in a visual feature can be dissociated at different stages of processing.

The predictive global neuronal workspace: A formal active inference model of visual consciousness

The global neuronal workspace (GNW) model has inspired over two decades of hypothesis-driven research on the neural basis of consciousness. However, recent studies have reported findings that are at odds with empirical predictions of the model. Further, the macro-anatomical focus of current GNW research has limited the specificity of predictions afforded by the model. In this paper we present a neurocomputational model - based on Active Inference - that captures central architectural elements of the GNW and is able to address these limitations. The resulting 'predictive global workspace' casts neuronal dynamics as approximating Bayesian inference, allowing precise, testable predictions at both the behavioural and neural levels of description. We report simulations demonstrating the model's ability to reproduce: 1) the electrophysiological and behavioural results observed in previous studies of inattentional blindness; and 2) the previously introduced four-way taxonomy predicted by the GNW, which describes the relationship between consciousness, attention, and sensory signal strength. We then illustrate how our model can reconcile/explain (apparently) conflicting findings, extend the GNW taxonomy to include the influence of prior expectations, and inspire novel paradigms to test associated behavioural and neural predictions.

Attention for future reward

When stimuli are consistently paired with reward, attention toward these stimuli becomes biased (e.g., Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert & Verguts, et al., Psychological Bulletin 142:693-728, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000047). An important premise is that participants need to repeatedly experience stimulus-reward pairings to obtain these effects (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:437-443, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010). This idea is based on associative learning theories (e.g., Pearce & Bouton, Annual Review of Psychology 52:111-139, 2001) that suggest that exposure to stimulus-reward pairings leads to the formation of stimulus-reward associations, and a transfer of salience of the reward to the neutral stimulus. However, novel learning theories (e.g., De Houwer, Learning and Motivation 53:7-23, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001) suggest such effects are not necessarily the result of associative learning, but can be caused by complex knowledge and expectancies as well. In the current experiment, we first instructed participants that a correct response to one centrally presented stimulus would be followed by a high reward, whereas a correct response to another centrally presented stimulus would be paired with a low reward. Before participants executed this task, they performed a visual probe task in which these stimuli were presented as distractors. We found that attention was drawn automatically toward high-reward stimuli relative to low-reward stimuli. This implies that complex inferences and expectancies can cause automatic attentional bias, challenging associative learning models of attentional control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Awh et al., 2012).

The Bright and Dark Sides of Performance-Dependent Monetary Rewards: Evidence From Visual Perception Tasks

Studies have shown that performance-dependent monetary rewards facilitate visual perception. However, no study has examined whether such a positive effect is limited to the rewarded task or may be generalized to other tasks. In the current study, two groups of people were asked to perform two visual perception tasks, one being a reward-relevant task and the other being a reward-irrelevant task. For the reward-relevant task, the experimental group received performance-dependent monetary rewards, whereas the control group did not. For the reward-irrelevant task, both groups were not rewarded. The two tasks were randomly intermixed trial by trial (Experiment 1) or presented block by block (Experiment 2) or session by session (Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c). Results showed that performance-dependent monetary rewards improved participants' performance on the relevant task in all experiments and impaired their performance on the irrelevant task in Experiments 2, 3a, 3b, and 3c. These results suggested that monetary rewards might incur a cost on reward-irrelevant tasks. Finally, the benefit of monetary rewards disappeared when they were no longer provided during the final session. This is the first study that reveals both the bright and dark sides of the performance-dependent monetary rewards in visual perception.

Perceptual awareness and active inference

Perceptual awareness depends upon the way in which we engage with our sensorium. This notion is central to active inference, a theoretical framework that treats perception and action as inferential processes. This variational perspective on cognition formalizes the notion of perception as hypothesis testing and treats actions as experiments that are designed (in part) to gather evidence for or against alternative hypotheses. The common treatment of perception and action affords a useful interpretation of certain perceptual phenomena whose active component is often not acknowledged. In this article, we start by considering Troxler fading - the dissipation of a peripheral percept during maintenance of fixation, and its recovery during free (saccadic) exploration. This offers an important example of the failure to maintain a percept without actively interrogating a visual scene. We argue that this may be understood in terms of the accumulation of uncertainty about a hypothesized stimulus when free exploration is disrupted by experimental instructions or pathology. Once we take this view, we can generalize the idea of using bodily (oculomotor) action to resolve uncertainty to include the use of mental (attentional) actions for the same purpose. This affords a useful way to think about binocular rivalry paradigms, in which perceptual changes need not be associated with an overt movement.

