The power of past performance in multidimensional supplier evaluation and supplier selection: Debiasing anchoring bias and its knock-on effects

This research examines how anchoring bias affects managers' multi-dimensional evaluations of supplier performance, supplier selection, and the effectiveness of two debiasing techniques. We consider the supplier past performance in one performance dimension as the anchor and investigate whether and how this anchor would have a knock-on effects on evaluating a supplier's performance in other dimensions. We conducted two online experimental studies (Study 1, sample size = 104 and Study 2, sample size = 408). Study 1 adopts a 2 x 1 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial experimental design, and Study 2 is a 3 (debiasing: no, consider-the-opposite, mental-mapping) x 2 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial design. The results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that when a supplier has received a low evaluation score in one dimension in the past, participants assign the same supplier lower scores in the other dimensions compared to a supplier that has obtained a high score in the past. We also find that anchoring has a knock-on effect on how likely participants are to choose the same supplier in the future. Our findings highlight the asymmetric effectiveness of 'consider-the-opposite' and 'mental-mapping' debiasing techniques. This research is the first study that examines how anchoring bias managers' evaluations in a multi-dimensional setting and its knock-on effects. It also explores the effectiveness of two low-cost debiasing techniques. A crucial practical implication is that suppliers' exceptionally good or disappointing past performance affects the judgement of supply managers. Hence, managers should use consider-the-opposite or mental-mapping techniques to debias the effect of high and low anchors, respectively.

Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases

One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people's information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several-so far mostly unrelated-biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans' tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.

On an effective and efficient method for exploiting the wisdom of the inner crowd

Researchers have shown that even an individual can produce the wisdom of the crowds, called "the wisdom of the inner crowd." However, the previous methods leave room for improvements in terms of efficacy and response time. This paper proposes a more efficient method, which required a short time, based on findings from cognitive and social psychology. The procedure is to ask participants to give two answers to the same question: first, their own estimate and, second, their estimate of public opinion. Experiments using this method showed that the averages of the two estimates were more accurate than the participants' first estimates. That is, the wisdom of the inner crowd elicited. In addition, we found that the method could be superior to other methods in terms of efficacy and convenience. Moreover, we identified the conditions where our method worked better. We further clarify the availability and limitations of using the wisdom of the inner crowd. Overall, this paper proposes an effective and short-time method for harvesting the wisdom of the inner crowd.

Comparing instructional strategies to support student teachers' learning to prepare an open-minded citizenship education lesson

Open-mindedness is defined as one's willingness and ability to consider opposing beliefs and perspectives and give them a serious, impartial consideration by setting aside one's commitment towards one's own beliefs and perspectives. Learning to prepare and teach open-minded lessons is a crucial skill for student teachers because it fosters an atmosphere in which pupils feel free to express their own views and to learn about the views of others. The aim of this experiment was to examine which instructional strategy best supports student teachers' learning to prepare an open-minded citizenship education lesson. Therefore, participants (n = 176) processed an instruction on how to prepare an open-minded citizenship education lesson through learning by teaching on video, preparing to teach, or re-study (control condition), and as a post-test designed a lesson plan. We examined the completeness and accuracy of the explanations of the instructional content, feelings of social presence and arousal, open-mindedness levels, the completeness and accuracy of the lesson plans, and the conceptual knowledge of the instructional content. In addition, the lesson plans were graded on overall quality. Results showed that all participants scored higher on open-mindedness as measured with the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale after the experiment than before the experiment. Participants in the control condition prepared significantly more accurate and complete open-minded lessons than participants in the other two conditions, suggesting they have gained better understanding of the instructional content. There were no significant differences between the conditions on the other outcome measures.

Perceived similarity determines social comparison effects of more and less physically active others

This research tested whether the effects of physical activity (PA) comparisons depend on the perceived similarity to comparison standards. In 3 experimental studies, participants compared themselves to a more or a less physically active person. Results showed that perceived similarity determined comparison outcomes: Participants' PA self-evaluation and self-efficacy were higher when focusing on similarities with more (vs less) (Study 1) and dissimilarities with less (vs more) active others (Study 1 and 2). Considering the opposite of the impression that less active others are similar and more active others are dissimilar increased participants' PA self-evaluation, self-efficacy, and intention (Study 3).

