Belief in Altruistic Motives Predicts Prosocial Actions and Inferences

Goal inference in moral narratives

We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as conveying accurate information about what happened ('informational goals') and swaying audiences' impressions about their moral characters ('reputational goals'). Here, we ask to what extent audiences' detection of narrators' reputational goals guide or prevent them from making moral character judgments intended by narrators. Across two pre-registered experiments, audiences read narratives written by real narrators about their own moral actions. Each narrator was incentivized to write about the same action twice while trying to appear like a morally good or bad person (positive and negative reputational goals). Audiences detected narrators' reputational goals with high accuracy and made judgments about moral character that aligned with narrators' goals. However, audiences were more suspicious toward positive than negative reputational goals, requiring more evidence of high informational goals. These results demonstrate how audiences' inferences of reputational goals can both support and hinder narrators: accurate goal recognition increases the chance that audiences will make judgments intended by narrators, but inferred positive reputational goals can lead to doubts about accuracy. More generally, this provides a novel approach to studying how moral information about people is transmitted through naturalistic narratives.

Gambling on others' health: risky pro-social decision-making in the era of COVID-19

Introduction

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, individuals were asked to perform costly actions to reduce harm to strangers, even while the general population, including authorities and experts, grappled with the uncertainty surrounding thenovel virus. Many studies have examined health decision-making by experts, but the study of lay, non-expert, individual decision-making on a stranger's health has been left to the wayside, as ordinary citizens are usually not tasked with such decisions.

Methods

We sought to capture a snapshot of this specific choice behavior by administering two surveys to the general population in the spring of 2020, when much of the global community was subject to COVID-19-related restrictions, as well as uncertainty surrounding the virus. We presented study participants with fictitious diseases varying in severity that threatened oneself, a loved one or a stranger. Participants were asked to choose between treatment options that could either provide a sure, but mild improvement (sure option) or cure the affected person at a given probability of success (risky option).

Results

Respondents preferred gambles overall, but risk-seeking decreased progressively with higher expected severity of disease. This pattern was observed regardless of the recipient's identity. Distinctions between targets emerged however whendecisions were conditioned on a treatment's monetary cost, with participants preferring cheaper options for strangers.

Discussion

Overall, these findings provide a descriptive model of individual decision-making under risk for others; and inform on the limits of what can be asked of an individual in service to a stranger.

How is emotional resonance achieved in storytellings of sadness/distress?

Storytelling pivots around stance seen as a window unto emotion: storytellers project a stance expressing their emotion toward the events and recipients preferably mirror that stance by affiliating with the storyteller’s stance. Whether the recipient’s affiliative stance is at the same time expressive of his/her emotional resonance with the storyteller and of emotional contagion is a question that has recently attracted intriguing research in Physiological Interaction Research. Connecting to this line of inquiry, this paper concerns itself with storytellings of sadness/distress. Its aim is to identify factors that facilitate emotion contagion in storytellings of sadness/distress and factors that impede it. Given the complexity and novelty of this question, this study is designed as a pilot study to scour the terrain and sketch out an interim roadmap before a larger study is undertaken. The data base is small, comprising two storytellings of sadness/distress. The methodology used to address the above research question is expansive: it includes CA methods to transcribe and analyze interactionally relevant aspects of the storytelling interaction; it draws on psychophysiological measures to establish whether and to what degree emotional resonance between co-participants is achieved. In discussing possible reasons why resonance is (not or not fully) achieved, the paper embarks on an extended analysis of the storytellers’ multimodal storytelling performance (reenactments, prosody, gaze, gesture) and considers factors lying beyond the storyteller’s control, including relevance, participation framework, personality, and susceptibility to emotion contagion.

Psychological Selfishness

Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often draw on classical conceptions of selfishness from evolutionary biology (i.e., selfish gene theory), economics (i.e., rational self-interest), and philosophy (i.e., psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the psychology of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit the self that disregards others' desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life-facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how using this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate the negative effects of selfishness.

The tainted altruism effect: a successful pre-registered replication

Newman and Cain (Newman, Cain 2014 Psychol. Sci. 25, 648-655 (doi:10.1177/0956797613504785)) reported that observers view a person's choices as less ethical when that person has acted in response to both altruistic and selfish (commercial) motivations, as compared with purely selfish interests. The altruistic component reduces the observers' approval rather than raising it. This puzzling phenomenon termed the 'tainted altruism' effect, has attracted considerable interest but no direct replications in prior research. We report direct replications of Newman and Cain's Experiments 2 and 3, using a larger sample (n = 501) intended to be fairly representative of the US population. The results confirm the original findings in considerable detail.

Too Good to be Liked? When and How Prosocial Others are Disliked

Outstandingly prosocial individuals may not always be valued and admired, but sometimes depreciated and rejected. While prior research has mainly focused on devaluation of highly competent or successful individuals, comparable research in the domain of prosociality is scarce. The present research suggests two mechanisms why devaluation of extreme prosocial individuals may occur: they may (a) constitute very high comparison standards for observers, and may (b) be perceived as communal narcissists. Two experiments test these assumptions. We confronted participants with an extreme prosocial or an ordinary control target and manipulated comparative aspects of the situation (salient vs. non-salient comparison, Experiment 1), and narcissistic aspects of the target (showing off vs. being modest, Experiment 2). Consistent with our assumptions, the extreme prosocial target was liked less than the control target, and even more so when the comparison situation was salient (Experiment 1), and when the target showed off with her good deeds (Experiment 2). Implications that prosociality does not always breed more liking are discussed.