Responses of Neurons in Lateral Intraparietal Area Depend on Stimulus-Associated Reward During Binocular Flash Suppression

Discovering neural correlates of subjective perception and dissociating them from sensory input has fascinated neuroscientists for a long time. Bistable and multistable perception phenomena have exhibited great experimental potential to address this question. Here, we performed electrophysiological recordings from single neurons in lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of rhesus macaques during stimulus and perceptual transitions induced by binocular flash suppression (BFS). LIP neurons demonstrated transient bursts of activity after stimulus presentation and stimulus or perceptual switches but only a minority of cells demonstrated stimulus and perceptual selectivity. To enhance LIP neural selectivity, we performed a second experiment in which the competing stimuli were associated with asymmetric rewards. We found that transient and sustained activities substantially increased while the proportion of stimulus selective neurons remained approximately the same, albeit with increased selectivity magnitude. In addition, we observed mild increases in the proportion of perceptually selective neurons which also showed increase magnitude of selectivity. Importantly, the increased selectivity of cells after the reward manipulation was not directly reflecting the reward size per se but an enhancement in stimulus differentiation. Based on our results, we conjecture that LIP contributes to perceptual transitions and serves a modulatory role in perceptual selection taking into account the stimulus behavioral value.

Calibration of peripheral perception of shape with and without saccadic eye movements

The cortical representations of a visual object differ radically across saccades. Several studies claim that the visual system adapts the peripheral percept to better match the subsequent foveal view. Recently, Herwig, Weiß, and Schneider (2015, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1339(1), 97-105) found that the perception of shape demonstrates a saccade-dependent learning effect. Here, we ask whether this learning actually requires saccades. We replicated Herwig et al.'s (2015) study and introduced a fixation condition. In a learning phase, participants were exposed to objects whose shape systematically changed during a saccade, or during a displacement from peripheral to foveal vision (without a saccade). In a subsequent test, objects were perceived as less (more) curved if they previously changed from more circular (triangular) in the periphery to more triangular (circular) in the fovea. Importantly, this pattern was seen both with and without saccades. We then tested whether a variable delay between the presentations of the peripheral and foveal objects would affect their association-hypothetically weakening it at longer delays. Again, we found that shape judgments depended on the changes experienced during the learning phase and that they were similar in both the saccade and fixation conditions. Surprisingly, they were not affected by the delay between the peripheral and foveal presentations over the range we tested. These results suggest that a general associative process, independent of saccade execution, contributes to the perception of shape across viewpoints.

Effects of Hunger on Visual Perception in Binocular Rivalry

The effect of hunger on visual perception is largely absent from contemporary vision science. Using a well-established visual phenomenon termed binocular rivalry, this study was carried out to investigate the effects of hunger on visual perception. A within-subject design was applied in which participants attended two sessions before and after their lunch or dinner, i.e., a hunger state and a satiated state. In Experiment 1, we found that the mean dominance times to food-related pictures were larger in the hungry condition than that in the satiated condition, while the mean dominance time to the non-food stimuli were unaffected. In Experiment 2, we found the times to break through continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) for both food-related and non-food-related pictures were not affected by hunger. In Experiment 3, a probe-detection task was conducted to address possible response-biases. Our findings provide evidence that hunger biases the dynamic process of binocular rivalry to unsuppressed and visible food stimuli, while processing suppressed and invisible food-related was unaffected. Our results support the notion that the top-down modulation by hunger on food-related visual perception is limited to visible stimuli.

Differentiating aversive conditioning in bistable perception: Avoidance of a percept vs. salience of a stimulus

Alternating conscious visual perception of bistable stimuli is influenced by several factors. In order to understand the effect of negative valence, we tested the effect of two types of aversive conditioning on dominance durations in binocular rivalry. Participants received either aversive classical conditioning of the stimuli shown alone between rivalry blocks, or aversive percept conditioning of one of the two possible perceptual choices during rivalry. Both groups showed successful aversive conditioning according to skin conductance responses and affective valence ratings. However, while classical conditioning led to an immediate but short-lived increase in dominance durations of the conditioned stimulus, percept conditioning yielded no significant immediate effect but tended to decrease durations of the conditioned percept during extinction. These results show dissociable effects of value learning on perceptual inference in situations of perceptual conflict, depending on whether learning relates to the decision between conflicting perceptual choices or the sensory stimuli per se.

