Anything you can do, you can do better: neural substrates of incentive-based performance enhancement

Expectation of reward differentially modulates executive inhibition

BACKGROUND

Inhibitory control, a key modulatory component of cognition guiding strategy and behaviour, can be affected by diverse contingencies. We explore here the effect of expectation of reward over behavioural adjustment in a Stop Signal Task modulated by reward. We hypothesize that cognitive control is modulated by different expectation of the reward.

METHODS

Participants were allocated to two groups differing in their degree of knowledge in what to expect from rewards. Expected Specific Reward participants (N = 21) were informed of the different monetary feedbacks they would receive after each successful inhibition. Unexpected Reward participants (N = 24) were only told that they would receive monetary reward after correct inhibitory trials, but not the amounts or differences.

RESULTS

Our results confirmed previous observations demonstrating a "kick-start effect" where a high reward feedback at the beginning of the task increases response inhibition. The Expected Specific Reward condition seems also to improve inhibitory control -as measured by the stop signal reaction time (SSRT)-, compared to the Unexpected Reward group.

CONCLUSIONS

Knowledge of reward magnitudes seems to play a role in cognitive control irrespective of feedback magnitude. The manipulation of reward expectation appears to trigger different strategies for cognitive control, inducing a bottom-up effect of external cues, or a top-down effect given by the anticipation of incoming rewards. This is an early exploration to unearth possible higher order modulators - expectation and motivation- of cognitive control. This approach aims to gain insight into diverse psychopathological conditions related to impulsivity and altered reward systems such as Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD), personality disorders, substance abuse, pathological gambling and cognitive aspects of Parkinson Disease.

Reward-associated distractors can harm cognitive performance

When people carry out cognitive tasks, they sometimes suffer from distractions, that is, drops in performance that occur close in time to task-irrelevant stimuli. In this research, we examine how the pursuit of rewards contributes to distractions. In two experiments, participants performed a math task (in which they could earn monetary rewards vs. not) while they were exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli (that were previously associated with monetary rewards vs. not). In Experiment 1, irrelevant cues that were previously associated with rewards (vs. not) impaired performance. In Experiment 2, this effect was only replicated when these reward-associated distractors appeared relatively early during task performance. While the results were thus somewhat mixed, they generally support the idea that reward associations can augment the negative effect of distractors on performance.

Caudate-Precuneus Functional Connectivity Is Associated with Obesity Preventive Eating Tendency

There exists diversity among individuals in difficulty controlling body weight. Body weight control, or obesity prevention, requires cognitive control over ingestive behavior, which may account for the diverse ability of body weight control. The caudate nuclei, especially the dorsal area, have been shown to play critical roles in ingestive behaviors, which significantly influences body weight control. However, the practice of body weight control is dependent on the body weight status, because the current obesity status determines the need for body weight control. To elucidate the underlying neural mechanism that accounts for individual differences in obesity prevention, we aimed to isolate functional caudate connectivity responsible for the underlying tendency of obesity prevention, independent of the current obesity status, using resting state fMRI data, body mass index (BMI), and assessment of ingestive behavior from 185 individuals from the NKI-Rockland sample. The underlying tendency of obesity prevention was estimated from BMI and behavioral and cognitive components of food intake. Functional connectivities between the caudate head and the whole brain were tested as a function of the estimated tendency in a voxel-wise manner. The bilateral precuneus showed inverse association between its connectivity to the caudate and the estimated tendency. Caudate-precuneus connectivity may have significant implications to understanding personal differences that accounts for the success in body weight control.

When unconscious rewards boost cognitive task performance inefficiently: the role of consciousness in integrating value and attainability information

Research has shown that high vs. low value rewards improve cognitive task performance independent of whether they are perceived consciously or unconsciously. However, efficient performance in response to high value rewards also depends on whether or not rewards are attainable. This raises the question of whether unconscious reward processing enables people to take into account such attainability information. Building on a theoretical framework according to which conscious reward processing is required to enable higher level cognitive processing, the present research tested the hypothesis that conscious but not unconscious reward processing enables integration of reward value with attainability information. In two behavioral experiments, participants were exposed to mask high and low value coins serving as rewards on a working memory (WM) task. The likelihood for conscious processing was manipulated by presenting the coins relatively briefly (17 ms) or long and clearly visible (300 ms). Crucially, rewards were expected to be attainable or unattainable. Requirements to integrate reward value with attainability information varied across experiments. Results showed that when integration of value and attainability was required (Experiment 1), long reward presentation led to efficient performance, i.e., selectively improved performance for high value attainable rewards. In contrast, in the short presentation condition, performance was increased for high value rewards even when these were unattainable. This difference between the effects of long and short presentation time disappeared when integration of value and attainability information was not required (Experiment 2). Together these findings suggest that unconsciously processed reward information is not integrated with attainability expectancies, causing inefficient effort investment. These findings are discussed in terms of a unique role of consciousness in efficient allocation of effort to cognitive control processes.