Leveraging Upward Social Comparison in Social Media to Promote Healthy Parenting

Children's health is heavily influenced by parenting practices that promote healthy eating and physical activities. The present study examined how upward social comparison in social media may facilitate parents' motivation to perform healthy parenting practices. We conducted a 2 (social comparison direction: upward vs. downward) x 2 (similarity: similar vs. dissimilar) experiment. The results indicated that parents who saw upward comparison targets, that is, other children with better eating and exercising practices on social media, were more likely to assimilate their own children with them than parents who saw downward comparison targets. This, in turn, increased the parents' self-evaluation and positively impacted their intention to engage in healthy parenting practices in the future. The study expands the research of social comparison to the domain of comparison of extended self. The empirical evidence demonstrates the positive impact of upward social comparison through assimilation and self-evaluation.

Anchoring in a Social Context: How the Possibility of Being Misinformed by Others Impacts One's Judgment

Building on research about naïve theories of biases, we propose that people are more likely to engage in critical thinking when assessing others’ reasoning. Hence, anchoring effects should be reduced when anchor values are presented as others’ estimates and people perceive others as less knowledgeable (i.e., more prone to biases) than themselves. Three experiments tested this hypothesis by presenting the same anchors as other participants’ answers or without a specified source. This source manipulation was combined with explicit forewarnings about the anchoring effect, which have been shown to trigger debiasing efforts. In support of our hypothesis, results showed that anchors provided by a social source effectively reduced the anchoring effect and did so in a more reliable way than forewarnings. Furthermore, the response-time analysis in two of the experiments suggests that such attenuation was the result of deliberate adjustment.

Unconscious Other's Impression Changer: A Method to Manipulate Cognitive Biases That Subtly Change Others' Impressions Positively/Negatively by Making AI Bias in Emotion Estimation AI

Artificial Intelligence (AI) for human emotion estimation, such as facial emotion estimation, has been actively studied. On the other hand, there has been little research on unconscious phenomena in cognition and psychology (i.e., cognitive biases) caused by viewing AI emotion estimation information. Therefore, this study verifies RQ "Do people have a cognitive bias in which impressions of others (i.e., how to see and feel about others) are changed by viewing biased AI's emotion estimation information? If it exists, can impression manipulation methods that intentionally use this cognitive bias be realized?" The proposed method for verification makes the emotion estimation system biased so as to estimate emotion more positively/negatively than AI without bias. A prototype system was implemented. Evaluation using video showed that the presentation of biased emotion estimation information causes a phenomenon that quickly and unconsciously changes the way people see and feel others' impressions, which supported the RQ. Specifically, viewing information that estimated others' emotions more positively/negatively caused the phenomenon in which the user's self-judgment was overridden and others' impressions of emotions, words, and actions were perceived more positively/negatively. The existence of this phenomenon and method indicates that biased emotion estimation AI has the potential to both cause adverse effects on people and support people for good purposes through the manipulation of their impressions. This study provides helpful insights for the design and use of emotion estimation AI considering cognitive biases.

Influences of early diagnostic suggestions on clinical reasoning

Previous research has highlighted the importance of physicians' early hypotheses for their subsequent diagnostic decisions. It has also been shown that diagnostic accuracy improves when physicians are presented with a list of diagnostic suggestions to consider at the start of the clinical encounter. The psychological mechanisms underlying this improvement in accuracy are hypothesised. It is possible that the provision of diagnostic suggestions disrupts physicians' intuitive thinking and reduces their certainty in their initial diagnostic hypotheses. This may encourage them to seek more information before reaching a diagnostic conclusion, evaluate this information more objectively, and be more open to changing their initial hypotheses. Three online experiments explored the effects of early diagnostic suggestions, provided by a hypothetical decision aid, on different aspects of the diagnostic reasoning process. Family physicians assessed up to two patient scenarios with and without suggestions. We measured effects on certainty about the initial diagnosis, information search and evaluation, and frequency of diagnostic changes. We did not find a clear and consistent effect of suggestions and detected mainly non-significant trends, some in the expected direction. We also detected a potential biasing effect: when the most likely diagnosis was included in the list of suggestions (vs. not included), physicians who gave that diagnosis initially, tended to request less information, evaluate it as more supportive of their diagnosis, become more certain about it, and change it less frequently when encountering new but ambiguous information; in other words, they seemed to validate rather than question their initial hypothesis. We conclude that further research using different methodologies and more realistic experimental situations is required to uncover both the beneficial and biasing effects of early diagnostic suggestions.

