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Aguilar-Janita M, Khalil N, Leyva I, Sendiña-Nadal I. Cooperation transitions in social games induced by aspiration-driven players. Phys Rev E 2024; 109:024107. [PMID: 38491644 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.109.024107] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Accepted: 01/16/2024] [Indexed: 03/18/2024]
Abstract
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation. This work theoretically analyzes and numerically explores an aspiration-driven strategy updating in a well-mixed population playing games. The payoffs of the game matrix and the aspiration are condensed into just two parameters that allow a comprehensive description of the dynamics. We find continuous and abrupt transitions in the cooperation density with excellent agreement between theory and the Gillespie simulations. Under strong selection, the system can display several levels of steady cooperation or get trapped into absorbing states. These states are still relevant for experiments even when irrational choices are made due to their prolonged relaxation times. Finally, we show that for the particular case of the prisoner dilemma, where defection is the dominant strategy under imitation mechanisms, the self-evaluation update instead favors cooperation nonlinearly with the level of aspiration. Thus, our work provides insights into the distinct role between imitation and self-evaluation with no learning dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Aguilar-Janita
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
| | - N Khalil
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
| | - I Leyva
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
| | - I Sendiña-Nadal
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
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2
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Wang X, Zhou L, McAvoy A, Li A. Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7453. [PMID: 37978181 PMCID: PMC10656501 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2023] [Accepted: 10/30/2023] [Indexed: 11/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different perspective on the personal and external social information required by imitation. We develop a general model of imitation dynamics with incomplete information in networked systems, which unifies classical update rules including the death-birth and pairwise-comparison rule on complex networks. Under pairwise interactions, we find that collective cooperation is most promoted if individuals neglect personal information. If personal information is considered, cooperators evolve more readily with more external information. Intriguingly, when interactions take place in groups on networks with low degrees of clustering, using more personal and less external information better facilitates cooperation. Our unifying perspective uncovers intuition by examining the rate and range of competition induced by different information situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaochen Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China
| | - Lei Zhou
- School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
| | - Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
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3
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Modeling pluralism and self-regulation explains the emergence of cooperation in networked societies. Sci Rep 2021; 11:19226. [PMID: 34584146 PMCID: PMC8479068 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-98524-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2021] [Accepted: 09/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding the dynamics of cooperative behavior of individuals in complex societies represents a fundamental research question which puzzles scientists working in heterogeneous fields. Many studies have been developed using the unitary agent assumption, which embeds the idea that when making decisions, individuals share the same socio-cultural parameters. In this paper, we propose the ECHO-EGN model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, which relaxes this strong assumption by considering the heterogeneity of three fundamental socio-cultural aspects ruling the behavior of groups of people: the propensity to be more cooperative with members of the same group (Endogamic cooperation), the propensity to cooperate with the public domain (Civicness) and the propensity to prefer connections with members of the same group (Homophily). The ECHO-EGN model is shown to have high performance in describing real world behavior of interacting individuals living in complex environments. Extensive numerical experiments allowing the comparison of real data and model simulations confirmed that the introduction of the above mechanisms enhances the realism in the modelling of cooperation dynamics. Additionally, theoretical findings allow us to conclude that endogamic cooperation may limit significantly the emergence of cooperation.
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4
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Xia K. The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism. BMC Ecol Evol 2021; 21:152. [PMID: 34348658 PMCID: PMC8336419 DOI: 10.1186/s12862-021-01847-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2020] [Accepted: 06/03/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood. RESULTS We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity [Formula: see text] (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level [Formula: see text] on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. CONCLUSIONS (1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when [Formula: see text] is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when [Formula: see text] is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when [Formula: see text] is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function [Formula: see text] and function [Formula: see text], the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,[Formula: see text]) on average abundance function [Formula: see text] have been explained.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ke Xia
- School of Economics, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou, China.
