Genetic testing and insurance

Knowledge, attitudes and preferences regarding genetic testing for smoking cessation. A cross-sectional survey among Dutch smokers

Objectives Recent research strongly suggests that genetic variation influences smokers' ability to stop. Therefore, the use of (pharmaco) genetic testing may increase cessation rates. This study aims to assess the intention of smokers concerning undergoing genetic testing for smoking cessation and their knowledge, attitudes and preferences about this subject. Design Online cross-sectional survey. Setting Database internet research company of which every inhabitant of the Netherlands of ≥12 years with an email address and capable of understanding Dutch can become a member. Participants 587 of 711 Dutch smokers aged ≥18 years, daily smokers for ≥5 years and smoke on average ≥10 cigarettes/day (response rate=83%). Primary and secondary outcome measures Smokers' knowledge, attitudes and preferences and their intention to undergo genetic testing for smoking cessation. Results Knowledge on the influence of genetic factors in smoking addiction and cessation was found to be low. Smokers underestimated their chances of having a genetic predisposition and the influence of this on smoking cessation. Participants perceived few disadvantages, some advantages and showed moderate self-efficacy towards undergoing a genetic test and dealing with the results. Smokers were mildly interested in receiving information and participating in genetic testing, especially when offered by their general practitioner (GP). Conclusions For successful implementation of genetic testing for smoking in general practice, several issues should be addressed, such as the knowledge on smoking cessation, genetics and genetic testing (including advantages and disadvantages) and the influence of genetics on smoking addiction and cessation. Furthermore, smokers allocate their GPs a crucial role in the provision of information and the delivery of a genetic test for smoking; however, it is unclear whether GPs will be able and willing to take on this role.

Genetic information and testing in insurance and employment: technical, social and ethical issues

The present paper examines the professional and scientific views on the social, ethical and legal issues that impact on genetic information and testing in insurance and employment in Europe. For this purpose, many aspects have been considered, such as the concerns of medical geneticists, of the insurers and employers, of the public, as well as the regulatory frameworks and unresolved issues. The method used was primarily the review of the technical, social, economical and ethical aspects of advances in genetics and the concerns of parties who are involved, that is, the insurers, the employers and the public. The existing guidelines and legislation on this topic were also reported. Then, the method was to examine the issues debated by these parties in Europe, as well as by 47 experts from 14 European countries invited to an international workshop organized by the European Society of Human Genetics Public and Professional Policy Committee in Manchester, UK, 25-27 February 2000. The result of this was that the most important issues raised by genetic information and testing in insurance and employment in Europe include a need for clear definitions of terms used in genetics, declaring the grounds on which genetic information is or is not used, and promoting confidence between the public and the insurance industry. There is currently very little use of genetic information in relation to employment, but the situation should be kept under review.

Genetic screening, health care and the insurance industry. Should genetic information be made available to insurers?

The potential use of genetic tests in insurance has raised concerns about discrimination and individuals losing access to health care either because of refusals to test for treatable diseases, or because test-positives cannot afford premiums. Governments have so far largely sought to restrict the use of genetic information by insurance companies. To date the number of tests available with significant actuarial value is limited. However, this is likely to change, raising more clearly the question as to whether the social costs of adverse selection outweigh the social costs of individuals not accessing health care for fear of the consequences of test information being used in insurance markets. In this contribution we set out the policy context and model the potential trade-offs between the losses faced by insurers from adverse selection by insurees (which will increase premiums reducing consumer welfare) and the detrimental health effects that may result from persons refusing to undergo tests that could identify treatable health conditions. It argues that the optimal public policy on genetic testing should reflect overall societal benefit, taking account of these trade-offs. Based on our model, the factors that influence the outcome include: the size of and value attached to the health gains from treatment; deterrent effects of a disclosure requirement on testing for health reasons; incidence of the disease; propensity of test-positives to adverse select; policy value adverse selectors buy in a non-disclosure environment; and price elasticity of demand for insurance. Our illustrative model can be used as a benchmark for developing other scenarios or incorporating real data in order to address the impact of different policies on disclosure and requirement to test.

Voluntary health insurance in the European Union: a critical assessment

The authors examine the role and nature of the market for voluntary health insurance in the European Union and review the impact of public policy, at both the national and E.U. levels, on the development of this market in recent years. The conceptual framework, based on a model of industrial analysis, allows a wide range of policy questions regarding market structure, conduct, and performance. By analyzing these three aspects of the market for voluntary health insurance, the authors are also able to raise questions about the equity and efficiency of voluntary health insurance as a means of funding health care in the European Union. The analysis suggests that the market for voluntary health insurance in the European Union suffers from significant information failures that seriously limit its potential for competition or efficiency and also reduce equity. Substantial deregulation of the E.U. market for voluntary health insurance has stripped regulatory bodies of their power to protect consumers and poses interesting challenges for national regulators, particularly if the market is to expand in the future. In a deregulated environment, it is questionable whether this method of funding health care will encourage a more efficient and equitable allocation of resources.

Genetic testing and insurance: opportunities and challenges for society

The increased availability of genetic tests poses new challenges to society. Here, we address the wider implications of genetic testing, with an emphasis on the markets for insurance. It also considers issues such as confidentiality, patient autonomy and fear of discrimination and the doctor-patient relationship.