Successful everyday decision making: Combining attributes and associates

How do people make everyday decisions in order to achieve the most successful outcome? Decision making research typically evaluates choices according to their expected utility. However, this research largely focuses on abstract or hypothetical tasks and rarely investigates whether the outcome is successful and satisfying for the decision maker. Instead, we use an everyday decision making task in which participants describe a personally meaningful decision they are currently facing. We investigate the decision processes used to make this decision, and evaluate how successful and satisfying the outcome of the decision is for them. We examine how well analytic, attribute-based processes explain everyday decision making and predict decision outcomes, and we compare these processes to associative processes elicited through free association. We also examine the characteristics of decisions and individuals that are associated with good decision outcomes. Across three experiments we found that: 1) an analytic decision analysis of everyday decisions is not superior to simpler attribute-based processes in predicting decision outcomes; 2) contrary to research linking associative cognition to biases, free association generates valid cues that predict choice and decision outcomes as effectively as attribute-based approaches; 3) contrary to research favouring either attribute-based or associative processes, combining both attribute-based and associates best explains everyday decisions and most accurately predicts decision outcomes; and 4) individuals with a tendency to attempt analytic thinking do not make more successful everyday decisions. Instead, frequency, simplicity, and knowledge of the decision predict success. We propose that attribute-based and associative processes, in combination, both explain everyday decision making and predict successful decision outcomes.

Hypocrisy in ethical consumption

When making consumption choices, people often fail to meet their own standards of both ethics and frugality. People also generally tend to demand more of others than they do of themselves. But little is known about how these different types of hypocrisy interact, particularly in relation to attitudes toward ethical consumption. In three experiments, we integrate research methods using anchoring and hypocrisy within the context of ethical consumption. Across three experiments, we find a default expectation that people (particularly people other than ourselves) should spend less on consumer items than they actually do. This default position can be inverted by making the ethical context of consumption salient, whereby the expectation is then that people (particularly other people) should spend more on consumer items than they actually do. Experiments 2 and 3 show that a moderate price anchor for ethical consumption is sufficient to shift expected standards for other people, but a higher price anchor is required to shift expected standards in personal behaviour. We discuss the countervailing roles of frugality and ethical consumption in understanding hypocrisy and ethical decision-making.

Anchoring effect induces false memories

While many studies have highlighted the existence of the anchoring effect in a wide variety of domains, no study to date has investigated its impact on memory. The present study aimed to test whether an irrelevant numerical anchor not only influences an estimate but also modifies the memory of the associated event. Two experiments (total N = 259) were conducted, combining the methodology used by Loftus and Palmer (Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 585-589, 1974) and a classic anchoring paradigm. The results show that an irrelevant numerical anchor can modify the estimate of a car's speed and produce false memories of the event. We discuss the link between the processes underlying the anchoring effect and the false memory phenomenon.

Metastatic cancer masquerading as miliary tuberculosis in an immunocompetent young adult

A healthy, immunocompetent South Asian man in his mid-20s, with a medical history of gastric ulcer, presented to Accident & Emergency with pleuritic chest pain, shortness of breath, fever, night sweats, weight loss, dry cough and asymptomatic iron deficiency anaemia. Following his initial assessment and investigations (chest X-ray, CT and blood tests), a diagnosis of miliary tuberculosis (TB) was made and empirical antimicrobial treatment started. However, subsequent microbiological testing, including urine, blood, induced sputum and lymph node sampling, was negative. Being interpreted as non-diagnostic, the antimicrobial therapy was continued. Following a clinical deterioration while on treatment, the patient’s case was re-evaluated and further investigations, including a repeat CT and a liver biopsy, confirmed a diagnosis of stage IV (T1aN3bM1) gastric carcinoma. Our case highlights the diagnostic challenges in differentiating metastatic cancer from miliary TB. We also focus on possible cognitive biases that may have influenced the initial management decisions.