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5
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2021. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2021.0240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter
θ
—which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when
θ
> 1. The case
θ
< 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower
θ
value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions in heterogeneous populations. Nat Commun 2021; 12:3250. [PMID: 34059670 PMCID: PMC8166829 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-23548-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2020] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
Update rules, which describe how individuals adjust their behavior over time, affect the outcome of social interactions. Theoretical studies have shown that evolutionary outcomes are sensitive to model details when update rules are imitation-based but are robust when update rules are self-evaluation based. However, studies of self-evaluation based rules have focused on homogeneous population structures where each individual has the same number of neighbors. Here, we consider heterogeneous population structures represented by weighted networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the condition for strategy success, which coincides with the classical condition of risk-dominance. This condition holds for all weighted networks and distributions of aspiration levels, and for individualized ways of self-evaluation. Our findings recover previous results as special cases and demonstrate the universality of the robustness property under self-evaluation based rules. Our work thus sheds light on the intrinsic difference between evolutionary dynamics under self-evaluation based and imitation-based update rules. Social interaction outcomes can depend on the type of information individuals possess and how it is used in decision-making. Here, Zhou et al. find that self-evaluation based decision-making rules lead to evolutionary outcomes that are robust to different population structures and ways of self-evaluation.
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Huang F, Cao M, Wang L. Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games. J R Soc Interface 2020; 17:20200639. [PMID: 33202177 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0639] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and population biology. However, the key question of how individuals, in the middle of challenging social dilemmas (e.g. the 'tragedy of the commons'), modulate their behaviours to adapt to the fluctuation of the environment has not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Using evolutionary game theory, we develop a framework of stochastic games that incorporates the adaptive mechanism of reinforcement learning to investigate whether cooperative behaviours can evolve in the ever-changing group interaction environment. When the action choices of players are just slightly influenced by past reinforcements, we construct an analytical condition to determine whether cooperation can be favoured over defection. Intuitively, this condition reveals why and how the environment can mediate cooperative dilemmas. Under our model architecture, we also compare this learning mechanism with two non-learning decision rules, and we find that learning significantly improves the propensity for cooperation in weak social dilemmas, and, in sharp contrast, hinders cooperation in strong social dilemmas. Our results suggest that in complex social-ecological dilemmas, learning enables the adaptation of individuals to varying environments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Huang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China.,Center for Data Science and System Complexity, Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands
| | - Ming Cao
- Center for Data Science and System Complexity, Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas under the coexistence of aspiration and imitation mechanisms. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:032120. [PMID: 33075988 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.032120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2020] [Accepted: 08/24/2020] [Indexed: 05/09/2023]
Abstract
Imitation and aspiration update rules are frequently observed in human and animal populations. While the imitation process entails payoff comparisons with surroundings, the aspiration process refers to self-evaluation. This work explores the evolution of cooperation in dyadic games under the coexistence of these two dynamics in an infinitely large well-mixed population. Two situations have been explored: (i) individuals adopt either an imitation or aspiration update rule with a certain probability, and (ii) the entire population is divided into two groups where one group only uses imitative rules and the other obeys aspiration updating alone. Both premises have been modeled by taking an infinite approximation of the finite population. In particular, the second mixing principle follows an additive property: the outcome of the whole population is the weighted average of outcomes from imitators and aspiration-driven individuals. Our work progressively investigates several variants of aspiration dynamics under strong selection, encompassing symmetric, asymmetric, and adaptive aspirations, which then coalesce with imitative dynamics. We also demonstrate which of the update rules performs better, under different social dilemmas, by allowing the evolution of the preference of update rules besides strategies. Aspiration dynamics always outperform imitation dynamics in the prisoner's dilemma, however, in the chicken and stag-hunt games the predominance of either update rule depends on the level of aspirations as well as on the extent of greed and fear present in the system. Finally, we examine the coevolution of strategies, aspirations, and update rules which leads to a binary state of obeying either imitation or aspiration dynamics. In such a circumstance, when aspiration dynamics prevail over imitation dynamics, cooperators and defectors coexist to an equal extent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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9