fMRI-based decoding of reward effects in binocular rivalry

Binocular rivalry is a phenomenon where the simultaneous presentation of two different stimuli to the two eyes leads to alternating perception of the two stimuli. The temporary dominance of one stimulus over the other is influenced by several factors. Here, we studied the influence of reward on binocular rivalry dynamics and its neural representation in visual cortex. Orthogonal rotating grating stimuli were shown continuously, while monetary reward was given during the conscious perception of one stimulus but not the other. Periods of perceptual dominance were assessed both through participants’ subjective report and objectively using functional magnetic resonance imaging and multi-voxel pattern analysis. Results did not confirm previous evidence for an effect of reward on perceptual dominance durations. Exploratory post-hoc analyses indicated that knowledge regarding both the reward contingency and the subjective nature of perceptual alternations may have interfered with potential reward effects on perceptual phase durations, suggesting a moderating role of meta-cognitive awareness in reward-based perceptual inference. Future studies of top-down influences on bistable perception should carefully consider the methodological challenges related to meta-cognitive awareness.

No Apparent Influence of Reward upon Visual Statistical Learning

Humans are capable of detecting and exploiting a variety of environmental regularities, including stimulus-stimulus contingencies (e.g., visual statistical learning) and stimulus-reward contingencies. However, the relationship between these two types of learning is poorly understood. In two experiments, we sought evidence that the occurrence of rewarding events enhances or impairs visual statistical learning. Across all of our attempts to find such evidence, we employed a training stage during which we grouped shapes into triplets and presented triplets one shape at a time in an undifferentiated stream. Participants subsequently performed a surprise recognition task in which they were tested on their knowledge of the underlying structure of the triplets. Unbeknownst to participants, triplets were also assigned no-, low-, or high-reward status. In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants viewed shape streams while low and high rewards were “randomly” given, presented as low- and high-pitched tones played through headphones. Rewards were always given on the third shape of a triplet (Experiment 1A) or the first shape of a triplet (Experiment 1B), and high- and low-reward sounds were always consistently paired with the same triplets. Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, except that participants were required to learn value associations of a subset of shapes before viewing the shape stream. Across all experiments, we observed significant visual statistical learning effects, but the strength of learning did not differ amongst no-, low-, or high-reward conditions for any of the experiments. Thus, our experiments failed to find any influence of rewards on statistical learning, implying that visual statistical learning may be unaffected by the occurrence of reward. The system that detects basic stimulus-stimulus regularities may operate independently of the system that detects reward contingencies.

Visual input signaling threat gains preferential access to awareness in a breaking continuous flash suppression paradigm

Visual input that signals threat is inherently relevant for survival. Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that threatening visual input elicits faster behavioral responses than non-threatening visual input. Considering that awareness is a prerequisite for performing demanding tasks and guiding novel behavior, we hypothesized that threatening visual input would gain faster access to awareness than non-threatening visual input. In the present study, we associated one of two basic visual stimuli, that were devoid of intrinsic relevance (colored annuli), with aversive stimulation (i.e., electric shocks) following a classical fear conditioning procedure. In the subsequent test phase no more electric shocks were delivered, and a breaking continuous flash suppression task was used to measure how fast these stimuli would access awareness. The results reveal that stimuli that were previously paired with an electric shock break through suppression faster than comparable stimuli that were not paired with an electric shock.

Reward alters the perception of time

Recent findings indicate that monetary rewards have a powerful effect on cognitive performance. In order to maximize overall gain, the prospect of earning reward biases visual attention to specific locations or stimulus features improving perceptual sensitivity and processing. The question we addressed in this study is whether the prospect of reward also affects the subjective perception of time. Here, participants performed a prospective timing task using temporal oddballs. The results show that temporal oddballs, displayed for varying durations, presented in a sequence of standard stimuli were perceived to last longer when they signaled a relatively high reward compared to when they signaled no or low reward. When instead of the oddball the standards signaled reward, the perception of the temporal oddball remained unaffected. We argue that by signaling reward, a stimulus becomes subjectively more salient thereby modulating its attentional deployment and distorting how it is perceived in time.

Revisiting the empirical case against perceptual modularity

Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations of the perceiver. Proponents of the encapsulation thesis, however, often argue that, when correctly interpreted, these psychological findings are compatible with the thesis. In our view, the debate over the significance and the correct interpretation of these psychological findings has reached an impasse. We hold that this impasse is due to the methodological limitations over psychophysical experiments, and it is very unlikely that such experiments, on their own, could yield results that would settle the debate. After defending this claim, we argue that integrating data from cognitive neuroscience resolves the debate in favor of those who deny the encapsulation thesis.