Anchors on prices of consumer goods only hold when decisions are hypothetical

We elicit willingness to pay for different types of consumption goods, systematically manipulating irrelevant anchors (high vs. low) and incentives to provide true valuations (hypothetical questions vs. Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism). On top of a strong hypothetical bias, we find that anchors only make a substantial, significant difference in the case of hypothetical data, the first experiments to directly document such an interaction. This finding suggests that hypothetical market research methods may deliver lower quality data. Moreover, it contributes to the discussion examining the mechanism underlying the anchoring effect, suggesting it could partly be caused by insufficient conscious effort to drift away from the anchor.

The Effect of VR Avatar Embodiment on Improving Attitudes and Closeness Toward Immigrants

Past research has discussed how the embodiment of an outgroup avatar in virtual reality (VR) can reduce intergroup bias. However, little is known about the mechanisms and boundary conditions that shape this effect. This study examines how the embodiment of both outgroup and ingroup VR avatars in different orders influences attitudes and perceived closeness toward a co-ethnic immigrant outgroup in Singapore. It also investigates the role of empathy and social identity orientation (SIO) in this relationship. An experiment with four avatar embodiment conditions (ingroup-then-outgroup, outgroup-then-ingroup, ingroup-only, and outgroup-only) was carried out with 171 participants from a public university in Singapore. Results showed that embodying an outgroup avatar alone, compared to embodying an ingroup avatar alone, significantly improves both attitudes and closeness toward an immigrant outgroup. The order of embodiment matters to an extent, suggesting the greater effectiveness of outgroup-first over ingroup-first embodiment in reducing bias. Empathy mediates the effect of all three outgroup embodiment conditions on improved attitudes and closeness toward immigrants. It was also found that the stronger one’s SIO is, the more effective embodiment is in improving perceived closeness with the outgroup via empathy. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

Retention and Transfer of Cognitive Bias Mitigation Interventions: A Systematic Literature Study

Cognitive biases can adversely affect human judgment and decision making and should therefore preferably be mitigated, so that we can achieve our goals as effectively as possible. Hence, numerous bias mitigation interventions have been developed and evaluated. However, to be effective in practical situations beyond laboratory conditions, the bias mitigation effects of these interventions should be retained over time and should transfer across contexts. This systematic review provides an overview of the literature on retention and transfer of bias mitigation interventions. A systematic search yielded 52 studies that were eligible for screening. At the end of the selection process, only 12 peer-reviewed studies remained that adequately studied retention over a period of at least 14 days (all 12 studies) or transfer to different tasks and contexts (one study). Eleven of the relevant studies investigated the effects of bias mitigation training using game- or video-based interventions. These 11 studies showed considerable overlap regarding the biases studied, kinds of interventions, and decision-making domains. Most of them indicated that gaming interventions were effective after the retention interval and that games were more effective than video interventions. The study that investigated transfer of bias mitigation training (next to retention) found indications of transfer across contexts. To be effective in practical circumstances, achieved effects of cognitive training should lead to enduring changes in the decision maker's behavior and should generalize toward other task domains or training contexts. Given the small number of overlapping studies, our main conclusion is that there is currently insufficient evidence that bias mitigation interventions will substantially help people to make better decisions in real life conditions. This is in line with recent theoretical insights about the “hard-wired” neural and evolutionary origin of cognitive biases.

Data in Context: How Digital Transformation Can Support Human Reasoning in Cyber-Physical Production Systems

In traditional production plants, current technologies do not provide sufficient context to support information integration and interpretation. Digital transformation technologies have the potential to support contextualization, but it is unclear how this can be achieved. The present article presents a selection of the psychological literature in four areas relevant to contextualization: information sampling, information integration, categorization, and causal reasoning. Characteristic biases and limitations of human information processing are discussed. Based on this literature, we derive functional requirements for digital transformation technologies, focusing on the cognitive activities they should support. We then present a selection of technologies that have the potential to foster contextualization. These technologies enable the modelling of system relations, the integration of data from different sources, and the connection of the present situation with historical data. We illustrate how these technologies can support contextual reasoning, and highlight challenges that should be addressed when designing human–machine cooperation in cyber-physical production systems.