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Wu B, Park HJ, Wu L, Zhou D. Evolution of cooperation driven by self-recommendation. Phys Rev E 2019; 100:042303. [PMID: 31770974 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.100.042303] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/19/2019] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Cooperators increase the fitness of others at a cost to themselves. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural selection in a well-mixed population. It challenges the evolutionists since cooperation is widespread. Information spreading has been revealed to play a key role in the emergence of cooperation. Individuals, however, are typically assumed to be passive in the information spreading. Here we assume that individuals self-recommend themselves to those that are about to have new neighbors. Individuals with higher tendencies of self-recommendation are likely to have more neighbors. In this way, individuals are active to spread the information. We analytically obtain a critical cost-to-benefit ratio, below which cooperation emerges. It reveals quantitatively how eloquent cooperators have to be compared with defectors to ensure that cooperation takes over the population. It also indicates that individuals need to be open enough to the self-recommendation to enhance cooperation level. In addition, the critical cost-to-benefit ratio represents the viscosity of the population, measuring how close cooperators are to each other. Our results highlight the role self-recommendation plays in cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, People's Republic of China
| | - Hye Jin Park
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Lingshan Wu
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, People's Republic of China
| | - Da Zhou
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.,School of Mathematical Sciences, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, People's Republic of China
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10
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Xiao Y, Wu B. Close spatial arrangement of mutants favors and disfavors fixation. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007212. [PMID: 31525178 PMCID: PMC6746358 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007212] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2019] [Accepted: 06/25/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous across all levels of biological systems ranging from microbial communities to human societies. It, however, seemingly contradicts the evolutionary theory, since cooperators are exploited by free-riders and thus are disfavored by natural selection. Many studies based on evolutionary game theory have tried to solve the puzzle and figure out the reason why cooperation exists and how it emerges. Network reciprocity is one of the mechanisms to promote cooperation, where nodes refer to individuals and links refer to social relationships. The spatial arrangement of mutant individuals, which refers to the clustering of mutants, plays a key role in network reciprocity. Besides, many other mechanisms supporting cooperation suggest that the clustering of mutants plays an important role in the expansion of mutants. However, the clustering of mutants and the game dynamics are typically coupled. It is still unclear how the clustering of mutants alone alters the evolutionary dynamics. To this end, we employ a minimal model with frequency independent fitness on a circle. It disentangles the clustering of mutants from game dynamics. The distance between two mutants on the circle is adopted as a natural indicator for the clustering of mutants or assortment. We find that the assortment is an amplifier of the selection for the connected mutants compared with the separated ones. Nevertheless, as mutants are separated, the more dispersed mutants are, the greater the chance of invasion is. It gives rise to the non-monotonic effect of clustering, which is counterintuitive. On the other hand, we find that less assortative mutants speed up fixation. Our model shows that the clustering of mutants plays a non-trivial role in fixation, which has emerged even if the game interaction is absent. Evolutionary dynamics on networks are key for biological and social evolution. Typically, the clustering mutants on networks can dramatically alter the direction of selection. Previous studies on the assortment of mutants assume that individuals interact in a frequency-dependent way. It is hard to tell how assortment alone alters the evolutionary fate. We establish a minimal network model to disentangle the assortment from the game interaction. We find that for weak selection limit, the assortment of mutants plays little role in fixation probability. For strong selection limit, connected mutants, i.e., the maximum assortment, are best for fixation. When the mutants are separated by only one wild-type individual, it is worse off than that separated by more than one wild-type individual in fixation probability. Our results show the nontrivial yet fundamental effect of the clustering on fixation. Noteworthily, it has already arisen, even if the game interaction is absent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yunming Xiao
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
| | - Bin Wu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
- * E-mail:
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11
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Su Q, Zhou L, Wang L. Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1006947. [PMID: 30933968 PMCID: PMC6459562 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006947] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2018] [Revised: 04/11/2019] [Accepted: 03/12/2019] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games. We find that labor division can promote collective cooperation markedly. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems. The outcome of an interaction often relies on not only interactants’ strategic behaviors but also genetic and physical relationships between interactants, such as genetic similarity and geographic proximity. Thus when encountering different opponents who use the same strategy, an individual may derive different payoffs. Social ties, acting as carriers of such information, are crucial to biological interactions. However, most prior studies simplify social ties as binary states (i.e., either present or absent) and ignore the information carried. Here we study evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs and introduce different types of edges to describe diverse social ties. We derive a simple rule to predict when a strategic behavior is more successful than the other. Based on this rule, we find that the labor division in eusocial insects could promote prosocial behavior. In addition, when payoff structures in different interactions are relationship-dependent, the condition for the success of one behavior can be obtained by studying interactions described by a unified payoff structure. Our work not only extends established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also shows the possibility to simplify complex and diverse interactions in real-world systems as simple and unified interactions in theoretical calculations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China.,Center for Polymer Studies, Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Lei Zhou
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
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