Anchoring and Judgment Bias: Disregarding Under Uncertainty

The current investigation examined the nature of the cognitive processes that underlie decision-making behavior. The focus of this project centered on the effects of utilizing heuristics that pertain to the availability of information stored in memory. Anchoring effects demonstrate that people will use any available information sampled from memory as a reference for making judgments of frequency. The specific aim of the experiment was to examine whether people exhibit patterns of behavior consistent with anchoring effects, revealed by corrupted subjective judgments, despite explicit notice of instruction to disregard the experimenter-supplied information (the anchor). Subjects failed to demonstrate an ability to disregard a relatively high anchor even when the instruction to do so was explicit. However, in contrast, subjects demonstrated an ability to disregard a relatively low anchor. More broadly, subjects instructed to disregard demonstrated a reduced effect of anchoring. Implications are considered within the context of the availability heuristic and the directly related effects of anchoring. The results may be interpreted within the framework of a dual-process model, two-system view that distinguishes intuition from reasoning. The present findings fit with well-supported theoretical explanations of anchoring effects, such as selective accessibility and numerical priming.

What Stimuli Are Necessary for Anchoring Effects to Occur?

The anchoring effect is a form of cognitive bias in which exposure to some piece of information affects its subsequent numerical estimation. Previous studies have discussed which stimuli, such as numbers or semantic priming stimuli, are most likely to induce anchoring effects. However, it has not been determined whether anchoring effects will occur when a number is presented alone or when the semantic priming stimuli have an equivalent dimension between a target and the stimuli without a number. We conducted five experimental studies (N = 493) using stimuli to induce anchoring effects. We found that anchoring effects did not occur when a number was presented alone or when phrases to induce semantic priming were used without presenting a number. These results indicate that both numerical and semantic priming stimuli must be presented for anchoring effects to occur. Our findings represent a substantial contribution to the literature on anchoring effects by offering insights into how these effects are generated.

You Know What I Know: Interviewer Knowledge Effects in Subjective Expectation Elicitation

Directly eliciting individuals' subjective beliefs via surveys is increasingly popular in social science research, but doing so via face-to-face surveys has an important downside: the interviewer's knowledge of the topic may spill over onto the respondent's recorded beliefs. Using a randomized experiment that used interviewers to implement an information treatment, we show that reported beliefs are significantly shifted by interviewer knowledge. Trained interviewers primed respondents to use the exact numbers used in the training, nudging them away from higher answers; recorded responses decreased by about 0.3 standard deviations of the initial belief distribution. Furthermore, respondents with stronger prior beliefs were less affected by interviewer knowledge. We suggest corrections for this issue from the perspectives of interviewer recruitment, survey design, and experiment setup.

Cognitive bias: how understanding its impact on antibiotic prescribing decisions can help advance antimicrobial stewardship

The way clinicians think about decision-making is evolving. Human decision-making shifts between two modes of thinking, either fast/intuitive (Type 1) or slow/deliberate (Type 2). In the healthcare setting where thousands of decisions are made daily, Type 1 thinking can reduce cognitive load and help ensure decision making is efficient and timely, but it can come at the expense of accuracy, leading to systematic errors, also called cognitive biases. This review provides an introduction to cognitive bias and provides explanation through patient vignettes of how cognitive biases contribute to suboptimal antibiotic prescribing. We describe common cognitive biases in antibiotic prescribing both from the clinician and the patient perspective, including hyperbolic discounting (the tendency to favour small immediate benefits over larger more distant benefits) and commission bias (the tendency towards action over inaction). Management of cognitive bias includes encouraging more mindful decision making (e.g., time-outs, checklists), improving awareness of one's own biases (i.e., meta-cognition), and designing an environment that facilitates safe and accurate decision making (e.g., decision support tools, nudges). A basic understanding of cognitive biases can help explain why certain stewardship interventions are more effective than others and may inspire more creative strategies to ensure antibiotics are used more safely and more effectively in our patients.

Cognitive Biases in Critical Decisions Facing SME Entrepreneurs: An External Accountants’ Perspective

Decisions by small and medium enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs are plagued by a variety of cognitive biases. Extant literature has mainly focused on a limited number of important biases (e.g., overconfidence) in a handful of important entrepreneurial decisions (e.g., start-up, market entry or exit). However, putting the spotlight on a few important biases and entrepreneurial decisions could leave other important biases and decisions underexposed. SME accountants are in a unique position to shed a broader light on this issue. SME entrepreneurs often seek advice of their accountants when they struggle with decisions that involve uncertainty and business risks in the domains of strategy, regulatory compliance, human resources, IT, and succession. In this study, we explore 12 different biases and analyze whether their importance can change across these decision domains. Interviews were performed with 14 SME accountants who provide an independent third-party view on decision making by over 3000 entrepreneurs. Our findings suggest that the importance of most of these biases varies from one decision domain to the other. We also identified four approaches (warn, inform, intervene, and coach) that accountants can take when entrepreneurs may fall victim to biases. We discuss the implications for research and practice of SME entrepreneurs and their accountants.

Cognitive bias in clinical medicine

Cognitive bias is increasingly recognised as an important source of medical error, and is both ubiquitous across clinical practice yet incompletely understood. This increasing awareness of bias has resulted in a surge in clinical and psychological research in the area and development of various 'debiasing strategies'. This paper describes the potential origins of bias based on 'dual process thinking', discusses and illustrates a number of the important biases that occur in clinical practice, and considers potential strategies that might be used to mitigate their effect.

Variations on anchoring: Sequential anchoring revisited

The anchoring effect, the assimilation of judgment toward a previously considered value, has been shown using various experimental paradigms. We used several variations of the sequential anchoring paradigm, in which a numeric estimate influences a subsequent numeric estimate on the same scale, to investigate how anchoring is influenced by multiple anchors, a comparison question, and by a newly introduced debiasing procedure. We replicated the anchoring effect using the sequential anchoring paradigm and showed that, when two anchors of opposite directions are presented, the second seems to influence a subsequent judgment somewhat more. A comparison of a target with another object before the numerical estimate was not sufficient to elicit anchoring, but it might have increased the sequential anchoring effect. The debiasing procedure, based on providing reference points on the numerical scale, prevented the sequential anchoring effect. The results are in accord with the scale distortion theory of anchoring, but other theories may also account for the observed findings with additional adjustments.

Symptom frequency and development of a generic functional disorder symptom scale suitable for use in studies of patients with irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia syndrome or chronic fatigue syndrome

Objectives

To describe the extent to which irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS), and chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) exhibit symptom overlap, and to validate a patient-derived, generic symptom questionnaire.

Methods

A patient-derived 61-item symptom-frequency questionnaire was completed by participants recruited through IBS, FMS and CFS self-help websites. Principal axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation was performed separately for those reporting an IBS, FMS or CFS diagnosis.

Results

Questionnaires were completed by 1751 participants of whom 851 reported more than one of the three diagnoses. Stomach pain on at least a weekly basis was reported by 79% of IBS, 52% of FMS, and 43% of CFS single diagnosis participants. Pain increasing the day after activity was reported by 32% of IBS, 94% of FMS, and 85% of CFS single diagnosis participants. Waking still tired at least once weekly was reported by 75% of IBS, 97% of FMS, and 95% of CFS single diagnosis participants. Exploratory factor analysis produced consistent results across all three diagnostic groups, the 61 items loading on 12 correlated factors with a single higher order factor on which all items loaded. Frequency analysis led to the rejection of one item (cold sores on or near lips), and freeform reporting by participants of additional symptoms identified an additional five, namely, restless legs, hair loss/brittle hair/thinning, dizziness/balance problems, blurred vision and urination problems.

Conclusions

IBS, FMS and CFS are polysymptomatic spectrum disorders with a wide range of overlapping symptoms, many of which are unrelated to diagnostic criteria. Frequency analysis and factor analysis confirm the validity of using the same questionnaire across different diagnostic categories. The 65-item general symptom questionnaire (GSQ-65) is a valid generic symptom scale suitable for assessing the many different symptoms of people with IBS, FMS and CFS.

Individual Differences in Anchoring Effect: Evidence for the Role of Insufficient Adjustment

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor's direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

Perspective Taking and Self-Persuasion: Why "Putting Yourself in Their Shoes" Reduces Openness to Attitude Change

Counterattitudinal-argument generation is a powerful tool for opening people up to alternative views. On the basis of decades of research, it should be especially effective when people adopt the perspective of individuals who hold alternative views. In the current research, however, we found the opposite: In three preregistered experiments (total N = 2,734), we found that taking the perspective of someone who endorses a counterattitudinal view lowers receptiveness to that view and reduces attitude change following a counterattitudinal-argument-generation task. This ironic effect can be understood through value congruence: Individuals who take the opposition's perspective generate arguments that are incongruent with their own values, which diminishes receptiveness and attitude change. Thus, trying to "put yourself in their shoes" can ultimately undermine self-persuasion. Consistent with a value-congruence account, this backfire effect is attenuated when people take the perspective of someone who holds the counterattitudinal view yet has similar overall values.

A cognitive forcing tool to mitigate cognitive bias - a randomised control trial

BACKGROUND

Cognitive bias is an important source of diagnostic error yet is a challenging area to understand and teach. Our aim was to determine whether a cognitive forcing tool can reduce the rates of error in clinical decision making. A secondary objective was to understand the process by which this effect might occur.

METHODS

We hypothesised that using a cognitive forcing tool would reduce diagnostic error rates. To test this hypothesis, a novel online case-based approach was used to conduct a single blinded randomized clinical trial conducted from January 2017 to September 2018. In addition, a qualitative series of "think aloud" interviews were conducted with 20 doctors from a UK teaching hospital in 2018. The primary outcome was the diagnostic error rate when solving bias inducing clinical vignettes. A volunteer sample of medical professionals from across the UK, Republic of Ireland and North America. They ranged in seniority from medical student to Attending Physician.

RESULTS

Seventy six participants were included in the study. The data showed doctors of all grades routinely made errors related to cognitive bias. There was no difference in error rates between groups (mean 2.8 cases correct in intervention vs 3.1 in control group, 95% CI -0.94 - 0.45 P = 0.49). The qualitative protocol revealed that the cognitive forcing strategy was well received and a produced a subjectively positive impact on doctors' accuracy and thoughtfulness in clinical cases.

CONCLUSIONS

The quantitative data failed to show an improvement in accuracy despite a positive qualitative experience. There is insufficient evidence to recommend this tool in clinical practice, however the qualitative data suggests such an approach has some merit and face validity to users.

Anchoring bias in face-to-face Time-Trade-Off valuations of health states

OBJECTIVE

To test whether anchoring (a cognitive bias) occurs during face-to-face interviews to value health states by Time-Trade-Off.

METHODS

147 Colombian subjects (111 males, 36 females) valued five EQ-5D health states better than death during a face-to-face interview. Subjects were randomly assigned to two different starting points.

RESULTS

Shapiro-Wilk test discarded normality, while non-parametric tests, including Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, showed that anchoring was significant in four out of five health states. A higher starting point increased the elicited value by 15 %-188 %. The size of the anchoring effect was not uniform among health states.

CONCLUSION

Anchoring effects may bias face-to-face Time Trade-Off valuations. The size of the anchoring effect is relevant enough for health policy.

Mitigating the Attraction Effect with Visualizations

Human decisions are prone to biases, and this is no less true for decisions made within data visualizations. Bias mitigation strategies often focus on the person, by educating people about their biases, typically with little success. We focus instead on the system, presenting the first evidence that altering the design of an interactive visualization tool can mitigate a strong bias - the attraction effect. Participants viewed 2D scatterplots where choices between superior alternatives were affected by the placement of other suboptimal points. We found that highlighting the superior alternatives weakened the bias, but did not eliminate it. We then tested an interactive approach where participants completely removed locally dominated points from the view, inspired by the elimination by aspects strategy in the decision-making literature. This approach strongly decreased the bias, leading to a counterintuitive suggestion: tools that allow removing inappropriately salient or distracting data from a view may help lead users to make more rational decisions.

On the Inability to Ignore Useless Advice

Research in the judge-advisor-paradigm suggests that advice is generally utilized less than it should be according to its quality. In a series of four experiments, we challenge this widely held assumption. We hypothesize that when advice quality is low, the opposite phenomenon, namely overutilization of advice, occurs. We further assume that this overutilization effect is the result of anchoring: advice serves as an anchor, thus causing an adjustment toward even useless advice. The data of our four experiments support these hypotheses. Judges systematically adjusted their estimates toward advice that we introduced to them as being useless, and this effect was stable after controlling for intentional utilization of this advice. Furthermore, we demonstrate that anchoring-based adjustment toward advice is independent of advice quality. Our findings enhance our understanding of the processes involved in advice taking and identify a potential threat to judgment accuracy arising from an inability to discount useless advice.

Reasons Pro et Contra as a Debiasing Technique in Legal Contexts

Although legal contexts are subject to biased reasoning and decision making, to identify and test debiasing techniques has largely remained an open task. We report on experimentally deploying the technique "giving reasons pro et contra" with professional ( N = 239) and lay judges ( N = 372) at Swedish municipal courts. Using a mock legal scenario, participants assessed the relevance of an eyewitness's previous conviction for his credibility. On average, both groups displayed low degrees of bias. We observed a small positive debiasing effect only for professional judges. Strong evidence was obtained for a relation between profession and relevance-assessment: Lay judges seemed to assign a greater importance to the prior conviction than professional judges did. We discuss challenges for future research, calling other research groups to contribute additional samples.

Debiasing visual pilots' weather-related decision making

Pilots who decide to continue a flight into deteriorating weather conditions, rather than turn back or divert, are a significant cause of fatal crashes in general aviation. Earlier research has suggested that cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect and confirmation bias are implicated in many decisions to continue into worsening weather. In this study, we explored whether a simple debiasing technique, 'considering the alternative', reduced the effect of these two potentially fatal biases. Despite the study being adequately powered, our attempts to reduce the effects of biases were both unsuccessful. Negative findings such as these are particularly useful in aviation, as they can provide information on what does not work in this high stakes industry, even though such strategies may work elsewhere.

The Influence of Effortful Thought and Cognitive Proficiencies on the Conjunction Fallacy: Implications for Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning and Judgment

Human judgment often violates normative standards, and virtually no judgment error has received as much attention as the conjunction fallacy. Judgment errors have historically served as evidence for dual-process theories of reasoning, insofar as these errors are assumed to arise from reliance on a fast and intuitive mental process, and are corrected via effortful deliberative reasoning. In the present research, three experiments tested the notion that conjunction errors are reduced by effortful thought. Predictions based on three different dual-process theory perspectives were tested: lax monitoring, override failure, and the Tripartite Model. Results indicated that participants higher in numeracy were less likely to make conjunction errors, but this association only emerged when participants engaged in two-sided reasoning, as opposed to one-sided or no reasoning. Confidence was higher for incorrect as opposed to correct judgments, suggesting that participants were unaware of their errors.

Academic judgments under uncertainty: A study of collective anchoring effects in Swedish Research Council panel groups

This article focuses on anchoring effects in the process of peer reviewing research proposals. Anchoring effects are commonly seen as the result of flaws in human judgment, as cognitive biases that stem from specific heuristics that guide people when they involve their intuition in solving a problem. Here, the cognitive biases will be analyzed from a sociological point of view, as interactional and aggregated phenomena. The article is based on direct observations of ten panel groups evaluating research proposals in the natural and engineering sciences for the Swedish Research Council. The analysis suggests that collective anchoring effects emerge as a result of the combination of the evaluation techniques that are being used (grading scales and average ranking) and the efforts of the evaluators to reach consensus in the face of disagreements and uncertainty in the group. What many commentators and evaluators have interpreted as an element of chance in the peer review process may also be understood as partly a result of the dynamic aspects of collective anchoring effects.